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COOPERATION OF UKRAINIAN AND SLOVENIAN DEPUTIES IN THE VIENNA PARLIAMENT IN THE LATE 19TH CENTURY

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ABSTRACT

In the article are analyzed cooperation of the Ukrainian and Slovenian deputies in the Vienna parliament as a part of the group – “Slavic Christian national union”. Functioning of the group was a consequence of common interests of its participants on national equality. The main stages of activity of the group and also the factors which had an impact on its efficiency are considered. This group was nearly only in the Austrian parliament for 1897–1900 which was on positions of national equality and protected the interests of Slavs. The activity of the group's deputies regarding the improvement of the socio-economic, cultural and educational situation of Ukrainians and Slovenians in the Austro-Hungarian monarchy was analyzed.

Keywords: Vienna parliament, Slavic Christian national union, social-christian movement, Slovenians, Ukrainians

COOPERAZIONE DEI DEPUTATI UCRAINI E SLOVENI NEL PARLAMENTO DI VIENNA ALLA FINE DEL XIX SECOLO

SINTESI

L'articolo analizza la cooperazione dei deputati ucraini e sloveni nel parlamento di Vienna che facevano parte del gruppo “Unione nazionale cristiano slava”. Le sue attività erano il risultato degli interessi comuni dei suoi membri riguardo all'uguaglianza nazionale. Sono state considerate le fasi principali

delle attività del gruppo, nonché i fattori che ne hanno influenzato l'efficacia. Durante il periodo 1897–1900 il gruppo era anche l'unico nel parlamento austriaco a rappresentare l'uguaglianza nazionale e nel difendere gli interessi degli slavi. È stata, inoltre, analizzata l'attività di questi deputati riguardo al miglioramento della situazione socio-economica, culturale e quella educativa di ucraini e degli sloveni nella Monarchia austro-ungarica.

Parole chiave: Parlamento di Vienna, Unione nazionale cristiano slava, movimento sociale e cristiano, sloveni, ucraini

INTRODUCTION

With independence declarations by the Republic Slovenia and Ukraine in 1991 there was a question of better establishment of the friendly relations between the countries, including in the parliamentary level. Therefore studying of positive experience of interaction of the Ukrainian and Slovenian deputies in the Vienna parliament at the end of the 19th century is important.

During the writing of this paper a number of sources is used. In particular, periodicals (newspapers “Ruslan”, “Slovenec”, “Slovenski narod”) in which it was regularly informed readers on internal meetings of members of SCNU, resolutions of meetings were published speeches of deputies of this club in the Vienna parliament and before voters.

“Stenographic protocols sessions of the House of Representatives of the Austrian Reichsrat” (SPSHRAR), where speeches of the Ukrainian¹ and Slovenian deputies were provided are extremely important for the research.

Memoirs of the Ukrainian and Slovenian deputies Olexander Barvinskyi, Fran Šuklje and Janez Evangelist Krek are one more important source of information.

Many valuable data contains also protocols of meetings of the Rus club of the Vienna parliament which were kept by Anatol Vakhnianyn. They are stored in fund 818 of the Central state historical archive in Lviv. It is, in particular, information on the constituent assembly of SCNU and the discussion about the nature of activity of this fraction.

Stenographic protocols of parliament are extremely big on the volume in German and in detail provide information on the course and content of discussions.

1 In this article, the terms “Ukrainian” and “Rusyn” are used interchangeably. These terms were used to denote the Greek-Catholic population of Galicia, which considered itself a separate nation, independent from both the Russians and the Poles.

In the historiography the issue of cooperation of the Ukrainian and Slovenian Christian parties in the Vienna parliament was little studied. Among the available works it is necessary to select the works of H. Binder (Binder, 2005), J. Cvirn (Cvirn, 2009), R. Lechniuk (Lechniuk, 2020), S. Matković (Matković, 2011), V. Melik (Melik, 1979), B. Radosavljevič (Radosavljevič, 1994), A. Špelec (Špelec, 2009).

Parliamentary elections of 1897 took place under new electoral laws according to which universal suffrage for men was introduced for the V curia. These elections changed balance of forces in a parliament a little, having reduced the German influence.

In election result Slovenes have received 16 mandates, and Ukrainians – 11 (the so-called moderate O. Barvinskyi, Anatol Vakhnianyn, Ivan Hrobelskyi, Modest Karatnitskyi, Kornylo Mandychevskyi and Ksenofont Okhrymovych who have formed “The Rus’ club”; so-called “independent” Danylo Tanyachkevych, Teofil Okunevskyi and Roman Yarosevych (has adjoined the Polish socialists under the leadership of I. Dashinski) and two Ukrainian deputies from Bukovyna). In a newly elected parliament moderate Ukrainians, Slovenes, Croats and two Czech representatives, at the initiative of Janez Evangelist Krek, have decided to create the joint fraction.




Fig. 1: Anatol Vakhnianyn (1841–1908) (Wikimedia Commons).

REASONS OF COOPERATION OF UKRAINIANS AND SLOVENIANS

It should be noted that the choice of allies was obvious to moderate Ukrainian deputies.

Firstly, both the Ukrainian and Slovenian public and Christian movements were based on the encyclical of the Pope Leo XIII of “*Rerum Novarum*” (1891). In it new reference points of social development based on traditional values of Christian ethics by the basic social principle. It embodied the new public concept forming more modern theoretical basis for counteraction to the socialist movement. If earlier the church considered a property difference natural, then its

task was limited only by philanthropy. The political catholicism and Christian democracy are tightly connected between themselves, tried to reform society, but by various approaches. Christian democrats got the liberty which is relating to fundamentals of Christianity and being implemented in the conditions of political democracy, however didn't hope for transformation of society by social policy of the state, and hoped that the church itself will become the engine of the restored society. "Rerum Novarum" was considered as the most important document of Catholicism of modern times and a basis of the main ideas of parties of the public and Christian direction of Europe.

Secondly, rather small deputy groups which could not play an important role without allies, made cooperation necessary for both Ukrainians and Slovenes in the Vienna parliament. Thirdly, both Ukrainians and Slovenes faced similar problems with recognition of their national rights in Galicia, Istria, Carniola, Carinthia, and Styria. Furthermore, this cooperation was made possible by the friendly attitude of Slovenes towards Ukrainians. One of the Slovenian leaders, J. E. Krek, was familiar with Ukrainian folklore and literature, and was fond of T. Shevchenko's creativity. He participated in Shevchenko's evenings in Vienna, popularized Ukrainian folk art among young Slovenian poets, including J. Abram, O. Župančič, J. Murn, A. Erjavec, and A. Merhar.

From the Ukrainian side representatives of the public and Christian society became initiators of cooperation with Slovenes, first of all O. Barvinskyi is a politician, the teacher, the organizer of numerous scientific and cultural institutions. He was one of initiators of transformation of literary society (Shevchenko's Society) into scientific association under the name Scientific organization of Taras Shevchenko, and then became its chairman during the period 1892–1897. Besides, he was the deputy of Galician diet (1894–1904), the House of Representatives (1891–1907) of the State Council, and for 1918–1919 the delegate of the Ukrainian National Council and the secretary of the State committee on religion and education in the First government of West Ukrainian People's Republic. Also O. Barvinskyi was an active popular writer of the Ukrainian history, the editor of a publishing series under the name Rus Historical Library – he was one of the first who used the term "Ukraine-Rus".

Contrary to the rapprochement of populist camp of the Ukrainian politics in Galicia with the Russophiles that was proclaimed in 1896, O. Barvinskyi's supporters tried to set up cooperation with national parties of other Slavic people living in the Habsburg Monarchy. It should be noted that the idea of creation of consolidation of Slavic parliamentarians was not new. In 1891 O. Barvinskyi had had thought to join Karl von Hohenwart's fraction. It was the conservative-clerical group that united German conservatives, Slovenian, Croatian and Romanian parliamentarians and was one of the largest, and therefore one of the most influential associations in the Vienna Parliament. However, then this idea was not supported by the Ukrainian deputies who decided to create separate fraction – "Rus Club" (Lechniuk, 2020, 285).

The purpose of creation of this consolidation, the Ukrainian deputies wanted to make use of the experience of the southern Slavs gained by them thanks to membership in K. Hohenwarth's club (IL NASU DMFT 135, c. 34, p.708). Exchange of experience has to promote increase in level of political and parliamentary culture of the Ukrainian deputies (IL NASU DMFT 135, c. 35, p.856). At the same time formation of rather numerically strong group could give chance to the Ukrainian deputies to play bigger, than still role in distribution of important state positions (IL NASU DMFT 135, c. 34, p.737–738).

It is important to note that cooperation between Ukrainian and Slovenian politicians was not based on the so-called "Slavic idea", and was result of pragmatic cooperation as a result of a coincidence of conservative principles of the participants and concrete aspirations in changing the national, social and economic situation in the state. This is confirmed by protocols of joint preparatory meetings in anticipation of creation of the

SCNU. At the constituent meetings cofounders of the SCNU clearly noted that this cooperation is not based on a "Slavic community", but rather aimed to advocate for the national interests of each of the separate peoples. In the case of the Ukrainian politicians, this meant sharp opposition of "Neo-Slavism" of Russophiles (CSHAU 818, op. 1, c. 10, p. 68). The opposition of O. Barvinskyi's group to "the Slavic ideas" and their absolute rejection of a Russophilia became one of engines of the formation of their political organization – the Catholic Ruthenian-Social Union which six representatives – O. Barvinskyi, A. Vakhnianyn, M. Karatnytskyi, K. Okhrymovych, K. Mandychevskyi and I. Hrobelskyi – became the Ukrainian representative office in the general Slavic fraction. The representative of Bukovyna, S. Vinnytskyi, also joined them. The Slovenes considered that "the South Slavic deputies, first of all, should be independent of the government which they should support only if it is really fair to Yugoslavs" (Krek, 1933, 12).



Fig. 2: Olexander Barvinskyi (1847–1926)
(Wikimedia Commons).

“SLAVIC CHRISTIAN AND NATIONAL UNION”: COMMON FRACTION OF UKRAINIANS, SLOVENIANS AND CROATS

On March 27, 1897 in the Vienna parliament the Ruthenian Club faction fraction led by the oldest of the Ukrainian deputies K. Mandichevskiy was officially created, and the first general meeting of the Ukrainian, Slovenian and Croatian deputies at which there was also D. Tanyachkevych took place already on March 30, 1897 (Slovenski narod, 1. 4. 1897, 1). Ukrainians suggested not to call fraction Catholic as it was initially planned, but “Christian” to allow participation of orthodox Serbians in it (CSHAU 818, op. 1, c. 10, p. 67). However, Serbs were not a part of fraction. O. Barvinskyi explained it with Serbo-Croatian misunderstanding: “When Ruthenians, Slovenes, Croats and Serbs gathered for an optional meeting, such persistent turmoil came up between Croats and Serbs that the union with Serbians impossible seemed. Croats asserted the historical state law with which Serbs could not agree” (IL NASU DMFT 135, c. 34, p.702). At this meeting the general committee for preparation of the charter of new fraction in which O. Barvinskyi, among others, was elected (CSHAU 818, op. 1, c. 10, p. 67). On April 1, 1897 the SCNU parliamentary fraction which consisted of 35 deputies was created: 16 Slovenes², 11 Croats³, 7 Ukrainians⁴ and 1 Czech (Radosavljevič, 1994, 336). The pastoral letter of the Catholic episcopate of Austria-Hungary on the eve of elections to the Vienna parliament became the basis of the SCNU program (IL NASU DMFT 135, c. 34, p.705). At the heart of this message – a number of requirements to voters and also the program of necessary reforms in the state. First of all, from voters it was required to vote for those candidates who were sincere Catholics and in the program and activity did not encroach on authority of Church and religion in general (Ruslan, 16. 1. 1897, 1–2).

All members of SCNU with own hand signed the charter consisting of 12 paragraphs and undertaken to vote according to decisions of fraction (at the same time it was allowed to refrain when voting) (IL NASU DMFT 135, c. 34, p.707). It is necessary to notice that at first German was language of communication at meetings of fraction, but subsequently Slavic deputies communicated mainly in their native languages (IL NASU DMFT 135, c. 34, p.704).

The SCNU program so designated its task: “To contribute to the organization of public life in a religious, cultural, social and economic view on a positive and Christian basis and will defend with any determination on certainly equality of the slavyansky people on the basis of the national rights and Christians freedom of Church”. At a meeting three cochairmen of SCNU – O. Barvinskyi, K. G. Bulat, I.

2 Hugo Berks, Alfred Coronini, Lambert Einspieler, Andrej Ferjačić, Anton Gregorčič, Lavoslav Gregorec, Janez Ev.Krek, Josip Kušar, Viljem Pfeifer, Jožef Pogačnik, Ivan Povše, France Robič, Fran Šuklje, Ivan Šušteršič, Jožef Žičkar, Ignacij Žitnik.

3 Juraj Biankini, Lovre Borčić, Gajo Bulat, Mihovil Klaić, Matko Laginja, Ninko Perić, Vjekoslav Spinčić, Anton Šupuk, Ante Trumbić, Božo Vuković, Luka Zore.

4 Oleksander Barvinskyi, Kornyllo Mandychevskiy, Ksenofont Ochrymowych, Anatole Vakhnianyn, Sydir Vinnytskyi.

Šusteršič are elected. Speaking at a meeting, A. Vakhnianyn noted that SCNU has to become the first step to transformation of the Monarchy of Gabsburg into Slavic federation (CSHAU 818, op. 1, c. 10, p. 68).

The SCNU social and economic program looked quite organic, considering similarity of the problems facing members of fraction. If such Slavic people of Austria-Hungary as Poles and Czechs, kept the social elite – the land aristocracy, then Ukrainians, Croats and Slovenes were deprived it, their national movements including the conservative directions, derived the human strength mainly from clergy and quite small intellectuals, and were forced to look for a support in the peasantry making numerous social group among these people.

O. Barvinskyi and A. Vakhnianyn in the social sphere propagandized adopting of successful experience of other countries and states. Most it was shown in their parliamentary and provincial diet speeches. Creation of the agricultural unions for providing the peasantry from impoverishment and debts, so, and from the main problem of social and economic life of Galicia of that time – mass emigration had to become one of the main tasks (Ruslan, 9. 3. 1899; Ruslan, 19. 8. 1897). The beginning in the region of loan cash desks of a system of Raiffeisen was an important initiative of A. Vakhnianyn. The need for such institutions was shown by a series of materials in “Ruslan” on the history of loan cash desks (Ruslan, 17. 12. 1897; Ruslan, 12. 3. 1899). Despite declaration of narrow-mindedness and the peasantry as a basis of a social order (Ruslan, 30. 1. 1897, 1), Christian the public did not depart from conservative foundations, explaining it with attachment of the Ukrainian peasant to tradition, relying on which (Ruslan, 26. 1. 1897, 1). Also it was indicated an important role of the aristocracy (Ukrainians did not have it), and the property status and the authority is recognized a support of public order (Ruslan, 8. 2. 1897, 2).

The advantage of cooperation of the Ukrainian and Slovenian politicians within SCNU in the social and economic sphere was that Slovenes could serve as role model for the Ukrainian Christian social activists. So, J.E. Krek’s diligence in the Slovenian lands has created banks and cooperatives, extensive network of other non-political societies which conducted active social and economic, educational and organizational work with peasants and workers. 1892 the “Slovenian Christian and social labor union” which became the main Slovenian institute of such orientation was founded. Social and economic postulates of this environment were propagandized also during large-scale Catholic meetings, taking place in Ljubljana in 1892, 1900, 1906 and 1913 (Bobić, 2012, 11–12).

Loan sharking was a considerable problem in Galicia. It was caused by the absence of cheap credits for small farming enterprises. Ukrainian deputies tried to solve this problem in both state authorities and the society itself. On January 18, 1897, A. Vakhnianyn in the parliament named usury as the cause of mass emigration from the region (Ruslan, 14. 1. 1897, 1–2). Laws were passed to prevent this problem, but they were ineffective. The law of 1877 prohibited it, but in fact it continued to exist, in some places - openly. Galicia was divided into districts between the largest usurer families (Ruslan, 14. 1. 1897, 1–2). In addition to interest in money, interest in grain, livestock, and labor usury was also popular. O. Barvinskyi called usury one of the main reasons for the economic decline of Galicia⁵.

5 In 1882–1894, 1735 people, including 899 (51,8%) in Galicia, were sentenced for loan sharking.

The biggest problems related to usury were in Hutsul Region, where in the last decades of the 19th century. there was a moral and economic decline, various epidemics periodically arose, the arbitrariness of usurers reigned. At the end of the 19th century usury was extremely common among the Hutsuls. On March 2, 1900, O. Barvinskyi submitted a request to the Cabinet of Ministers regarding the government's intentions in regard with numerous illegal actions carried out in Hutsul region (Ruslan, 4. 24. 1897, 3).

Ukrainian deputies believed that spontaneous national-social conflicts were possible without state intervention (Ruslan, 26. 2. 1900, 1–2). During a meeting with the Minister of Justice of Austria Spence, O. Barvinskyi emphasized the passivity of the courts regarding illegal usury activities. In his opinion, court officials did not prevent usurers because they were their debtors. Instead, the minister promised to bring the guilty to justice (Ruslan, 10. 3. 1900, 2–3).

A. Vakhnianyn, with the support of the SCNU, repeatedly raised questions in the Vienna Parliament regarding the protection of the rights of the Greek-Catholic population of Galicia. In particular, he advocated for Ukrainian soldiers in the Austrian army to have the opportunity to celebrate religious holidays⁶, as well as for pensions for widows and orphans of Greek-Catholic priests (Ruslan, 21. 5. 1900, 1–2).

Despite declarations, in particular the Slovenian politicians, on priority of social and economic aspects (Ruslan, 21. 6. 1897, 1) the most important activity of SCNU was made in the sphere of national rights (Slovenski narod, 6. 4. 1897, 1). It is explained by the general situation in Cisleithania for the last decade of the 19th century, first of all sharp aggravation of national contradictions. Failure of the Ukrainian-Polish “new era” and Czech-German “agreements” of 1890 (attempt of achievement of a compromise in national political affairs, each of which, due to various reasons, was not crowned with success), aggravation of national opposition in Galicia (“Badeni” elections” 1897, and subsequently questions of the Ukrainian university and agricultural strikes of 1902), in the Czech lands – because of a language question and in Carniola – because of unwillingness of the Austrian Germans to allow teaching in Slovenian in a gymnasium in Celje – all this was symptoms of the state contradictions in the state. Along with strengthening of influence of more radical national Parties (Young Czech Party (Mladočeši), the German nationalists, the Polish and Ukrainian national democrats) the habitual political, cultural and social system of the monarchy was threatened what conservative-minded Ukrainian, Slovenian and Croatian politicians could not reconcile to.

SCNU representatives were active participants in parliamentary majority which was created after elections of 1897 and which “The Polish circle”, conservative German fractions which were successors of already nonexistent Gogenvart's club, Czechs and representatives of SCNU entered tried to realize the national and social and economic program principles.

The first attempts of the prime minister K. Badeni to create parliamentary majority from representatives of “The Polish circle”, Czechs and the German liberals failed because of the Czech-German antagonism caused by the new language rules for Bohemia

6 Unlike Catholics, Greek Catholics used the Julian calendar.

and Moravia promised by Badeni, giving equal rights to German and Czech languages (IL NASU DMFT 135, c. 34, p.736). On the other hand, the attempt to create the “right” parliamentary coalition into which entered “The Polish club”, Czechs, the German Catholic group and SHNS successfully came to the end. The new majority contained 222 seats in parliament from 425. It meant that an exit of any fraction from the coalition led to its disintegration. For SCNU, according to O. Barvinskyi, this situation was ideal combination of circumstances, having 35 representatives, the union had “gold share”. It forced Poles, Czechs and the German conservatives to consider requirements of SCNU (IL NASU DMFT 135, c. 35, p.856). For this reason the initiative of creation of the general fraction was very timely, only in a day after approval of SCNU negotiations on creation of the coalition began (IL NASU DMFT 135, c. 34, p.738).

The Slavic fraction was included into the majority, having declared own positions which sometimes differed from positions of other representatives of the majority, in particular “The Polish circle”. The conclusion of the text of the appeal of parliament to the emperor Franz Joseph I became the first showdown for SCNU. On May 6, 1897 the meeting of fraction on this matter at which the additions to the draft of the address concerning questions of national equality and an economic condition of the peasantry are discussed and put forward took place. In particular, the fraction insisted on introduction of national equality in public life, school and the government, reduction of expenses on imperious institutions, support of the peasantry. It was accented also on development of school according to the religious and national principles. It is also decided that in case these offers are not supported to send own appeal to the monarch (Ruslan, 27. 4. 1897, 1). O. Barvinskyi on behalf of SCNU submitted these proposals in editorial committee, and they were considered (Ruslan, 4. 5. 1897, 1).

The attitude of Ukrainians and Slovenes concerning expansion of autonomy of certain regions of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy was interesting. According to them *ce conditio sine qua non*⁷ was absolute protection of ethnic minorities in these territories (Ruslan, 7. 9. 1897, 2).

On March 21, 1898 A. Ferjančič was elected the senior vice president of the Chamber of Deputies (till October, 1899). The parliament made the number of proposals on the solution of the language question. In particular, on April 22, 1898 L. Gregorec, F. Šuklje and O. Barvinskyi on behalf of SCNU made the request, demanding from the government to adopt immediately the law, for implementation of Article 19 of the Fundamental state law of 1867 (Melik, 1979, 61; Špelec, 2009, 44). In it it was noted:

All people of the state are equal and each people have the firm right to protect and develop the nationality and language. The state recognizes equality of all of the languages used in the region at school, the government and private life. In the regions where there live several people, public institutions of training that each of these people received the necessary means for science in the language flat-out to studying of the second regional language have to be so arranged (Zöllner, 1990, 401).

7 Prerequisite – Latin.

This request was explained by Gregorec, having offered that all languages had to appear regional and to be equal before provincial and the government. Each citizen could look for and find justice in all instances in the language (Cvirn, 2009, 61–79).

Complexity of the language question forced the government to explain the position in relation to it. In particular, on April 27, 1898, Prime Minister Thun noted that the government is ready to meet all the legal requirements of individual nations, and linguistic ones Gautsch order is only a temporary solution. Respectively, he supported adoption of the language law though he knew about problems, related. It agreed with offers on election of special parliamentary (language) committee and promised it support and the help to the government. At the same time Thun reminded future members of the committee that in search of the solution of a language question they will deal not only with “one language issue”, but also “the whole complex of language questions” which it will be necessary to treat differently according to different circumstances. The main objective of language committee he saw in development of the basic principles of effective protection of ethnic minorities in certain lands, in unification of positions of use of languages at the schools and all other matters of argument generating national disagreements. According to him, the fact that all matters of argument can be resolved by a simple formula and only one law adopted by parliamentary majority is wrong. On the contrary, to receive the satisfactory final result, first it is necessary to approve the main principles of protection of minorities and only then to start development of the law. This statement caused the broad language debate continuing with breaks – because of technical obstacles – before postponement of the National Assembly for June 7, 1898 when to the forefront there were disagreements between separate parties and the nations again.

At the session on May 4, 1898. The position of SCNU was in detail stated once again by L. Gregorec supporting adoption of the difficult law on executive power in coordination with Article 19 (SPSHAR, XIV. sesija, 18. seja, 4. 5. 1898, 1040–1044).

The parliamentary majority was not monolithic, and it inevitably affected its capacity. Despite the edition of the manifesto calling for association of forces and refusal of the international conflicts (Ruslan, 23. 11. 1897, 2; Ruslan, 30. 11. 1897, 2), real activity of separate fractions of the majority testified to a divergence of declarations with practical measures. So, “The Polish circle” constantly tried to conduct separate policy, noting need of granting the bigger autonomy of Galicia. It meant strengthening of Poles in East Galicia for Ukrainians and weakening of their positions. SCNU said that it will maintain the majority on condition of upholding of national equality of all nationalities by it in all parts of Cisleithania (Ruslan, 8. 6. 1897, 1; Ruslan, 24. 6. 1897, 1). The example of disinterest of the “Polish circle” in real national equality was the language bill proposed by the deputy M. Bilinski, the bill that had not been even accepted for discussion in the parliament by the Polish faction itself. This decision caused protest and indignation of the representatives of SCNU, and “Ruslan” predicted the crisis of the parliamentary majority. It led to a protest and indignation of representatives of SCNU, and “Ruslan” provided crisis of parliamentary majority (Ruslan, 9. 10. 1899, 1; Ruslan, 19. 10. 1899, 1).

Unfortunately, the parliament could not elect language committee because of technical obstacles of some German parties. Therefore on June 7, 1898 the Prime Minister postponed a session for an indefinite term. On May 5, 1898 the deputy J. Švegel noted that the government itself developed the basic principles of settlement of a language question and began negotiations only with representatives of some German parties and Young Czechs (SPSHAR, XIV. sesija, 19. seja, 5. maj 1898, 1110–1111). However this “an action of reconciliation” completely failed as it was boycotted by representatives of the German People’s Party and German Progressive Party. The failure of negotiations was not only because of the Germans demanding immediate cancellation language orders of Gautsch, but also the Czechs insisting on that provincial, but not state authorities of the power were responsible for language policy (Urban, 1994, 689).

As the Prime Minister Thun has not invited the representative of SCNU, the fourth largest fraction, to negotiations, the Ukrainian and Slovenian deputies had opinions on transition to opposition. In the run-up to the autumn session the head of the government has held meeting with representatives of SHNS. However, instead of one of heads of fraction F. Povše, Thun has invited A. Ferjančič that has angered Catholic deputies led by J.E. Krek. In particular, on September 23, 1898 the leadership of the Catholic National Party has said that the Slovenian deputies have to leave the only government coalition and enter into opposition. J.E. Krek’s proposal on SCNU exit from the only government coalition did not receive the necessary majority at a meeting of fraction on September 29, 1898. Such idea was opposed also by the Ukrainian deputies (Krek, 1933, 82).

It is necessary to notice that insignificant progress of Ukrainians and Slovenes was caused also by internal contradictions in their environments. In particular, F. Šuklje noted incompetence of one of leaders of Slovenes of F. Povše: “Though Povše actually was considered as an expert in agriculture, he had no those qualities which are necessary for the chairman of bigger deputy group. Soon we understood lack of the higher education and communication with the head of club in because discussions in club became more and more seldom and, of course, really insignificant” (Šuklje, 1995, 82).

Crisis was the integral element of existence of parliamentary majority (and the Vienna parliament in a cadence of 1897–1900 in general). In parliament there was regularly a question of integrity and coordination of actions, an exit of separate fractions because of internal contradictions. On November 27, 1899 Young Czechs deputies actually destroyed the coalition, having announced obstruction, than paralyzed work of parliament. Ukrainians accused “The Polish circle” which blocked M. Bielinskyi’s project of aggravation of a situation (Ruslan, 18. 11. 1899, 1). The decision on convocation of the temporary parliamentary commission for development of the language bill is as a result made, however Czechs did not support this offer and continued to block work of parliament. On December 16, 1899 SCNU introduced the bill on nationalities providing a solution of the problem of national equality in monarchy (Ruslan, 8. 12. 1899, 2) in parliament but also it did not yield result. The publication of the Kracow conservatives of “Czas” was indignant with the Ukrainian initiatives, noting that they should not bring up the Ukrainian question in parliament. At the same time, the Czech conservative newspaper “Politik” warned Poles against the conflicts with SCNU, especially during crisis of the

parliamentary coalition. In return, “Ruslan” noted that indifference of the central and local authorities to the Ukrainian requirements induced the Ukrainian deputies to change tactics from SCNU (Ruslan, 1. 10. 1898, 1). Considering extremely tangled situation in the majority which did not suit any of its participants, the question of expediency of stay in the coalition became debatable not only for Young Czechs (obstruction turned out to be consequence of what), but also in Slavic fraction. In particular, the member of SCNU I. Hrobelskyi in the letter to O. Barvinskyi of October 30, 1898 noted inefficiency of stay in the coalition.

Considerably drawing up the mandate of one of his leaders of I. Šusteršič in connection with impossibility to combine deputy and lawyer activity influenced further work of SCNU.

Due to this situation in the agenda of SCNU there was a question of expediency and further to remain in parliamentary majority, so, to support the governments. Intense discussions took place in the autumn of 1898. Almost at the same time there took place congresses of the Slovenian politicians in Ljubljana (on September 22) and the Ukrainian deputies of Galician diet and Vienna parliament in Stanislavov (on September 23). At both meetings the attitude of the coalition and the government towards the Slovenian and Ukrainian national demands was criticized. Slovenes decided to leave parliamentary majority though they eventually did not realize this step.

Constructive work of parliament and the decision of social and national problems were made it impossible by also regular changes of the governments – during activity of their cadence there were 6 of them. Instability of the governments and consequently, the political situation, it is caused by the acute crisis caused by language decrees for the Czech’s lands of the Prime Minister K. Badeni, published on April 6, 1897. According to them, the German and Czech languages acquired the equal rights in office-work of administrative and legal agencies. Decreased to sharply negative reaction practically of all German political environments of the monarchy, mass protests, radicalization, growth of the German nationalism, Pan-German and, as a result, anti-Slavic moods among German population. With respect there to intense discussions in the Vienna parliament developed even into mass fights of deputies, and the German obstruction was replaced by Czech (Łazuga, 2013, 208–246).

Even under so extremely adverse conditions of policy with SCNU tried to convince all new prime ministers of need of implementation of their projects. During discussion of the government program of the Prime Minister F. Thun appointed in March, 1898 on behalf of SCNU his cochairman – the Slovenian deputy I. Šusteršič acted. He noted that the offered program “is too impartial” because of what it can be interpreted in different ways. Besides, in it the position of the government on national, peasant and religious questions is not opened. And still SCNU considered more important not the text of the program, but concrete work therefore I. Šusteršič on behalf of fraction trusted the government (Ruslan, 1. 10. 1898, 2). And though the prime minister declared desire to cooperate with the parliamentary coalition and created the special commission for preparation of the bill on the international relations in the empire, his focus only on the Czech-German problem caused discontent of Slavic fraction.

As a result – again there was a question of further stay of SCNU in parliamentary majority. “Ruslan” explained such discussions with an unwillingness of fraction to further expect favor from the government (Ruslan, 26. 6. 1898, 1).

In June, 1899 the meeting of committee of the parliamentary coalition with F. Thun's participation took place. Representatives of SCNU defended further need of the solution of a language problem at the same time for all edges, having secured with support of the Czech deputies. Together they suggested to bring this question in the program of the coalition, however this idea was supported neither by “Polish circle”, nor the Austrian “Catholic center”, nor the prime minister for whom and further priority was permission of the German-Czech conflict (Ruslan, 30. 5. 1899, 1).

Essential claims Ukrainians and Slovenes had also to the new government of M. Clary. On October 5, 1899 at the meeting of ruling coalition the decision on the fastest preparation of the bill on settlement of the language relations in the monarchy and also is made on appointment of the new government which would consider offers of parliamentary majority. The Ukrainian deputies positively apprehended this position of the coalition (Ruslan, 26. 9. 1899, 1), the similar position was taken by all SCNU fraction. But the role of the transitional government of M. Clary, according to wishes of the emperor, had to come down only to liquidation of language orders of K. Badeni and settling of the major affairs of the monarchy (Łazuga, 2013, 239). Considering it, the government did not even try to resolve the ethnic question in the state.

More positively cooperation with the following president of ministers – E. Körber whose negotiations with fractions of the majority were completed successfully began, and in March, 1900 the unity of the majority is renewed. However, the requirements of the Czech deputies were not fulfilled, and they continued blocking of work of parliament. “The Polish circle” left the coalition and SCNU addressed Czechs with the offer to suspend blocking and again to enter negotiations with the government. These attempts were vain. The coalition actually broke up, and possible dissolution of parliament became more and more real (Ruslan, 15. 2. 1900, 2; Ruslan, 24. 2. 1900, 1).

After final disintegration of parliamentary majority representatives of SCNU, Old Czechs and the Center decided to keep interfractional solidarity to demand from the government of specific actions on introduction of national equality. A new coalition, “New Right” (as it was dubbed in the press), which had only 57 members, the only one that declared its desire to protect the interests of all Slavic peoples of the Habsburg monarchy. The fidelity of the monarchy and Christian foundations, and a main objective – protection of the national and religious interests of the represented people were the main bases of new association. The new block intended to rely on Christian outlook in public and public affairs (Ruslan, 31. 5. 1900, 1; Ruslan, 22. 6. 1900, 1). However, because of incapacity of the Vienna parliament on September 8, 1900 the emperor Franz Joseph I issued the decree about dissolution of the lower house of parliament and called new elections.

It should be noted that Ukrainians and Slovenians tried to support each other not only in parliament. In particular, the Slov Carniolian enian diet in Ljubljana appealed to rise in common in Galician diet in defense of the rights of Slavic students against prosecution by the German students (Ruslan, 27. 1. 1898, 2). Ukrainians

welcomed Slovenes with transfer of relics of the outstanding Slovenian linguist and philologist of Jernej Kopitar from Vienna to Ljubljana. About it the editorial office of the newspaper “*Ruslan*” sent the telegram where, in particular, in Slovenian it was noted: “*Živeli Slovenci! Živela rusinsko-slovenska vzajemnost*” (Long live the Slovenes! Long live rusino-slovenian reciprocity) (*Ruslan*, 1.10.1897, 1897, 3). With assistance of Slovenians the Ukrainian deputies tried to improve cultural and educational position of Ukrainians of Galicia. In particular, O. Barvinskyi with assistance of the coalition demanded from the Minister of Education of establishment of the Ukrainian gymnasium in Ternopil. Thanks to what on October 14, 1898 it was solemnly open.

CONCLUSION

The union in one faction of southern Slavs and Ukrainians, two ethnic groups living far away from each other, was a unique phenomenon in Viennese parliament. They were also united by the fact that both Slovenes and Ukrainians were “small”, agrarian and Slavonic nations within the Habsburg empire. The research of cooperation of the Ukrainian and Slovenian deputies in the Vienna parliament shows that progress which all participants of SCNU managed to reach, including to the Ukrainian deputies. Nearly for the first time the Polish or Czech Slavic fraction played an important role in Vienna, was an active player as on directly parliamentary and secret stage. For the first time existence of parliamentary majority substantially depended on Ukrainians, Slovenes or Croats, and it was forced to consider the government. It is possible to assume that only deep crisis of parliament because of the German-Czech opposition and, as a result, a paralysis of its activity at first German left and nationalists, and subsequently Czechs, did not allow representatives of SCNU to increase the achievements. However, even reached it appeared enough to show success of real policy, sharply criticized at that time the Ukrainian oppositional narodovets, radicals and Russophiles. The context not only purely parliamentary, but also personal and cultural became important.

The prospect of a research of this perspective opens a possibility of comparative analysis of Social-Christians movements of the Slavic people of Cisleithania which representatives were the Christian public from SCNU.

SODELOVANJE UKRAJINSKIH IN SLOVENSКИH POSLANCEV V DUNAJSKEM PARLAMENTU KONEC 19. STOLETJA

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POVZETEK

V članku so analizirana sodelovanja ukrajinskih in slovenskih poslancev v dunajskem parlamentu kot del skupine – »Slovanska krščanska narodna zveza«. Delovanje skupine je bila posledica skupnih interesov njenih udeležencev za nacionalno enakost. Raziskane so glavne stopnje aktivnosti skupine in dejavniki, ki so vplivali na njeno učinkovitost. Ta skupina je bila skoraj edina v avstrijskem parlamentu za obdobje 1897–1900, ki je bila na pozicijah nacionalne enakosti in je varovala interese Slovanov. Analizirana je bila aktivnost poslancev skupine v zvezi z izboljšanjem socioalno-ekonomske, kulturne in izobraževalne situacije Ukrajincev in Slovencev v avstro-ogrski monarhiji. Metodologija raziskave temelji na principih historicizma, sistematičnega pristopa, znanstvenega pristopa, pristopa preverjanja, avtorjeve objektivnosti, zmerne pripovedne konstruktivizma, kot tudi na uporabi splošno-znanstvenih (analiza, sinteza, generalizacija) in posebnih zgodovinskih (zgodovinsko-genetskih, zgodovinsko-tipoloških, zgodovinsko-sistemskih) metod.

Ključne besede: Dunajski parlament, Slovanska krščanska narodna zveza, socialno-krščansko gibanje, Slovenci, Ukrajinci

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THE BALKANS AS A GATEWAY TO POLISH INDEPENDENCE.
THE FACE OF THE BALKAN POLICY OF THE HÔTEL LAMBERT
TOWARDS NATIONAL MOVEMENTS FORMING WITHIN THE
BORDERS OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

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ABSTRACT

This article presents an outline of the activities of the Hôtel Lambert - one of the most influential parties of the Polish Great Emigration - in the face of the Balkan national movements taking shape within the Ottoman Empire in the 19th century. It indicates the directions of activity of the political camp of Prince Adam Jerzy Czartoryski towards the internal and external situation of the Balkan countries. The text discusses the importance of Balkan concepts presented by the Hôtel Lambert and their influence on the dynamically changing political reality in this region of Europe.

Keywords: Hôtel Lambert, Adam Jerzy Czartoryski, 19th century, Polish Great Emigration, Balkans, Balkan policy, Ottoman Empire

I BALCANI COME PORTA DELL'INDIPENDENZA POLACCA.
LE CARATTERISTICHE DELLA POLITICA BALCANICA DELL' HÔTEL
LAMBERT NEI CONFRONTI DEI MOVIMENTI NAZIONALI
FORMATISI ENTRO I CONFINI DELL'IMPERO OTTOMANO

SINTESI

L'articolo presenta una panoramica delle attività dell'Hôtel Lambert – uno dei partiti più influenti della Grande Emigrazione Polacca – di fronte ai movimenti nazionali balcanici che prendevano forma all'interno dell'Impero Ottomano nel XIX secolo. Il saggio indica le direzioni di attività del campo politico del principe Adam Jerzy Czartoryski nei confronti della situazione interna ed esterna dei Paesi balcanici. Il testo discute l'importanza dei concetti balcanici presentati dall'Hôtel Lambert e la loro influenza sulla realtà politica nella cornice dinamica del cambiamento di questa regione d'Europa.

Parole chiave: Hôtel Lambert, Adam Jerzy Czartoryski, XIX secolo, Grande Emigrazione polacca, Balcani, politica balcanica, Impero Ottomano

INTRODUCTION

The Hôtel Lambert was a Polish political camp established in exile in Paris after the defeat of the November Uprising (1830–1831). This environment, focused around the figure of Prince Adam Jerzy Czartoryski, grouped leading representatives of the aristocracy, senior officers and people with right-wing views from various social and professional groups of the, so-called, Polish Great Emigration. The goal of the political activity of the Hôtel Lambert was to regain Poland's independence. In order to achieve this aim, the camp carried out extensive diplomatic work continuously for forty years (1833–1872). As Hans Henning Hahn perfectly observed, the Czartoryski party spent several decades trying to influence the existing system of international relations among the great powers, thus becoming, as it were, a subject of these relations (1973, 348–349). Through diplomatic endeavours, the Hôtel Lambert sought to maintain the presence of the “*Polish question*” in the public opinion of Western states. In this respect, it exerted a significant influence on the formation of European opinion on Polish national liberation aspirations. Hotel became their diplomatic advocate (Kalembka, 1982).

The primary goal of Poland's regaining independence was framed by a specific vision of the party's foreign policy. Various concepts were developed within its framework. The concept of Balkan policy was the most widely developed and practically implemented. It represented the most persistent direction of Polish international action in the post-insurrection period. The successful implementation of its assumptions was to be the path which, through appropriate external factors, would lead to the rebirth of Poland (Berry, 1985, 45–67).

THE HÔTEL LAMBERT AND THE BALKAN QUESTION

The independence of Poland was a paramount value for the Prince. He wanted a nation-state to be established without violent social changes, with a monarchical system that would be limited by a constitution (Hahn, 1987, 68) The Hôtel Lambert's vision, however, rejected the path of armed insurrection as the only answer to the problem. Prince Adam Jerzy Czartoryski initially decided to base his activity on extensive diplomatic efforts (Bartoszewski-Wnukowski, 2007, 10). As a result of an analysis of the international situation at the time, and with an understanding of the influence of the Vienna order, he concluded that the Polish could only gain independence through an appropriate international agreement. He was aware that Poland's attaining the status of full sovereignty could be achieved only as a result of specific external phenomena (Hahn, 1987, 70). However, pursuing a policy intending to obtain, through international contacts, appropriate assistance for the Polish question was not the only idea initiated by the Hôtel Lambert.

Prince Czartoryski's political thought was to be supplemented by a properly prepared uprising that would break out at the right time in favourable international conditions. The determinant of this state would be the European conflict or revolution, in any of the partitioning powers¹. Ludwik Gadon stressed that "the Prince did not think that Poland could be liberated by diplomatic efforts alone, without his own efforts, without an uprising. But he believed only in an uprising at the right time, in favourable circumstances" (Bartoszewski-Wnukowski, 2007, 11). The ideological profile of the Hôtel Lambert, which was described as conservative, showed a subdued approach to the issue of the uprising breaking out too soon. Prince Adam Jerzy Czartoryski saw the future independence uprising as the culmination of certain diplomatic efforts which, with international support, would have a chance of success being well organised and prepared. He postulated the creation of the nucleus of a Polish armed force within foreign armies and the training of officers in foreign services. It is worth noting that he doubted the postulates of other competing circles, such as the Polish Democratic Society, that the preparation of an uprising required only propaganda and a call to arms under the banner of freedom of the peoples (Skowronek, 1991, 31–33; Berry, 1985, 45–49).

After the fall of the November Uprising, Czartoryski foresaw that the rivalry of the powers in the east could lead to a pan-European conflict. This involved a war between Turkey, backed by Russia, and Egypt, which was supported by Britain and France. This conflict demonstrated the diplomatic sense of Russia, which, by signing the Treaty of Hünkâr **İskelesi** with Turkey in 1833, began the process of subjugating the Ottoman Empire. Russia's policy sought the political subjugation of Turkey, with the aim of finally subduing it in order to deal an economic blow to English power (Skowronek, 1983, 69).

By his attitude, Prince Adam Jerzy Czartoryski tried to convince English and French politicians of the possible threat to their position in the East due to Russia's behaviour. The essence of his diplomatic efforts was to demonstrate to both powers that support for the Polish question could be an effective brake on the actions of the Tsar, who was striving for the political subjugation of Turkey and numerous Balkan nations². On the one hand, the exacerbation of conflicts between the superpowers might have raised Czartoryski's hopes for the start of a pan-European war, which would have favoured the emancipation of the Polish question. On the other hand, however, the prince's activities among French and English diplomats did not bring about the intended effect in terms of Polish cooperation, with the above-mentioned powers, in eastern affairs (Kukiel, 2008, 217; Berry, 1985, 50; Handelsman, 1949, 38–46)³

1 BCz, 5282 IV, Instruction for Marcinkowski dated 14.10.1834.

2 BCz, 5282 IV, Powód i cel misji wschodnich (author: A. J. Czartoryski), August 1836.

3 BCz, 5281 IV, A. J. Czartoryski, East 1833. Note prepared on the occasion of the Huma issues announced to Lord Palmerston on Eastern affairs, London, dated 10.05.1833.

Representatives of Western governments did not fully share Czartoryski's opinion, which compounded his disappointment with their attitude. His planned diplomatic game did not brought results despite the fact that the Turkish-Egyptian conflict could have been a prelude to broader military action in Europe. Prince Adam Jerzy's disapproval of French and English policy towards the Polish question was a turning point that gave space for the formation of a new attitude in his party.

The Hôtel Lambert began to see in the Ottoman Empire a suitable ally in the struggle for Polish independence⁴. The change of emphasis in foreign policy was certainly influenced by contacts with Turkish ambassadors in London, as well as by the accounts of Polish emigrants who found refuge within the borders of the Empire after the November Uprising. Moreover, this period is associated with an intensification of Adam Jerzy's activities towards Turkish politicians, to whom he tried, in numerous memoranda, to present the similarity of the political interests of Turkey and the Poles (Skowronek, 1983, 147).

It is worth noting that the representatives of the Hôtel Lambert hoped for an imminent conflict between the superpowers over the East, thanks to which Poles would be able to strike out for independence⁵. The party also drew up plans for a great war between European states, including sketches for a national uprising on Polish soil with a similar uprising in the Balkans (Skowronek, 1983, 151). From the second half of the 1830s onwards, the Czartoryski's milieu began to analyse the political situation, in geopolitical terms, in the Balkans with increasing frequency. The need for involvement in this field was increasingly raised. It was felt that with the Hôtel Lambert's rapprochement with the Balkan nations, the Polish question would have a real chance of gradually emancipating its independence demands (Cetnarowicz, 1997, 107)⁶ The change in attitude on the part of Prince Adam Jerzy Czartoryski's party did not manifest itself as a firm rejection of previous diplomatic efforts towards Western states, but was an opportunity to broaden the avenues through which Poles could strike out for independence.

One of the first reasons why interest in the Balkan question was elevated to the pedestal of the Hôtel Lambert's political activity was the publication of Karol Boromeusz Hoffman's book "Four uprisings or a brief lecture on the ways in which Greece, the Netherlands, Portugal and Poland waged for Independence" (Skowronek, 1983, 136). The author, an activist of the Hôtel Lambert, presented in his treatise the liberation ways followed by the nations included in the title. This author devoted much attention to the Greek uprising as one of the most important models of a successful struggle for independence.

4 BCz, 5282 IV, Matériaux pour un plan d'action concertée, August 1837.

5 BCz 5282 IV, Reason and purpose of Eastern missions, August 1836.

6 BCz, 5282 IV, Powód i cel misji wschodnich (author: A. J. Czartoryski), August 1836.

He stressed that “nationality alone is not sufficient to regain independence”, stating that the European powers had a dominant role in the final treaties ending the uprising (Skowronek, 1991, 32–34; Cetnarowicz, 2003, 160–162). Hoffman highlighted the fact that consolidating the success of the uprising was not possible without the help of any of the European powers, which in turn could lead to certain limitations in terms of the gains of the uprising. He assessed the behaviour of the powers decidedly negatively. Moreover, he expressed complete solidarity with the Greek model of the struggle for independence. Jerzy Skowronek noted that the opinions of Karol Boromeusz Hoffman led to the conclusion that a significant partner of Polish independence aspirations could be analogous movements of other nations under foreign rule (Skowronek, 1983, 143). The Greeks, who initially wished to initiate an insurrection in Wallachia and Moldavia, saw an opportunity in the staged spread of the insurrection, which was eventually to reach their homeland (Jelavich, 2005, 208). The recognition by the Greeks of the aspirations of the Balkan peoples to liberate themselves from their spheres of influence and dependence indicated the possibility of an effective struggle to limit Russian influence in the Balkans (Skowronek, 1976, 48)⁷.

Confirmation of the acceptance of Hoffman’s expressed views was undoubtedly provided by the publication of this work in the pages of the party’s journal. Another of the reasons that made the interest in the Balkans more significant was undoubtedly the novel *Kirjali*, published by Michał Czajkowski in 1839. The author, a participant in the November Uprising and novelist, presented in his work the contemporary aspirations and hopes of the Balkan peoples – above all the Slavs under Turkish state sovereignty. The book gained, among Poles, immense popularity, which resulted in an increased general interest in Balkan issues (Skowronek, 1983, 126). The *Hôtel Lambert*, with which Michał Czajkowski had collaborated since 1838, intensified its revision of its stance on the emancipation of the Balkan peoples against the background of the novel’s publication (Michalak, 2011, 164–165; Berry, 1985, 50–51).

BALKAN PROGRAMME CONCEPTS AND REALITY

The caesura I have set in this paper to begin my analysis of the individual activities of the *Hôtel Lambert* on the Balkan question is marked by a meeting between the Parisian group of the Romanian émigrés in 1836 and activists of the Czartoryski camp. This group tried to reach out to Polish democrats in order to contact, through their international contacts, the Young Europe organisation created by Mazzini (Skowronek, 1994, 387, 405). The activists Ion Ghica, Nicolae Bălcescu and Radu Golescu, during their talks with the democratic camp of the Polish émigrés, were at the same time directed to the partisanship of Prince

7 BCz, 5282 IV, Powód i cel misji wschodnich (author: A. J. Czartoryski), August 1836.

Czartoryski, who wished to take advantage of the opportunity to start cooperation with the Romanian émigrés (Berry, 1985, 47–48). The intermediary in their contact with the Hôtel Lambert was Michał Czajkowski, in the future an active member of the conspiratorial intelligence network of the Czartoryski camp, as a person coming from a democratic camp, and Władysław Zamoyski (Michalak, 2011, 169–170). The activists of the Hôtel Lambert argued that preparations could begin in Moldavia and Wallachia to initiate an uprising in the Polish lands, which met with Radu Golescu's approval and his declaration of readiness to undertake similar actions in all Danube Principalities. In addition, Golescu made an extensive analysis, for use by the Hôtel Lambert, of the socio-political and economic situation in the Danube Principalities. In it, he mentioned that the Serbian ruler Miloš Obrenović, who is working to gather around Serbia – Bulgaria, Bosnia and Montenegro – would use the Romanian initiative to create one common Slavic state⁸. The above note, which was received by Prince Czartoryski in September 1837, provided a sticking point to think seriously about the Romanian question (Skowronek, 1976, 52; Skowronek, 1983, 178). At the beginning of 1838, the Hôtel Lambert widened its acquaintanceship with other Romanian activists in order to agree on the concrete provisions of cooperation outlined in Radu Golescu's analysis. The increasing cooperation between Romanian and Polish activists led Janusz Woronicz, one of the Czartoryski's follower, to travel to Danube Principalities in the hope of making his emigration plans a reality. However, his reports, assuring the Romanians of their sympathy for the Poles, did not reflect the actual state of readiness for military action. Prince Czartoryski was urged to obtain the approval of Turkey and the Western powers for military action, while securing funds for military action. Attempts to persuade the French to support the initiative in the Danube Principalities failed, just as no support was obtained from Turkey for the transformation of its possessions into fiefdoms. In view of this state of affairs Polish-Romanian plans were sidelined in international affairs and the action itself, testifying to the independence of the Polish initiative, ended in failure (Bodea, 1970; Cetnarowicz, 1984, 145–146; Skowronek, 1994, 521).

Nevertheless, this did not end the efforts of the Czartoryski camp to effectively link Polish aspirations with those of the Balkan nations. The involvement of the Hôtel Lambert in this issue was only just gaining the necessary

8 Obrenović's policy was directed towards cooperation with the Ottoman Empire, from which he gradually obtained concessions and autonomy. In the main, his vision was focused on strengthening his position in Serbia itself, rather than on building a Slavic alliance in the Balkans (Cetnarowicz, 1989, 373–380).

momentum⁹. At that time, the members of the Hôtel Lambert were preparing another action of a political and military nature, which they wished to organise on the border of Albania and Montenegro. A partner in the Polish action was the Serb Nikola Vasojević, who, claiming that his family was the leader of the inhabitants of this borderland, wanted to create his own state in this area. His arrival in Paris in 1840 and his contacts with the Hôtel Lambert, as he was a student at the Collège de France, formed the basis for a political settlement. The negotiator on the part of the Czartoryski camp was Michał Czajkowski, who from that period onwards began to organise intensive conspiratorial and intelligence activities on behalf of the Hôtel Lambert. The result of these bilateral talks was the conclusion of a relevant political and diplomatic agreement between Prince Czartoryski and Nikola Vasojević, which was called the preliminary draft. The Polish side wanted to make the Serb's homeland the main preparatory base for the military forces that would initiate a Polish national uprising in the future. The cooperation between Czartoryski and Vasojević was to become the basis for expanding the circle of political influence over all Slavs, which would give rise to an autonomous federation of Turkish Slavs. This agreement and preparations for joint action did not materialise due to Vasojević's disappointment with the unsuccessful efforts of the party's activists to raise funds, which caused him to leave, in 1841, for the Balkans (Cetnarowicz, 1984, 145–146)

In the middle of 1841, Prince Czartoryski sent his three political agents (Czajkowski, Wereszyński and Łyszczynski) to the Balkan Peninsula to explore the possibility of cooperation with individual nations (Michalak, 2011, 165–166). Above all, the camp leadership was keen to reach the Wallachian-Bulgarian borderland, which was poorly controlled by the Turks. Their mission was a half-success, as apart from reports informing them of the current political situation in the Balkans, they did not obtain any other tangible benefits of their expedition. At this point, it is worth noting that the early 1840s marked the beginning of a period in which the Hôtel Lambert was outlining broader perspectives on Balkan affairs. Czartoryski and his supporters began to take activists from the area more seriously in the face of the, as yet little emphasised, partial passivity of the Western powers, who did not want to get involved in the Balkan question. As Jerzy Skowronek noted, “the successes of the aspirations of the Balkan peoples were to facilitate the armed struggle for Poland's independence”, so

9 The political activity of the Hôtel Lambert was constantly supplemented by journalistic activity. Publications with a Slavophile tendency, related to the history and culture of the southern Slavs, and published memoranda on the essence of the Balkan question contributed to the establishment of the Chair of Slavic Languages and Literatures at the Collège de France in Paris. Recognised as the founder of this chair, Prince Adam Jerzy Czartoryski recommended to the French Minister of Enlightenment his candidate who could lead this institution. This was Adam Mickiewicz, who was appointed to the post in September 1840 (Kuziak, 2019; Skowronek, 1983, 179, Kubik, 2015).

the Czartoryski's followers, faced with the collapsing vision of an international conflict, decided to intensify their actions in the Balkans (1983, 180). In my opinion, the attempt at partial independence of Balkan actions, in view of the hostility to this issue of England and France, was related to the possibility of losing the position of the Czartoryski camp in the Balkans. The intensification of political action, among nations under the Turkish yoke, was a fundamental element in the struggle for Polish independence, as only in this configuration could the Slavophile idea be realized¹⁰

In the face of Russian propaganda, which also initiated the trend towards the unification of the Slavs, the camp of the conservative part of the émigrés had to seek support among the Western countries in order to have backing for their initiatives. The beginning of the fifth decade of the 19th century benefited from the popularization of the Balkan question among European countries (Skowronek, 1975, 267). Thanks to the Parisian lectures of Adam Mickiewicz, similar chairs, such as the one at the Collège de France, were established at the universities of Berlin and Wrocław⁶¹. It thus succeeded in getting a wider audience interested in the Southern Slavs. This was certainly welcomed by the activists of the Hôtel Lambert as well as the national liberation conspirators in the Balkans, as it helped to strengthen relations between the West and the Balkan nations. It is worth mentioning the words quoted at the time by Michał Czajkowski to the effect that “one must help the Slavs [...] in order to have influence over them, and with this influence one can only be master of the eastern question” (Cetnarowicz, 1984, 164). This testifies to the aspirations of both Czajkowski and the Hôtel Lambert leadership to stabilize the party's position in the Balkans as the only Polish agency in the area capable of effectively fighting for the emancipation of enslaved nations. The aforementioned Michał Czajkowski moved permanently to Turkey at the time, where he initiated and directed directly the actions of the Hôtel Lambert in the Balkans. He gained the support of the French ambassador in Istanbul and made acquaintances with Turkish officials, which enabled him to carry out his activities (Michalak, 2011, 165). The first effects of his stay in Turkey manifested themselves in early 1842 when he established a Polish settlement, which was named Adampol – after

10 The policy of the Hôtel Lambert towards the Balkan national movements was based on and Slavophilic idea, aiming at a lasting and multifaceted cooperation of the Slavs. The lack of a unified programme of Slavophilism distinguished different concepts of this correlation. The first, which was associated with the current of Panslavism, referred to the cult of the Russian tradition. It proclaimed the political liberation of the Slavs by means of Russia and their unification under its hegemony. The second concept was represented by the Poles, who, through the idea of Slavophilism, wished to find a way to their own rise to independence. The alliance with other Slavic nations was to be based on the moral leadership of Poland, which would occupy a privileged position among them. Slavophilism, represented by the Czartoryski camp, had a decidedly anti-Russian, freedom-oriented and patriotic character. The vision of Polish Slavophilism was to be based on the Catholic West in order to decisively oppose Russian pan-Slavism (Bartoszewski-Wnukowski, 2007, 10; Kuk, 1996, 99–101; Handelsman, 1949, 186–187).



Fig. 1: Portrait of Adam Jerzy Czartoryski (painted by Paul Delaroche in 1857) (Wikimedia Commons).

the leader of the Hôtel Lambert (Kalembka, 1982, 273–274)¹¹. In the summer of 1842, Czajkowski appeared in Paris, where he presented a report to Adam Jerzy Czartoryski on his activities to date and set out his plans for the future. He proposed firmly binding the action of the Hôtel Lambert around Serbia in order to gradually rally all southern Slavs around it, and to launch a propaganda campaign in Ukraine and southern Russia. The Serbian question, which had been in the orbit of the camp's activists prior to Czajkowski's report, played a significant role at the time, as it was around Serbia that the Hôtel Lambert would seek to organise its immediate political following in the Balkans (Skowronek, 1976, 60; Berry, 1985, 62–64; Handelsman, 1949, 103–106)

From 1817, Serbia was ruled by Prince Miloš Obrenović, who, from the late 1830s onwards, focused the attention of Hôtel Lambert activists as a potential leader of the South Slavs (Handelsman, 1949, 94). Prince Adam Czartoryski

¹¹ It was located south of Istanbul, east of the port of Beykoz (Skowronek, 1983, 210–211; Dopierala, 1983).

saw in Prince Miloš a person who would be able to effectively spearhead the national liberation struggle of enslaved peoples and unite southern Slavs, who would become an ally in Polish independence aspirations (Cetnarowicz, 1989)¹².

The events of 1842, when the Obrenović family was overthrown in a dynastic coup, corrected the attitude of the Hôtel Lambert towards the Serbian question. The Serbian upheaval, according to Prince Czartoryski, could have been the trigger for a wider military conflict involving the powers. The vision of war, which was of particular interest to the activists of the Hôtel Lambert, led the Czartoryski's followers, to seek an agreement with the new Prince of Serbia, Aleksandar Karađorđević (Cetnarowicz, 2006, 267–271; Skowronek, 1994, 410).

At the beginning of 1843, Adam Jerzy prepared a special document called *Conseils sur la conduite a suivre par la Serbie*, which was delivered to the Serbian ruler. The concept that Czartoryski presented in the memorial was related to his previous ideas of binding the southern Slavs around Serbia. The thoughts of the leader of the Hôtel Lambert were expanded and modified by František Zach in his work, which he called *Načertanije*¹³.

The document was delivered to Illija Garašanin – Minister of the Interior of Serbia, who approved of the vision presented in Zach's note (Žáček, 1963, 40–42; Žáček 1976, 18–21). The programme outlined by Zach was adopted by the Serbian politician as a vision of the Greater Serbian agenda (Žurek, 2004, 252). The activists of the Hôtel Lambert played the role of initiators of an integration policy plan based on the Greater Serbian concept. They urged their Serbian partners to develop a long-range programme that envisaged the political unification of all South Slav nations. The projected vision also envisaged the involvement of the Slavs located within the borders of the Habsburg monarchy in the new plan (Skowronek, 1991, 31–38).

The cooperation between the Poles and the new Serbian government heralded a tightening of these relations, which gave hope that the camp's stated goals could be realised. Parisian group activists launched a diplomatic campaign to ensure that France and England recognised the election of Prince Alexander, while Michał Czajkowski went to Belgrade to begin efforts to locate permanent

12 The hopes associated with Prince Miloš, however, failed to materialise, as the dynastic interests of the Obrenović family were more important than the prospect of ruling the united Slavic nations. From 1839 onwards, Serbia was ruled by Prince Mihailo Obrenović. He ascended the throne when he was 16 years old and, as a minor, could not rule independently. In view of this, there was a regency (Toma Vučić-Perišić, Avram Petronijević, Jevrem Obrenović) until March 1840. Prince Mihailo Obrenović, son of Miloš, represented the same pragmatic approach as his father. Nevertheless, Adam Czartoryski's views and his vision of Serbia as the centre of a future federation did not change (Cetnarowicz, 1989; Cetnarowicz 2006, 267–271).

13 At the end of July 1843, Prince Czartoryski entrusted František Zach with the task of establishing an agency of the Hôtel Lambert in Belgrade. This agency was to cover with its reach activities in “the Slavic countries of Turkey” (Cetnarowicz, 2017).

agents of the Hôtel Lambert there. Moreover, the deterioration of relations between Belgrade and St Petersburg provided a basis for Czartoryski's party to become a valuable ally for the new Serbian ruler. For the Balkan plans of the Hôtel Lambert, this situation increasingly presented the possibility of their realization. Prince Czartoryski hoped that France, in view of the situation in the Balkans, would decide to support the political efforts of the Hôtel Lambert aimed at the gradual unification of the southern Slavs under the leadership of Serbia. During this period, František Zach set to work to strengthen the national Slav movement. He encouraged all Serbian politicians to cooperate with Garašanin and tried to support the seeds of a national movement in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Cetnarowicz, 1990; Žáček, 1963, 40–42; Żurek, 2015).

The party's activists stressed the need to strengthen the economic pillars of the future federation by, among other things, building a trade road that would connect Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina with the sea coast, thus removing the partial dependence of these countries on Austrian influence. Through the prism of theoretical treatises on federation, the Czartoryski's followers planned to preserve regional distinctiveness for the constituent countries. The closest prospect for translating these plans into Balkan reality was the aspiration of the activists of the Hôtel Lambert to gradually build strong and independent Slavic states within the Ottoman Empire, which, bound together by political and economic treaties, would be able, after the inevitable fall of Turkey, to resist Russian expansion in the Balkans. This point of view was to be a suitable argument for the Serbs to successfully seek the support of the Western powers (Skowronek, 1983, 214; Berry, 1985, 47–52).

In the course of time, the cooperation of the Hôtel Lambert with Prince Alexander was also extended to the level of Serbia's internal affairs. Camp activists proposed sending a group of Serbian children to Paris to attend French schools. František Zach, one of the party's agents in Belgrade, participated in the discussions on the construction of the educational system in Serbia, making many proposals that were partly taken into account in the decisions of the principality's authorities in the following years. One of his personal successes was undoubtedly his involvement in the creation of the Artillery School, which was opened in 1850 (Cetnarowicz, 2003, 163–167; Cetnarowicz 1990).

Prince Czartoryski's plans for an effective agitation for Serbia among Turkish politicians had to be gradually changed, thus postponing the prospect of the Hôtel Lambert's overall Balkan mission. The reason for this state of affairs was the distrust of the Turks towards the new Serbian ruler, which made them evade concessions in favor of Serbia. These actions were motivated by the impossibility of reconciling Turkish political interests with the prince's dynastic ambitions. Moreover, in 1845, the position of the aforementioned agent František Zach was dynamically losing its importance due to which contacts between the Hôtel Lambert and the highest Serbian officials were partially interrupted (Cetnarowicz, 2003, 162–164; Skowronek, 1983, 216).

It is also worth mentioning the actions of the Hôtel Lambert towards the Bulgarian question¹⁴. As early as 1842, Michał Czajkowski, together with the camp's activists, planned to develop, both in Bulgaria and in Istanbul, a wide-ranging educational campaign aimed at creating a national education for Bulgarians (Michalak, 2011, 166–168)¹⁵.

After the Serbian events, Czajkowski came to the conclusion that the Bulgarians were a completely separate nation that did not fit into the Yugoslav concept. He was inclined to develop a broad independent Bulgarian national movement, which would be supported by the Hôtel Lambert as well as by Serbia (Skowronek, 1975, 278). Working with some Turkish politicians, Czajkowski hoped to reach some sort of Bulgarian-Turkish agreement, which would accept the development of a Bulgarian national movement (Popek, 2017, 124–126, Handelsman, 1949, 119–121). Czajkowski's activities, which in time included the aspect of cultural development through the publication of manuscripts and Bulgarian calendars, were approved by a section of Bulgarian society¹⁶.

His agitation to bring Porte and Bulgaria closer together by creating this political compromise was reflected in the support of some Bulgarian national politicians. He became associated with activists leading educational and cultural initiatives. The contacts he gained allowed him to reach out in 1844 to the leaders of the struggle for the national hierarchy of the Bulgarian church, which had lost its autocephaly after the Turkish conquest and was subordinated to the Patriarch of Constantinople. With the support of the Yeromonach Ilarion Makariopolski, he was allowed to hold talks with the leader of the Bulgarian national movement – Georgi Sava Rakovski. The initiator of the two unsuccessful insurrectionary attempts of 1841 and 1842 did not enter into close cooperation with the agent of the Hôtel Lambert, who raised the issue of a compromise programme of Bulgarian aspirations towards Turkey. A partial success of Czajkowski's efforts was to obtain permission from Porte for the return of Bulgarian emigrants from Danube Principalities (Berry, 1985, 63)¹⁷.

Despite the many efforts of his actions were not completely accepted by the Bulgarian people in general, who looked upon Turkey's attitude as a partitioning occupier (Michalak, 2011; Popek, 2017, 131–132). The clergy of the Bulgarian church, expressing their willingness to support some of Czajkowski's actions, became the only avenue through which the Hôtel Lambert could implement its plans in this geographical area. The imprisonment of the clergy in a monastery, by the Patriarch of Constantinople in 1845, marked a certain end to Czajkowski's activities in Bulgaria. In addition, attempts to forge a compromise, put forward towards

14 Described the issue in detail: Popek, 2017, 119–135.

15 BCz, 5413 IV, Action in Bulgaria, Constantinople 1844; BCz, 5411 IV, Letter from Michał Czajkowski, Constantinople, dated 4.04.1843.

16 BCz, 5413 IV, Action in Bulgaria, Constantinople 1844.

17 BCz, 5414 IV, Tsarograd Deposits, Constantinople, dated 3.04.1845.

Turkey by an agent of the Hôtel Lambert, were completely thwarted (Skowronek, 1975, 278). Nonetheless, Michał Czajkowski still tried to maintain contacts with the activists of Bulgarian national movements he had met, but these were not relationships that could link the Polish question with Bulgarian aspirations.

The period following the unsuccessful Bulgarian actions was marked by further failures of the Hôtel Lambert within Serbia. Politicians in the principality, disillusioned in their hopes for greater Western assistance, suggested a rapprochement with Russia. Contacts with the Hôtel Lambert were reduced, perceiving its negligible influence on the policies of France, England and Turkey. The main reason for the weakening of mutual contacts was the discrepancies on Serbian internal and external policy between Czartoryski's party and the leaders of the principality (Cetnarowicz, 1997, 110).

In addition, the efforts, in which the Hôtel Lambert was involved, for concessions from the Porte strengthening Serbian independence failed. Against this backdrop, the Hôtel Lambert turned its attention to the Danube Principalities, as territory that could serve as an immediate logistical base for preparations for a potential uprising in Poland. Particularly important was to be Moldavia, from which it would be easiest to organise a march into Galicia and create a storage area for arms (Handelsman, 1949, 125, 228, 300–303).

The initiation, beyond the influence of the Hôtel Lambert, of the Krakow Uprising of February 1846 further motivated Czartoryski's party to tighten cooperation with the Romanian movements. The events in the Polish lands could have developed into a wider insurrectionary movement, which the Hôtel Lambert wanted to exploit. The Parisian leadership directed its agents to send emissaries to Poland to prepare a force for an almost immediate insurrection 79.

However, attempts to make arrangements with the Romanians failed, which was undoubtedly related to the activities of the emissaries of the Polish Democratic Society (Skowronek, 1983, 272). Attempts by the Hôtel Lambert to establish cooperation with Bulgarian and Romanian activists in the 1840s showed signs of the first crisis in the great Balkan partisan actions. Jerzy Skowronek noted that the partners of the Hôtel Lambert, at that time, were sympathetic to the claim that this partisanship had no significant forces that would create the hope that any of the stated goals of cooperation could be realized (Skowronek, 1976, 99).

The Cracow uprising and the Galician Slaughter lowered the prestige of the Czartoryski camp by putting the party *de facto* outside the uprising movement. The Hotel itself played a diminishing role among Poles under the Partitions. Moreover, the Galician Slaughter aroused the distrust of Balkan peasant activists towards the Polish nobility, who had experienced such violence from the native peasant class. It is worth mentioning that moderate Balkan politicians suspected that the Galician events testified to the predominance of leftist currents in the Polish national liberation movement, which also translated into

distrust of activists associated with Prince Czartoryski (Skowronek, 1975, 280–281; Berry, 1985, 66–67; Kalembka, 1982, 336)¹⁸.

For the Hôtel Lambert, then, a period of struggle for the good name of the camp and their political significance in Poland began. Michał Czajkowski assured Turkish politicians that the events of 1846 had been triggered by the democratic camp and that the peasant uprising had been provoked by Chancellor Metternich. This explanation was probably approved by the Sultan's court, so the Czartoryski camp did not suffer such a significant setback in its relations with Turkey. Moreover, they outlined new scenarios for Balkan action, which were favourably analysed by Turkish politicians.

In the summer of 1847, a group of partisan activists, led by Adam Jerzy Czartoryski and Władysław Zamoyski, drew up a detailed analysis of their camp's foreign policy to date (Skowronek, 1983, 283). The starting point of this outline was the statement that the year 1846 showed the danger that threatened Poles from the left and the partitioning authorities. The Hotel's priority was still Turkey, which should win the favor of the Slavs as its allies. The successes that the Hôtel Lambert had achieved in Serbia between 1842 and 1843 were highlighted, and the demand for another attempt to unite the Danube Principalities was articulated. In Bulgarian affairs, the need to develop a national consciousness as distinct from the Yugoslavs was suggested. This was wanted to be realised through assistance of the native clergy thus laying the foundation for a possible future union with the Catholic Church (Berry, 1985, 62–65; Skowronek, 1983, 281).

Hôtel Lambert, in the period following the release of the study on international affairs, began to pay more attention to projected Catholic actions in the Balkans. There were some 200.000 Catholics living in Albania, Herzegovina and Bosnia, whom the Hôtel Lambert wanted to support so that they would form the basis for initiating new national movements in the Balkans. The camp's activists sought in Turkey to regulate the affairs of Catholics and to strengthen the Church in the areas inhabited by them (Żurek, 2017, 273).

At the same time, Father Hipolit Terlecki, who had established cooperation with Prince Czartoryski's camp, postulated the idea of bringing the Eastern and Catholic Churches closer together through the creation of a new union. There was noticeable scepticism about this idea among a significant number of activists at the Hôtel Lambert, who increasingly understood the Balkan realities, as it would require a lengthy process. In addition, Michał Czajkowski, Ludwik Zawierkowski and František Zach tried to support the view of fighting for national churches within the Orthodox Church (Skowronek, 1975, 282).

The various variants of Catholic action remained only the realm of theoretical considerations during the 1840s. They did not gain the clear support of most of the Balkan partners of the Hôtel Lambert. English politicians were reluctant

18 On the policy of Prince Adam Jerzy Czartoryski towards the Republic of Krakow cf.: Żurawski vel Grajewski, 2018.

to accept the proposal of the Czartoryski camp, but the French approached the idea with great openness. A positive exception to this background was associated with the Bulgarians, where the long-standing work of the Hôtel Lambert's agents, especially the Istanbul agency, led to a clear support in the years 1859–1860 union of the Bulgarians with the Catholic Church. Czartoryski's follower Władysław Jordan played a key role in contacting Daragan Tsankov, who set the Bulgarian national movement on the path of union with Rome (Widerszal, 1937, 108, 119–120). Władysław Jordan coordinated the campaign to finance various Bulgarian activities in the late 1850s, including in particular support for the journal of the Unitarian movement "Bulgaria". This activity was directly supported by Adam Jerzy Czartoryski, who sought support for the whole venture from the French. The Bulgarian Greek Catholic Church, founded in 1860, subsequently played an important role in the Bulgarian national movement in the 1860s and 1870s. Polish Uniate priests also played an important role in this process, such as Bishop Franciszek Malczewski (Kukiel, 2008, 270; Bender, 1974, 292; Widerszal, 1937, 108–121).

The period of the Springtime of the Peoples was a period of hope for the Hôtel Lambert for the revival of Balkan contacts. However, the international situation was not a determinant factor that could have pushed the party to such commitment as it presented in the years 1843–1845. Jerzy Skowronek emphasised that the Czartoryski camp was in fact undertaking ad hoc actions, defensive as it were, to eliminate or weaken conflicts that were particularly dangerous at the time (1975, 283).

The actions of the Hôtel Lambert during the Springtime of the Peoples particularly concerned the Slavic nations located within the Habsburg monarchy, which is not the subject of this work¹⁹. The years following the Springtime of the Peoples were characterized by the Hôtel Lambert's marasmus on Balkan issues. One could see the gradual disappearance of the party's influence in the area. This period was associated with the departure from the Czartoryski camp of two significant figures who had shaped the Balkan policy of the Hôtel Lambert in the past, namely Michał Czajkowski and František Zach (Berry, 1985, 66–67).

On the eve of the Crimean War, the last Serbian hope of playing any kind of political role in the Principality – namely Ilija Garašanin – was dismissed – a move that scuppered the already illusory prospects of cooperation with the Serbs (Wasilewski & Felczak, 1985, 307). The conflict itself, which lasted from 1853 to 1856, was the realisation of the expectations of the Hôtel Lambert and above all of Adam Jerzy Czartoryski, who had been counting on him for over twenty years (Kukiel, 2008, 271; Wierzbicki, 2013, 26–34). Faced with this situation, the Prince's camp could not be indifferent, as confirmed by Marian Kukiel, who stated that the activists of the Hôtel Lambert became

19 In detail on this topic: Żurek, 2005; Dziwanowski, 1948.

more active than ever, and that Prince Czartoryski himself “displayed youthful energy” (2008, 272). The camp’s leader supervised work on a general political plan that was to propose specific solutions to Balkan and Polish affairs. The aim of this programme was to win over Austria, for support of the Polish question, by ceding to it the Danube principalities and creating from them a united Romania under the Habsburg scepter. This state was also to include Transylvania. Faced with this idea, Austria would potentially be ready to cede Galicia, which would become the focal point for building an independent Poland. Prince Czartoryski envisaged the creation of separate statehoods for the Balkan countries. The success of this vision was to be determined by the will of the Western states, which would become guarantors of their future independence (Skowronek, 1975, 284).

Another important aspect was the creation of a Polish armed force, which could be renamed as the future Polish army. To this end, Prince Adam Jerzy sent Władysław Zamoyski to Turkey, who, apart from vague promises, failed to obtain any assurances. The Hôtel Lambert, believing in the chances of a successful Polish military formation, could not obtain the consent of the Western powers, who, in view of the uncertain international situation, did not want to support the Polish question too much (Kukiel, 2008, 282; Wierzbicki, 2013, 39–49). As time went on, Czartoryski’s political plans were marginalized, as no Western power took the prince’s ideas seriously enough to attempt to make them a reality. The only hope that the Hôtel Lambert placed in the Western states towards the end of the conflict was to organise the nucleus of a Polish army. In October 1855, it was decided that there would be a Polish regiment formed by Władysław Zamoyski, which would be in the pay of the British under the name of the Sultan’s Cossacks (Kukiel, 2008, 289). This event provided some basis on which Prince Czartoryski could still count on the support of the Polish question by the French and English governments, but as in previous years this was an illusory hope. The regiment of Sultan’s Cossacks was joined by many Poles from prisoner-of-war camps (Urbanik & Baylen, 1981; Wierzbicki, 2013, 67–102; Kalembka, 1982, 381).

In addition, the former agent of the Hôtel Lambert, Michał Czajkowski, now named Sadik Pasha because he had embraced Islam, coordinated the Cossack formations in Turkey. He was convinced that Porte would provide the Balkan countries with a degree of autonomy by which he would win the sympathy of the Slavs, who would feed into the Cossack ranks and this could create a platform for mutual relations between the Balkan nations and the Empire (Michalak, 2011). This idea failed, as both Turks and Slav activists could not agree to such conditions. The southern Slavs saw in the Crimean War an opportunity to articulate their national aspirations and therefore every attempt to preserve, in various forms, dependence on Turkey was incompatible with their national interest (Skowronek, 1975, 284).

The end of the Crimean War again oscillated around the wait-and-see attitude of Czartoryski, who hoped to champion the Polish question at the peace congress and to maintain the Zamoyski regiment. Unfortunately, neither of these issues was achieved (Skowronek, 1975, 284; Cetnarowicz, 2003, 166–167).

After the war, with which Czartoryski had pinned so many hopes, he removed himself from public life, seeing the real ineffectiveness of his political efforts to regain Poland's independence (Kukiel, 2008, 295). In time, the leader of the Hôtel Lambert recalled that Austria was ready and willing to restore Poland's independence and that the idea was approved by France and only the indifference of England prevented the success of the initiative (Kukiel, 2008, 301). Nonetheless, this was an opinion that was formed in retrospect, probably explaining to some extent the ineffective actions of the Prince. The last major initiative of the Hôtel Lambert in the Balkans was attempted to create a Bulgarian Greek-Catholic Church at the beginning of the 1860s, which was inspired mainly by Władysław Jordan (Widerszal, 1937, 119–120). On 15 July 1861, Prince Adam Jerzy Czartoryski died, which was undoubtedly a blow to the party's activists, since regardless of the assessments of his activities, he was the *spiritus movens* of the Hôtel Lambert and the main initiator of all the Balkan actions of the party (Kukiel, 2008, 302). After his death, some of the Hôtel Lambert activists became involved in political activities directly under the auspices of the Ottoman Empire. There were known cases that certain individuals acted against the Balkan national liberation movements, which led to criticism of the Poles by Slavic activists (Skowronek, 1975, 283).

CONCLUSION

The Hôtel Lambert, in creating a comprehensive conception of its foreign policy, expressed in it a theoretically concretized vision of organising the Balkan nations into a various state organisms. The Balkan policy of the Hôtel Lambert had a defined task before it. It was to be the tool through which Poland would regain its independence. Thus, it heralded the return of Poles from exile to a free homeland. The Balkan concept, which had a real chance of materialising in the first years of Prince Aleksandar Karađorđević's rule, was undoubtedly a significant political project (Skowronek, 1994, 410). Its value, however, was not duly endorsed or fully understood at the time, which was primarily related to the limited support for these actions by France and England. As Hans Henning Hahn noted, the difficulty for the Hôtel Lambert was to conduct foreign policy in exile (Hahn, 1987, 336). Although the Czartoryski camp's freedom of action was not overly restricted, the clout of its own arguments, without the support of foreign powers, was negligible on the international arena. The influence of the Balkan concept, which in its optimal version envisaged the creation of a federation of autonomous states uniting around the

Principality of Serbia, the strongest in the region, undoubtedly had an impact on the formation of Serbian political thought. The role of the Balkan policy of the Hôtel Lambert in the face of the dynamically changing political reality in the Balkans was accepted, above all in the 1840s, by the representatives of Balkan national movements, and although it eventually tendency to oppose the actions of the Czartoryski party, it had a significant impact on the formation of national consciousness in the countries under discussion (Cetnarowicz, 2003, 160–167). Prince Czartoryski's camp wanted to take advantage of the situation of the Ottoman Empire to organise culturally strong nations within its borders, which in due course, with some acquiescence from the Porte, would gain independence by being on friendly terms with the former invader. This concept presented to both parties involved was not properly interpreted, as the Turks did not want to get rid of their possessions. On the other hand, the Balkan peoples did not want to create any new dependencies with a state, for centuries symbolizing the aggressor, which deprived many nations on the Balkan Peninsula of having their own statehood.

It is important to underline the fact that the Balkan concept represented by Hôtel Lambert activists contributed to the emergence and consolidation of the idea of cooperation between the peoples of the future Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (Wasilewski, Felczak, 1985, 476). It can thus be concluded that Czartoryski's vision, in some limited form, influenced the socio-political life of the Balkan peoples in the following decades. Despite its final defeat during the period of the Hôtel Lambert's activities (Hahn, 1973, 373–374) the policy brought many benefits to the individual nations of the region. The policy influenced Western opinions on Balkan affairs and the political thought of individual Serbian, Bulgarian or Romanian activists. Jerzy Skowronek noted that the Balkan programme of the Hôtel Lambert was an interesting manifestation of abstract political thought – Enlightenment and Romantic – which evolved under the influence of reality in the Balkans (Skowronek, 1983, 296). It is worth noting that the activities of the Hôtel Lambert also influenced Polish political thought, various elements of which were implemented into selected directions of political thinking in the 20th century.

BALKAN KOT POT DO POLJSKE NEODVISNOSTI.
OBRAZ BALKANSKE POLITIKE HOTELA LAMBERT V ODNOSU
DO NACIONALNIH GIBANJ, KI SO SE OBLIKOVALA
ZNOTRAJ MEJA OSMANSKEGA CESARSTVA

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POVZETEK

Hôtel Lambert je razvil celovit pristop k svoji balkanski politiki. Strankarski aktivisti, zlasti knez Czartoryski, so predstavili teoretično vizijo, ki bi ob ustreznih mednarodnih podporah oblikovala novo realnost na Balkanu. Ta koncept je predvideval organizacijo balkanskih narodov v avtonomne državne organizacije. Programski koncepti tega tabora so pokazali, da imajo široko paleto možnosti vplivanja na družbeno-politično stvarnost na Balkanu. Njihova ustvarjalna iznajdljivost in samostojno oblikovanje postulatov pričata o izjemno dragoceni politični misli, iz katere so v naslednjih desetletjih črpali poljski in balkanski politiki. Vizija organizacije balkanskih narodov naj bi bila ena od ključnih faz v procesu ponovne osamosvojitve Poljske. Balkanski koncept, ki je imel v prvih letih vladavine kneza Aleksandra Karađevića realne možnosti za uresničitev, je bil nedvomno pomemben politični projekt. Vendar njegova vrednost v tistem času ni bila ustrezno priznana ali v celoti razumljena, predvsem zaradi omejene podpore zahodnih sil, Francije in Anglije. Končna ocena vseh balkanskih dejavnosti v regiji torej ni bila posledica politične nezrelosti balkanskih narodov, temveč pasivnega odnosa zahodnih sil. Tabor kneza Czartoryskega je želel izkoristiti položaj Osmanskega cesarstva in na njegovem ozemlju organizirati kulturno močne narode, ki bi sčasoma, z nekaj privolitve Porte, postali neodvisni in hkrati ostali v prijateljskih odnosih z nekdanjim zavojevalcem. Ta koncept, ki je bil predstavljen obema stranema, ni bil pravilno interpretiran, saj se Turki niso želeli znebiti svojih posesti, medtem ko balkanska ljudstva niso želela ustvariti novih odvisnih držav z državo, ki je že stoletja simbolizirala agresorja.

Ključne besede: Adam Jerzy Czartoryski, XIX stoletje, velika poljska emigracija, Balkan, balkanska politika, Osmansko cesarstvo

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THE FIRST CROATIAN SERIES OF POSTCARDS OF RIJEKA AND SURROUNDINGS ISSUED BETWEEN 1889 AND 1891

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ABSTRACT

The primary aim of the paper is to analyse the entirety of the first Croatian series of postcards depicting Rijeka, Opatija, Trsat, Sušak, Kraljevica, Volosko, Bakar, and Lovran from 1889 to 1891 and examine their impact on mass printing of photographs, the development of postcards, and impact on the development of tourism. Postcards are understood as integral multilevel hereditary information carriers, which are, essentially, communicators. The main focus is given to the photographers Alois Beer and Ilario Carposio, the printing house Stabilimento Tipo – Lithografico Fiumano, the engraver V. Turati Inc., and other participants in the process of creating postcards. The first analysis is based on the evaluation and selection of old postcards, the second one is based on comparing photographs with woodcuts and halftone printing in printed publications, and the third analysis is based on the comparison of quantitative available data of postcards with the information from the La Bilancia and La Varietà newspapers.

Keywords: earlier postcards, Rijeka, Opatija, halftone printing, Stabilimento Tipo-litografico fiumano, Alois Beer, Ilario Carposio

LA PRIMA SERIE DI CARTOLINE CROATE DI FIUME E DINTORNI PUBBLICATA TRA 1889 E IL 1891

SINTESI

L'obiettivo principale dell'articolo è quello di analizzare l'intera serie di cartoline croate che ritraggono Fiume, Abbazia, Tersatto, Sussak, Portorè, Volosca, Buccari e Laurana dal 1889 al 1891 ed esaminare il loro impatto sulla stampa di massa di fotografie, lo sviluppo delle cartoline e l'impatto sullo sviluppo del turismo. Le cartoline sono intese come portatrici integrali di informazioni ereditarie a più livelli, che sono, essenzialmente,

comunicatori. L'attenzione è rivolta soprattutto ai fotografi Alois Beer e Ilario Carposio, alla tipografia Stabilimento Tipo – Litografico Fiumano, all'incisore V. Turati Inc. e ad altri partecipanti al processo di creazione delle cartoline. La prima analisi si basa sulla valutazione e sulla selezione di vecchie cartoline, la seconda sul confronto tra le fotografie e le xilografie e i mezzitoni delle pubblicazioni a stampa, mentre la terza analisi si basa sul confronto tra i dati quantitativi disponibili delle cartoline e le informazioni dei giornali La Bilancia e La Varietà.

Parole chiave: prime cartoline, Fiume, Abbazia, stampa a mezzatinta, Stabilimento Tipo-litografico fiumano, Alois Beer, Ilario Carposio

INTRODUCTION

The reason for the problematisation of the first series of postcards in Croatia depicting Rijeka and its surroundings was that Rijeka was chosen as the cultural capital of Europe in 2020.¹ This event has served as a stimulus for understanding the visual identity of the city of the late 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century on the example of the now discarded symbol of tourism – postcards. Since the second half of the 19th century, the territories of Istria, Dalmatia, and the exotic Balkan regions have been of interest to French, English, and German photographers and lithographers who published motifs from these regions in books and various other types of publications. Illustrated newspapers of that age were full of exotic motifs from faraway Africa and Asia, or Dalmatia, the Balkans, and Istria. Such motifs in photographs and lithographs of the second half of the 19th century are complemented by panoramic views or motifs of newly built objects in order to represent a place as well as possible. The emergence of a new media – the postal card, which has spread throughout Europe since 1. 10. 1869, can be traced chronologically, based on the information on the back of the illustrated postal card printed in 1894 for the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the first printed postal card (Bogavčić private collection, Jubiläums Karte, 1894).²

The postcard as a new medium, created after the postal card, appeared in the early 1870s on the territory of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy (Ferchenbauer, 2008, 234; Krátký, 2019, 41), France (Frech, 1991, 8), and Germany (Degen, 1998,

1 The presentation on the topic “Rijeka on the First Croatian Series of Postcards from 1889 to 1890”, VI Croatian Congress of Historians, Rijeka, 29. 11. – 2. 10. 2021, was given on 29. 11. 2021.

2 An illustrated postal card, the back of which shows information about the years of printing of the first postal cards throughout Europe and the world, so for Austro-Hungarian Monarchy the date given is 1. 10. 1869, for Switzerland, Luxembourg, and some German states it is 1870, Kingdom of Italy 1874, Principality of Serbia 1873, etc.

12–13) and its origins can be traced in their development from illustrated postal cards to postcards. In Croatian, but also in a broader context, postcards originate from the form of hand-illustrated postal cards to the emergence of the first printed illustrated postal cards, which preceded the serial mass-production of postcards (Bogavčić & Salopek Bogavčić, 2020, 126–129). The appearance of Rijeka postcards in this paper is considered in the context of the appearance of similar series in Tyrol and Trieste, which arose immediately before the Rijeka series or at a similar time. Series of postcards on such territories as Kingdom of Italy³ (Torboli, 2022, 2, 216–286), Archduchy of Austria below the Enns and County of Tyrol⁴ (Torboli, 2022, 90–91, 128, 130, 135–36) and the Kingdom of Bohemia⁵ (Degen, 1998, 14–21) are first created in the 1880s. The Croatian context of the development of the first series of postcards is connected with the first postcard of Opatija, created immediately before the Rijeka series of postcards, i.e., no later than 1888 (Bogavčić & Salopek Bogavčić, 2020, 129).

The first Croatian series of postcards from 1889 to 1891 shows the area of Rijeka⁶ and its adjacent parts of the Margraviate of Istria (Opatija, Lovran, Volosko, and the Istrian coast) and parts of the Modruš-Rijeka County (Sušak, Trsat, Bakar, and Kraljevica). The paper will compare how the photographs by recognised authors relate to the motifs on the postcards, analyse the dynamics and techniques under which they were printed, analyse how the postcards were distributed, and also emphasize what the impacts of the first series of postcards were.

Understanding the contextualization of the origin of the first series of postcards is complemented by further comparison and analysis of data at three levels. The first level of analysis was based on the evaluation of numerous domestic and foreign private and public collections of photographs and postcards. The secondary level of assessment, based on the analysis of photographs and printed publications, is supplemented by analyses of printing processes. Based on the quantitative analysis of the postcards and the consideration of articles from the *La Varietà* and *La Bilancia* newspapers, the process of issuing the first batch of postcards was reconstructed as the third methodological level. The results were obtained on the volume, time, quantity, and dynamics of printing of the postcards of the aforementioned series, which were additionally supplemented with data on the distribution and sale of postcards. Thus, quantitative analysis on a small sample of found and preserved postcards made it possible to estimate the total circulation, as well as analyse

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- 3 Italian postcards date from the mid-1870s, postal cards from 1873, while the first large series of Italian postcards, according to the Torboli was created simultaneously with the Rijeka series and contains 240 different motifs.
 - 4 Austrian postcards were first created in 1870/71, the series of illustrated postal cards of Vienna and Tyrol was created in the mid-1880s, while the postcard series of Tyrol was created in the late-1880s.
 - 5 Bohemian postcards were created in the 1870s, and in the late 1890s, a series of the Sokol movement postcards was created.
 - 6 Corpus separatum, the City of Rijeka and surroundings (*Fiume város és kerülete*). Rijeka was separate part from Kingdom of Croatia and Slavonia directly connected with Lands of the Crown of Saint Stephen.

the use of the language of their users, the impact of legislation on printing, the dynamics of postal use of the preserved postcards, and the general enterprise of printing the first batch of postcards by a printing company such as *Stabilimento Tipo-litografico Fiumano*.

VALORISATION OF POSTCARDS

The understanding of postcards as a source of information or as an information communicator (Maroević, 1993, 123), and not only as illustrations, was preceded by a systematic collecting, evaluation, analysis, and synthesis of various aspects of postcards. This methodology was supplemented by quantitative analyses that would allow evaluating the postcards in their totality on the basis of visual, printed, linguistic, material-figurative, technical-technological, symbolic, sociological, operational, and similar content. Quantitative analysis of postcards in various public and private collections makes it possible to determine how rare the postcards are, understand their circulation, and trace the flow of audience interest in it, depending on whether it has been printed in several editions or only a single edition. For the purposes of this research, many museums, libraries, and archival public and private collections in Croatia and in abroad⁷ have been consulted, and, in the collections of the Maritime and Historical Museum of the Croatian Littoral, Rijeka⁸, and the National and University Library of Zagreb⁹, one postcard from this series in each location have been discovered. There are seven large private collections of Rijeka postcards in Rijeka, and in five of them, not a single postcard from this series exists, although the collections number several thousand different units of examples of Rijeka postcards from the end of the 19th century to the Second World War. One item from this series was found in one private collection, while in the largest collection of Rijeka postcards,¹⁰ there are around ten different items from this series (Smešny, 2020, 97–106). In other private collections in Croatia there are two postcards from this series¹¹, while in foreign private collections, such as the Vujičić private collection¹², there are two postcards from this series.

7 The following postcard collections were examined: the Maritime and Historical Museum of the Croatian Littoral, the Museum of the City of Rijeka, the National and University Library, the Maritime and Historical Museum of Istria, the Croatian State Archive, the Museum of Tourism, the Hungarian Archives, Museum and Library Database- Hungaricana, the Österreichische Nationalbibliothek – Ansichtskartenportal, etc.

8 Historical and Maritime Museum of the Croatian Littoral, Rijeka, Postcard Collection, *Fiume, veduta generale*, KPO-ZR 309, PPMHP 111815.

9 National and University Library of Zagreb (hereinafter NUL), Postcard Collection, *Tersatto*, GZ 30/1987.

10 The largest collection of Rijeka postcards, Vladimir Smešny, has been the basis for cataloguing the postcards of the City of Rijeka since 1889. Four volumes have been released up to the year 1925.

11 One postcard is from Mario Kuzmanović private postcards collection, Slavonski Brod and other owner wants to remain anonymous.

12 Milan Vujičić private postcards collection, Vienna.

The Lukan private collection¹³ had one such postcard, which was presented as a gift on the occasion of the creation of this paper to one of the authors. The Bogavčić private collection¹⁴ features about twenty different examples of postcards of this series. The first series of the Rijeka postcards is specific because of a small number of preserved examples, which makes it extremely rare, and also because of the fact that this is the first Croatian “mass” printed series of postcards. For comparison, in 1896, an extensive series of postcards were printed on the occasion of the Millennial Exhibition in Budapest, of which three postcards show areas in Kingdom of Croatia and Slavonia (Plitvice Lakes and Zagreb) and City of Rijeka (Viestnik Županije virovitičke, 1. 9. 1896, 2) and they cannot be considered rare based on their frequency, since several hundred examples of each motif have been preserved. Therefore, in order to understand the emergence of postcards in Croatia at that time, it is necessary to analyse its various aspects, such as material, size, form, type of printing, printing language, role of the publisher, author, printer, distributor and seller, as well as the handwritten messages of the users, postal use, motifs, ownership, the social interactions of the users, and others elements that can be found on the postcards.

In total, 24 different motifs were found on 44 postcards of the specified series of Rijeka and the surrounding area in all public and private collections. Based on the analysis of the periodicals of *La Bilancia* and *La Varietà*, the existence of 14 additional motifs was recorded, which make up the whole of the 38 motifs of that first series. (Table 1). Out of the 38 motifs from the first series of postcards, nine motifs remain unknown, while five motifs were found based on literature: *Via Governo*, *Hohe See (Costa Istriana con una Nave in Pericolo)*, *Tunnel Mundung (Shocco del Tunnel al Dolaz)* *Städtisches Schulgebäude (Edificio della Scuole)*, *Magy. kir. Tengereszeti Akademia (Accademia di Marina)* (Smešny, 2020, 105). Of the fourteen unknown motifs and motifs known only from the literature (designation 0A and 0B in Table 1), a visual representation of five of them (designation 0B) was found in the literature, whereas for nine motifs (designation 0A) it is unknown what they looked like. The analysis of the found postcards showed that thirteen motifs were found in one item (designation 1 in Table 1), five motifs were found twice (designation 2 in Table 1), three motifs were preserved three times, and three more motifs were preserved four times (designations 3 and 4 in Table 1). The analysis showed that the most preserved motifs were the most general since panoramic and general images of the city of Rijeka and Opatija were preserved in several examples (3–4 items), unlike the individual building motifs (Villa Ružić, etc.) or certain small settlements in the vicinity (Kraljevica), which were not found at all. The above is the result of the users’ demand for common and familiar motifs that symbolised the settlement.

13 Walter Lukan private postcards collection, Vienna.

14 Ivan Bogavčić private postcards collection, Zagreb. Dimensions of all postcards from this serie in Bogavčić private postcards collection are around 140x 85 mm.

Table 1: representation of the number of preserved postcards based on motifs.

Motifs	Information about the type and number of motifs	Number of preserved / found postcards			
		1 item	2 items	3 items	4 items
Unknown image motives (0A)	9				
Known image motifs from literature (0B)	5				
Known image motifs based on postcards	24	13	5	3	3
Total motifs	38				

FROM PHOTOGRAPHY TO POSTCARDS

Rijeka newspapers¹⁵ published articles about the novelty – the arrival of postcards. No magazine, newspaper, or any other publication of that time in the territory of modern Croatia¹⁶ have published an article about the advent of postcards until 1892¹⁷ (Bogavčić, 2014, 28–29). Why did this happen in Rijeka, and not in Split, which already in 1880 had the first postcard¹⁸ in region (Bogavčić & Salopek Bogavčić, 2020, 128)? The possibility probably lies in a number of circumstances that have made Rijeka as well as its surroundings one of the more innovative and fashionable centers of the Monarchy since the second half of the 19th century. The printing house that printed the first batch of Croatian postcards *Stabilimento Tipo-litografico Fiumano*, has existed in Rijeka since 1862. Its owner Emidio Mohovich (Mohovich, 2021) was a Croatian journalist and publisher who initially worked together with Carl Huber (Smokvina, 2003, 186). *Stabilimento Tipo-litografico Fiumano* printed numerous pamphlets, statistical reviews, gymnasium reports, economic and industrial reviews of Rijeka, as well as the newspapers *Giornale Di Fiume* (1865 – 1871), *La Bilancia* (1868 – 1919) and *La Varietà* (1882 – 1896.) From the 1860s, Rijeka competed with Trieste and thus became an increasingly important industrial centre, which, with its port, shipbuilding, metallurgy, and chemical industries, stimulated the development of transport and, consequently, tourism. The adoption of the City Charter in 1872, the appearance of the Southern

15 La Bilancia, 13. 9. 1889: Novita in Carte di Corrispodenza, 2., La Varietà, 14. 9. 1899, Novita in Carte di Corrispodenza, 2.

16 It was divided in Triune Kingdom of Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia with separate City of Rijeka and Margraviate of Istria.

17 The Research Legacy of Giardini, 1994, 4.

18 One of the oldest Croatian postcards depicting Split from 1880. is illustrated postal card with in advance printed postal stamp at reverse side (similar as postal stationary).



Fig. 1: Alois Beer, Fiume von Hafen (Smešny private collection, Smešny, 2020, 3, photograph cca 1880).

Railway in 1873 in Rijeka, and the adoption of a town-planning plan in 1874 (Žic, 1999, 82–83.) influenced the additional development of the city in the communication and urban planning sense. Opatija, in turn, developed as a tourist destination in the 1840s, and realised its potential in the 1880s, when it became a health and tourism centre (Kranjčević & Muzur, 2020, 135). The vistas of the city were interesting not only to ordinary citizens and visitors but were also considered special and were presented (in the 1880s) as a gift. Sets of photographs by Carlo Zamboni and Illario Carposio were presented as a gift to the Royal Family upon their visit to Rijeka in 1885. (Labus & Smokvina, 1995, 300; Smokvina, 2003, 194). *The Stabilimento Tipo-litografico Fiumano* printing house collaborated not only with many local photographers, but also with the official monarchical photographer. Thanks to foreign photographers, photography “came to life” in Rijeka from 1844 to 1861 (Labus & Smokvina, 1995, 299). After the opening of Emidio Mohovich’s store in 1865, photographs were sold there as part of the assortment (Smokvina, 2003, 187). In Mohovich’s newspaper, *Giornale di Fiume*, many photographers with whom he worked advertised their services, from Ignazio Pollak, Salamon Hering (Labus & Smokvina, 1995, 299) to photographers like Ilario Carposio and Carlo Zamboni von Lorbeerfeld, who advertise themselves in *La Bilancia* (Smokvina, 2003, 192, 197). It seems that Emidio Mohovich also collaborated with Alois Beer, the official photographer of the Imperial and Royal Navy. Based on

photographs of Rijeka from the second half of the 19th century, one can see how the motifs from the photographs taken in the 1870s and 1880s were used as photographic templates for the first series of postcards of Rijeka and its surroundings.

Of at least seventeen motifs on postcards issued before September 13, 1889 (Smešny, 2020, 97–105; Bogavčić private collection, 1889–1891) for fourteen of them, it is known what they looked like, for at least seven, this research determined that these were photographs by Ilario Carposio, used as postcard templates, and two were made based on photographs by Alois Beer. Looking at the available and published photographs of Ilario Carposio, one can see how the photographs, which were used as templates for postcards, were created mainly in the early 1880s, for example, the published photographs *The Corso* (Galić, 1995, 66), *Theatre* (Dubrović, 1995, 54), or the panoramic photograph of the *View of Rijeka from Trsat* (Smokvina, 2004, 17). An interesting example is a photo of I. R. Accademia di Marina made by Ilario Carposio¹⁹, that was template for woodcut, published in the book *Fiume und Seine Umgebungen* (Littrow, 1884, 26–27), and then again photograph template for the postcard printed in 1889. Two motifs from postcards printed in September 1889 – Trsat and the motif of the Rijeka port (*Porto Interno*) (Bogavčić private collection, 1889–1891) – were printed according to the photographic templates of Alois Beer. In the example of a photo of the Rijeka port by Alois Beer named *Fiume von Hafen*²⁰ (Albertina Foto, GLV2000/18385), which was determined after 1875²¹, it can be seen how the photograph was a template for the woodcut *Le Port de Fiume* (Bogavčić private collection; Bauron, 1888, 65) (Figure 2).

The book lists M. L'abbe P. Bauron as the author of the photograph. A similar photo template by Alois Beer (Smešny, 2020, 3) (Figure 1) was used to create one postcard (Figure 3) as part of the first batch of postcards, i.e., *Porto Interno*²² (Bogavčić private collection, 1889–1891). Both photos are numbered 2292 (Smešny, 2020, 3) and were made from the same negative, but have significantly different frames. In addition to the shifts in framing, the photographs differ in that the one from which the postcard was made was additionally retouched (one boat is missing and the flag is flat). The photograph from which the *Porto interno* postcard was made was a template for the subsequent creation of many lithographic postcards with the same port motif found in the postcard editions of Carl Otto Hayd (Smešny, 2020, 39), A. Rosenblatt (Smešny, 2020, 135), Carl Spies (Smešny, 2020, 168, 170), etc.

19 The authors would like to thank Miljenko Smokvina for allowing them to view the copies of photos by Ilario Carposio.

20 Alois Beer, *Croatische Kuste, Fiume von Hafen*, no. 2292, 490, in: Albertina Foto GLV2000/18385. [https://sammlungenonline.albertina.at/?query=search=/record/objectnumbersearch=\[FotoGLV2000/18385\]&showtype=record](https://sammlungenonline.albertina.at/?query=search=/record/objectnumbersearch=[FotoGLV2000/18385]&showtype=record) (last access: 2022-07-07).

21 Alois Beer, *Croatische Kuste, Fiume von Hafen*, no. 2292, 490, in: Albertina Foto GLV2000/18385. [https://sammlungenonline.albertina.at/?query=search=/record/objectnumbersearch=\[FotoGLV2000/18385\]&showtype=record](https://sammlungenonline.albertina.at/?query=search=/record/objectnumbersearch=[FotoGLV2000/18385]&showtype=record) (last access: 2022-07-07).

22 The postcard with the second title - Porto, was probably printed after the first edition was sold out, as can be seen from the title in newspaper articles and on the Type C reverse side.



Fig. 2: *Le Port de Fiume*, illustration M. l'abbe P. Bauron, *Les Rives illyriennes: Istrie, Dalmatie, Monténégro*, Woodbury-type, 1888 (Bogavčić private collection).




Fig. 3: *Fiume Porto Interno*. Postcard issued before 13. 9. 1889, postal use 26. 12. 1893 (Bogavčić private collection, 1889–1891).

Based on the catalogue of photographs by Alois Beer (*Katalog von Landschaftsaufnahmen von Alois Beer*, 1892, 32) it is possible to determine that he also took the photo of Tersatto (Smešny, 2020, 3), which was also taken after 1875 (*Katalog von Landschaftsaufnahmen von Alois Beer*, 1892, 32), and was the basis for creating a postcard (Smešny, 2020, 102; Bogavčić private collection, 1889–1891), which is engraved *AV (ph)*. In this series of photographs made by Alois Beer there are ten photographs of Rijeka and Trsat, numbered from 2290 to 2300 (*Katalog von Landschaftsaufnahmen von Alois Beer*, 1892, 32). In the catalogue of photographs by Alois Beer, a series of photographs of the Istrian coast ends with a photograph of Lovran, i.e., number 2261, and a new series of photographs begins with the photographs of Bakar (2320 and 2321) and Kraljevica (2324). Postcards of Lovran and Kraljevica that might have been printed on September 14, 1889 are perhaps based on photographs by Alois Beer. In addition to the fact that a couple of postcards of Rijeka and its surroundings were based on the photographic templates by Alois Beer, they were also created on the photographic templates by authors who tended to photograph the city itself more, such as Ilario Carposio and possibly Carlo Zamboni von

Lorbeerfeld. Thus, out of 14 postcards created around 14. 9. 1889, six of them had a photographic template based on the photography of Ilario Carposio, six were based on unknown photographic templates (one, possibly, I. Carposio)²³ and two were certainly based on Alois Beer's photography. The time range of photographs that served as a photographic template ranges from 1875 to 1888. Perhaps the earliest photographs were taken based on Alois Beer's catalogue around 1875, while the latter ones may have been created around 1887 or 1888, e.g., when the construction of the Continental Hotel was completed, also called the "Bačić Palace" in honour of its owner Hinko Vitez Bačić (Bacich), that is, as the very name of the postcard says "Sussak (Palazzo Baccich)" (La Varietà, 19. 10. 1889, 1).²⁴ Comparing postcards with photographs, it was noticed that sometimes the frame of the motif on the postcard is significantly reduced than the frame of the photograph. The above can be seen by comparing the photo of the Ürmény Square and Insula Gorup²⁵ with the postcard entitled *Mercati coperti*²⁶ (Smešny, 2020, 98). The postcards of the first Croatian series were printed until the beginning of 1890 and, accordingly, the photographs that served as photographic templates could have been created by 1890. However, these are mostly photographs that were created in the 1880s.

THE ROLE OF THE ENGRAVER IN THE PRODUCTION OF POSTCARDS

By linking which photographic templates the postcards were created from, it is possible to determine the authorship of the photographer, more accurately determine the mutual dating and whether there was subsequent interference on the postcard in relation to the original photo, as well as to compare the frame of the postcard with the frame of the photograph. In general, most of the postcards before 1918 were created by a photo-mechanical process from photographs, using halftone printing and collotype processes, while a smaller part was created using lithographic techniques and photographic methods. The halftone printing with which this series of postcards was created was mainly used until 1895, and after that, the postcards were mostly printed with collotype. Halftone printing is a graphic process consisting of two sequences: the first is for creating a reprophotographic screen template (a halftone negative) from a photograph, and the second is for transferring a print which reproduces photographs to a metal plate (often zinc) using mechanical printing (Stulik & Kaplan, 2013, 5), i.e., prints a postcard or other types of illustrated print. The size and location of the dots affect the lighter or darker tone of the image, and

23 Based on the information about the negative of the photo provided by mr. Smokvina (the original is in the Magyar Nemzeti Múzeum Magyarország, neg. 64413, motif of the Accademia di Marina).

24 La Varietà, 19. 10. 1889: Carte di Corrispondenza delle Vedute di Fiume e Contorni, 1.

25 PPMHP, 101078, author unknown, circa 1884. In: Digital PPMHP. <https://digitalni.ppmhp.hr/?pr=i&id=15985> (last access: 2022-07-10).

26 The postcard is included in the Smešny private collection of postcards, Rijeka.



Fig. 4: Example of one back side of the postcard with four different types of postal printed languages, Type D (Bogavčić private collection, 1889–1891).

for newspapers and some other printed materials printed on coarser paper, a coarser screen was used, while for artistic images, thinner paper and a finer screen were used. This process made it possible to print photos more massively, which before the introduction of halftone printing were redrawn manually by engraving a wooden block from which they were printed (Smokvina, 1995, 222). The first successful and commercial halftone prints appeared in France in 1881, and then in Germany in 1882, while since 1883 it has been used for newspaper and magazine illustrations, which have become popular since 1893, thanks to Max Levy (Stulik & Kaplan, 2013, 5–7).

This novelty was made by engravers or illustrators who would sometimes sign their work in the corner of the metal plate/stencil/cliche. Of the ten determined Rijeka postcards printed before September 13, 1889, six of them have the V.T. inscription (in the lower left or right corner of the graphic part of the postcard) or the V.Turati Inc. inscription (Bogavčić private collection, 1889–1891) Such an inscription is also found on one postcard of Opatija (Figure 5, 6 – photograph of Abbazia, Hotel Stefania and the postcard with the same motif and inscription V.Turati Inc.) printed before September 13, 1889 (Bogavčić private collection, 1889–1891). These are probably mostly photographic templates of Ilario Carposio. Based on the fact that the specified inscriptions do not appear on postcards after 13. 9. 1889, it can be concluded

that the engraver V.T. participated in the creation of the first postcards of this series.

V.T or Turati V. or V.Turati Inc (Turati V., 2022) was an illustrator and engraver company that had operated in Kingdom of Italy since 1884²⁷. Initially, after its founding, the company was “an artistic institution for the application of photography: an illustrated circular” (V.Turati inc., 2022), and after patenting photomechanical engraving in 1884, it was, in time, transformed into Stab. tipografico e di fotoincisione V. Turati, i.e., the company of Vittorio Turati from Milan. The company (Turati V., 18?, 2–3) patented photo-mechanical engraving in 1884. that didn’t need retouching²⁸. They advertised that it could use a technique called Typophotography (Vittoriotypy) for fast machine reproduction of photographs in conventional printing by thousands of copies. The company used typophotography as a photo-mechanical process, then photozincotyping as a photochemical process and zincotyping as a chemical process. They used special clichés (metal plates/stencils), which they advertised as different from those used before. The company stressed that their stencils can serve more than a hundred thousand copies without wearing out (Turati, 18?, 2–3). By enlarging the printed photo on the *Porto Interno* postcard (Figure 8), a circular screen with mostly regular patterns is observable, and in some places, there are elements of an irregular pattern, typical of the early period, until the Ives/Levy cross-dot screen was introduced circa 1893. The aforementioned postcards of the Rijeka series were created using halftone printing, which was probably a low-resolution photolithography with a flat ink application (Stulik & Kaplan, 2013, 35). On this postcard, the medium resolution of the halftone printing screen (grid) was used – because the dots are not visible to the naked eye, but with a slightly better magnification they are clearly visible and the quality is about 150 lpi²⁹ (Stulik & Kaplan, 2013, 6, 9).

Some postcards like *Via del Governo II* (Smešny, 2020, 105) Trsat, Bakar, *Hotel Quarnero* Opatija, and the motif of *Marina con Baragozzi* (Bogavčić private collection, 1889–1891) also have an inscription that can be assumed belong to another engraver/illustrator. The inscription on the postcard reads AV³⁰ ph (?) in the lower left or right corner of the image. Variations of the *ph* signatures exist also on the other Rijeka postcards like *La Torre del Orologio* (Smešny, 2020, 97) *Riva Stefania* (Balazs, 1994, X, illust. 59) *Mercati Coperti* (Smešny, 2020, 98) *Ponte Girante Sulla Fiumara* and Lovrana (Bogavčić private collection, 1889–1891) About a dozen postcards do not have any illustrator inscriptions, and on the postcards that were not locate, the possible

27 Stab. tipografico e di fotoincisione V. Turati, Milano.

28 Patent of an Italian industrial enterprise.

29 Lines per inch (measurement for printing resolution).

30 This might have been the work of the Bohemian illustrator and forester Vaclav Leo Anderle (1859–1944) who is best known in Croatia for his illustrations of the books by Dragutin Hirc, such as the Croatian Littoral, Plitvice Lakes and Gorski Kotar.

signatures remain unknown. Based on all of the above, it is obvious that Stabilimento Tipo-litografico Fiumano had a foreign associate who used the latest methods to make clichés out of photographs, from which the illustrated parts of the postcards were printed. Thanks to the use of halftone printing, a larger circulation of illustrated printed publications was achieved, and these photographs could be more represented in print media.

«NOVITA IN CARTE DI CORRISPONDENZA»³¹

In September 1889, the Rijeka newspapers *La Bilancia* and *La Varietà* mention a novelty in correspondence cards (Bogavčić, 2014, 28), calling it «cartoline postali colle vedute» (*La Bilancia*, 18. 9. 1889, 2), which can be translated as *postal card with a picture (dopisnica sa slikom)*³² (Bogavčić & Salopek Bogavčić, 2020, 126), i.e., later as a *picture postcard (karta razglednica)*³³ (*Dom i svijet*, 5. 2. 1899, 80). This was a novelty in which for the first time it was necessary to buy a postage stamp and paste it on the postal card, on which there was not only the correspondence area but also an illustration. Postal cards of that time were printed as “total” or postal stationary (Ganzsache, 2022), and there was no need to additionally buy postage stamps. The new postcards were printed on thin greyish-green cardboard of the default postal card format³⁴, and on the back³⁵, there was space for correspondence and an illustration. Not only have both newspapers of the *Stabilimento Tipolitografico Fiumana* publishing house brought forth the information about the emergence of a new form of communication, but they had also reported in detail on the motives, circulations, points of sale, and similar data related to the first series of postcards. Based on newspaper articles, it is possible to systematically trace the arrival of the first Croatian series of postcards, that is, in what dynamics certain motives appeared, which was rarely observed in other cities of Croatia³⁶. After examining the listed newspapers articles, it was

31 A new type of correspondence card, which still has not been named on 13. 9. 1889.

32 The linguistic construction of picture postal cards was often used in the late 19th and early 20th centuries denoting a postcard. This syntagm was created and used as a translation of the German Correspondenz-karte syntagm and was used before the term “postcard”. Furthermore, it continued to be used for quite a long time after the creation of the term “postcard”.

33 Postcards were called “picture postal cards” because they were created from postal cards, and for a while there was no adequate term found in the language that would not depend on the term of postal cards. Confirmation of the first use of the term postcard is found in the syntagm “picture postcards”, which is a translation of the German term Ansichtskarten.

34 The dimensions of postal cards at that time were 142 x 85 mm.

35 At that time, the rear part was intended for private use, that is, for the sender’s text, while the front side was the official side of the postcard with the address and other official postage markings, including postage stamps. Later, the two terms are reversed, and the term “front” is used for the side with the visual image, and the “back” side denotes the part intended for the address.

36 This was noted, for example, in Zadar, as well.




Fig. 5: Ilario Carposio – Fiume, Abbazia, Photograph of hotel Stefania, after 1885 (Bogavčić private collection, 1889–1891).

evident how in the middle of September 1889, (*La Bilancia*, 13. 9. 1899, 2; *La Varietà*, 14. 9. 1899, 2) at least sixteen different motifs on postcards were being sold.

The exact number of this first part of the series of postcards remains unclear since the mentioned articles exhaustively list the motifs of the Rijeka postcards, and together they list the motifs of the Opatija postcards as “various picturesque vistas of Opatija” (*La Bilancia*, 13. 9. 1899, 2; *La Varietà*, 14. 9. 1899, 2). The postcards were sold in several shops in Rijeka and could be bought in bulk at the *Stabilimento Tipo-litografico Fiumano* in packs of 100 pieces (*La Bilancia*, 13. 9. 1889, 2). These postcards were sold for two kreutzers each, and two or five additional kreutzers needed to be attached to them, depending on where they were sent. The circulation of this series of postcards is estimated from two to five thousand items per motif, in total about one hundred thousand postcards. The postcards were sold in about eight locations in Rijeka:

1. Stabilimento Tipo-litografico Fiumano, Via Governo (La Bilancia, 13. 9. 1889, 2)
2. Polonio – Balbi, Libreria in Piazza Adamich (La Varietà, 14. 9. 1889, 2)
3. G.B. Schnautz, Via del Corso (La Bilancia, 14. 1. 1890, 2)
4. F.A. Schnantz, Cartoleria in Piazza Adamich (La Varietà, 14. 9. 1889, 2)
5. Vittorio Macchioro, Via del Governo (La Varietà, 19. 10. 1889, 1)
6. Ant. Bastianich, Via del Lido (La Bilancia, 14. 1. 1890, 2)
7. Marco Oberdorfer, Negozio al Corso (La Varietà, 19. 10. 1889, 1)
8. S. Gozzano, Via del Teatro (La Bilancia, 14. 1. 1890, 2)

If we examine the motifs mentioned in the first edition of 13. 9. 1889, we can establish that they were divided into the motifs of Rijeka, the motifs of Opatija, and the surroundings of Rijeka. The motifs of Rijeka include: *Fiume (Veduta Generale di Fiume)*, *Teatro Comunale – La Piazza Urmeny col Teatro Comunale*, *Via del Corso – Il Corso*, *Via del Governo*, *Piazza Adamich*, *Cassa Comunale di Risparmio*, *I. R. Accademia di Marina*, *R. Governo Marittimo (Edifizio del r. Governo marittimo/Quello del r. Governo marittimo)* and *Porto Interno*. The motives of Opatija were not listed exhaustively but were described as “diverse pittoresche vedute d’Abbazia”, which implies that there were already several Opatija motifs in the first series of postcards (La Bilancia, 13. 9. 1889, 2). This first part of the postcard series also featured postcards with the surroundings of Rijeka, i.e., the postcards of *Tersatto*, *Bucari*, *Portore*, *Volosca*, and *Susak*. It is obvious that this is the motif of *Susak – Palazzo Bachich*, given that in a newspaper article dated 27 September, this motif is included in the group of those that have already been published, while for another motif of *Sussak (Villa Ruzic)* it was stated that it was still being prepared. This article lists all the motifs, but the motif of *Riva Szapary* is particularly interesting, and was not specified in previous articles (La Varietà, 27. 9. 1889, 2). The first assumption is that it was a recently released motif, but based on the date indicated by the sender on the reproduced postcard (Balazs, 1994, 59), we can establish that it was printed together with all the motifs already mentioned before 13. 9. 1889. The motifs of Opatija are listed by name in this article, *Hotel Stefania* and *Hotel Quarnero*, which were probably released in the first half of September 1889, as well as the motifs listed so far. (La Varietà, 27. 9. 1889, 2). New postcard motifs were announced for the next issue, i.e., Rijeka motifs: *La Torre dell Orologio*, *Molo Zichy*, *Riva Stefania*, *Sbocco del Tunnel*, *Mercati Coperti*, and *Ponte Girante sulla Fiumara*. The motifs of the surroundings were also announced. *Sussak (Villa Ruzic)* and *Lovrana*.

Based on the articles (La Bilancia, 12. 10. 1889, 2; La Varietà, 14. 10. 1889, 1) it became known that some of the previously announced motifs were printed, i.e., five motifs, *La Torre dell Orologio*, *Molo Zichy*, *Riva Stefania*, *Sbocco del Tunnel*, and *Mercati Coperti*. All previous motifs printed on postcards were

summarised (La Varietà, 19. 10. 1889, 1) and can be divided into three types: a) postcards whose existence has already been confirmed on the basis of previous newspaper articles, b) postcards that were announced on 27 September and the printing of which was confirmed (*Ponte Girante sulla Fiumara*, *Sussak Villa Ruzic*, *Lovrana*) and c) a new hitherto unknown motif (*Via del Governo due Diverse*)³⁷.

In mid-November (La Varietà, 21. 11. 1889, 1) information about four new postcards appears: *Palazzo Governiale* (*Palazzo governiale*), *Edifizio Scolastico Maschile* (*Edifizio delle scuole comunali maschili in via Clotildee*), *Villa Angiolina in Abbazia*, *Costa Istriana con una Nave in Pericolo* (*Nave in pericolo sulla costa Istriana*). At the beginning of 1890, a series of articles presents a complete list of postcards issued by that time, which include new motifs of Rijeka, such as *Rada di Fiume* (*Canale della Fiumara*), new motifs of Opatija, such as *Veduta Generale*, *Parco*, *Porto*, *Stabilimenti Bagni*, *Villa Elisabetta*, and from the vicinity of Rijeka, the *Marina con Baragozzi* (La Bilancia, 14. 1. 1890; 23. 1. 1890; 12. 2. 1890).

Apart from the 37 motifs listed so far, after 1890, a postcard with the *Via del Molo* motif was published, which, as is known, was printed based on a photograph by Ilario Carposio (Dubrović, 1995, 53) after the second half of 1890, because it depicts the motif of the new bell tower of the Church of St. Vitus, erected on 7 June 1890³⁸ (PPMHP, 101177/1). This postcard was printed no later than August 1891, based on postal use.³⁹

The analysis of newspaper articles and found examples of postcards established the dynamics of the publishing of postcards from September 1889 to August 1891. During this period, motifs of the city of Rijeka were printed the most, 21 in total, followed by eight Opatija motifs, two Sušak motifs and two general naval motifs, as well as one motif each of Trsat, Kraljevica, Bakar, Volosko, and Lovran. Most of the postcards, 17 of them, were printed in the first wave of the series release, that is, in September 1889. In October 1889, nine postcards were printed. In November, four more were printed, and in December or January 1890, seven postcards were printed. An additional postcard of this series was printed no later than mid-August 1891.

TEXTS OF THE FIRST SERIES OF POSTCARDS

The texts on the postcards can be divided into texts that were used when printing the postcards, and texts used by senders. The printed texts on the postcards are divided into texts on the front and back sides of the postcards.

37 Up to this point, only one motif of *Via Governo* was known.

38 PPMHP, 101177/1, foto: Ilario Carposio, 07.06.1890. In: Digital PPMHP. <https://digitalni.ppmhp.hr/?pr=i&id=16084> (last access: 2022-07-10).

39 Postal use, 19. 8. 1891.




Fig. 6: Abbazia - Hotel Stefania. Postcard issued before 13. 9. 1889, postal use 15.4.1890. V.Turati inc. engraved (Bogavčić private collection, 1889–1891).

The address side, i.e., the reverse side of the postcard is subject to postal legislation, which cannot be said about the front side, on which the illustration and the place reserved for the sender's text are located. The printed text on the front side of this series of postcards always consists of the name of the settlement, and, often, the name of a particular motif that the postcard depicts. The postcards of this series are printed in Italian, and some of them contain only the name of the settlement (for example, Fiume), which is the same for several other languages like German or Hungarian (Bogavčić private collection, 1889–1891).

When analysing the reverse sides, four different types of the reverse side of the postcards were noticed:

- A) the reverse side without any printed elements
- B) the reverse side with the printed bold font “Carta di Corrispondenza” and four dotted horizontal address lines
- C) the Type B reverse side, on which “Levelező-Lap.” is written in bold simple letters over “Carta di Corrispondenza”
- D) the reverse side, on which “Levelező-Lap. – Correspondenz-Karte” is printed in the upper row in elongated letters above the four dotted address lines, and below, in significantly smaller letters, “Carta di Corrispondenza. – Karta Dopisnica” (Bogavčić private collection, 1889–1891): (Figure 4).

The Type A reverse side is probably a typo or a trial print that was not intended for sale and postal use, but was used by someone who thus preserved this type of reverse side, which is by far the rarest and is not only a rarity in this series of postcards but also a rarity in the postal use of postcards in general. It is rare to find such examples preserved without a printed back, and even rarer that they were also postally used. The Type B reverse side was printed first, as the printing language of the front and back is the same, that is, both sides are in Italian. The publishers quickly realised that the postcards with the reverse side of Type B did not comply with postal legislation in the Rijeka area, and subsequently added Hungarian to the previously printed postcards. On the territory of the Hungarian postal administration, postcards and postal cards had to be named in Hungarian, that is, the type of postal item had to be printed in Hungarian (Levelező-Lap). This is evident when comparing the position of the printed Italian text, which is located on the Type B and Type C reverse sides in the same place with respect to the frame, and the Hungarian text was subsequently printed above the Italian text, thus creating a disharmonious composition on the Type C reverse side. Considering that the postcards of this series also depicted the surroundings of Rijeka and were used in settlements included in the Austrian postal zone, it was very quickly noticed that even the Type C reverse sides did not fully




Fig. 7: Trieste-Piazza Giuseppina, postcard, postal use 19. 7. 1891 (Bogavčić private collection, 1889–1891).

comply with the rules in force in this area.⁴⁰ In order to comply with postal laws both in Cislantania and Translantania, the publishers created the Type D reverse side, which has been preserved on the largest number of known postcards, over 80% of them, and which contained all four languages, with Hungarian and German being more prominent in size and position, since they were official, compared to Italian and Croatian. Postcards of Type B and Type C were printed exclusively in September 1889, and, perhaps, in early October 1889, and they were postally used mostly in 1889 or 1890. The postcards with motifs of the first part of the series from September 1889 were re-printed with a new reverse side (Type D).

A total of 34 postally-used postcards were registered⁴¹, and the sender's language on them was analysed, as well as the locations of outgoing and incoming mail. German was used on more than half of the postcards used, while Hungarian⁴² and Croatian were used on 20%, respectively, and Italian was used on about ten per cent. Interestingly, the use of German decreases in more recent usage, so that in earlier periods it was used on almost 70% of postcards, and in the period around 1898, its usage was reduced to 20%. Analysing where the postcards are addressed, it can be seen that about 20% of the postcards are addressed to Kingdom of Hungary, Kingdom of Croatia and Slavonia and Archduchy of Austria and about ten per cent to the Margraviate of Istria, about five per cent to Dalmatia, and about 20% to other locations such as Kranjska, Kingdom of Italy, German Empire, Republic of France, and the Kingdom of Bohemia. From the above, it can be seen that almost 90% are addressed within the Monarchy and only about 10% outside the Monarchy. The location of outgoing mail on postcards is most often the one also depicted on the motifs, and about 90% of the postcards in this Rijeka series were delivered from Rijeka, Opatija, and the surrounding area. Two examples of postcards bought in Rijeka are interesting, one of which was written in Split and sent from Dubrovnik to Zagreb, and the other was sent from Zsebely to Szegeden. The first case probably involved a ship voyage from Rijeka to Dalmatia, and in the second case, the sender probably bought the postcards in Rijeka and subsequently used them elsewhere.


POSTAL USE OF INDIVIDUAL POSTCARDS

Of the 44 found postcards of Rijeka and its surroundings, 34 were postally used. Analysing the time of use of these postcards, it is possible to determine how the use is grouped into three periods: the first period – from 1889 to 1891, the second period – from 1893 to 1894, and the third period – from 1897 to

40 La Bilancia, 8. 10. 1889: Carte di corrispondenza colle vedute di Fiume, 2.

41 Analysis of language was made on 34 postally used postcards.

42 On two postcards it is unclear whether Croatian or Slovenian was used, given the brevity of the message.

Chart 1: Postal use of postcards by year.

1899. (Chart 1). In the first period, slightly more than 50% of postcards were used and about 25% in the other two periods, respectively. It is interesting to note how these periods coincide with the key years of the history of Rijeka postcards. The first period corresponds to the emergence of the first series of Rijeka postcards, the second period corresponds to the more “mass” use of lithographic postcards in Rijeka, and the third period corresponds to the beginning of the “mass” collotype printing of postcards in Rijeka and Croatia. It can be assumed that the more widespread use of lithographic and collotype printed postcards stimulated the sale and use of previously printed postcards from the first series of postcards of Rijeka.

ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE FIRST SERIES OF POSTCARDS OF RIJEKA AND ITS SURROUNDINGS

When studying the context of Rijeka postcards, a series of Trieste postcards⁴³ (Bogavčić private collection, Trieste-Piazza Giuseppina) was recorded, which were printed in the same way, on paper of the same type and colour as the Rijeka series of postcards.

Considering the above, we can assume how this series of Trieste postcards arose under the influence of Rijeka’s printing achievements of that time, as well as the influence of Italian successes in engraving (Figure 7 – Trieste postcard). From the motif standpoint, the first series of postcards of Rijeka and its surroundings influenced the emergence of postcards called the “Red Series”, created around 1899 (Smešny, 2020, 103; Bogavčić private collection, V.T., 1899). These are identical photo templates that were used in the first batch of postcards, with the only difference being that the graphic images were

43 The postcards of Trieste were printed no later than 1891, based on postal use.

made in red halftone. Shape-wise, and partially motif-wise, the first series of postcards of Rijeka and its surroundings influenced a series of postcards called “Unio Fiume” (Smešny, 2020, 185–187; Bogavčić private collection, “DELTA” Forgo HID, 1899).

The photographs that served as templates for the first series of postcards were taken by photographers of the 1870s and 1880s, such as Alois Beer, Ilario Carposio, and possibly Carlo Zamboni, and have been used on postcards since 1889. In addition, they can also be found as sources for making lithographic postcards. At the end of September 1890, Mohovich’s *Stabilimento* printed an album which included “...36 vistas, including 20 of Rijeka, 8 of Opatija, 8 vistas of Trieste, Susak, Bakar, Kraljevica, Volosko, and Lovran. The album is intended for foreigners who, after visiting the city, can take home memories of the most beautiful vistas of our region ... ” (Smokvina, 2003, 202).

CONCLUSION

This paper highlights two key theses necessary for understanding postcards: 1) The postcard is a hereditary source of data, not just an illustration, and 2) the evaluation and interpretation of postcards make it possible to understand how the first Croatian series of postcards arose under the influence of communication, economics, and tourism in the Monarchy and European context. Postcards as an integral heritage object can be understood “in totality” only by observing at the variety of visual, textual, material, formative, functional, socio-symbolic, technical and technological qualities. Understanding the contextualization of the origin of the first series of postcards is complemented by further comparison and analysis of data at three levels. The first level of analysis was based on the evaluation of numerous domestic and foreign private and public collections of photographs and postcards. The secondary level of assessment, based on the analysis of photographs and printed publications, is supplemented by analyses of printing processes. Based on the quantitative analysis of the postcards and the consideration of articles from the *La Varietà* and *La Bilancia* newspapers, the process of issuing the first batch of postcards was reconstructed as the third methodological level. The results were obtained on the volume, time, quantity, and dynamics of printing of the postcards of the aforementioned series, which were additionally supplemented with data on the distribution and sale of postcards. Thus, quantitative analysis on a small sample of found and preserved postcards made it possible to estimate the total circulation, as well as analyse the use of the language of their users, the impact of legislation on printing, the dynamics of postal use of the preserved postcards, and the general enterprise of printing the first batch of postcards by a printing company such as *Stabilimento Tipo-litografico Fiumano*. The mass production of postcards in Kingdom of Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmacia (Triune Kingdom), Margraviate of Istria and City of Rijeka and surroundings began with the Rijeka postcard series in 1889. Although Rijeka was *corpus separatum* directly connected with Lands of the Crown of Saint Stephen, this Rijeka postcards series depicts beside Rijeka motives, surrounding areas at Kingdom of Croatia-Slavonia and Margraviate of Istria. Appearance of this postcards

series was a result of the regional influences of Kingdom of Italy, Archduchy of Austria below te Enns, County of Tyrol and the Kingdom of Bohemia, where similar series of postcards appeared in the 1880s. Rijeka with its surroundings, as an important industrial and tourist centre, was an attractive motif in photographs, and subsequently, on postcards. The rarity of the Rijeka series is evidenced by the data that out of 38 registered motifs, only 24 were observed on preserved postcards, and five more motifs were visually identified based on literature. The above is a small fraction of the estimated around one hundred thousand that had been printed



Fig. 8: Enlarged part of the Fiume Porto Interno postcard, halftone printing (Bogavčić private collection, 1889–1891).

and distributed in at least eight locations in the city of Rijeka, of which only 44 items were found at the time of writing of this paper. The feat of printing postcards was started by the printing company *Stabilimento Tipo-litografico Fiumano* with twenty years of experience, which apparently used the services of the associate *V. Turati Inc.* and *AV ph (?)*, who, from the photographs by Alois Beer and Ilario Carposio taken in the 1870s and 1880s, created clichés/stencils using photomechanical processes and printed the postcards using halftone printing. Such a new product can be understood as a mass printed photograph, which, due to the combination of image, text, and postal use, was also called a picture postal card, that is, a postcard. This series of postcards had a direct impact on the Trieste series of postcards, as well as an indirect one on the further development of the “golden age” postcards in region.

PRVE HRVAŠKE RAZGLEDNICE REKE IN OKOLICE, IZDANE
MED LETOMA 1889 IN 1891

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POVZETEK

V tem delu sta izpostavljeni dve ključni tezi, pomembni za razumevanje razglednic 1) razglednica je dediščinski vir podatkov in ne le ilustracij, 2) vrednotenje in interpretacija razglednic nam pomagata razumeti, kako je prva hrvaška serija razglednic nastala pod komunikacijskimi, gospodarskimi in turističnimi vplivi v hrvaškem in evropskem kontekstu. Razglednice kot dediščinski objekt, iz javnih in zasebnih zbirk, razumemo kot celoto šele z opazovanjem različnih vizualnih, besedilnih, materialnih, oblikovnih, funkcionalnih, socialnih, simboličnih in tehnično-tehnoloških lastnosti. Množična proizvodnja razglednic na Hrvaškem se je začela z reškimi razglednicami leta 1889, kar je posledica regionalnih vplivov Kraljevine Italije, Nadvojvodine Avstrije pod reko Anišo, Grofovine Tirolske in Češkega kraljestva. Reka, Opatija in okolica kot industrijska in turistična središča so bile privlačen motiv fotografij in razglednic. Kako redka je reška serija, pove podatek, da je od 38 evidentiranih motivov le 24 na ohranjenih razglednicah, še pet motivov pa je vizualno določenih na podlagi literature. To je le delček od ocenjenih sto tisoč natisnjenih in razdeljenih na Reki, od katerih je bilo v času pisanja tega dela najdenih le 44 primerkov. Razglednice je tiskalo podjetje Stabilimento Tipo-litografico fiumano z dvajsetletnimi izkušnjami, ki je uporabljalo storitve sodelavcev V. Turati inc. in AV ph (?), ki sta v sedemdesetih in osemdesetih letih iz fotografij Aloisa Beera, Ilaria Carposia s fotomehaničnimi postopki ustvarjala klišeje ter z avtotipijo tiskala razglednice. Nov izdelek je nastal s kombinacijo slike, besedila in storitve pošte in se je imenoval dopisnica s sliko. Članki v časopisih La Bilanca in La Varieta nam pomagajo razumeti razsežnosti tega podviga, sistem prodaje in distribucije ter dinamike izdajanja ter pregled motivov. Reška serija je neposredno vplivala na tržaško serijo razglednic in posredno na nadaljnji razvoj razglednic »zlate dobe«, ki je vplivala na razvoj turizma in modo »nošenja domov spominov z najlepšimi vedutami«.

Ključne besede: najzgodnejše razglednice, Reka, Opatija, avtotipija, Stabilimento Tipo-litografico fiumano, Alois Beer, Ilario Carposio

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WOMEN FROM SHUSHA WHO WERE EXPOSED TO REPRESSION
DURING THE “GREAT TERROR”: IN THE ARCHIVAL DOCUMENTS
OF THE STATE SECURITY SERVICE OF THE REPUBLIC OF
AZERBAIJAN

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ABSTRACT

During the research, we tried to find answers to the following questions. First of all, was the Soviet government innately ruthless only against its enemies? Secondly, after years, what was the evidence of the acquittals (verdict of “not guilty”) given to those people? It should be noted that not all of the results obtained through the study of the documents of the women from Shusha and their family members available in our state archives and information collected about them from other sources are scientific novelty. This work nevertheless provides valuable material and insights, because we essentially used the archive documents of the State Security Service of the Republic of Azerbaijan. By the way, we used documents of the Archive of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan, too. These sources gave us very detailed information about this issue. Another advantage of that, they help us to explain the meaning of the “Great terror”. Because great terror was “great” not only in terms of the numbers of its victims, but also in its great quantity of perpetrators, and that it was the regime’s combining of “democracy campaigns” with the hunt for “enemies” that blurred the difference between hunter and hunted. Overall, this article is a unique investigation (only the families of the women from Shusha were studied) which confirms the results of the various studies on repression conducted earlier. This work is a valuable addition to the picture of the terror in Shusha, in the historical city of Azerbaijan.

Keywords: Shusha, political repression, totalitarian, exile, “the great terror”

LE DONNE DI SHUSHA ESPOSTE ALLA REPRESSIONE DURANTE IL
«GRANDE TERRORE»: NEI DOCUMENTI D’ARCHIVIO DEL SERVIZIO DI
SICUREZZA DI STATO DELLA REPUBBLICA DELL’AZERBAIGIAN

SINTESI

Durante la ricerca abbiamo cercato di trovare risposte alle seguenti domande. Innanzitutto, il governo sovietico era intrinsecamente spietato solo contro i suoi nemici? In secondo luogo, a distanza di anni, quali erano le prove delle assoluzioni (i verdetti

di «non colpevolezza») date a queste persone? Va notato che non tutti i risultati ottenuti attraverso lo studio dei documenti delle donne di Shusha e dei loro familiari disponibili nei nostri archivi di Stato e le informazioni raccolte su di loro da altre fonti sono una novità scientifica. Comunque riteniamo che il nostro lavoro fornisce materiale e spunti preziosi. Essenzialmente abbiamo utilizzato i documenti d'archivio del Servizio di sicurezza di Stato della Repubblica dell'Azerbaijan e, inoltre, abbiamo utilizzato anche i documenti dell'Archivio del Ministero degli Affari Interni della Repubblica dell'Azerbaijan. Queste fonti ci hanno fornito informazioni molto dettagliate sulla questione. Un altro vantaggio è che ci aiutano a spiegare il significato del «Grande terrore». Difatti, il grande terrore era «grande» non solo in termini numerici delle sue vittime, ma anche per la grande quantità di carnefici, e che fu il regime a combinare le «campagne per la democrazia» con la caccia ai «nemici» per confondere la differenza tra cacciatori e prede. Nell'insieme, l'articolo è una indagine unica nel suo genere (sono state studiate solo le famiglie delle donne di Shusha) che conferma i risultati dei vari studi sulla repressione condotti in precedenza. Si tratta di una preziosa integrazione al quadro del terrore a Shusha, nella storica città dell'Azerbaijan.

Parole chiave: Shusha, repressione politica, totalitario, esilio, «il grande terrore»

INTRODUCTION

The choice of name for the waves of Stalinist repression in 1937 and 1938 is crucial to any analysis of the period. Following Robert Conquest's terminology, many Western historians refer to the period as the "Great Terror" (Conquest, 1990). In Russian the period is often called the "Ezhovshchina," or the "era of Ezhov." At the beginning of July in 1937, Joseph Stalin abruptly decided to launch a mass purge of Soviet society that extended far beyond the purges of state and Communist Party elites already under way. Stalin and his political police chief, Nikolai Ezhov, ordered local party bosses and police chiefs to prepare for mass arrests of "criminals" and "former kulaks"—the latter term referring to those peasants who were exiled from their homes during the collectivization of Soviet agriculture in the early 1930s and had been kept under surveillance by the local police ever since. At the end of the month, Stalin and Ezhov provided local police chiefs with arrest and execution quotas for every administrative region of the USSR and instructed them to begin what were termed "mass operations of repression of kulaks, criminals, and other anti-Soviet elements." These operations were to begin on August 5, 10, or 15, depending on the region of the country. The initial waves of arrests in the fall of 1937 were expansive enough, but as the weeks of mass operations turned into months, local police made use of whatever means

they could to fulfill the demands emanating from Moscow for continued arrests of “anti-Soviet elements.” After local police administrations exhausted readily available categories of suspects, they swept up individuals in raids of public squares or open air markets and arrested them for lack of proper identification, or they arrested individuals known to them as petty criminals, vagrants, or individuals otherwise on the margins of Soviet society. The mass operations were nothing like the well-known purges of Communist Party and state elites—the Moscow “show trials” of top party leaders, the purge of the party at large, and the devastating purge of the Red Army—which wracked the Soviet Union at the same time and which, for fifty years after they occurred, were synonymous with Stalin’s “Great Terror.” Stalin and Ezhov maintained tight control over these operations, but they approved continual expansions of arrests and executions throughout 1937 and 1938. By the time Stalin called off the mass operations in late November 1938, the NKVD had sentenced some 1.15 million people. Roughly 683,000 were shot, representing the vast majority of the individuals executed by the regime in these two appalling years of Stalinist terror (Hagenloh, 2009, 1–2).

In the paper we have aimed to bring the results obtained through the collection, systematization and analysis of existing materials, especially archival documents in the state archives of the Republic of Azerbaijan, in the press and other sources about repressed women from Shusha into scientific circulation.

When we get acquainted with those women’s documents involved in the research, it becomes clear that the main point of the articles they were accused in the court are identical to each other (articles: 63, 69, 70, 72, 73, 75, 130), and one point is the same. That is, the main reason they were considered “guilty” was that they were “family members of traitors”. Women, whose husbands were executed by shooting as “traitors of the country”, “anti-revolutionaries”, “musavatists” and so on, (cf. Table 2) were not only sentenced to life in prison and exile, but also had their tender age children taken from them. Even pregnant women were not spared. During the research, we tried to find answers to the following questions. Was the Soviet government innately ruthless only against its enemies? What was the evidence of the rehabilitations given to those people years later?

WAS THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT INNATELY RUTHLESS ONLY AGAINST ITS ENEMIES?

Beginning from April 28, 1920, as a result of the arbitrariness and violence committed on the basis of laws against human rights by the totalitarian state regime hundreds of thousands of innocent people were repressed for their political beliefs, activities, thinking differently and other reasons in the territory of the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic (Law of the Republic of Azerbaijan, 1996). Although the peak of the state terror and repression against its citizens was considered to be 1937–1938 years, in fact, during the Soviet regime, repressions were almost always carried out. This was due to the essence and ideology of this regime. The regime,

which was constantly looking for class enemies, anti-Soviet elements, “traitors of the motherland”, organized these repressions and terror purposefully. Anyone could be its target.

Those, arrested during the harsher repressions in the 1930s, were subjected to severe torture, and laws were not observed in the process of court. As a result of the 10–15 minute court, dozens of people were sentenced to the most severe punishment. Due to the large number of prisoners, such courts were conducted by “troikas” (a group consisting of three men) made up of senior officials. Not only the person declared an “enemy of the people”, instituted criminal proceedings against his relatives and friends and they were subjected to severe punishments. These punitive measures left a heavy mark on the fate of many people - women, children, and the elderly. The years of repression are called the period of “great terror” not without reason (Ismailov, 2015). If we pay attention to the archival documents, we will see that during this terror only on July 30, 1937, in the operating order No. 00447 of the ECPD of the USSR, they were branded as Ittihadists, Musavatists and counter-revolutionaries, and from August 5, 5.250 people in Azerbaijan were ordered to be repressed (Lubyanka, 2004, 273–275). The city of Shusha of Azerbaijan was also involved into this historical process; not only individuals of Shusha who were branded as anti-Soviet, anti-Bolshevik, counter-revolutionary were shot, mass deportation of Azerbaijanis was organized in the mountainous part of Karabakh as a whole (Mammadov, 2008, 71). Against the background of all these events, the women of Shusha, which we studied in the article, became victims of this “great terror” as well. Although the number of women involved in the investigation was 19, this meant the repression of 19 families and all their close relatives, but not 19 people. It is supposed that the repressed women from Shusha were more than 19. However, as a result of the research conducted in the Archives of the State Security Service of the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Archives of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan, we could investigate the documents of 19 Shusha women and their husbands and some family members. As these studies are continued in the future, it is very likely that new persons and facts will be revealed.

Based on the documents collected from the archives, some statistical analyses were conducted and the following results were obtained:

1. The archival documents of 7 out of 19 repressed families contain information about their children (names and dates of birth). These 7 families had 22 children. 17 of the children were of tender age when their parents were arrested. (Among them even 1 child was 2 months old, 1 child was 11 months old.)
2. At the time of arrest, 7 out of 19 women from Shusha were between 20–25 years old, 10 were between 26–40 years old, 1 was 42, and 1 was 60 years old. (Table 1)
3. Among the women, 8 had higher education, 2 – secondary education, 1 – primary education and 8 had no education.
4. Among the women, 15 had no party affiliation, 2 were members of Azerbaijan K (b) P, and no exact information about party affiliation of the 2.

5. Among the arrested men, 1 was 25 years old, 16 were between 26–50 years old, and 2 were over 60. (Table 2)
6. Among the men, 7 had higher education, 1 – secondary education, and 1 – primary education. There is no information about the education of 1 person. (Table 2)
7. Among the men, 9 had no party affiliation, 7 were members of Azerbaijan K (b) P, 2 were claimed to be members of the Musavat Party, and 1 to be a member of the Ittihad Party. (Table 2)

Despite the fact that some of the collected materials about women from Shusha are systematized and given in the table below (cf. Table 1), we need to present the information of several families in more detail in order to get the answer to the question “*Was the Soviet government merciless only against its enemies?*”. This will allow us to understand better what was happened.

One of the victims of repression is Hajiyev Khanlar Abdul Huseyn oglu, who was born in 1901 in the city of Shusha, the husband of Hajiyeva Gulustan Bahlul gizi. He had only primary education. Khanlar Hajiyev served in the army from the age of 16 and even became an officer. He was a member of the All-Union Communist (b) Party since 1925. In the last years of his life, he worked as a captain in the Goychay District Military Commissariat, and was the chief of the 77th Azerbaijan Artillery Regiment in charge of supplies. He was convicted in court under category I for alleged counter-revolutionary activity. Those convicted under this category were shot. During his trial, he was accused of being a member of a Trotskyist-Zinovyev counter-revolutionary organization and a terrorist center in Azerbaijan. Allegedly, in the Azerbaijani divisional formations he tried to overthrow the Soviet government by armed means and create a bourgeois-nationalist state. First, he was charged with articles 72, then 64, 70 and 73 of the Criminal Code of the Azerbaijan SSR and was shot on January 3, 1938 with his property confiscated. He was acquitted on July 30, 1957, as the accusations were proved to be groundless (ASSRA-AWR, 13896, 1–12). His wife Hajiyeva Gulustan Bahlul gizi was born in 1910 in the city of Shusha. She was also able to study only at the primary level. On October 27, 1937, she was accused and arrested under Articles 72–73 of the Criminal Code of the Azerbaijan SSR. When she was sentenced, her daughter Turan was a one-month-old baby. Although her husband was rehabilitated in 1957, the acquittal of Gulistan was delayed until July 2, 1997. Gulistan died in 1983 (ASSRA-AWR, 8829, 1–3).

Askerov Baba Abi oglu, the husband of Khalifazadeh Surayya from Shusha, was born in 1902 in Guba district. He was a member of All-Union C (b) P since 1922. In 1930, he graduated from the Azerbaijan State University, and in 1932, he was admitted to the post-graduate course of the Azerbaijan State Scientific Research Institute. He was first accused of allegedly spreading Trotskyism among students, and later was arrested on May 21, 1937, as a member of a terrorist insurgent organization that actively participated in the preparation of a terrorist act against Mir Jafar Bagirov, according to articles 64, 70, 73 of the CC of the Azerbaijan SSR. He was shot on October 12, 1937. He was acquitted on May 12, 1956, as the accusations were false and the claims had no

basis (OPENLIST, 2022a). His wife, Khalifazadeh Surayya Suleyman gizi was born in 1906 in Shusha, grew up there. In 1924, she was among the first 17 women graduates of the Higher Pedagogical Institute. From October 14, 1937, until her arrest, she worked as a teacher at secondary school number 13 in Baku. From February 2, 1938 to October 15, 1945, she was imprisoned in the “Akmolinsk Camp of Wives of Traitors to the Motherland” (ALZhIR) in harsh conditions (ALZhIR).

Fatma and Anvar Tutayug sisters, like Surayya Khalifazadeh, were among the first women educators with higher education. In 1922, Fatma Tutayug Khaspolad giri was sent to study at the newly opened Azerbaijan Higher Pedagogical Girls’ Institute in Baku by the educational department of Shusha district and successfully completed her studies (Khalilzadeh, 2014, 10). Fatma and Anvar Tutayugs have always attracted attention as the most active Komsomol members from the years of their education. They remained loyal to the communist ideology almost until the end of their lives. However, after their husbands’ cooperation with the secretly operating Karabakh Provincial Committee of the Musavat party was discovered they both were also subjected to repression (According to the criminal case against Hashim Feyzullayev, the husband of Fatma Tutayug, he was allegedly elected a member of the Karabakh Provincial Committee of the Musavat Party, which operated secretly in 1926) (Guliyev, 2011a, 6–7).

Anvar Khaspolad gizi Tutayug divorced from her first husband Ayyub Hajiyev and married a certain Yusif Jabrailov. Despite this, in 1937, when Ayyub Hajiyev was arrested, Anvar Tutayug was also accused (Guliyev, 2011b, 6–7). In the year of her arrest, Anvar Tutayug was admitted to the Medical Institute. On April 9, 1938, she was sent to Bail prison. Anvar Tutayug was sentenced for 8 years and sent to the Temnikov city corrective labor camp in the Mordva ASSR. In May 1938, Anvar, pregnant when she was imprisoned, had to give birth to her son in prison camp No. 15 in Yavash settlement, Potma district of Moscow province. A two-month-old baby named Khaspolad was taken from her and sent to an orphanage, and she herself was sent to exile. On September 9, 1938, at the age of 28 Anvar died of a heart attack (Guliyev, 2011b, 6–7).

Mammadov Ali Samad oglu, the husband of another woman from Shusha, Mehmandarova Surayya Alinagi gizi, was elected as a representative to the 1st Congress of the Communists of Azerbaijan in Lankaran district in 1919. He graduated from the Y.M.Sverdlov Communist University in Moscow. In different years, he was the head of the Military Revolutionary Committee of the Lankaran district, the instructor of the Central Committee of the Azerbaijan C (b)P, secretary of the Party Committee of the Lankaran district, head of the Executive Committee of the Ganja district, the People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Azerbaijan SSR, head of the Executive Committee of Aghdam district, People’s Finance Commissar of the Azerbaijan SSR, head of the Executive Committee of Gutgashen (Gabala) District, Commissioner of the Azerbaijan Office of the Grain Supply Department, member of C(b) CC of Azerbaijan, CEC of Azerbaijan, CEC, USSR CEC of Transcaucasia and UC (b)P of Transcaucasian Country Committee Inspection Commission. However,

he was arrested on false charges and shot on January 7, 1938. He was acquitted on September 29, 1956, considering that the charges were groundless. (It should be noted that in his young years, he was also a member of the “Yeni Javanlar” musavat youth organization in Lankaran since 1916) (Guliyev, 2019, 334–335).

Mehmandarova Surayya Alinagi gizi was one of the intelligent women of the famous Mehmandarov kin. She was arrested on July 15, 1938 and sent to a corrective labor camp for 5 years, and was released from prison in 1943. On December 7, 1948, she was under judicial investigation for contacting “family members of enemies of the people”, and on January 14, 1949, she was again imprisoned for 5 years. She was rehabilitated on September 29, 1956 (Guliyev, 2019, 333–340).

One of the victims of repression was Hajiyeva Rafiga Hassan gizi, who was born in Shusha in 1922. She was charged with Article 63–3 of the Criminal Code of the Azerbaijan SSR and arrested on January 20, 1949. Rafiga Hajiyeva, who was rehabilitated on March 14, 1956, had no party affiliation. In her personal file, information is also given about her sister Hajiyeva Sanubar Hassan gizi. It turns out that her sister’s husband was Hassanov Garyagdi Ziyad oglu, who worked at the USSR embassy to Turkey. Hassanov Garyagdi refuses to return to the USSR in 1947. As Hajiyeva Sanubar Hassan gizi moved to her husband in 1946, both were accused of treason. Although the Soviet government could not punish them, it took revenge on Hajiyeva Rafiga Hassan gizi and her husband Zamanov Abbas Fattah oglu. It is true that in the documents it was mentioned that this point was not taken into account in the repression of Rafiga and her husband (ASSSRA-AWR, 542, 1–8).

One of the highly educated women from Shusha was Hajiyeva Faguma Hassan gizi. She graduated from the Faculty of Oriental Studies of the Azerbaijan State University and became a member of the trade union of employees of higher schools and scientific institutions. She was charged with Article 63-3 of the Criminal Code of the Azerbaijan SSR and arrested on January 20, 1949, and on March 9, 1956, she was acquitted as the allegations were proved to be groundless (ASSSRA-AWR, 542, 1–6).

These facts suggest that among the repressed persons, not only members of the Communist Party, but also persons who had been actively participating in this party for many years and who rose to important positions, were easily slandered and sentenced to be shot on false charges. So, even those who loyally served the regime, their lives could end tragically at any moment due to some slander. If one closely looks through the documents stored in the archives, especially the interrogation reports, expert documents created to prove the “guilt” of the defendant, in the vast majority of them you can see the signatures of people of Armenian, Russian and Jewish origin. If it were reasonable that those defendants were guilty, then the vast majority of them could not be acquitted later, even if it was late.

If Surayya Mehmandarova, Fatma and Anvar Tutayugs, Geisu Sadikhova and other well-known women from Shusha were educated and intelligent women of Azerbaijan, and they unjustifiably considered them dangerous and sentenced them to life in exile under the name of “family members of traitors”, the situation of Mehtiyeva Ziba Abdulazim gizi, Alasgarova Khatun Azim gizi and Hajiyeva Gulustan Bahlul gizi and others was

completely different. So, when getting acquainted with their documents, it is known that some of them did not even complete their secondary education. This meant that the Soviet regime invented various pretexts to repress people from all strata of society.

One of the most terrible moments in the implementation of repressions was that it was determined by a special plan and set a quota. In the Soviet government, planning was the main goal in politics, as in economics (They claimed that it was possible to keep all the processes under complete control with this method). So, how many people should be exiled and to which areas they should be exiled was determined in advance. However, in many cases, as they themselves admitted, they exceeded the “quota”.

WHAT IS ACQUITTALS EVIDENCE OF?

March 5, 1953 entered history as the end of the life of I.V.Stalin, the First Secretary of the Communist Party of the USSR, and the end of mass repressions in the USSR. Since 1954, acquittals have been given to the persons subjected to repression. Although some of the victims of repression were exonerated in 1956 and others in 1960, there were families whose exoneration was delayed until the 1990s. Despite of their acquittal, both they and their children suffered from various diseases and lived in need until the end of their lives.

Even the change of power in the same political system uncovers and exposes the crime committed by the previous government, if it acquits the people who were shot years ago and their family members who were sentenced to exile it proves that the system is imperfect, authoritarian and totalitarian. In other words, the persons sentenced to be shot and their family members who were sentenced to live in exile (as can be seen from the table, many of them died tragically in exile – cf.: Table 1), if the family members were a “serious danger” for the Soviet society, as claimed in the indictment documents and “proved” in the examination documents, then why did that system and its new laws acquit them?! It is true that these acquittals not only failed to restore their lost lives and rights, but also did not even make the difficult life of the majority of the surviving family members easy, because these acquittals were not intended to restore justice and human rights. The main purpose of taking such a step was to replace the members of the old team with new ones, as in authoritarian and totalitarian regimes. Such acquittals provided them with the opportunity to have a better representation in the government and to place their “new staff” in the authorities by simply proving the crimes of the “old”.

CONCLUSION

It should be noted that not all of the results obtained through the study of the documents of Shusha women and their family members available in our state archives and materials collected about them from other sources are scientific innovations. But it is a unique investigation (only the families of Shusha women were studied) which confirms the results of the various investigations conducted earlier on repression. By its result, this research suggests that if the country’s regime is based on terrorism, anyone, without exception can be a victim of this policy. Because among them there are people with

primary education, who could not write her own name and answer the accusations made in Russian-language court case. There were also women, who were party members, serving the government, as well as quite intelligent and highly educated people. They were simply branded as “traitors” and forced to live in exile. Overall, our research again confirmed that even ordinary women were imprisoned, who posed totally no danger to him or to his regime. Stalin reserved the right to repress those whom he felt might be a threat in the future but even with this version, it is difficult to imagine that many of his victims posed even a future danger.

Table 1: The repressed women

No.	Name, surname and father's name	date and place of birth	Educa-tion	the article which she was charged with	date of arrest	date of acquittal	party affiliation and working place	Reference
1	Alasgarova Khatun Azim gizi	1877, Shusha district, Zarisly village.	-	Article 63-3of the Azerb.SSR CC	21.10.1944	-	No party affiliation. She was a housewife.	ASSSRA-AWR, 486, 3
2	Hajiyeva Faguma Hasan gizi	1926, Shusha city.	higher	Article 63-3of the Azerb.SSR CC	20.01.1949	09.03.1956	No party affiliation. She was a housewife.	ASSSRA-AWR, 542, 1-6
3	Hajiyeva Gulustan Bahlul gizi	1910, Shusha city	Primary	Article 72 – 75 of the Azerb.SSR CC	27.10.1937	02.07.1997	No party affiliation. She was a housewife.	ASSSRA-AWR, 8829, 1-3
4	Hajiyeva Mahira Hasan gizi	1918, Shusha district,	-	Article 63-3of the Azerb.SSR CC	20.01.1949	-	-	ASSSRA-AWR, 542, 1-6
5	Hajiyeva Rafiga Hasan gizi	1922, Shusha city.	-	Article 63-3of the Azerb.SSR CC	20.01.1949	14.03.1956	She was a member of All-Union C (b)P. She was a housewife.	ASSSRA-AWR, 542, 1-8
6	Khalifazadeh Surayya Suleyman gizi	18.03.1906, Shusha city.	Higher	-	14.10.1937 She was sent to a forced labor camp for 8 years. On 02.02.1938, she was brought from the Baku prison to the Aknola Special Camp of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in Karaganda. On 15.10.1945, she was released from the corrective labor camp in Karaganda.	-	No party affiliation. She was a teacher at school No. 13 in Baku.	ALZhr
7	Isazadeh Sura Alasgar gizi	1907, Shusha city	Sec-ondary	Article 72/73 of the Azerb.SSR CC	17.01.1938	-	No party affiliation. She was a housewife.	ASSSRA-AWR, 10778, 1-10
8	Isgandarova Hajjar Astan gizi	1919, Shusha district, Shirfan vil.	-	Article 63-3of the Azerb.SSR CC	23.09.1942	05.02.1990	No party affiliation. She was a collective farmer in the village of Kosalar, Khankendi district.	ASSSRA-AWR, 4, 3-6
9	Guliyeva Mima Hasan gizi	1923, Shusha city.	-	Article 63-3of the Azerb.SSR CC	18.03.1944	19.02.1990	She was a member of All-Union C(b)P. She worked as an accountant in the financial department of Barda district.	ASSSRA-AWR, 464, 1-4, 7, 10
10	Guliyeva Valida Hilal gizi	1914, Shusha city	Sec-ondary	Articles 69, 70 and 73 of the Azerb.SSR CC	09.01.1938	12.01.1956	No party affiliation. She was a housewife.	ASSSRA-AWR, 6931, 1-2, 5, 6

11	Mahmudbeyova Antiga Ali gizi	1919, Shusha city.	Higher	Article 63-3of the Azerb.SSR CC	10.03.1943	08.03.1956	No party affiliation. She was a dentist in an outpatient clinic.	ASSSRA-AWR, 276, 1, 2, 4-7, 13-20
12	Mehmandarova Surayya Alinagi gizi	1910, Shusha city.	higher		She was imprisoned for 5 years on 15.08.1938. On 14.01.1949, she was again sentenced to 5 years prison, pardoned in 1951.	29.09.1956	No party affiliation. She was a resident doctor at the stomatology department of the Azerbaijan Medical Institute, and a sanitary doctor after her release.	Guliyev, 2019, 333-340
13	Mustafayeva Finuza Salim gizi	1905, Shusha city.	Higher	Articles 130, 200 of the Azerb.SSR CC	25.07.1947	07.04.1948	No party affiliation. She was a doctor at the Children's Colony Trust.	ASSSRA-AWR, 125, 5-8, 17, 25
14	Najatova Gamar Gazi gizi	1902, Shusha dist., Qatbaly vil.	-	-	05.10.1937 (Kazakhstan)	-	-	AMIARA-RF, R-814, s.9,16,17, 20
15	Rahimova Leila Maharam gizi	1917, Shusha city	-	Article 63-3of the Azerb.SSR CC	29.12.1943	19.02.1990	No party affiliation. She was a housewife.	ASSSRA-AWR, 435, 1, 2, 4, 7
16	Salayeva Zurnud Mammadali gizi	1916, Shusha city	higher (student)	Articles 72-73 of the Azerb.SSR CC.	02.08.1938	04.05.1960	No party affiliation. She was a housewife.	ASSSRA-AWR, 8998, 1-6, 9 12-17
17	Shahsuvarova Dilgusha Firudin gizi	1901, Shusha city	-	Articles 72-73 of the Azerb.SSR CC.	04.07.1934 - 20.03.1939	-	No party affiliation. She was a housewife.	ASSSRA-AWR, 12493, 3
18	Tutayug Anvar Khaspolad gizi (later she was married for the second time with Yusif Jabrayilov)	1910, Shusha city	higher (student)	Articles 72-73 of the Azerb.SSR CC.	In April 1938, she was imprisoned for 8 years.	-	No party affiliation. She taught at "Narmaniya" school in Shusha.	Khalilza-deh, 2014, 10; Azadliq, 23.08.2013, 14; Guliyev, 2011b, 6-7
19	Tutayug Fanna Khaspolad gizi	1906, Shusha city	higher	Articles 72-73 of the Azerb.SSR CC.	She was arrested in 1931 and released after a while.	-	No party affiliation. She worked as the director of the city first-class school in Shusha, a teacher, a teacher at the cotton growing technical school in Salyan, after her release from prison, she worked as a teacher of Russian language and literature in various secondary schools, and as a department head at the Ministry of Education of the Azerb. SSR.	Khalilza-deh, 2014, 10; Azadliq, 23.08.2013, 14; Guliyev, 2011a, 6-7

Table 2: *The repressed men*

No.	Name, surname and patronymic	date and place of birth	edu- cation	the article which he was charged with	Date of arrest	date of acquittal	Party affiliation and working place	Reference
1	Javadov Alijavad Mammadali oglu (husband of Mustafayeva Fruzza Salim gizi)	1899, Baku city	high-her	Article 130 of the Azerb. SSR CC.	He was arrested on 24.06.1947.	-	He was a member of All-Union C(b)P. He was the head of the health department of Baku city, Azizbeyov district.	ASSSRA- -AWR, 125, 3,9, 15, 16-23
2	Alasgarov Gafar Huseyn oglu – (husband of Alasgarova Khatun Azim gizi)	1847, Shusha district, Zarisli village.	-	-	21.10.1944	-	No party affiliation. He was an ordinary collective farmer.	ASSSRA- -AWR, 486, 1-3
3	Askarov Baba Abi oglu (husband of Khalilazadeh Surayya)	1902, Guba district.	high-her	Articles 64, 70, 73 of the Azerb.SSR CC	Arrested on 21.05.1937, shot on 12.10.1937.	12.05.1956	In 1932, in 1922, he was admitted to the membership of All-Union C(b)P. He was an employee of the Institute of Party History. From 1928 to 1937, he was a history teacher and deputy dean of the History Faculty of Azerbaijan State University.	OPENLIST, 2022a
4	Feyzullayev Hashim Mustafa oglu (husband of Tutayig Fatma Khaspolad gizi)	1902, Baku gubernia, Agdere vil.	-	-	He was arrested on 02.02.1927 and exiled to the Solovki Islands for 10 years.	-	In the criminal case, he was described as a member of the Musavat organization. No party affiliation. He was a teacher at the cotton growing technical school in Salyan.	Khalilza- -deh, 2014, 10; Azadliq, 23. 08. 2013, 14; Guliyev, 2011a, 6–7
5	Hajiyev Ayyub Ahmad oglu (husband of Tutayig Anvar Khaspolad gizi)	Date of birth is unknown, Karayagin district, Sarajik vil.	-	-	He was arrested on 04.01.1938.	-	He was accused of being musavatist, counter-revolution and anti-Soviet propaganda. In the criminal case, he was described as a member of Musavat since 1935. The working place is unknown.	Khalilza- -deh, 2014, 10; Azadliq, 23. 08. 2013, 14; Guliyev, 2011b, 6–7; OPENLIST, 2022c

6	Hajiyev Khanlar Abdul Hussein oglu (husband of Hajiyeva Gulustan Bahlul gizi)	1901, Shusha city	primary	At first Articles 72-73 of the Azerb.SSR CC, then Articles 64, 70 and 73 of the Azerb. SSR CC.	He was arrested on 26.09.1937 and shot on 03.01.1938.	1956 (30.07.1957)	He was a member of C(b)P from 1925 to 14.10.1937. Since 1934, he was described as a member of the Trotskyst-Zinoviyev counter-revolutionary organization, terrorist center, and national organization in Azerbaijan, Azerbaijan was accused of the overthrow of the Soviet government by armed means and an attempt to create a bourgeois-nationalist state. He served in the army from the age of 16 and became an officer. In the last years of his life, he worked as a captain in Goychay District Military Commissariat. He was the chief of the 77th Azerbaijan Artillery Regiment for supply work.	ASSSRA-AWR, 13896, 1-12; OPENLIST, 2022d
7	Hajiyev Ismayil Isfandyar oglu (Hajiyev Saleh's brother)	1912, Basar-kecher district, Mazra vil.	-	-	He was shot on 15.12.1942.	-	No party affiliation. He was a hydraulic technician.	ASSSRA-AWR, 464, 11-20
8	Hajiyev Mammad Alakbar oglu	1912, Ganja city	-	Article 63-2 of the Azerb. SSR CC	-	-	No party affiliation. He was a teacher at a village school.	ASSSRA-AWR, 464, 23
9	Hajiyev Saleh Isfandyar oglu (husband of Hajiyeva Mina)	1914, Ganja city	secondary	Article 63-3of the Azerb. SSR CC	He was arrested on 27.02.1943 and shot on August 3, 1943.	14.03. 1956	He was a member of the All-Union CP, a member of the Red Army in October 1941. of the 803rd rifle battery He was a battery commander and a teacher.	ASSSRA-AWR, 464, 1-18, 25
10	Isazadeh Mammad Ismail oglu (husband of Isazadeh Sura Alasgar gizi)	1898, Place of birth is unknown.	-	-	He was arrested on 26.08.1937 and shot on 03.01.1938.	05.11.1957	No party affiliation. He was the regiment commander of the 231st infantry regiment and the 77th Azerbaijani infantry division.	ASSSRA-AWR, 10778, 4; Larkin, 2016, 59; OPENLIST, 2022e
11	Iskandarov Murshud Muralim oglu (husband of Iskandarova Hajjar Astan gizi)	1914, Place of birth is unknown.	uneducated	-	He was arrested on 10.03.1942.	-	No party affiliation. He was a Red Army member of the 9th Company, 3rd Battalion and the 775th Infantry Regiment.	ASSSRA-AWR, 4, 7-9

12	Guliyev Ashraf Gulu oglu (husband of Guliyeva Valida Hital gizi)	1908, Shusha city	higher	Articles 69, 70, 72-73 of the Azerb. SSR CC.	Arrested on 04.08.1937 and shot on 13.10.1937.	-	He was a member of the Leninist Young Communist League of Azerbaijan. In the criminal case, he was described as a member of the Trotskyist-Zinoviev counter-revolutionary organization in Azerbaijan. He was a general history teacher at the Higher Pedagogical Institute and Azerbaijan State University. He was the dean of the Faculty of History of the Azerbaijan Pedagogical Institute. He was removed from the higher educational institution for his public activities. (Deputy director of the Institute of History of ANAS in another document - see: OPENLIST, 2022b)	ASSSRA- -AWR, 12493, 1-5, 8, 9, 16, 18, 20
13	Mahmudbeyov Shahlar Ibadulla oglu (husband of Mahmudbeyova Antiga Ali gizi)	1856, Place of birth is unknown.		Article 63-3of the Azerb. SSR CC	05.02.1943		-	ASSSRA- -AWR, 276, 1, 3, 10
14	Mammadov Ali Samad oglu (husband of Mehmandarova Surayya)	1900, Lankaran town.	higher	-	He was shot on 07.01.1938.	29.09.1956	He was a member of the CC of AC(b), CEC of Azerbaijan, CEC of Transcaucasia, CEC of the USSR and All-union C (b) P, inspection commission of the Transcaucasian Country Committee. Since 1916, he has been a member of the Musavat youth organization "Yeni Javanlar" in Lankaran. He actively propagandized in the uyezd. In 1919, was elected a representative to the 1st Congress of Communists of Azerbaijan in Lankaran uyezd. He worked in the positions of the head of the Military Revolutionary Committee of Lankaran uyezd, Instructor of the Central Committee of C(b) P of Azerbaijan, Secretary of Lankaran Uyezd Party Committee, Head of Ganja Uyezd Executive Committee, People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Azerbaijan SSR, head of Aghdam District Executive Committee, People's Finance Commissioner of the Azerbaijan SSR, Head of the Gutgashen Executive Committee, commissioner of Azerbaijan department of the Grain Supply Office.	Guliyev, 2019, 334-335

15	Novruzov Hajj Gara oğlu	1908, Shusha city.	un- edu- ca- ted	-	He was arrested on 09.03.1942.		No party affiliation. He was a worker, a member of the 9th company, 3rd battalion, 775th infantry regiment of the Red Army.	ASSSRA- -AWR, 4, 7, 9-13
16	Rahimzadeh Rasul Abdulla oğlu (husband of Rahimova Leila Maharram gizi)	1904, Goychay district, Garabulag vil.	high- her	Article 63-3of the Azerb. SSR CC	He was shot on November 16, 1942.	-	-	ASSSRA- -AWR, 15, 1-8
17	Salayev Aga Dadash oğlu (husband of Salayeva Zümrüd Mammədali gizi)	1908, Lankaran town.	high- her	Articles 21/64, 70 and 73 of the Azerb.SSR CC	He was arrested on 23.07.1937.		He was a member of the All-Union CP (since 1932). In his criminal case he is accused of being a musavatist. He was the head of the District Department for Public Education of Sabirabad District Executive Committee.	ASSSRA- -AWR, 6254, 6-8, 10-14
18	Shahsuvarov Samad Adilqhan oğlu (husband of Shahsuvarova Dilqusha Frudin gizi)	1894, Lachin district, Minkend vil.	high- her	Articles 64-18, 70, 72, 73 of the Azerb.SSR CC	He was arrested on 09.01.1938.	16.07.1957	In his criminal case he was described as a member of the counter-revolutionary "İftihad" organization. He was a teacher at Shusha Pedagogical Technical secondary school.	ASSSRA- -AWR, 12493, 1-3, 6, 7-11, 14, 15; OPENLIST, 2022f

ŽENSKÉ IZ ŠUŠE, KI SO BILE IZPOSTAVLJENE REPRESIJI MED “VELIKIM TERORJEM”: V ARHIVSKIH DOKUMENTIH SLUŽBE DRŽAVNE VARNOSTI REPUBLIKE AZERBAJDŽANA

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POVZETEK

Med raziskavo smo skušali najti odgovore na nekaj ključnih vprašanj. Prvič, ali je bila sovjetska vlada »po naravi« neusmiljena le do svojih sovražnikov? Drugič, kakšni so bili po dolgih letih dokazi o oprostilnih sodbah (razsodba »nedolžen«), ki so bile izrečene tem ljudem? Poudariti je treba, da vsi rezultati, pridobljeni s preučevanjem dokumentov žensk iz Šuše in njihovih družinskih članov, ki so na voljo v naših državnih arhivih, ter gradiva, zbranega o njih iz drugih virov, niso znanstvena novost. Kljub temu pričujoče delo prinaša dragoceno gradivo in spoznanja, ker smo v glavnem uporabili arhivske dokumente Službe državne varnosti Azerbajdžanske republike. Mimogrede, uporabili smo tudi dokumente arhiva Ministrstva za notranje zadeve Republike Azerbajdžan. Ti viri so nam dali zelo podrobne informacije o tem vprašanju. Njihova dodatna prednost je, da nam pomagajo pojasniti pomen »velikega terorja«. Veliki teror namreč ni bil »velik« le po številu žrtev, temveč tudi po veliki količini storilcev, in po tem, da je režim z združevanjem »kampanj za demokracijo« z lovom na »sovražnike« zabilisal razliko med lovцем in tistim, ki ga lovijo. Na splošno je ta članek edinstvena raziskava (preučevane so bile le družine žensk iz Šuše), ki potrjuje rezultate različnih prej opravljenih raziskav o represiji. To delo je dragocen dodatek k sliki terorja v Šuši, v zgodovinskem mestu Azerbajdžana.

Ključne besede: Šuša, politična represija, totalitarizem, izgnanstvo, »veliki teror«

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THE ASSASSINATION OF GENERAL İSMAIL MAHIR PASHA IN ISTANBUL (1908)

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ABSTRACT

Ismail Mahir Pasha was sent to Thessaloniki by Abdulhamid II as an inspector to investigate the Committee of Union and Progress which caused him to get caught by the radar of the Committee Union and Progress members when he returned to Istanbul. The Committee Union and Progress members sent him a fake letter to get him out of his household and consequently assassinated him on a street on December 2nd, 1908, by a man dressed as an officer who couldn't get caught. The aim of this article is to evaluate the reasons of the assassination process and who he was assassinated by and to examine the political results of this assassination.

Keywords: Abdulhamid II, İsmail Mahir Pasha, Committee of Union and Progress, assassination, Ottoman, İstanbul

L'ASSASSINIO DEL GENERALE İSMAIL MAHIR PASHA A ISTANBUL (1908)

SINTESI

Abdulhamid II mandò il generale İsmail Mahir Pascià a Salonicco con il compito di indagare intorno al Comitato per l'Unione e il Progresso. Al suo ritorno a Istanbul, il generale finì nel mirino dei membri del Comitato che gli inviarono una falsa lettera per farlo uscire di casa e di conseguenza, il 2 dicembre 1908, venne ucciso in strada. L'assassino, vestito da ufficiale, riuscì a dileguarsi. Lo scopo dell'articolo è approfondire le ragioni dell'assassinio e indagare su chi lo eseguì, oltre che esaminare i risvolti politici dell'omicidio.

Parole chiave: Abdulhamid II, İsmail Mahir Pasha, Comitato per l'Unione e il Progresso, assassinio, Impero ottomano, Istanbul

INTRODUCTION

The 19th century, which is considered to be the most painful years of the Ottoman Empire with the rapid events both inside and outside, had been a period when the modernization efforts of the state reached its peak. The beginning of radical reform movements in the basic dynamics of the state had been the scene of a sometimes secret and sometimes open struggle between tradition and supporters of change. Especially the new generation of military and civilian intellectuals, who grew up in the modern schools opened by Mahmud II, took action to realize a change in the most basic principles of the state as a result of the innovations brought by the Tanzimat. The members of Genç Osmanlılar Cemiyeti (Young Ottomans Committee), which sprouted in the mid-1860s, agreed that the reforms were insufficient and that what really needed to be changed was the management system. According to them, the way to keep different religious and ethnic groups that wanted to leave the state together was to establish a constitutional government. Although “the Young Turks”, who wanted to create a public opinion on this issue, especially in the newspapers and journals they published (Shaw & Shaw, 1977, 156–157), increased their pressure day by day and tried to have Sultan Abdulaziz declared the constitutional government, they were not successful in their attempts. When the military/civil committee, which replaced Sultan Abdulaziz, who was deposed by a palace coup, with Murad V, realized that the new sultan would not be successful in realizing this change, they turned their direction to Şehzade Abdülhamid (Akşin, 1995, 15). Sultan Abdulhamid, who ascended the throne with the support of the Young Turks, accepted the transition to the constitutional government, as there was no time to be lost in a period when the state was going through hard times and the Great Powers were increasing their pressure, and this decision was declared to the Great Powers.

A new era started in the Ottoman Empire with the Kanun-i Esasi and the parliament that was opened in an environment where the Sultan and the Young Turks did not feel trust towards each other. The Great Powers – Great Britain, France, and Russia –, which continued to follow a destructive policy through minorities, did not find this step sufficient, and with the Russians taking action (1877–1878 Ottoman-Russian War), Sultan Abdulhamid shelved the Kanun-i Esasi and the parliament system, which he promised to declare but took very slowly. Immediately after these developments, Sultan Abdulhamid started to liquidate the Young Turks and was successful in this. The very short life of the constitutional government brought along the emergence of a number of new formations against the Hamidiye Regime. In 1889, during the centennial patrol of the French Revolution, a secret and revolutionary organization, which would later become the Committee of Union and Progress, was established by five young people at the School of Medicine (Zürcher, 2004, 86). This organization, which is a continuation of the movement that started in the 1860s, mostly consisted of young officers, and carried out its efforts to have Sultan Abdulhamid re-declared the constitutional monarchy.

In a short time, the committee entered into relations with many internal and external societies and organizations that were fundamentally opposed to the Hamidiye Regime, thus the committee gained considerable power. The committee, which was active in Paris and Geneva, soon made Thessaloniki its center. Since the Third Army in Thessaloniki was the first place of duty for the newly graduated officers, the committee was able to be organized in many of the Balkan cities. Due to the intelligence network established by Sultan Abdulhamid, the committee had never made concessions from its secret structure in order not to be exposed. So much so that even the entrance ceremony to the committee was held in a certain secrecy and the members of the committee knew each other within certain limitations. The committee took the Carbonari organization, an Italian masonic organization, as an example and went for a cell-like structure. In this structure, many of the members of the organization were in contact only with the members in their cell and found it appropriate to agree among themselves with certain symbols (Ramsour, 2002, 27–28). In this way, a wave of mystery circulating as a word of mouth had transformed the committee into a more charismatic and withdrawn structure. Despite all the criticism, this secret structure of the committee did not change even after the 1908 Revolution, the members strictly remained faithful to the oath they had sworn while entering the committee, and they respected its legacy even after the committee was dissolved.

Apart from this committee, it is certain that there are smaller secret organizations within the secret committee. The most famous of these secret organizations is a group called the Fedais. The Fedais group, which consisted mostly of young and courageous officers of the committee, although there were a small number of civilians, was working as an assassination team that strictly followed the decisions taken by the general central. This organization, which the Committee of Union and Progress strengthened its power in the following periods and used to suppress the opposition, remains one of the dark spots of recent Turkish history.

FEDAIS AT WORK: THE ATTEMPT TO ASSASSINATE THE CENTRAL COMMANDER OF THESSALONIKI, NAZIM BEY, AND THE ARRIVAL OF THE INVESTIGATION COMMITTEE UNDER THE PRESIDENCY OF İSMAIL MAHIR PASHA

The strengthening of the existing structure of the Committee of Union and Progress was achieved by establishing and merging with the Ottoman Freedom Committee, which was established in Thessaloniki. In 1906, ten civilians and soldiers, who came together in a place called Beş Çınar in Thessaloniki, established this committee in 1889 with the same purpose as five young students studying in Military Medicine Faculty. The ten people who attended the meeting were: the Director of Military Junior High School of Bursa (Bursa Askeri Rüşdiyesi) Mehmet Tahir Bey, Naki Bey, the French teacher of the same middle school, Talat Bey, the head clerk of the Thessaloniki-Monastery post-telegraph office, Rahmi Bey, Mithat Şükrü, Kazım

Nami, Ömer Naci, İsmail Canbolat, Hakkı Baha, Edip Servet Bey (Duru, 1957, 13). Sina Akşin states that another source is commemorating Captain İsmail Hakkı and Süleyman Fehmi in the place of the last two people (Akşin, 1980, 58). Since the members of the association thought that it would attract attention that ten people would gather in the same house every night, they chose Talat, Rahmi and İsmail Canbolat as the Supreme Delegation, which later took the name General Center (Çavdar, 1991, 26). Thus, the center of gravity of the committee shifted from Paris to Thessaloniki and other centers in the Balkans began to act under the control of Thessaloniki (Küçükılınç, 2018, 26).

Upon the news that some opposition movements had started in Thessaloniki, the sultan sent Nazım Bey, one of his trusted men, the Central Commander of Thessaloniki and also Enver Bey's brother-in-law, to understand what was going on in Thessaloniki and Rumelia. After Nazım Bey gathered important information about the committee and was invited to Istanbul, the committee decided to eliminate Nazım Bey and Mustafa Necip Bey was chosen from the fedais for this job. The assassination, which took place in a plan that included İsmail Canbolat and Enver Bey, failed and both Nazım Bey and Mustafa Necip, who carried out the assassination, were injured. Mustafa Necip managed to escape, but with the guidance of Enver Bey, the news that the assassination was carried out by the Bulgarian komitadjis spread and Nazım Bey was convinced of this situation. This first assassination carried out by the association's supporters had failed, but both Nazım Bey's going to Istanbul and explaining the situation to the Sultan and other news from Thessaloniki showed Yıldız the seriousness of the situation. In a series of telegrams sent by Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha, it was stated that the young officers in Thessaloniki and Rumelia were in a motion to re-declare the constitutional monarchy and that they would take action in the near future.¹ After these events, Sultan Abdulhamid understood the purpose of the committee and sent a delegation consisted of Yusuf and Recep Pashas to Thessaloniki under the leadership of İsmail Mahir Pasha to confirm the information received and to meet with the commanders of the soldiers who were in Thessaloniki and the officers who wanted to make a revolution (Ziya Şakir, 2014, 244). The apparent task of the incoming delegation was to inspect the equipment depots of the Third Army (Ahmad, 2004, 18). However, the CUP (Committee Union and Progress) members knew the main purpose of the committee that in the book titled *İnkılâb-Why and How It Happened*, written by Doctor Mehmed Reşid Bey under the pseudonym Cevri, he used the following expressions for this committee:

1 Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha, in the tahrir he sent to the Chief Inscription on 18 June 1908, talked about how harmful it was for the corrupters to enter an army, and that the mischief-makers in the army used weapons in the days when the Russian Emperor and the King of England met, and as a result, it was important and essential for their chiefs to be obtained. Because of this, the measures to be taken by Esad Pasha, who was in the Ministry of the Army of the Imperial Council, and İsmail Mahir, Yusuf, Recep Pashas and Fehmi Bey who came from Istanbul, ensured that those involved in this business were found out, and instead of the officer whose complacency and incompetence had not been seen for a while in the pursuit of bandits. He stated that redif officers with fixed loyalty should be appointed (İSAM.HHP, 19/1274, 18 June 1908).

As soon as it understood the importance of the intellectual revolution in Rumelia, the repressive government was alarmed. It began to send flocks of spies there. Among the spies, the one who showed the most effort was Nazım, the Central Commander of Thessaloniki. Therefore, removing his body was a duty for the Committee. Nazım Bey injured from the attack of a glorious officer and fled to Istanbul. After this, a committee consisting of Mahir, Yusuf and Receb Pashas was sent to Thessaloniki (Çulcu, 2011, 225).

According to Enver Bey, the delegation came to Thessaloniki one day after the assassination of Nazım Bey², and its task was to investigate this assassination and, more importantly, to engage in the discovery of the committee (Cengiz, 1991, 89). It is not known whether İsmail Mahir Pasha had a disputant nature, but disagreements arose between this delegation, which was sent to Thessaloniki for an important task, and the delegation was later recalled (Ali Said, 1994, 148). İrtem states that both the disagreements between the members of the delegation and İbrahim Pasha's failure to withdraw this delegation and his recommendation to recall it were effective in the recall of the delegation. He also adds that Yusuf Pasha, who was in the delegation, and Rahmi Bey, the Former Governor of Izmir, who was in Thessaloniki at that period, met from time to time because they were relatives, and that Rahmi Bey's intimidation of Yusuf Pasha by saying that the fedais would assassinate them had an effect (İrtem, 1999, 298). Regarding the reason why the delegation was called back to Istanbul, Feroz Ahmad provides the following information based on the British archives:

The flow of events accelerated when the delegation headed by Mahir Pasha set foot in Thessaloniki. The Commander-in-Chief of the Third Army Esat Pasha and Chief of Staff Ali Rıza Pasha were summoned to Istanbul. Considering that these two pashas were the chief culprits of the discontent in the Third Army, the Palace planned to appoint commanders loyal to the Palace who would impose stricter disciplinary rules in their place, thereby preventing movement among the soldiers (Ahmad, 2004, 18).

It can also be seen on the same archives that “İbrahim Pasha, who succeeded Esat Pasha, was known as a reactionary for a long time. However, after he became the Commander of the Third Army, he started to cooperate with the Macedonian General Inspector Hilmi Pasha, who was known to have liberal tendencies. Together, they sent spokespersons to the Palace several times, demanding that the delegation be recalled.” The information is concluded as “Finally, at the beginning of July, Mahir Pasha was ordered to return to Istanbul (Ahmad, 2004, 18–19).” It seems that there were some disagreements between the delegation, especially

2 Süleyman Kâni İrtem writes that the assassination of Nazım Bey took place on 13 June 1908, while the delegation came to Thessaloniki on 15 June 1908 (İrtem, 1999, 292).

İsmail Mahir Pasha, and Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha, and this attitude of Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha was effective in inviting the delegation to Istanbul. A telegram written by Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha to the Head Clerk on 24 June 1908 is important in terms of showing the current conflict between the two. In his article, Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha stated that he had always been loyal to the sultan and the state, but that dishonest people like İsmail Mahir Pasha had slandered that he had written a false letter to him, and that for this reason, he would not have any dealings or correspondence with the treacherous İsmail Mahir Pasha (İSAM.HHP, 2/137, 24 June 1908.) Alkan states that according to the French documents, the return date of the delegation to Istanbul was July 2 (Alkan, 2012, 195–196), it seems that the delegation served in Thessaloniki for 20 days between 12 June and 2 July 1908.

It is also possible to see what activities the committee did about the CUP members in the writings of the Rumelia Inspector Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha to the Palace about the activities of the committee. For example, in his letter dated June 11, 1908, it is reported that one of the members of Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha's delegation went to Karaferye, Vodine and Yenice Districts and took action to immediately arrest the officer who was found to be a member of the association (İSAM.HHP, 2/137, 24 June 1908). Of course, the members of the committee did not tolerate these attacks, investigations and arrests against them, and they held a grudge against the members of the delegation, especially the head of the delegation, İsmail Mahir Pasha, whom they considered responsible for these actions.

On the days of the Nazım Bey Assassination, it is seen that the CUP members who were to be known for being Fedais carried out other assassinations, which were at least as important as the Nazım Bey assassination in terms of showing the power of the committee. When these events, which coincided with the days before the proclamation of the Constitutional Monarchy, were evaluated collectively, it can be said that these assassinations had a significant impact on the realization of the proclamation of the constitutional monarchy. The first of these assassinations was the murder of Monastir Police Inspector Sami Bey, who was alleged to have been a spy on behalf of the palace, on 6 July.³ This event was followed by the murder of Hacı Hakkı Bey, who was a member of İsmail Mahir Pasha's delegation, and his clerk, Şuayb, whose movements were carefully followed by the CUP members. Again, at that time, the assassination of Naim Bey, who conveyed the important information he knew to Yıldız and went to Istanbul to provide information, and was promoted to lieutenant colonel for this reason, followed. On the evening of July 5, when Naim Bey was in Thessaloniki, on his way home from Beyazkule, he was shot by an officer named Abdülkadir, one of the fedais of the committee, but the victim survived, and an unranked soldier waiting in front of the police station finished

3 In the letter written by Talat Bey, under the pseudonym Sâi, to the "Ottoman Progress and Union Committee Headquarters Committee", there are the following lines about the murder of Sami Bey: "The General Inspectorate has been convinced that the murder of Monastir Police Inspector Sami was by our committee" (Kuran, 2012, 458).

the work that Abdülkadir had left unfinished (Ziya Şakir, 2014, 321–322). Just after the assassination of Şemsi Pasha, on July 10, Mustafa Şevket Efendi, Mufti of the Monastery Artillery Regiment, was killed by Abdülkadir, when he left the Colombo Hotel where he was staying in Thessaloniki to go to Istanbul (Kabacalı, 2007, 84). Some of the other assassinations carried out by the CUP member Fedais before and after the Constitutional Monarchy was declared are as follows: The Monastery District Commander Osman Hidayet Pasha was shot while he was reading the sultan's edict on 17th July and murder of Debre Governor Hüsnü Bey on 19th July. The political murders that took place around the same dates but whose dates could not be determined can be listed as follows: The Governor of Prilepe, the murder of the Serez Artillery Commander, the shooting of Lawyer Sabir Efendi in Skopje, the wounding of Major Rıfki, who was a spy, by an officer named Siyami, in Thessaloniki Dock, the killing of Captain Bahaeddin from Crete by an officer in the warehouses behind the customs in Thessaloniki, the murder of Law Captain İbrahim, Law Enforcement Officer Cavalry Captain Ali in the Central Command, and a civilian from Thessaloniki in the morning on the day of the declaration of constitutionalism (Kabacalı, 2007, 84–85).

An unsuccessful assassination attempt on Nazım Bey's life on 11 June 1908, and then the delegation's arrival in Thessaloniki under the presidency of İsmail Mahir Pasha created great uneasiness for the committee. The committee, which was in danger of being exposed, had no choice but to carry out the revolution. Especially in the branches of the committee in various regions of Rumelia, the demands were rising at the point of starting the revolution as soon as possible. The CUP members thought that the first of the events that ignited the revolution was the meeting of King Edward VII of England and Tsar Nicholas of Russia in Reval to discuss the Macedonian Question on 9 June (Alkan, 2008, 48). This meeting about the future of Macedonia has been a driving force in the movement of the committee. The events that broke out due to a picnic that Austria railway workers had and Albanians misunderstood, in the region called Firzovik, located on the border with Austria, caused the Albanians to arm themselves and became a pressure element for the declaration of the Constitutional Monarchy by being guided by the CUP members (Külçe, 1944, 52–53). As a result of these events that developed one after another, the step that actually started the revolution was that Resneli Niyazi Bey went to the mountain with about 150 of his men on 3 July. Resneli Niyazi Bey was called to Istanbul in connection with the assassination of Eyüp Sabri Bey and Nazım Bey, but he did not respond to this call and was followed by Enver Bey, who took refuge in Tikveş from Thessaloniki. With the news of the revolt reaching Istanbul, Sultan Abdülhamid sent Şemsi Pasha, one of his most trusted men, who knew the region very well and was influential in the region because he was an Albanian, to Monastir (Mustafa Ragıp, 2007, 12).

The arrival of Şemsi Pasha in Monastir caused a great indignation within the Committee. Knowing the effect of Pasha on Albanians, the committee made an assassination plan to eliminate the pasha in order to reach the result, and the task was

given to Mülazım Atıf Bey. On July 7, 1908, Atıf Bey shot and killed Şemsi Pasha while he was leaving the Monastir Telegraph Office, he was wounded but saved his life and hid by the CUP members and was safely smuggled into Resne (Özdemir, 2014, 179–180). Considering that the probability of suppressing the rebellion by Şemsi Pasha is very high, the murder of Pasha can be interpreted as one of the most important events in recent history. It can be said that the success of the rebellion with the death of Pasha and the subsequent transition to the constitutional administration paved the way for the power of the Union and Progress, which would shape a period (Babacan, 2005, 26). The abduction of Osman Pasha, who was sent to the region after the news of Şemsi Pasha's death, was also abducted by the CUP members, an indication that the influence of the central authority in the region was almost non-existent, and as a result of the telegrams sent one after another from different centers in Rumelia, Sultan Abdulhamid declared on 23 July 1908 that the constitutional administration was reinstated (Tunaya, 2004, 19).

Assassination of İsmail Mahir Pasha (December 2, 1908)

The five-and-a-half-month period between the assassination attempt on Nazım Bey, which was the first step taken by the CUP members in Thessaloniki on the way to the revolution, and the date İsmail Mahir Pasha was killed in Istanbul on December 2, was a period that witnessed important events almost day by day. The process that led to the death of İsmail Mahir Pasha, one of the most trusted pashas of Sultan Abdulhamid, started when the Pasha presided over the delegation sent to Thessaloniki to investigate the activities of the committee in the region after the assassination attempt on Nazım Bey.

Who was İsmail Mahir Pasha?

İsmail Mahir Pasha gives the following information about himself in the autobiography document:

I am the son of Zeynel Abidin Bey, who passed away in 1864, when he was the District Governor of Mina Sanjak of Yemen (the governors were called district governors at the time), who was one of the notables of the Konice Town of the Ioannina Province and who had the third medal of honor and medals. My date of birth is in Konice at the beginning of March 1853. After studying in some schools for a while, I was given the rank of battalion clerk in 1871 and went to the reserve unit settled in Yemen, and after giving the ranks of regimental clerk and regimental security officer there, I returned to Istanbul in February 1878 and served in Hassa Ordu-yu Hümayûn for three years. After transferring to the 3rd Army, I presented the ranks of major in 1885, district governor in 1891, and miralay in 1899 (BOA, Y.PRK.TKM., 33–15, 25 June 1903).

In the continuation of the document, İsmail Mahir Pasha stated that he had medals of the 4th rank for his achievements in the Battles of Serbia and Thessaly due to his services in Yemen, Majîdî, and Serbian Border Commissar, and that he served as a commander in the province of Kosovo, bandit pursuit and in the District Governorates of Gresne, Yakova and Kalkandelen. During the wars, he served as the Lamyâ outpost commander and the commissioner of the trustees. After the war, he served as the Commander of the Dömeke Provident Regiment, and with the evacuation of Thessaly, he performed his duties as the Commander of Public Security in Yanya. He was transferred to the Miralay of the 61st Regiment in Shkodër with his current rank. He also states that he was transferred to the 6th Humayun Army (BOA, Y.PRK.TKM., 33–15, 25 June 1903).

İsmail Mahir Pasha took part in the delegation sent to the island to investigate the Samos Events before he went to Thessaloniki to investigate the assassination attempt on Nazım Bey and the secret committee. This task is an important turning point in İsmail Mahir Pasha's professional life. Due to the active role played by Pasha during the events in Samos in May 1908, he was promoted to the rank of Ferik. The rebellion started by the Revolutionary Sofulis, who took all the orders from the Greek authorities, was closely followed by the Ottoman authorities. The Ottoman authorities, who took the path of solving the incident before it got too big, made political attempts, but the opposition group gradually increased its activities. The Sublime Porte realized that he could not ignore more issues and solve the problem through advice, and he felt obliged to take all kinds of measures, including military operations, in order to radically change this negative picture against himself on the island (Örenç, 1995, 145–146).

While the Bâb-ı Âli was carrying on its military preparations, considering the political aspect of the issue, it was beneficial to have a person from the civil servants on the island, and appointed the Thessaloniki Governor Rauf Pasha and his assistant Konstantinidi Pasha for this task. The rule was conveyed to Rauf Pasha, and he was ordered to leave his office to the Provincial Inspector of Rumelia by proxy, with the Eighteenth Shooter Battalion, which was dispatched from Salonika, and to act immediately, with the accompany with his assistant. Apart from these individuals, İsmail Mahir and Sadık Pashas, two of the Sultan's aides, were assigned to supervise the necessary measures (Örenç, 1995, 149).

İsmail Mahir Pasha was wounded in the leg as a result of the fire opened by the rebels in Samos.⁴ In the telegram sent to the Sublime Porte from the Thessaloniki Governor Rauf Bey, who was sent as a civil servant for the reformation of Samos, this situation was expressed as follows: “Yesterday, upon the urging of İsmail Mahir Pasha from the aide-de-camp, a house that dared to fire weapons on the Hamidiye Cruiser was bombarded, destroyed and punished by being destroyed. Troops were landed and they patrolled” (BOA, Y.A.HUS., 522–5, 18 May 1908).

4 Western Times, 1 June 1908: Women and Children Shot by Turkish Troops in Samos, 4.

İSMAIL MAHIR PASHA BECOMES THE TARGET OF THE CUP MEMBERS

The delegation, which was assigned to investigate the revolutionary movement in Thessaloniki, reached there one day after the assassination attempt on 12 June and settled in İsplândit Palas and started its activities immediately. According to Ahmad, the delegation, which remained in Thessaloniki until July 2, had little success in revealing the secret societies. Therefore, the organization of the Committee of Union and Progress in Thessaloniki remained as it was (Ahmad, 19). A similar interpretation is also seen in Kabacalı. Kabacalı states that this high commission of detectives returned to Istanbul without revealing the secret organization (Kabacalı, 2007, 91). Özdemir, like Ahmad and Kabacalı, states that the commission did not provide the expected preventive benefit, but on the contrary, the attacks of the fedais who were worried about being prosecuted increased even more (Özdemir, 2014, 213).

We can say that this delegation, headed by İsmail Mahir Pasha, did not fail much contrary to the above-mentioned researchers' claims, at least it put a serious pressure on the CUP members. As a result, Özdemir's writings about the increase in the attacks of the fedais are in a way an indication of the committee's discomfort with the committee. Ramsour writes that after the work of the delegation, some officers were arrested and sent to Istanbul (Ramsour, 168). Again, Avcı, in his work based on British secret reports, states that the delegation's arrival in Thessaloniki, departing from Istanbul, was enough to alarm the committee and, in Lowther's words, the arrival of the delegation was a signal for the committee to take action (Avcı, 2005, 197).

In this regard, a letter showing the perspectives of the CUP members towards the incoming delegation and how the members of the delegation were persecuted by the committee is very important. Although the exact date could not be determined, in the letter sent by Talat Bey under the pseudonym Sâî to the Headquarters of the "Ottoman Progress and Union Committee" after the assassination of Nazım Bey, Talat Bey wrote the following:

The measures taken by the government on recent events are very serious. With this, it is understood that they will be completely surprised by a more fundamental and serious action. Upon the case, the palace sent three pashas, one of whom was more stupid than the other, and one of them was ferik, a war governor and a doctor. (Names: İsmail Mahir, Yusuf, Receb Pashas and Hasan Fehim and Halim). These people attempted to deceive the people with lies such as the promise of becoming a vizier and the promise of thousands of liras, and when they were humiliated and belittled by everyone and some of them were intimidated by the committee, they were surprised at what they would do, even though they included the general inspector in their journals, they said that everyone from the highest ranking soldier to the soldier and from the governor to the villager was included in the committee. After sending them to Istanbul with fear, they were summoned to Istanbul by quarreling with each other when Indicator İbrahim Pasha became the army commander (Kuran, 2012, 458).

Talat Bey continues to explain the situation as

prior to the appointment of İbrahim Pasha, Indicator, Grand Vizier Ferid Pasha's brother-in-law, Mirliva Ali Pasha and Artillery Miralay Hasan Rıza Bey and subsequently Deputy Commander of the Army Ferik Esad Pasha were summoned to Istanbul. Of these, Ali Pasha and Hasan Rıza Bey are imprisoned in the Bâb-ı Seraskeri. Lastly, Erkam Harb Major Enver Bey was also tried to be summoned by fraud, but the treacherous purpose was understood and he temporarily abandoned his official duty to perform the duty of 'Rumelia Internal Organization and General Forces Inspector' of the Committee. Surely our officers there know what kind of hero Enver Bey is (Kuran, 2012, 458).

It was concluded in his statement that it was obligatory to keep this news confidential without being included in the newspaper (Kuran, 2012, 458).

Kuran interpreted this letter as “On the one hand, he cites the assassinations perpetrated against the lives of people whom they deem harmful to the committee, and on the other hand, he mentions that these people who were sent from the Palace were subjected to persecution one by one” (Kuran, 2012, 459) and indeed, the committee was thinking of taking some kind of revenge on the members of this committee.

Another proof that the delegation was influential on the CUP members is the assassinations of the members of the delegation. If the committee had been so ineffective, the committee's attitude towards them would not have been so harsh. The first of the members of the delegation to be assassinated was Hacı Hakkı Bey. Hacı Hakkı Bey was a member of the Istanbul Şehremaneti and was assigned to gather information about the committee in Thessaloniki. Talat Pasha gave the following information about Hacı Hakkı Bey in the letter mentioned above. “A nasty person named Hacı Hakkı Bey, one of the bad people of Istanbul and a member of the municipality, was appointed to the sleuthing organization here by Yıldız and started his duty as a spy. We hope that we will soon be acquainted with the supply and disclosure. Şuayıb, one of the spies of Fehim Pasha, the clerk of Haji Hakki, was killed at night.”

İrtem mentions about the incident of Hacı Hakkı Bey in his book as follows: “Even though it was understood that it was not possible to do anything to Abdülhamid as a result of the negotiations, it was decided to take action since eliminating his men would mean taking his sword from his hands and putting himself in danger. The attempt against Hacı Hakkı Bey in Thessaloniki was the result of this decision. Colonel Tunçay gives the following explanation against what Hacı İsmail Hakkı Bey wrote about what happened to him in Thessaloniki in the pamphlet “İzhar-ı Hakikat”, which he published after the constitutional monarchy: The articles of Hacı Hakkı Bey about the fact that guns were thrown at him or the house he lived in by others do not correspond to the truth. The execution of Hacı Hakkı Bey was decided by the Central Committee of Thessaloniki (İttihat Terakki), and his execution was written to the Fedai Division. A

person from the Fedai Division – who is in Ankara now. Maybe I don't write his name in case he doesn't want to publish it- had accepted. Captain Abdülkadir Efendi, who was one of the administrative committee of the Fedai Division, was also assigned to support and help this fedai. Hacı Hakkı Bey was returning home from the Beyazkule garden late that night, with his guard. The fedai shot at him in the back alley. Hacı Hakkı Bey fell on the ground shouting. His guard, on the other hand, was both running away and trying to get his revolver in its holster. The fedai followed him and fired at him, after seeing him fall too, he turned and aimed his gun at the head of Hacı Hakkı Bey, who was lying on the ground. But this time the revolver did not fire. He drew the second pistol next to him, which didn't work. He withdrew, unable to reload his automatic pistols. This is why Hacı Hakkı Bey escaped a certain death. The fact that he depicted the situation in a way that did not comply with the truth in his pamphlet, which he wrote after the Constitutional Monarchy, must have been based on the purpose of not arousing the enmity of the committee again. It is seen that İrtəm and Colonel Süleyman Fehmi Tunçay, who told the events by sending a letter to him, were wrong on some points. Because the book *Izhar-ı Hakikat* belongs to Ferik Hasan Tahsin Pasha, not to Hacı Hakkı Bey. It is already known in the sources that Hacı Hakkı Bey was killed as a result of an assassination on 6 July (Alkan, 2012, 352; Ahmad, 2004, 26).

Mustafa Şevket Efendi, Mufti of the Monastir Artillery Regiment, who, like Hacı Hakkı Bey, contacted the İsmail Mahir Pasha delegation and conveyed information to them, was killed in Thessaloniki on 10 July. Mithat Şükrü Bleda, one of the leading names of the committee, describes this assassination as follows:

The information given about the Mufti of Monastir, one of the ordinary informers of Yıldız Palace, was not in the mood that he was a person to be neglected at all. According to what we learned, he was constantly journaling the activities of our committee in Monastir. So it was decided that he was a dangerous person. The interesting thing is that this mufti took orders directly from Yıldız Palace and sent his journals there (Bleda, 1979, 38–39).

Bleda mentions that they had learned that he was preparing to go to Istanbul with an order from the Mabeyn and their Monastir organization had informed them that this man's life was dangerous. He goes on describing the event with the following details:

The mufti had come to Thessaloniki to go to Istanbul. This bigot had to disappear from his body. We learned that he was staying at the Colombo hotel in Thessaloniki. We understood that the guy knew a lot and that he would go to Istanbul as soon as possible and tell his master everything. In fact, the importance of this trip was evident from his rush. He was not supposed to go to Istanbul and we were going to finish the job right there. This time our "fedai" was Abdulkadir Efendi. As soon as he took this duty, he took off his military suit and dressed in civilian.

He went to the Colombo hotel and began to wander up and down the front of the building. The Istanbul train would depart early the next morning. Therefore, he had no time to lose. Abdulkadir Efendi, who could not sleep all night, saw the teacher with his bag in his hand coming down the stairs of the hotel in the early hours of the morning and drew his gun and stuck the bullet just as the mufti was getting into the car (Bleda, 1979, 38–39).

He concludes his description as “the mufti collapsed to the ground in blood, and in the rush of the hotel staff, no one had attempted to find out where the lead had come from” (Bleda, 1979, 38–39).

Another assassination event that took place after the delegation’s mission in Thessaloniki was quite interesting. On July 12, Sadık Pasha, a member of the delegation, was killed near Çanakkale by two people while he was on the way to Istanbul (Ahmad, 2004, 26) on the Sidon Ferry (Akşin, 1980, 74). İrtəm said that this incident was not caused by the CUP members but due to the disagreement between Rüstem Bey and Sadık Pasha, and that Rüstem Bey went to Prizren after the spies started to be shot by the CUP members and brought a young man aged 19–20 to shoot Sadık Pasha. He states that Sadık Pasha set off, one day after they came to Thessaloniki with this young man, and that he had this young man on the ship and had Pasha shot in the vicinity of Çanakkale. İrtəm further adds that since this assassination was in accordance with the wishes and interests of the committee, no voice was heard by the committee (İrtəm, 1999, 298–299). It is not known whether this claim, which we could not find in any other source, was true, but somehow another of the men trusted by the Sultan was eliminated. It is possible to say that these assassinations had a serious impact on İsmail Mahir Pasha, because it is known that after he arrived in Istanbul, Mahir Pasha did not leave his mansion much and did not meet with many people.

An event that took place after the delegation of İsmail Mahir Pasha left Thessaloniki is also important in terms of showing how the committee was perceived by the CUP members.

The incident showing that this committee commissioned by Sultan Abdulhamid was taken seriously by the CUP members, and Talat Bey, who referred to them as “idiots”, saw the departure of the delegation from Thessaloniki and the re-declaration of the Constitutional Monarchy as a victory for the members of the delegation, and in a broader sense, against Sultan Abdulhamid, has been experienced that it is important in terms of showing Talat Bey’s feelings towards the delegation, albeit a symbolic act. On the morning of July 25, two days after the proclamation of the Constitutional Monarchy, Talat Bey informed his friends that Merkez-i Umumî would settle in İsplândid Palas. Although Rasim and Süleyman Fehmi Beys said that this was not the right thing to do, Talat Bey could not be controlled, and Talat Bey said: “We will live in the apartment where İsmail Mahir Pasha lived,” and the middle floor of the apartment overlooking the sea has been moved (İrtəm, 1999, 369).

The Return of the Delegation to Istanbul and the Murder of İsmail Mahir Pasha

The return of İsmail Mahir Pasha to Istanbul caused events that were at least as important as his departure. Because İsmail Mahir Pasha claimed that some high-ranking officers, especially Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha, betrayed the palace, and he even made the same claim about Ali Pasha, the son-in-law of the Grand Vizier Avlonyalı Ferid Pasha. Pasha was exiled to Bursa in a short time due to these accusations (Ahmad, 2004, 19). While he was in exile in Bursa, he was arrested on 9 August 1908 together with the Inspector of the Military School, Zülüflü İsmail Pasha (Kabacalı, 2007, 91).⁵

The release of Mahir Pasha, whose detention did not last long, was reflected in the İkdâm Newspaper as follows: “It was stated to Bab-ı Ali that İsmail Mahir Pasha, who was imprisoned in the Ministry of War, wanted to be released on the grounds of his illness.⁶ It is seen from this news in the newspaper that İsmail Mahir Pasha, who was imprisoned for two and a half months, was released on the condition of residing in his household due to health reasons.

Sabah Newspaper, on the other hand, conveyed the developments after Pasha’s arrival in Istanbul to its readers as follows: “Before the Second Constitutional Monarchy, İsmail Mahir Pasha came to Dersaadet after he had acted against the members of the Union and Progress in the Third Army and was sent to Bursa after being detained for a while in the Ministry of War after the proclamation of the Freedom. After being there for a while, he came to Dersaadet this time”.⁷ It is understood from this news of Sabah Newspaper that İsmail Mahir Pasha was first arrested and kept in prison for a while in the Ministry of War, and then he was sent to Bursa.

The situation of İsmail Mahir Pasha’s appointment to Sivas ten days before he was assassinated was reflected in the İkdâm Newspaper as follows:

The request to send Ferik İsmail Pasha, who was later dismissed while he was an inspector of the Military School in the Hamidiye Period, to Sivas in order to be appointed to a division commandership that would be opened in the Fourth Army in the future, was sent from the Ministry of War to the Office of the Sadâret and it was asked about what work the aforementioned pasha would be busy in Sivas (!) from the relevant ministry.⁸

It is clear that İsmail Mahir Pasha feared that he would be assassinated by the CUP members at this time. Even before he left Thessaloniki, he said to Kazım Nami Bey, one of the most important members of the Committee of Union and Progress, perhaps because he was afraid of the CUP members, “Our master, sent us here to learn the state and behavior of the officers. I’ve been inquiring since the day we

5 Dundee Courier, 11 August 1908: The New Era in Turkey, 4.

6 İkdâm, 23 October 1908: İsmail Mahir Paşa, 3.

7 Sabah, 4 December 1908: İsmail Mahir Paşa’nın Maktûliyeti ve Lazım Geldiği Kadar Tafsilât, 2.

8 İkdâm, 23 November 1908: Mahir Paşa, 3.

arrived. I saw no faults, no faults in our officers. All of them are decent, decent, valuable officers who protect the honor of military service.” He wanted to send a message to the Committee, perhaps through Kazım Nami Bey, whom he learned to be a member of the committee, by saying “I will report what I saw on my return (Duru, 1957, 26)”. However, it is clear that this message was not enough to save Mahir Pasha. According to the Sabah Newspaper, “Pasha, who prudently did not go out of his mansion too much, ordered his servants not to open the door and to open to those who came to the door once their identity was understood through the window according to the sentence ‘traitors become cowards.’”⁹

İsmail Mahir Pasha was killed on 2 December 1908 as a result of a well-designed assassination. Pasha did not accept the invitation of a man dressed as an officer who came to his house to bring a telegram that invites him to Mabeyn for different reasons on December 1st, but a day later, believing the telegram sent by the Minister of War and requesting a meeting, he left his house to go to the Ministry of War with his servant and he was shot and killed by a person wearing an officer’s uniform in front of Sultan Mahmut II tomb. When we look at the narration of this event in different sources, it is seen that the general line of the event is the same, but when we go into detail, different discourses emerge.

An officer who came to İsmail Mahir Pasha’s mansion on 1 December gave a telegram to the servants of the house and asked them to deliver it to the Pasha. In the telegram taken at 3.15 am on the 1 December 1908;

“To His Excellency Ferik İsmail Mahir Pasha

When you receive the telegram, it is reported that it is the order of the sultan to come directly to the Mabeyn-i Hümâyûn-ı Mülûkhâne in civilian clothes.

Cevad, the First Secretary of the Sultan” (BOA, Y.A.HUS. H., 1 December 1908) statement is included. As it can be understood from the telegram, İsmail Mahir Pasha was summoned to the Mabeyn in a civil manner with the signature of Ali Cevad, the Chief Clerk of the Mabeyn. It can be thought that those who sent this fake telegram to the pasha in order to carry out the assassination followed such a course because they thought that the pasha would attract more attention with his military uniform.

It seems that İsmail Mahir Pasha sensed that this telegram was a fake telegram prepared to drive him out of the house, and for this reason, he did not go to Mabeyn immediately. However, Ali Cevad Bey informed İsmail Mahir Pasha, who went before Ali Cevad Bey to learn the truth of the incident, that no such telegram was sent to him from the Mabeyn and that he would present the event to the sultan. When the situation was reported to the sultan by Ali Cevad, the sultan ordered that no such telegram was sent to the pasha and that his grand vizier should handle the issue. The content of the meetings between the Grand Vizier Kamil Pasha and the Minister of War Ali Rıza Pasha with İsmail Mahir Pasha and the fake telegram were written to the palace as follows:

9 Sabah, 4 December 1908: İsmail Mahir Paşa’nın Maktûliyeti ve Lazım Geldiği Kadar Tafsilât, 2.

Ferik İsmail Mahir Pasha was asked to come to the Sublime Porte at half past one o'clock in the night by sending the news that the pasha had to be seen for investigation and information regarding the telegram sent for the special memorandum dated December 1, 1908. He stated that he wanted to discover the correctness of the situation regarding their bringing and giving. According to the investigation carried out by sending civil servants to the Dersaadet Telegraph Office, to find out if such a telegram was received from the Mâbeyn Telegraph Center and it was unsuspected that it was not the original. Since it is not possible to predict what benefit it might be for him because it was classified by the person, or whether it would be something that was assigned against the pasha by another person, it is of great importance that the information to be received tomorrow by notification and referral to His Excellency the Minister of War, should be carried out (BOA, Y.A.HUS., 1 December 1908).

Kamil Pasha and Ali Rıza Pasha, who met with İsmail Mahir Pasha, who was summoned to the Grand Vizier at half past one at night, and saw the copy of the telegram, sent an officer to the telegraph office and revealed that such a telegram had not been sent to İsmail Mahir Pasha and there was no doubt that the telegram was fake. However, they stated that it was not known whether this fake telegram was taken by the pasha himself or by another person, and they also stated that this issue would be investigated. As a matter of fact, it is obvious that there is a distrust of İsmail Mahir Pasha's statement from this statement.

The information given by Ali Cevat Bey, who was mentioned on the fake telegram and one of the key figures in the assassination, after the assassination took place, also confirms the course of the event. Ali Cevad Bey describes what happened on the day and night of December 1 as follows:

I came to İsmail Mahir Pasha that day and said: I have received your telegram stating that I must come to the Imperial Palace today. However, since I did not dare to leave my house alone, he said that he had received a telegram saying that I would request that an officer be sent to the Ministry of War and that this work be done by the Ministry of War, he said that he did not send such a telegram to him, and that he suspected the situation because he knew about his situation, and was told that Sultan did not send such a telegram to him. When he presented the situation, he states that they ordered this telegram to be checked and sent to the Grand Vizier Pasha. He said that the Grand Vizier and the Minister of War had called İsmail Mahir Pasha to the Sublime Porte at night and talked to him, and upon the Pasha's telegram signed by Ali Cevat, he was sent home by saying no such telegram was sent to him from Yıldız or any other center, and that the matter would be investigated (Unat, 1991, 21).

It is understood that some events that cannot be fully understood took place the day before the death of Pasha. It is possible to see the traces of this obscurity in the

newspapers that reported the incident to their readers after the assassination took place. For example, Sabah Newspaper states that before the meeting in the evening, İsmail Mahir Pasha first met with the Minister of War, and writes the following:

The previous day, he had received a telegram from Mabeyn with the signature of Cevad containing an invitation to come to the Mabeyn. He went to the Minister of War; Ali Rıza Pasha, and showed him the statement and the telegram and asked him whether he should go or not. İsmail Mahir Pasha yearned for perseverance in the place where he was a regular in the Hamidiye Period and could not visit for a long time. So much so that the Minister of War could not find a face among His Excellency. It was also late. He has come to his house. The Minister of War told the situation to the Grand Vizier Pasha. Thereupon, in the evening, the Grand Vizier and the Minister of War summoned İsmail Mahir Pasha to the Sublime Porte and met with him. After the interview, Mahir Pasha went to his mansion.¹⁰

Yeni Gazete gives the following information about Pasha's last moments before the assassination: "According to our private investigation, the mood of the deceased has changed since a few days, he has always started to behave suspiciously, even being cautious, often not showing up to those who search for him in his apartment. In fact, on Tuesday evening, an unknown person went to his house and said that there was a telegram on behalf of Pasha, and the servant girl took it from the window." It is also reported in the newspaper that, in the telegram, which was written with a pencil on the printed paper, it was written that the Pasha would immediately go to the Mabeyn-i Hümâyûn. The Pasha did not respond to this invitation, but kept the telegram in his possession, either because he acted cautiously or because he thought that a Ferik would only be obliged to comply with that order of the Ministry of War during the Constitutional Period.¹¹

One day after this fake telegram was sent, someone dressed in an officer's uniform came to İsmail Mahir Pasha's mansion in Binbirdirek and gave a letter to the girl who opened the door. The girl took the memorandum to İsmail Mahir Pasha. The content of the memorandum was as the following:

"Good Lord

We need to meet for tonight's matter. I am ready for your presentation. On December 2, 1908, the Minister of War Ali Rıza¹²" was writing. Contrary to what was written in the telegram yesterday, Mahir Pasha, who received this memorandum, believed for some unknown reason that this time the invitation was real, and took his servant, Yanyalı Mahdi, with him and set out for the Ministry of War. "At four, half past four o'clock, as he was reaching the entrance of Fazlı Paşa Street opposite the Sultan Mahmud Tomb and a few steps away from the İstikamet Pharmacy, a gunshot was heard. An unknown

10 Sabah, 4 December 1908: İsmail Mahir Paşa'nın Maktûliyeti ve Lazım Geldiği Kadar Tafsilât, 2.

11 Yeni Gazete, 4 December 1908: İsmail Mahir Paşa'nın Katli, 3.

12 İkdâm, 4 December 1908: İsmail Mahir Paşa'nın Katli, 2.

person from behind injured Mahdi, first in the left hip and then in his right hand, with a revolver.” According to the newspaper, while Pasha was turning back from his left at the sound of gunfire, he found himself in front of the assassin and, unable to take any action, extended his hand to the revolver in his pocket, but could not remove it because the revolver was wrapped in a handkerchief, and the unknown person suddenly fired and the bullet from his revolver hit Pasha’s heart. The newspaper concludes the news as “He fell on his back to the corner and the bottom of the wall. After the murderer fired two more shots, he was out of sight.”¹³

According to the news which was reported in Sabah newspaper, the notice that was received by the police mentions that the person who handed the revolver and was thought to be an officer was dressed in a soldier’s outfit and had a sword on his waist. After unloading the revolver, he walked towards Fazlı Pasha and went back to Divanyolu. It is also reported that “There he repeated the word (soldier run to the street) and repeated it in a hasty manner, and took the road towards Kadırga from the street next to Matbaa-i Osmaniye. No one saw his revolver in his hand during the incident.”¹⁴

Yeni Gazete conveys the moments after the murder to its readers as follows.

The neighborhood watchman, the gendarme waiting for the spot, the cavalry staff and those who heard the uproar immediately caught up with the scene and saw that the Pasha and his servant were lying injured, and they were transferred to the İstikamet Pharmacy there. Pasha surrendered his spirit while being imported from the door of the pharmacy. There, only the first aid was performed on the wounds of the servant Mahdi.

*When the gunshots were heard from the Pasha’s house there, they immediately ran and when they saw the victim in the pharmacy, they wanted to transfer him to his residence. After his examination was carried out by the police doctor, Pasha’s body was taken to his house and the butler was transferred to the municipal police hospital for treatment.*¹⁵

The official report of this assassination, which took place in the middle of the city, not too late, was kept as follows:

At four thirty in the evening on Thursday, the third of December, when we heard that guns were fired six times in front of Sultan Mahmud Tomb in Divanyolu, İsmail Mahir Pasha and his servant Mehdi bin Cevahir, who had a mansion in Binbirdirek, were lying wounded in Rauf Bey Pharmacy across the Sultan Mahmud Tomb. And Mahir Pasha, who was unconscious and was about to sober up, when his servant Mahdi was interrogated after his wounds were bandaged,

13 Yeni Gazete, 4 December 1908: İsmail Mahir Paşa’nın Katli, 3.

14 Sabah, 4 December 1908: İsmail Mahir Paşa’nın Maktûliyeti ve Lazım Geldiği Kadar Tafsilât, 2.

15 Yeni Gazete, 4 December 1908: İsmail Mahir Paşa’nın Katli, 3.

he said that a person dressed in a military suit came to the mansion at night and left a letter to the servant girl addressed to the Pasha, and then went out into the street with the statement that he was invited to the mansion by the Minister of War. When they came to the corner of Rauf Bey Pharmacy, a person who was thought to be a soldier emptied his revolver on them and that he had escaped by injuring him in three places before and then injured Pasha.¹⁶

The report goes on stating the event as, being examined by the doctors on duty, he was taken to the Prison General Hospital and Mahir Pasha, whose statement could not be taken because the treatment was not successful, passed away, Assistant Prosecutor Tevfik Bey was summoned by the duty doctor for the execution and procedure. It is reported that watchman İbiş, İbrahim, who worked at the Balcı Store, and Feyzi, the subscriber officer at the Matbaa-i Osmani, who were at the crime scene, were interrogated one by one, a person in military clothes and a sword in his waist, who could not be identified, with a revolver in his hand, deserted to Fazlı Pasha and then again. The report finishes with the following words: “He hastily repeated the word (soldier run to the street) by going out on Divanyolu, and he escaped by turning towards Kadırga from Matbaa-i Osmaniye street, it was understood that no one saw him while he was using a revolver, and İsmail Mahir Pasha’s body was sent to his mansion on a stretcher.”¹⁷

Shortly after Pasha was assassinated, Grand Vizier Kamil Pasha was informed of the event by a telegram sent to the Grand Viziership with the signature of the Minister of Police, Sami, at six forty. The telegram sent by Sami Bey to the Grand Vizier is as follows:

To the High Presence of the Grand Vizier

This evening, at a quarter past five, an unknown person went to İsmail Mahir Pasha’s mansion around the Sultan Mahmud Tomb and took him out on the street under the pretext that the Minister of War wanted him. At a distance of one hundred and fifty meters from the mansion, he fled first by injuring his servant with a revolver and then murdering him. The murderer is being investigated by the police and the investigation continues by the summoned prosecutor. 4 December 1908 (BOA, Y.A. HUS., 526-13, 2 December 1908).

Kamil Pasha also conveyed the news of the assassination, which was reported to him, to the Palace with the following words:

The telegram of the Ministry of Police was presented, stating that Ferik İsmail Mahir Pasha was deceived by an unknown person and was killed by being removed from his house at night. This case indicates the possibility that the fake telegram, of which

16 Yeni Gazete, 4 December 1908: İsmail Mahir Paşa’nın Katli, 3.

17 Yeni Gazete, 4 December 1908: İsmail Mahir Paşa’nın Katli, 3.

the copy was presented with the sultan's special decree dated December 2, 1908, was prepared by the person who was hostile to the pasha, and it is clear that if the murderer is caught, the truth will be revealed, sir.

Grand Vizier Kamil (BOA, Y.A. HUS., 526-13, 2 December 1908).

Two days after the assassination took place, Sabah Newspaper had a meeting with the Minister of War, Ali Rıza Pasha, and the reporter asked Nâzır Pasha to tell what happened. The statement of Ali Rıza Pasha was reflected in the newspaper as follows:

“According to the information published about the culling of İsmail Mahir Pasha, according to the statement of his servant Mahdi, it was stated that a man dressed in a military uniform came to the house the previous evening and handed a letter bearing the signature of the Minister of War, even a copy of the memorandum was printed below.”¹⁸

It is stated in the newspaper that one of their reporters went to the Minister of War Pasha that night to get information about this memorandum. A detailed statement made by the Minister, declaring that such a resolution was not original, is included in the newspaper as follows:

While we were sitting here at four o'clock in the previous night, they had brought news that “İsmail Mahir Pasha has come and wants to see you”. “Come on,” I replied. He came to me a little later. He was in civilian clothes. “I received a telegram from Mabeyn. They are calling me there. I came to consult whether I should go or not,” he said. “I can't say anything to that. It's your decision to go or not,” I replied. He left and came back two hours later. “I thought, it won't be possible to go, it's late. I will answer the telegram,” he said. “You know,” we said to him. He's gone out. The previous day, while he was in the Assembly, Grand Vizier Pasha received a telegram from Mabeyn. In this, İsmail Mahir Pasha sent a telegram stating that he was invited to Mabeyn by telegram and that he could not go unless the Ministry of War was notified. No such invitation telegram was sent to him. Since there was an order “Let it be verified”, İsmail Pasha was summoned to the Grand Vizier's office to be verified, and even the telegram, which he claimed to have, was checked upon request. Mahir Pasha also left a copy of the telegram with me. Most likely, this telegram was also something fake. He said that I had sent a memorandum to Mahir Pasha when Mahir Pasha's brother Pertev Bey came here yesterday morning.

*Today, two officers from the Ministry of Justice Investigation Department came to me, declaring and expressing how Mahir Pasha arrived, how he asked for permission, and finally what I had replied to him, and I signed the paper prepared in that way. This is what the current situation is all about.*¹⁹

18 Sabah, 4 December 1908: İsmail Mahir Paşa'nın Maktûliyeti ve Lazım Geldiği Kadar Tafsilât, 2.

19 Sabah, 4 December 1908: İsmail Mahir Paşa'nın Maktûliyeti ve Lazım Geldiği Kadar Tafsilât, 2.

The information given by Ali Rıza Pasha clearly shows that those who planned the assassination were watching all the steps of Mahir Pasha moment by moment. Especially Pasha did not want to go to the Mabeyn because he did not believe the first telegram, but when he was invited again by the Minister after the night he met with the Minister of War, he must have thought that the invitation was real this time, so he took his servant with him and set out. The most striking point here is that it was known to the assassin(s) that İsmail Mahir Pasha had a meeting with the Minister of War at night, perhaps through his men in the Ministry.

One of those who came to the scene after İsmail Mahir Pasha and his servant were shot was government doctor Nikolaki Efendi. Nikolaki Efendi, who came to his house and examined Pasha, kept the death report as follows:

When İsmail Mahir Pasha was examined in his own house, a hole with a diameter of seven millimeters was created by the bullet of the firearm fired closely at the front of his chest and at the sixth distance of the spine in the left rib cage, and this hole was scarred around it, and the right side of his back and the tenth spine in the lower part were slightly larger than the hole drilled. A large bullet exit was seen and it was understood that the bullet had pierced his heart while traveling and that he died from loss of blood due to his wound.²⁰

The body of İsmail Mahir Pasha was taken from his house at eight o'clock one day after the assassination and buried in the family cemetery near Merkez Efendi Lodge.²¹

Who Shot İsmail Mahir Pasha?

This assassination, which took place approximately four and a half months after the proclamation of the Constitutional Monarchy, caused great indignation. The fact that the person who shot Pasha could not be caught caused the murder to remain unsolved. However, the way the murder was committed is similar to the previous murders of the members of the Committee of Union and Progress, civilians and mostly soldiers. Of course, wearing an officer's uniform and committing the murder with a revolver could be a method used by a power other than the CUP members to pin the murder on the CUP members. Apart from that, this murder may have been committed for a personal reason. However, the fact that İsmail Mahir Pasha went to Thessaloniki to investigate the Assassination of Nazım Bey and to gather information about the committee, that some members of this delegation were assassinated and the members of the delegation were threatened, draws attention to the CUP members.

There is no doubt that the most important issue that can clarify the point of who committed the assassination is the statements of the witnesses. Istanbul Chief Public

20 Yeni Gazete, 4 December 1908: İsmail Mahir Paşa'nın Katli, 3.

21 Şura-yı Ümmet, 4 December 1908: İsmail Mahir Paşa'nın Katli-Tahkikat-ı Vaka, 3.

Prosecutor's Office Chief Assistant Tevfik Bey and Prosecutor Süleyman Sırrı Efendi conducted the investigation regarding the murder that took place in the evening hours. When the statements of those present, especially the Pasha's servant Mehdi, were asked, the guard Mehdi was asked, "Who shot you tonight, who killed Pasha? "He must be a soldier. Tonight, they shot at the corner opposite the Sultan Mahmud Tomb. Someone came to the house. When the servant girl gave a letter to be given to His Excellency Pasha and said, "The Minister of War is calling him," they shot both of us in the corner I said while I was going with the Pasha. I can't describe his appearance," he replied. Ibiş, who is the watchman of Uzun Şücaettin District, answered the question of what is the information about the incident;

Tonight at half past four, a tall man dressed in a black hoodie and boots, and I'd only recognize him if I saw him: 'Watchman, revolver being thrown upstairs' said to me. He also went downstairs. I also went to the crime scene. I saw Pasha in the pharmacy. The person who came across me also informed the Fazlı Pasha Police Station. The gendarmerie officer told me. I don't know how many rounds were fired, he replied.²²

From the other two witnesses of the incident, İbrahim Efendi, from the Balcı Kardeşler Store, heard six handed guns in Divanyolu, then a man fled towards the Fazlı Paşa slope with a revolver in his hand. After a while, two police officers came running and started the survey. He said that he saw him go to Divanyolu and go towards Kadırga. The other witness, Bosboğaz Newspaper subscriber Feyzi Efendi, reported that while he was closing the shop under the Matbaa-i Osmaniye at half past four in the night, he heard six gunshots and a soldier in a military suit ran past him and said as we had said above, "Is there no police station here?" has done.²³

The point of who committed an unsolved murder will remain in the dark. Because, as a result of our research on this subject, some names that were stated to have committed this murder, albeit different from each other, were reached.

Falih Rıfki Atay was the first to give information about who İsmail Mahir Pasha was killed by. Atay points to Halil (Kut) Pasha by saying, "According to what I learned later, it was Enver Pasha's uncle who killed İsmail Mahir Pasha" (Atay, 2013, 56). Halil (Kut), who was Enver Pasha's step-uncle, was a member of the group of the Fedayeen of the Committee.

Mustafa Müftüoğlu, in a non-academic study (Küçükılınç, 2018, 17), stated that İsmail Mahir Pasha, the important man of the Yıldız Intelligence Organization, was marked in Thessaloniki, was always followed in Istanbul, and his relevance to the palace did not go unnoticed despite his pardon. He adds that it was Abdulkadir, who also committed many murders on behalf of the committee, who shot Pasha

22 Sabah, 4 December 1908: İsmail Mahir Paşa'nın Maktûliyeti ve Lazım Geldiği Kadar Tafsilât, 2.

23 Yeni Gazete, 4 December 1908: İsmail Mahir Paşa'nın Katli, 3.

(Müftüoğlu, 1977, 77–78). Murat Çulcu also states that the murder was committed by Abdülkadir, one of the community's fedais (Çulcu, 1990, 230)

One of the names who gave information about who committed the murder is Süleyman Külçe. In the book of Külçe, he claims that it was Mustafa Necip who assassinated Nazım Bey in Thessaloniki who shot Pasha (Külçe, 1944, 55). Refi Cevat, on the other hand, claims that it was one of the fedais, Yakup Cemil, who shot the pasha (Ulunay, 1973, 249).

One of the most different and striking claims about who or by whom the murder was carried out is in the Czernowitzer Allgemeine Zeitung newspaper, one of the media organs closely interested in the incident. The newspaper writes that Pasha was killed by one of the 21 young officers from Thessaloniki and this was done to avenge the sins of the old regime. It also added that the investigation carried out to find those responsible was done very carelessly.²⁴ The Innsbrucker Nachrichten Newspaper, on the other hand, conveys the news of the assassination as “It turned out that those who killed Mahir Pasha were former members of the Young Turks.”²⁵

Again, there is a different information in Neues Wiener newspaper that the murder was committed by former members of the Young Turks. The newspaper makes the following claim, which is not mentioned in any other source: “It has now become clear that those who killed the general were former members of the Young Turks. Mahir Pasha was sent to Thessaloniki for research twice. After he was sent, his death sentence was given by the committee there. But he managed to evade the two committee members tasked with the execution of the sentence. These members were therefore expelled from the committee. They executed the death sentence in order to get into the eye again.”²⁶

The Reichspost Newspaper, in its news dated December 5, 1908, reported that the assassination could have been committed by a very different hand:

*İsmail Mahir Pasha was Albanian. The investigation into him was inconclusive. On the one hand, this is predicted. This event may be an assassination of the Young Turk committee or an assassination of officers. Pasha had earned the hatred of the officers with his research in Salonika. On the other hand, it is claimed that this action may be an assassination of the Albanians, who are the compatriots of Pasha.*²⁷

The newspaper Neue Freie Presse published in Vienna, while reporting the murder of Mahir Pasha, expresses a different claim that we have not encountered in other newspapers. Newspaper conveys the news to the readers as;

24 Czernowitzer Allgemeine Zeitung, 7 Dezember 1908: Ein Prozess des Sultans mit dem Kriegsminister, 2.

25 Innsbrucker Nachrichten, 5 Dezember 1908: Zur Ermordung des Generals İsmail Mahir Pascha, 9.

26 Neues Wiener Journal, 5 Dezember 1908: Der Mord an der İsmail Mahir Pascha. Die Tat ehemaliger jungtürkische Mitglieder–Vollführung eines früheren Todesurteils Ein Akt der Rehabilitierung, 12.

27 Reichspost, 5 Dezember 1908: Die Vorgänge in der Türkei, 2.

*İsmail Pasha was taken to the street at 10 pm by two officers with a modified fake letter from the Minister of War. He was then knocked down by eight shots. The reason for the assassination is not yet clear. İsmail Mahir Pasha, who was killed yesterday, must have been the person who arrested Enver Bey in the Monastir. It may have been carried out by the friends of Enver Bey, who was ambitious and resentful because of this.*²⁸

The murder of İsmail Mahir Pasha, who was targeted by the CUP members because of his negative attitude towards the committee in Thessaloniki and because he was one of the most trusted men of Abdulhamid II, as a result of an assassination, has a serious place both in the Istanbul Newspapers and in the transmission of the witnesses of the period. Both in the newspapers and in the memoirs, a negative attitude was taken against İsmail Mahir Pasha and the murder of Pasha, who was a loyal man of the Hamidiye Regime, was seen as the price of his old sins and it was emphasized that İsmail Mahir Pasha was not a very acceptable man as a personality. For example, Sabah Newspaper wrote about Pasha in our yesterday's issue that İsmail Mahir Pasha, who was one of the great spies of the Revolution, was injured and killed by a revolver bullet fired by an officer in Divanyolu in Çemberlitaş, and that his servant Yanyalı Mahdi was dangerously injured. İsmail Mahir Pasha came to Dersaadet after he had been involved in the fight against the freedom fighters in the Third Army before the Second Constitutional Monarchy and was sent to Bursa after being detained for a while in the Ministry of War after the proclamation of the Freedom. After being there for a while, he came to Dersaadet this time and instructed his servants not to open the door after his sentence 'traitors become cowards' and to open the door once the identity of those who came to the door was understood from the window.²⁹ It is possible to see similar expressions used by Sabah Newspaper in the Hukûk-ı Umûmiye Newspaper. While conveying the news of the assassination to its readers, the newspaper emphasizes that the loss of Pasha was not a cause for sadness because he was a person who put out fires and took pleasure in it, with the following words:

*İsmail Mahir Pasha, one of the most formidable spies of the Abdulhamid Era, was murdered by an unknown person with a revolver in front of the Sultan Mahmud Tomb at around four-four-thirty the previous night, and even his servant was injured. İsmail Mahir Pasha, who is known for having a great pleasure in demolishing houses and extinguishing fires and making it a habit to do so... [...] Although those who know İsmail Pasha's past cannot be affected, our government should work hard to find the perpetrator in order to put an end to the circulating rumor for this reason.*³⁰

28 Neue Freie Presse, 4 Dezember 1908: Die Ermordung Mahir Paschas, 3.

29 Sabah, 4 December 1908: İsmail Mahir Paşa'nın Maktûliyeti ve Lazım Geldiği Kadar Tafsilât, 2.

30 Hukûk-u Umûmiye, 4 December 1908: İsmail Mahir Paşa'nın Katli, 4.

Yeni Gazete, on the other hand, stated that there are many bad things to be said about Pasha in its columns, but it would be better not to talk about the dead behind them, and included the following words about Pasha:

After the official announcement, if it is necessary to talk about the personality of the Pasha, here; We prefer silence, observing the order of “remember the dead with goodness”. Let’s just add that İsmail Mahir Pasha, although he seemed very attached to western customs, was not well-informed. Although his speech was very neat and he was apparently very observant of military laws, he was not a soldier to be considered a casualty for our army, as can be understood from the official statement. May Allah Almighty forgive his negligence.³¹

Unlike Sabah, Hukûk-u Umûmiye and Yeni Gazete, Tanin, Şura-yı Ümmet and İttihat-Terakki Newspapers, which were published as the publication organs of the Committee of Union and Progress, avoided commenting on Pasha and only reported the assassination event to their readers.

One of the important names of the CUP, Tanin editor-in-chief Hüseyin Cahit Bey, while expressing that he does not approve of the assassination, states that Pasha is an insignificant person who should not be among the people to be killed, and adopts an attitude similar to the attitude of the newspapers of the period towards İsmail Mahir Pasha.³² Hasan Amca, one of the leading members of the Committee of Union and Progress, who was in front of the Sultan Mahmud Tomb at the time that İsmail Mahir Pasha was shot, and who was a witness to the event, wrote the moment of Pasha’s shooting and his experiences as follows.

I was walking on the cobblestone pavement opposite the tomb of Sultan Mahmut II. It was maybe 11 or 12 midnight. After a sound like the shutter of a shop was closing, I saw that one of the two people five or ten steps ahead of me, whom I can’t remember from where we came across, got lost, the other one knelt on the ground as if playing

31 Yeni Gazete, 4 December 1908: İsmail Mahir Paşa’nın Katli, 3.

32 He comments on the murder of Hüseyin Cahit Pasha: “In the 3 December 1908 issue of Tanin, the following lines in the “Latest News” section shed light on the event: “Last night, at around five-thirty o’clock in the evening, there was a meeting on the street opposite the Sultan Mahmut tomb. A murder was committed. Six shots were fired at İsmail Mahir Pasha, who was passing by, and because two of them coincided, Pasha died with the effect of his wounds, and those who threw weapons fled. The police are conducting the necessary investigation.” What was the reason and meaning of this political killing? While a revolution is being prepared, being made, assassinations against the oppression management men who are wanted to be destroyed in this way can be considered logical. But now that the Constitutional Monarchy has been realized and even the most hated men of the Abdülhamid administration were not touched, the murder of an unknown İsmail Mahir Pasha in the middle of the street in Istanbul was a very meaningless and inappropriate act. They whispered that, in order to gain the power and worthiness that the Committee was losing in Istanbul, they had killed a man who had been sentenced to death. Presumably the attempt was a big mistake if it came out of the Association. The dignity of an Association cannot be sustained by instilling terror in the people” (Yalçın, 2000, 87–88).

zeybek, and he made a gesture as if he wanted to get up even though he had opened his arms as in the zeybek game. He couldn't get up, he collapsed again. I got to him when he said in a spiteful voice:

- They shot the pasha, there, said. He pointed to a darkness receding from the opposite sidewalk. I turned to my right. I found the second person who had disappeared, slumped against the wall, almost taking their last breaths. A cloaked man was walking away from the opposite sidewalk in the direction of the Kadırğa (Amca, 1989, 64–65).

Strangely enough, after explaining that Hasan Amca Pasha, who witnessed the event at the time of his murder, was taken to Rauf Pharmacy after he was shot, that his wife came to the Rauf Pharmacy, that he sent the woman to his house and that he accompanied the funeral to the Pasha's house, and said, "This murderer, who left the place of the tragedy he committed in cold blood, went away. Although he did not do anything more than mourn a family", he states that the murder of Pasha did not upset anyone but his family. Hasan Amca explained the reason why İsmail Mahir Pasha was killed: "There was no sin that İsmail Mahir Pasha committed that day... According to my investigation, this man was only an Albanian nobleman and is a relative of Şemsi Pasha. In this respect, he was chosen as a harmful man to be feared" and adds that he criticized the committee for this assassination (Amca, 1989, 67).

CONCLUSION

The last century of the Ottoman Empire can be considered as a very turbulent period. While the state was experiencing land losses on the one hand, it started to recognize the systems of the states where it lost land and accelerate its modernization moves in order to minimize these land losses. The fact that foreign states threatened the unitary structure of the State by fueling the nationalist movements within the minorities within the empire led to some reform movements towards these elements in the first place. Especially after the Tanzimat Edict, an atmosphere began to emerge among the Ottoman intellectuals that the establishment of a western style management system would play a role in preventing separatist and nationalist movements. First of all, these intellectuals, who tried to spread their thoughts by using the press organs, started to operate by establishing secret organizations over time.

Among these secret organizations, the organization that most influenced Turkey's recent history had undoubtedly been the Committee of Union and Progress. The Committee of Union and Progress is a committee that has not compromised on the principle of confidentiality since its establishment. Its main goal is the opening of the parliament, which was suspended by Abdulhamid II due to the 93 War, and the re-enactment of the constitution. For this purpose, the organization targeting Sultan Abdulhamid, which it saw as the biggest obstacle to the constitutional government, tried many legitimate or illegitimate ways for this purpose. There are smaller secret organizations formed within this secret committee, in which mostly junior officers from school are members, and the most interesting of these organizations is the group of bodyguards. This organization,

which was created to “eliminate the movements that the center of the committee saw as an obstacle to freedom or to decipher the structure of the committee”, carried out serious activities both before and after the constitutional monarchy, and it can even be said that it has signed off on events that will change the course of history.

One of the most notable assassinations of the committee was the assassination of İsmail Mahir Pasha, one of the important spies of the Abdülhamid era, on 2 December 1908. Mahir Pasha, who headed the delegation sent from Istanbul to investigate the situation of the members of the committee who made an unsuccessful assassination attempt on Nazım Bey, who was assigned to investigate the activities of the Association in Thessaloniki on 11 June, became the target of the Association during his short stay here, and the mission of the delegation ended and he moved to Istanbul. Upon his return to Turkey, Pasha was the victim of an unsolved murder. Of course, the murder of Ferik, one of the most loyal men of the Palace, in broad daylight in the middle of Istanbul, meant a clear intimidation to Sultan Abdulhamid. The foreign press, especially the Ottoman press, gave wide coverage to the event, and some newspapers even talked about a possible change of throne after this assassination event. Although the assassination of İsmail Mahir Pasha remained unsolved, it is accepted as an action carried out by the Fedayeen branch of the Committee of Union and Progress and was recorded as an event that deeply affected the political life of the period.

Before the declaration of the Second Constitutional Monarchy, in order to strengthen its dominance in Macedonia, the Committee, which eliminated the people that they saw as obstacles to the realization of the goals of the Committee, started assassination activities in order to show its power in the capital, where actually it was relatively weak, after Sultan Abdulhamid put the Constitution into effect for the second time on 23 July 1908. When it's evaluated the first of these assassinations, the Assassination of İsmail Mahir Pasha, together with the Assassination of Journalist Hasan Fehmi, it is seen that it had consequences that deeply affected the Ottoman political life. Just as the murder of Şemsi Pasha, one of the Sultan's most trusted men, heralded the proclamation of the Second Constitutional Monarchy, the murder of Mahir Pasha, one of the sultan's former aides, in Istanbul also heralded the 31 March Incident, which resulted in the dethronement of Abdulhamid II. It can be said that because of these assassinations, which made the Sultan feel that his authority in the capital was lost, the balance of power in the capital turned in favor of the CUP members.

ATENTAT NA GENERALA İSMAILA MAHIRJA PASHO V ISTANBULU (1908)

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POVZETEK

Po razglasitvi 2. ustavne monarhije je Odbor za zvezo in napredek še naprej usmerjal svoje napade na ljudi, ki so jih imeli za ljudi starega režima, in Mahir Pasha je bil kot stari pomočnik sultana Osmanskega cesarstva Abdulhamida II. nedvomno eden od tistih, ki so bili v nevarnosti. Kot izkušen vojak, ki se je zavedal te nevarnosti, ni imel nikakršnega namena, da bi zapustil svoj dvorec. Nekega dne, pred 2. decembrom 1908, ga je nekdo, ki je bil oblečen v vojaška oblačila, povabil na ministrstvo, vendar temu vabilu ni verjel in se z vednostjo vojnega ministra ni zglasil na ministrstvu, minister pa je sam potrdil, da je bilo vabilo lažno. Vendar pa je 2. decembra spet nekdo v vojaških oblačilih prinesel telegram, kjer je spet pisalo, da ga vojni minister vabi na ministrstvo. Po tem telegramu se je Mahir Pasha odpravil na ministrstvo, vendar ga je na ulici Divanyolu umoril nekdo v oficirskih oblačilih. Atentatorja ni bilo mogoče ujeti. Ta atentat, ki je bil podoben tistim, ki jih je izvedla skupina atentatorjev Odbora, imenovana »Fedais«, je ostal nerešen umor. Umor Mahirja Pasha, ki se je zgodil zelo blizu palače in samega sultana, sredi dneva in sredi Istanbula, je imel svoje politične posledice. Namen tega članka je oceniti razloge in atentat, raziskati, kdo ga je umoril ter preučiti politične posledice tega atentata.

Ključne besede: Abdulhamid II, İsmail Mahir Pasha, člani Odbora za zvezo in napredek, atentat, Otomansko cesarstvo, Istanbul

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RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE POWERS IN THE YUGOSLAV SOCIALIST CONSTITUTIONS

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ABSTRACT

The aim of the work is to examine the relationship between the legislative and the executive power in socialist Yugoslavia, in order to answer the question whether and to what extent the principles of the assembly system had really been constitutionally guaranteed. The author analyzes competencies and mutual relationship between the legislative and executive power in the four constitutional acts (1946, 1953, 1963, 1974). The constitutional acts proclaimed that the Assembly was the supreme organ of power, while the constitutional theory claimed that it was the assembly system of power although the constitutional acts contained competencies of the political-executive organs which gave them considerable influence. This had been the least visible in the 1953 and 1963 constitutional acts, while the 1946 and 1974 constitutions seriously strengthened the position of the executive power. Therefore, the author only reluctantly concludes that the Yugoslav constitutional system had the features of the assembly system. More precisely, it had been a kind of mixed system with the elements of the assembly system and the separation of powers, at least in the 1946 and 1974 constitutions.

Keywords: Yugoslavia, assembly system, constitution, Federal Assembly, Federal Executive Council, President of the Republic, Presidency of SFRY

RELAZIONE TRA IL POTERE LEGISLATIVO E QUELLO ESECUTIVO NELLE COSTITUZIONI JUGOSLAVE SOCIALISTE

SINTESI

Il contributo si propone di esaminare il rapporto tra il potere legislativo e quello esecutivo nella Jugoslavia socialista per rilevare se realmente e in quale misura la Costituzione garantisse i principi del sistema assembleare. A questo scopo, l'autore analizza le competenze conferite agli organi legislativi e a quelli esecutivi nonché i loro reciproci rapporti qualificati nelle quattro Carte costituzionali (del 1946, 1953, 1963 e 1974). Mentre tutte le Costituzioni definivano l'Assemblea come organo supremo del potere e la teoria costituzionale sosteneva che lo Stato era organizzato a sistema assembleare, la Costituzione nominava anche competenze degli organi politici esecutivi assegnando

loro una considerevole influenza. Tali competenze erano più circoscritte negli atti del 1953 e 1963, mentre in quelli del 1946 e 1974 la posizione del potere esecutivo era notevolmente rafforzata. Pertanto, l'autore conclude che sì, il sistema costituzionale jugoslavo possedeva proprietà del sistema assembleare, ma si trattava più propriamente di un ordinamento misto caratterizzato sia da elementi del sistema assembleare sia dalla separazione dei poteri, almeno secondo le Costituzioni del 1946 e del 1974.

Parole chiave: Jugoslavia, sistema assembleare, Costituzione, Assemblea federale, Consiglio esecutivo federale, Presidente della Repubblica, Presidenza della RSFJ

INTRODUCTION

The second Yugoslavia, which had defined itself as a socialist state and society, had three constitutions (1946, 1963, and 1974) and one constitutional law (1953). Although constitutional provisions changed considerably during the decades of Yugoslavia's existence, one of the principles which had been constant was the supposed prevalence of the legislative over executive power. Yugoslav constitution-makers and political elites advocated the principles of the assembly system, which had theoretically been defined as a system in which legislative dominated over executive power.

The main hypothesis of this work is that although the assembly system had been proclaimed as one of the cornerstones of the constitutional system, it was constitutionalized with some deviations. The principle of unity of powers was enacted in different ways in above-mentioned constitutional acts. However, its development was not straightforward.

The political aspect of the problem shows that the process of decision-making was monopolized by the tiny oligarchy on the top of the ruling political party. This fact caused strengthening of the executive bodies, such as the Government (according to the 1946 Constitution), the Federal Executive Council (from 1953 on), and the Presidency of Yugoslavia (after 1971). The fact that the most important and powerful members of the political elite were at the same time members of these political institutions, decisively influenced strengthening of these institutions. These facts limited the importance and possibilities of dominance of the assembly. It will be shown that the strengthening of the assembly had been most visible in the 1953 Constitutional Law, at the peak of the ideological and political offensive against the Stalinist ideology, when the most important ideologists of the regime thought that the dominance of the assembly in the decision-making process had to become one of the means in the struggle for the democratization of the political system. The 1963 Constitution established the balance between legislative and executive powers, which was caused by the stabilization of relations with Soviet Union and abandoning of the offensive against

bureaucratic distortions in the circumstances of stabilization of the new self-managing system established after 1950 with ultimate guidance of the political elite. The 1974 Constitution had been a step backward. It meant strengthening of the collective head of state since the political elite sought an instrument for stabilization of the Federation. The Presidency of Yugoslavia, composed of one representative of each federal unit and autonomous province, seemed as the most appropriate instrument for achievement of this aim. In order to achieve political stability of Yugoslavia through effective Presidency, whose members had to represent interests of their respective federal units, this collective head of state had to have effective and wide competencies, both at the expense of the Federal Executive Council and the Assembly.

Therefore, we shall try to explain that the principle of unity of powers although nominally one of the cornerstones of the constitutional system had been differently prescribed in constitutional provisions and realized in political practice during different phases of constitutional and political development.

This paper analyzes only constitutional provisions on the relationship between legislative and executive powers at the federal level. We find this analysis methodologically correct for two reasons. Firstly, although federal units widened their right to self-organization from 1963 on, their constitution-makers did not introduce even slightest differences regarding relationship between legislative and executive powers comparing Yugoslav constitutional acts.

Two first constitutional acts at the Yugoslav level, those from 1946 and 1953, even contained relatively detailed provisions on the organization of state power in federal units, which prevented the latter from autonomous constitutionalization of their respective state organizations. Chapters IX and X of the 1946 Constitution were dedicated to highest organs of state power in people's republics and to organs of state administration of people's republics. Chapter III of the 1953 Constitutional Law was dedicated to the principal provisions on the republican organs of power. Both constitutional acts regulated relationship between legislative and executive powers in detail which did not leave much room for federal units to arrange this issue on their own.

Secondly, Yugoslav constitutional acts were legal expression of the political will, programme and ideology of the political elite which included political elites of the federal units as its inseparable parts. Therefore, it was unimaginable for the political elites in federal units to enact such organization of state power which would mean departure from the assembly system of government. Even if they legally could do that, they would never go in that direction since the assembly system, as more democratic system than parliamentary system, was one of the sources of legitimacy of the constitutional and political system. For Yugoslav political elite, as well as for all other political elites, it was very important to ensure its citizens that the main principles of the constitutional and political system would be preserved. Therefore, although it made serious changes in the contents and functioning of the assembly system during the decades, it had to claim that the system had not changed considerably. It had never questioned the very existence of the assembly system although constitutional provisions changed.

THE MIXED SYSTEM OF THE FIRST CONSTITUTION

The first Yugoslav constitution (1946) described the National Assembly as the supreme organ of state power which meant that it established hierarchical relationship between legislative power and two other state powers (executive and judiciary). Two reasons influenced this outcome. Firstly, the first Yugoslav constitution was modelled on the 1936 Soviet Constitution which also introduced, at least on paper, the principle of the legislative body's supremacy.

Secondly, the first Yugoslav Constitution introduced the principle of popular sovereignty in its Article 6. Although the same principle had been proclaimed in bourgeois constitutions as well, socialist (or self-proclaimed socialist) constitution-makers had different attitude on this principle. In their opinion, the principle of popular sovereignty could not be limited to general voting right and free elections but also required particular organization of state power based on the dominance of parliament over other state organs. If parliament (i.e. assembly) was representative body of the people, which included members from different social classes and layers, it had to have more power than other state organs, since the latter were not popular representative bodies (Stefanović, 1950, 474–475). Therefore, the assembly had to concentrate legislative power but also to indirectly exercise executive power as well.

Despite these theoretical considerations, the Constitution had prescribed that the National Assembly shared its legislative power with the Government. This fact considerably influenced the very functioning of the system as well as the real power of the Assembly. The Government did not have the formal power to enact the laws. The National Assembly could not delegate legislative power to the Government for if it could, the system could not be defined as the assembly system. However, the very Constitution had prescribed that the Government had the right to enact two types of regulations. The first one was the ordinary regulations, which existed also in other constitutional systems and which were necessary for the execution of laws as basic legal acts. These regulations were not autonomous legal acts since the Government had to enact them in the framework of the principles and concrete solutions prescribed in the laws.

Another type of the regulations was the ones with the strength of law. According to Article 78 of the Constitution, the Government had the right to enact the regulations for the fulfilment of laws as well as the regulations enacted according to the authority given to the Government in and by the laws. The Government could enact these regulations only if the National Assembly authorized it (Stefanović, 1950, 597), as could be seen from their name. These regulations were in fact the ones which had the strength of laws. They were not the laws in formal sense but in material sense.

Although it had not been prescribed explicitly in the Constitution that the second type of regulations was the regulations with legal strength, it was clear that this was the intention of the constitution-maker (Mratović et al., 1981, 143–144). Namely, the usual or ordinary regulations were enacted in order to enable fulfilment of laws. Therefore, if the constitution-maker prescribed the regulations which were based on

the legal authorization, his intention had been to give the strength of law to these regulations (for more details cf.: Stefanović, 1950, 597–604). This contradicted Article 51 of the Constitution which had prescribed that the National Assembly had the exclusive legislative power in the sphere of competencies of the federal state. In other words, the National Assembly did not have the exclusive legislative power but it had to share it with the Government, which was contrary to the very nature of the assembly system.

The National Assembly had the right to limit the competence of the Government regarding enactment of such regulations. Namely, the National Assembly could give free hands to the Government regarding enactment of such regulations in the sense that the Government could totally independently draft these regulations. Therefore, the Government could completely regulate most areas of social life. On the other hand, the National Assembly could give to the Government only limited right to enact regulations with legal strength if it would draft some guidelines. The right of the Government to participate in legislative function of the state was limited since some issues, according to explicit constitutional provision, could be enacted by the National Assembly only.

In practice, the Government enacted many regulations with the strength of law. In this way, it practised the legislative function which originally had belonged to the National Assembly. The delegation of legislative power from the National Assembly to the Government occurred. In the period between 1946 and 1950, the Government enacted 345 regulations with the strength of law, while the National Assembly enacted 148 laws (Nikolić, 1973, 60), particularly in the areas of economic system and public finances, according to the law enacted in February 1946 (Nikolić, 1973, 59–60). This meant that the Government had substituted the National Assembly in exercise of the legislative function to some extent. It was true that the Government had to submit such regulations to the National Assembly for approval but it was also true that the National Assembly had approved them all. This was not surprising since the National Assembly had the one-party composition while the Government was composed of the most prominent party leaders. The constitution-maker could not expect that the National Assembly, composed of both top and middle-level party leaders, would question the exercise of the legislative power by the Government, which was composed of the most influential party leaders. Even in a political system with true opposition, such competence of the Government would cause its domination over the National Assembly since the MPs who belonged to the parliamentary majority would support the Government's decisions. Such an outcome was even more expected in an assembly without true opposition. Since the concentration of legislative power in the hands of assembly is one of basic features of the assembly system (Nikolić, 1973, 663), it follows that the 1946 Constitution did not prescribe this system.

The fact that the National Assembly could limit the Government's right to participate in the exercise of legislative function did not mean much in practice. Since the Government was composed of the most influential members of the political elite, the National Assembly enabled it to enact regulations with legal strength whenever the Government found it necessary. Even the duty of the Government to submit such

regulations for approval of the National Assembly at its next session, as it had been prescribed in the 1946 law¹ did not mean much because it could not be really expected that the National Assembly would deny such an approval. After such a regulation was enacted by the Government, it immediately came into effect. Since the National Assembly met rarely, these regulations were of great influence even if the National Assembly would decide to deny their approval.

In its initial phase, the introduction of self-management in 1950 had been partial and entirely at the micro level. Constitutional position of the Government and its relationship to the National Assembly had not changed a bit. The Government continued to act in the same way, since its political power as well as its constitutional competencies had given to it the possibility to continue to substitute the National Assembly as the lawmaker.²

Another legal limitation of the Assembly's legislative function could be found in the fact that according to Article 60 of the Constitution the National Assembly had had two regular sessions a year, each lasting only for few days. It was obvious that the National Assembly could not really become the supreme power in the state if it had to work only for a few days a year. It could exercise more real power only if it would be in a permanent session, and if its members could receive permanent technical, organizational, and legal assistance from experts employed in the National Assembly and other institutions. The lack of information, experience, and knowledge seriously limited the role of MPs comparing to the Government's constant access to all necessary information, and professional assistance of civil servants employed in ministries.

The political reason which caused the secondary role of the National Assembly could be found in the fact that the most important party leaders had been members of the Government. Like in the parliamentary systems, such composition of the Government prevented the Assembly from having more prominent role in the decision-making process.

All these legal and political reasons justified the opinions that the system of government established in the 1946 Constitution had important elements of the system of the separation of powers, i.e., the elements of the parliamentary system (Lukić, 1953, 59–60). It would be an exaggeration to claim that the system was the parliamentary one since the instruments of mutual dependence of legislative and executive powers were missing. While the National Assembly controlled the work of the Government, and according to Article 77 of the Constitution the latter had been responsible to the former, there were no constitutional provisions which gave the right to the Government to resign or to pose the question of confidence. The Government did not have the right to ask the head of state (the Presidium of the National Assembly) to dissolve the National Assembly as well.

1 It was the Law on authorization of the Government of the FPRY for enactment of regulations in the area of people's economy.

2 Even after the introduction of self-management in 1950, but before the enactment of the 1953 Constitutional Law, the Government had enacted 104 regulations with legal strength, while the National Assembly had enacted 56 laws (Nikolić, 1973, 60).

As one could see, the Government was formally subordinated to the National Assembly. However, abovementioned political and constitutional reasons for domination of the Government over the National Assembly prevailed, and that was the reason why the principle of unity of powers neither had been prescribed consistently nor functioned as it had been theoretically and ideologically conceived. It was not just the real political circumstances which caused the domination of the Government. The constitutional provisions also gave it considerable independence from the Assembly, in the first instances through its right to participate in the exercise of the legislative function. The Government had been a real inspirer of the state policies and laws (Đorđević, 1964, 189) while the National Assembly had not really shaped the policies but simply approved the Government's proposals. Although the National Assembly had the right to reject the Government's proposals, it never happened. Moreover, the Government's proposals were adopted with no substantial discussion or amendments.

Other authors claimed that the system which had been established in the 1946 Constitution essentially had all the main characteristics of the assembly system (Krbek, 1955, 49), and that the Constitution wholly prescribed the principle of unity of powers (Stefanović, 1950, 476). According to this opinion, there had not been relative independence in the relationship between the state organs which fulfilled different functions of state power (Krbek, 1946, 184), which was the proof that the system had been based on the principle of the unity of powers. Although there is some truth in these claims, we do not think that this system could really be defined as the assembly system. Namely, formally speaking, there had not been relative independence in the relationship between legislative and executive in the sense that legislative had formal means of influence over executive while vice versa had not been prescribed at least in the sense that the executive could not influence the existence of the legislative. On the other hand, the executive had been independent in the sense that it had the right to participate in the exercise of legislative function, while the legislative in practice could never impose its will on executive since the political monopoly rested in the hands of the latter.

Some authors argued that it was the illusory assembly system (Mratović et al., 1981, 428). Although this opinion substantially neglected that the system had the features of the assembly system, its shortcoming was that it did not clearly define it. It would be methodologically more correct to claim that the system had been a mixture of the assembly and parliamentary systems than to claim that it had been the illusory assembly system for the latter definition more revealed what the system had not been than what it had been.

According to another opinion, the constitutional provisions only at first sight reminded on parliamentary system since the Government could not influence the existence of the National Assembly (Fira, 2007, 106).

The abovementioned authors evaluated the formal characteristics of the system that had been prescribed in the Constitution. However, even this formal approach could not lead to the conclusion that the system had the nature of the assembly system. It was true that most elements of this system formally were present. However,

one important element was missing, namely the right of the National Assembly to be sole legislator since the Government, as mentioned before, had the right to enact regulations with the strength of law. Therefore, we agree with those authors who have claimed that the Constitution prescribed a mixed system of government. The system was similar to the parliamentary system because it introduced relative independence of the legislative and executive, since the executive participated in the legislative function and it decisively shaped all the policies. On the other hand, difference with the parliamentary system could be found in the fact that the executive could not formally influence the existence of the legislative since the National Assembly could not be dissolved either by the Government or the Presidium of the National Assembly.

Other authors reached the conclusion that the system had the features of the assembly system having in mind only relationship between the National Assembly and other organs in respect of their election and accountability (Stefanović, 1950, 476–477). According to this opinion, the very fact that the National Assembly elected the Government and could depose it, while the Government could not dissolve the National Assembly, was enough for conclusion that the principle of unity of powers was enacted. Although these features of the Yugoslav system were important for conclusions on its legal nature, it was nevertheless necessary to take into consideration its other features, such as competencies of both the National Assembly and the Government in exercising legislative function of state power. When one takes into consideration these competencies, the explicit and firm conclusion on the assembly system in the first Yugoslav constitution has to be question as we have already done.

The institution of the Presidium of the National Assembly also limited the powers of the National Assembly. The Presidium had triple legal and political nature. It had been at the same time the executive body of the National Assembly, its substitute in some occasions, and the collective head of state. According to Article 74 of the Constitution, the Presidium, among other competencies: had given obligatory interpretation of laws; ratified international treaties; nominated and recalled, on the proposal of the President of the Government, individual ministers; changed the structure of the Government; etc. Indeed, the National Assembly had to approve some of these decisions. However, since the Assembly met rarely, the Presidium's decisions had real political impact. In practice, the Presidium did not become influential decision-maker since this role had been reserved for the Government.

Considering this fact as well as the constitutional competencies of the Presidium, it could be said that its existence contributed to the strengthening of the principle of unity of powers (Krbek, 1946, 185). Namely, the fact that the Presidium had, among other things, the nature of the collective head of state, the absence of the individual head of state meant that there was no potential for constitutional or practical strengthening of the head of state, which could additionally endanger the formal domination of the National Assembly.




Fig. 1: Decision on enactment of the Constitution of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia 1946 (Wikimedia Commons).

TOWARD ASSEMBLY SYSTEM IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

After the 1948 split with the USSR, Yugoslav regime decided to adopt radical social and political changes introducing workers' self-management in 1950. These changes were fundamental in the sense that they aimed at considerable and radical reform of the very system. Therefore, the new constitution had to be enacted since the nature and the content of the changes were such that the new constitution was necessary. It was not possible to realize radical changes in the constitutional framework which had been drafted according to Stalinist model. However, the political elite had decided that for the first phase of the reform it would be enough to enact the constitutional law which would replace considerable portion of the 1946 Constitution (Rusinow, 1978, 70–71).

Yugoslav constitution-makers developed the idea that the political power had to be concentrated in the assemblies (Kardelj, 1977, 162–163). If the bureaucracy had to be weakened and eventually defeated, the power had to be concentrated in the assembly since bureaucracy could not as easily control the assembly as it could control the executive (Kardelj, 1980, 15, 19–20). The executive organs became "natural" strongholds of the bureaucracy since they were composed of the most influential politicians, which had at their disposal material means and the aid of experts in different fields. The main ideologists thus implicitly admitted that bureaucracy became the new ruling class or at least ruling layer which drew its power, among other sources, from their positions in the Government and its practical domination over the National Assembly.

The 1953 Constitutional Law on the Bases of the Social and Political Order of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia and on the Federal Institutions changed considerable parts of the 1946 Constitution since the Constitutional Law had prescribed new constitutional principles of the social and political order of the state such as workers' self-management, decentralization, stronger position of the assemblies, introduction of the socio-economic bicameralism etc.

The Constitutional Law prescribed in Article 13 that the Federal People's Assembly was the representative of the people's sovereignty and the supreme organ of power of the Federation. This very definition meant that the constitution-maker intended to preserve and possibly to strengthen the assembly system of government. The Assembly exercised both legislative and executive functions (Đorđević, 1977, 314), which was one of the most important features of the assembly system. This was also the new feature of the constitutional system since the constitution-maker intended to concentrate both legislative and executive functions in the hands of the Assembly which had not been the case until then.

This intention could also be seen from Article 15 of the Constitutional Law, which had prescribed *exclusive* competencies of the Federal People's Assembly such as: 1) enactment of laws, annual social plans and budget; 2) election of the Federal Executive Council (FEC); 3) election and removal of the President of the Republic; 4) election and removal of the judges of the Federal Supreme Court; 5) amending the Constitution; etc.

The Assembly had not shared its most important competencies with other institutions (i.e., with the FEC and the President of the Republic), which was one of important differences comparing with the 1946 Constitution. Namely, the Constitutional Law excluded the executive from direct exercise of the legislative function since the government (i.e., the FEC) no longer had the right to enact the regulations with the strength of law. This was the most important difference between the 1946 Constitution and the 1953 Constitutional Law, testifying the intention of the constitution-maker to strengthen the principles of the assembly system.

The principal relationship between the Federal People's Assembly, on one side, and the FEC and the President of the Republic, on the other side, was marked by the fact that two latter organs were defined as the executive organs of the former while the Assembly, according to the assembly system, exercised both the legislative and executive functions (Đorđević, 1964, 189). The President of the Republic was elected by the Assembly, which also had the right to recall him for political and other reasons. This meant that the President of the Republic formally had been subjected to the Assembly. The President had to be elected among the MPs, on the proposal of at least twenty MPs. The facts that the procedure for his election had to begin and finish in the Assembly, as well as the fact that he was responsible to the Assembly, were clear elements of the assembly system.

The President had not had the right to legislative initiative or the right to veto, which meant that he had not had the possibility to influence the legislative power directly, which were important elements of the assembly system. His power rested in the fact that he had been the chairman of the FEC. He could influence the Assembly through the FEC's right to legislative initiative and the FEC's right to exercise the executive function. Of course, these were the FEC's competencies, which the President could exercise only through the FEC. If the President had not agreed with a decision of the FEC, he could veto it until the Assembly would take the final decision. This constitutional provision also gave to the President important competence and the means of control over the FEC, which had not been in accordance with the role of the head of state in the assembly system. Some authors argued that the President of the Republic had been the first among equals in the FEC but at the same time that he had been the political chief of this state organ (Đorđević, 1958, 323). In our opinion, he could not be both, and in fact he had been the political head of this institution which gave him serious political influence. In this way, the President of the Republic preserved for himself real political power rising directly from the Constitutional Law.

Development of the assembly system in the 1953 Constitutional Law could be primarily seen in the fact that the FEC did not have the right to enact the regulations with the strength of law. This meant that it could not exercise the autonomous normative power but only to enact regulations which were necessary for the execution of the laws. This fact considerably weakened the position of the FEC in comparison to the position of the Government according to the 1946 Constitution and strengthened the elements of the assembly system.

However, the FEC still had the most powerful practical role in the system due to one constitutional and one political reason. The constitutional reason was its constitutional right to legislative initiative, which it used very widely. The consequence was that most laws were adopted on the FEC's initiative. Some authors thought that the FEC had even had important constitutional powers as well (Đorđević, 1964, 189). The Federal Executive Council had under its control whole federal administrative apparatus, composed of experts with knowledge and information which were necessary for drafting laws. The members of the Assembly could not count on such an expert aid. In fact, the only important competence which could and did give considerable power to the FEC was the right to legislative initiative (including drafting budget and social plans).

The political reason for the powerful role of the FEC in the system laid in the fact that it had been composed of the most influential political leaders. Since these leaders, with Tito himself, who was the FEC's chairman, exercised considerable political power, it was quite natural, although contrary to the principles of the assembly system, that the FEC was more influential than the Assembly. If the FEC had been composed of the non-political experts or of the second-class members of the political elite, and if the most important members concentrated their work in the Assembly, the latter could become more powerful in comparison with the former.

In order to strengthen the Assembly constitutionally and in practice, the political elite had to fulfil one constitutional and one political condition. Constitutionally speaking, members of the Assembly had to be prevented from being at the same time members of the FEC. This would be departure from the principles of the assembly system but its positive consequence would be that there would not be too much concentration of power in the hands of one small group of members of the political elite. Politically speaking, the political elite had to decide not to elect its members to the FEC but to the Assembly.

Another interesting and potentially important issue was the solution according to which the state administration had been separated from the FEC. According to Article 90 of the Constitutional Law, state secretariats and other organs of state administration had the duty to directly execute affairs which were in the competence of the Federation. The state secretaries headed the state secretariats. However, only two of them were members of the FEC *ex officio* which had not excluded those other members of the FEC could also be nominated as secretaries. In this way, the Constitutional Law tried to diminish the political power of the state administration since it was separated from the FEC as a political-executive body. The idea was to separate political-executive function from the administrative function of state power (Festić, 1969, 155–158; Mratović et al., 1981, 153) in order to weaken the position of the administrative bodies, such as the state secretariats. The constitution-maker feared that the FEC could keep the political power which the Government had after 1946 since the ministers as the heads of the administrative organs (the ministries) had also been members of the Government. According to some authors, this was the Kardeljian antibureaucratic device

(Rusinow, 1978, 72). In practice, however, the heads of the administrative organs were too often nominated among the members of the FEC (Marković, 1980, 182). It seems that the Constitutional Law had to explicitly prescribe that the state secretaries could not at the same time be members of the FEC with possible exception of state secretaries for defence and foreign affairs.

It has to be emphasized that the FEC still had the right to initiate legislation and to overview its execution while it had been composed of the most influential members of the political elite. Therefore, the very separation of the political-executive and the administrative functions did not produce the dominance of the Assembly over the executive. Despite all this, the practice prevailed that the members of the FEC were at the same time the heads of secretariats which meant that the elements of the parliamentary government were present in the structure and method of functioning of the FEC (Nikolić, 1973, 67). It seems that the constitution-maker did not find the FEC's right to initiate legislation as a political problem which could have as its consequence the dominance of the former over the Assembly. Or, maybe the constitution-maker even wanted to keep strong constitutional and political position of the FEC. Whatever the case was, the constitution-maker (un)intentionally exacerbated fulfilment of the idea that the Assembly should become the supreme organ of state power.

In our opinion, the main source of the executive's dominance was in the fact that the FEC, composed of influential members of political elite, had the monopoly over the legislative procedure. Two solutions to this problem were possible. Either the FEC would not be composed of the most influential members of the political elite, or the right to legislative initiative should rest in the working bodies of the Assembly. In our opinion, the second solution would be better for two reasons. Firstly, if the FEC would be composed even of second-class members of the political elite, its political power would still be considerable since these members of the FEC would have to follow instructions of the ruling party, at least in the most important cases. Secondly, if the legislative initiative would become the monopoly of the Assembly's working bodies, the whole legislative procedure would begin and end in the Assembly, and other political institutions would have less influence on it although it would be illusory to expect that there would not be any influence at all.

The right of the FEC to submit collective resignation after 1953 also gave it considerable political influence (Nikolić, 1973, 68). This was one of departures from the principles of the assembly system which had not been enacted initially in the Constitutional Law but had been enacted later on in the 1958 Assembly's Rules of Procedure (Đorđević, 1961, 514). Firstly, this raised the issue of the constitutionality of such a solution since the Rules of Procedure could not give this right to the FEC if it had not already been prescribed in the Constitutional Law. Secondly, the right to submit collective resignation was a means of political influence of the FEC on the Assembly, i.e. it was a source of the political threat which the FEC could use if necessary to subdue the Assembly.

Previous analysis leads to the conclusion that the constitutional basis of the assembly system was laid down in the 1953 Constitutional Law.

“THE CHARTER OF SELF-MANAGEMENT”

The 1963 Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) had been enacted at the moment when self-management had been stabilized as the basic feature of the Yugoslav socialism, and when leading ideologists believed that the system had been stable but needed some improvements. These improvements were necessary in order to combat bureaucracy which had been understood as the main enemy inside the system.

The Federal Assembly had been defined both as the supreme organ of state power and as an organ of self-management. Its double nature emerged from the theory of withering away of the state. If the state had to wither away, the assembly could not be typical state institution any more. It had to begin to transform itself into the organ of society. Whether one examines the assembly as a state organ or as an organ of self-management, the conclusion had to be the same: the assembly had to be the supreme power. Firstly, as a state organ, it had to exercise the supreme power since it represented the bearer of sovereignty, namely the working people and other citizens. Secondly, as an organ of self-management, the assembly had to exercise the supreme power since it was the only possible organizational form of realization of self-management at macro level.

Therefore, the idea that self-management, as the cornerstone of the social system, had to be strengthened and developed, demanded further changes in the role of the Assembly. That was the reason why this constitution had also proclaimed the assembly system, although some authors thought that it introduced the elements of the separation of powers (about this cf. Nikolić, 1973, 73). The Assembly had been defined as the supreme organ of power which by itself was a clear sign that the assembly system had been introduced. However, some changes were visible comparing to previous solutions. The Assembly exercised the legislative function directly, while it exercised the executive function indirectly, through two institutions which formally were responsible to it – the President of the Republic and the FEC. The basic principles of the assembly system remained – the Assembly elected both the President of the Republic and the FEC, and it had the right to overview their work and to remove them from office. On the other side, these organs could not influence the existence of the Assembly since none of them had the right to dissolve it.

The constitutional position of the President of the Republic changed. He was not any more the chair of the FEC, but the autonomous political-executive institution. He was not the political-executive organ of the Assembly. Furthermore, the X Chapter of the Constitution had been dedicated to the President of the Republic, while the XI Chapter had been dedicated to the political-executive and administrative organs of the Assembly. The very structure of the Constitution coupled with the constitutional definition of the President of the Republic indicated the intention to strengthen his constitutional position which at least implicitly reduced the power of the Assembly.



Fig. 2: Session of the Federal People's Assembly of Yugoslavia 1958 (Wikimedia Commons).

He was elected by the Assembly, although it was not obligatory that a candidate was an MP. Since it had not been necessary for the President of the Republic to be elected as an MP before nominated for the President, it could not be said for sure if a candidate for the President's office had the voters' legitimacy.

If a candidate had been an MP, and he/she had been elected, his post as an MP would cease. The President of the Republic still did not have considerable powers, while his political role was highly important due to the fact that the post had been occupied by Tito, the undisputable state and party leader. Contrary to the nature of the assembly system, the Constitution did not explicitly prescribe the right of the Assembly to recall the President (Article 164) although it prescribed in Article 219 his responsibility to the Assembly according to the Constitution and law (Đorđević, 1964, 403). However, some authors argued that the Assembly still had this right since without it the very accountability of the President to the Assembly would be meaningless (Nikolić, 1973, 86). On the contrary, we think that such a conclusion is too strong since according to it the Assembly would have the right to recall the President, which would be in accordance with the assembly system, but which nevertheless had not been explicitly prescribed. The constitution-maker had to prescribe the right of the Assembly to recall the President of the Republic at any time and for any reason, but this solution simply was missing, in our opinion because the constitution-maker thought it improper for the function occupied by President Tito.

It is interesting to note that the Federal Assembly had the right to recall the President of the Republic according to the Constitutional Law while the President was the chair of the FEC. This right of the Assembly was missing in the 1963 Constitution when the President was an independent political-executive institution. Not only that he was not the chair of the FEC but his position was strengthened even more since he was not defined as a political-executive organ of the Assembly. The fact that the President of the Republic could not be recalled by the Assembly was an element of the parliamentary system.

In our opinion, it had been contrary to the nature of the assembly system, and more in accordance with the parliamentary system, that the President of the Republic had the right to propose a candidate for the post of the chair of the FEC (logically, he also would have the right to propose dismissal of the chair), and that he had the right to convoke the FEC and to propose to it the issues which it had to discuss and to vote on. This provision was in accordance to the fact that the President of the Republic was not any more the executive organ of the Assembly but relatively autonomous political institution. However, principally speaking as well as considering the fact that the post had been held by the most important political leader, this provision could not be justified by the standards of the assembly system. It would be better if the chair of the FEC had been nominated by the special Assembly's commission. In that case, the procedure of the FEC's election would begin and finish in the Assembly, which would be completely in accordance with the principles of the assembly system. The President of the Republic, as the political-executive institution, should not have the right to participate in the procedure of election of another political institution.

The same could be said about the election of the judges of the Constitutional Court of Yugoslavia, whose members had been elected by the Assembly on the proposal of the President of the Republic, which gave him considerable importance and power. Some authors rightly argued that the FEC to some extent had been in the position of dependency toward the President (Mratović et al., 1981, 165). The Constitution did not explicitly prescribe the right of the Assembly to abrogate the President's legal acts, which was deviation from the assembly system. Since the Assembly had been the highest power institution, it had to have this right.

The Federal Executive Council had been defined as the political-executive organ of the Assembly, which was in accordance with the nature of the assembly system. The FEC was elected by and responsible to the Assembly, and it was not able to influence the existence of the Assembly either directly or indirectly. This was one of the most important features of the assembly system. The members of the FEC were elected among the members of the Federal Assembly by the Federal Council of the Federal Assembly. This solution was positive and natural since it was in the nature of the assembly system that the members of the FEC had been at the same time the members of the Assembly.

The FEC was often described as a political committee of the Assembly. This theoretical definition had to describe the FEC as an Assembly's working body which had not been based on the principles of mutual dependence and balance of forces but rather

on the principles of the hierarchical subordination of the former to the latter. However, the fact that the FEC had been the *political* committee of the Assembly meant that in practice it had been the institution which considerably (or even decisively) influenced the policy-making process.

According to Article 227 of the Constitution majority of the members of the FEC could resign which would lead to the resignation of the FEC as a whole. This solution meant the possibility of mild pressure of the FEC on the Assembly since it was hardly possible, except in the case of serious political crisis, that majority of the FEC's members could resign. On the other hand, the chair of the FEC could submit collective resignation on behalf of the FEC. This right of the FEC had been potentially strong means of pressure on the Assembly which had not been in accordance with the nature of the assembly system.

The FEC's formal competencies were not as strong as it was the case with the government in the parliamentary system or with the Yugoslav Government according to the 1946 Constitution. The FEC had not the right to enact regulations with the strength of law. It could only enact regulations which were necessary for the implementation of laws. This meant that the legislative function rested solely in the Assembly. However, Article 225 of the Constitution prescribed that the FEC was responsible for the implementation of policies whose basic features had already been decided by the Assembly. The Assembly decided only on the outlines of the policies while the FEC formulated more precise content of these policies. Although the FEC had to act in the legal and political framework outlined by the Assembly it nevertheless had some autonomy, and this was not convergent with the very idea of the assembly system.

The most important competencies of the FEC were the right to initiate legislation as well as the right to implement adopted laws. These two rights gave considerable political and constitutional weight to the FEC since it continued to be a master of the legislative process and of everyday functioning of the Federation. Great majority of adopted laws were drafted by the FEC, while the MPs rarely used their right to initiate legislation. In this way, the dominance of the FEC continued. Instead of being executive organ of the Assembly, the FEC in practice continued to play the role of the primary policy-maker. The reasons for such practice were the same as during the period of the Constitutional Law validity.

The relationship between the legislative and the executive could be different if one political-executive organ (such as the FEC) had been abolished and replaced with a series of executive bodies (such as committees for finance, defence, labour relations, etc.), composed of members of the Assembly and responsible to it. Since this never happened (although there had been such proposals during the preparation of the Draft Constitution), another solution for reduction of the power of the FEC could have been found in its composition, i.e. in the decision of the political elite to concentrate its activities in the Assembly while abstaining from the membership in the FEC. The fact that the FEC had been the main initiator of the laws would not be negative in itself if the relationship between the Assembly and the FEC had been such that the Assembly highly critically examined draft bills of the FEC and rejected serious percentage of

them. This would mean that the Assembly became politically independent from the FEC and ready to cooperate with it and not just to confirm its draft bills. This outcome could be possible only if the FEC ceased to be a political institution and be composed entirely or predominantly of professionals who did not belong to political elite. Only such composition of the FEC would guarantee freedom of the Assembly to discuss and decide on draft bills without political dependence on the initiators of legislation.

After 1963, the Assembly became more active and more important political institution.³ The number of adopted laws significantly rose, including the systemic laws, which had often been drafted by the Assembly. It was more important that the Assembly disapproved with some legislative proposals of the FEC, which would be unimaginable in the parliamentary systems. For the first time, the Assembly had become really active political institution (Rusinow, 1978, 152–153), which gave more vitality to the idea of the assembly system.

Although this was positive move forward, the Constitution still gave important rights to the FEC. According to Article 228, the FEC had the right to express the attitude on the draft laws submitted by other initiators. Potentially, this was strong competence of the FEC since it was highly probable that its negative attitude on a bill would mean that the Assembly would reject it. Although this competence was prescribed in order to improve good relations between the Assembly and the FEC, it was not convergent with the very nature of the assembly system since it gave considerable power to the FEC in the legislative procedure. Since the FEC had great political authority, its negative attitude on a draft bill almost automatically meant that a draft bill would be rejected. However, the Constitution had prescribed in Article 232 that the FEC had the right to collective resignation if the Assembly, contrary to the opinion of the FEC, adopted a draft bill or other act. This solution was more in accordance with the parliamentary than the assembly system since it gave to the FEC the possibility to blackmail the Assembly.

The FEC did not have the general constitutional competence to enact the regulations necessary for the implementation of the laws. It had had this right according to the 1953 Constitutional Law and it got it again in 1971.⁴ The 1963 Constitution solution was good since it limited the power of the FEC to enact regulations. The Assembly had the full right to decide when and to what extent the FEC should have the right to enact regulations. In this way, the Assembly could additionally control the work of the FEC. The right to enact regulations was indeed important aspect of the shaping policies and their implementation considering the fact that laws were quite general and that they had to be made more concrete in order to be implemented. Therefore, it could be said that the absence of this general constitutional competence is in accordance with the assembly system.

3 Although most of the adopted laws had been submitted by the FEC, the working bodies of the Federal Assembly actively used its right to legislative initiative than before. From April 1963 to December 1965, these bodies submitted 160 draft bills, while other subjects (mostly the FEC) submitted 855 draft bills (Nikolić, 1973, 76, 81).

4 Some theorists questioned this solution – cf. Đukić, 1973, 57.

According to Article 226 of the Constitution, the federal secretaries and the federal state secretaries (both were the heads of administrative departments – “ministries”) were *ex officio* members of the FEC, although as members of its “wider team”, having the right to participate in decision on general issues (in fact, on the most important issues, such as draft bills, draft budget, etc.). This meant one step back comparing to the 1953 Constitutional Law. The constitution-maker departed from the idea that the administrative organs should be separated from the political-executive ones in order to limit the power of the executive, and this new solution could be criticized as a departure from the principles of the assembly system. Since the heads of administrative departments were at the same time influential party officials and the members of the FEC, it was clear that their role was not only administrative but also political, i.e. that they participated to considerable extent in policy-making. It would be better if they were not members of the FEC at all (Đorđević, 1964, 463).

THE LAST CONSTITUTION

The 1974 Constitution of the SFRY was the last constitution of this state which at the moment of its enactment had already been highly confederalized. This fact, which was confirmed in the Constitution, influenced very much the competencies and the relationship between three main federal political institutions – the Assembly of Yugoslavia, the Presidency (the collegial head of state), and the FEC.

Although the constitutional system had officially rested on the assembly system, the latter changed considerably. The competencies of the FEC remained unchanged to some extent which meant that it preserved its powerful position in the political system although in line with the changes in the federal system which tended to become more a mixture of federation and confederation. The strong position of the Presidency of Yugoslavia also influenced lesser competencies of the FEC. The Constitution introduced the principle of incompatibility of membership in the Assembly and the FEC, out of fear that double membership in these organs would considerably strengthen political influence of the members of the FEC. In this way, the Constitution adopted solution similar to the one in the Swiss Constitution, which often has been described as a departure from the assembly system (Marković, 1976, 136) although the intention of the constitution-maker seemed well-founded. Namely, according to one theoretical opinion, members of the executive council (“government”) had to be at the same time members of the Assembly because the former had only been the working body of the latter. Since the executive council did not have its own policies, its role was only to execute the political will of the assembly. The will of the assembly would be best executed by those who participated in shaping the policies, i.e. members of the assembly.

The Constitution did not bring considerable changes in the position of the FEC. It had the right to enact regulations for execution of laws based on the general constitutional authorization. This was contrary to the 1963 Constitution which did not recognize general authorization for enactment of regulations. This new solution enabled the FEC to practically widen its power since it could regulate with these regulations issues which had to be

regulated by laws. Of course, this could happen only regarding second-class issues when the laws had not regulated particular issues in sufficient details. The federal secretaries (who headed the secretariats as the federal administrative organs) as well as the heads of other federal administrative organs were members of the FEC, which made the latter to look like the government in the parliamentary system.

Article 348 of the Constitution prescribed that the Presidency had the right (and duty) to propose a candidate for the post of the president of the FEC (about practical aspects of this solution, cf.: Kamberović, 2012, 179–227). This was departure from the principle of the assembly system and it was more in accordance with the principle of separation of powers. The Assembly had to approve a proposal but however it was limited with the Presidency's proposal and it had to behave according to "take it or leave it" principle. Since the Presidency was composed of very (or most) influential members of the political elite, whose attitudes were considered as joint interest of republic and autonomous province, it was very hard for the Assembly to disagree. In any case, the only solution completely in accordance with the assembly system would be that the procedure of election of the FEC began and finished in the Assembly.

The method of election of the FEC revealed true impotence of the Assembly. The V Amendment to the Constitution gave the right to the Socialist Alliance, as a socio-political organization, to lead the procedure for harmonisation of opinions and interests of republics and autonomous provinces regarding the nomination of the president of the FEC. After that, the Presidency had to nominate him/her. The role of the Assembly had been only to approve the nomination. This meant that the Assembly had to take into consideration opinions of many political subjects: six republics and two autonomous provinces, the Socialist Alliance, and the nine-member Presidency.

According to the Constitution, the Assembly of SFRY remained, at least nominally, the highest organ of state power and of self-management, although its' constitutional position weakened (Marković, 1980, 224), since the political-executive organs exercised considerable influence over it. The FEC, for example, had the right to collective resignation. This was the means of pressure of the executive on the legislative which was quite natural for the parliamentary system but was not in accordance with the principles of the assembly system. The FEC's right to collective resignation meant that it could make a pressure on the Assembly to adopt its policies or it would resign, which would be a gross political problem decreasing the very legitimacy of the Assembly itself. This constitutional institute, prescribed also in the 1963 Constitution, potentially strengthened the position of the FEC and decreased the power of the Assembly since it gave the FEC considerable blackmailing potential.

In the second half of 1980s the FEC offered its collective resignation four times. In 1985, the FEC under the presidency of Milka Planinc offered its resignation twice, and the FEC under the presidency of Branko Mikulić did it also in 1988 (Sarač-Rujanac, 2020, 143–196). At last, the latter finally submitted its collective resignation in December 1988. These were political moves characteristic for parliamentary system and directly opposite to the nature of the assembly system since in the latter the "government" can not offer its resignation since it is only a working body of the assembly. These moves of

the FEC in 1985 and 1988 were discussed between the FEC and the Presidency of SFRY. In other words, the Assembly of SFRY played only secondary role. If the FEC finally decided, up to December 1988, not to resign, it was entirely thanks to its relationship with the Presidency. The reason why the FEC intended to resign could not be seen primarily in its misunderstanding with the Assembly but in the fact that the republics and autonomous provinces did not accept the FEC's policies while the Assembly in some cases was not able to act efficiently. For example, it was not able to adopt the draft budget for 1989 primarily due to blockades by some republics and autonomous provinces. At the end, the FEC resigned in December 1988 after the Assembly of SFRY rejected to adopt nine acts in the field of economics and finances. Only at first sight it seems that the FEC had to surrender to the Assembly which did not approve of its policies. However, true reasons had to be found in the fact that the Assembly, as a kind of diplomatic conference of republics and autonomous provinces, had not been able any more to shape policies based on consensus of all subjects of the Federation. In fact, the FEC had not been a "victim" of the Assembly's supremacy but of bad political relations between republics and autonomous provinces.

The Federal Executive Council had the constitutional right to pose the question of the Assembly's confidence in its work. In this way, the FEC had the possibility to make a pressure on the Assembly either to conform to its policies or to remove it. This was typical means of influence of the executive on the legislative in the parliamentary system, completely inappropriate for the supposed hierarchical relations between the Assembly and the FEC. However, the 1981 amendments potentially strengthened the position of the Assembly since after two years in office the FEC had to submit the report on its work, and the Assembly had to debate about it and at the end to vote confidence or no confidence in the FEC (Potts, 1996, 310).

These changes of relationship between two political institutions in the direction of separation of powers were result of the constitution-maker's intention to strengthen an executive organ which could effectively shape and fulfil federal policies. Since the Assembly of Yugoslavia made decisions according to complex procedures, including very often consensus of representatives of republics and autonomous provinces (Mirić, 1984, 84–90) there was a need for an institution which could act effectively. Such an institution had to have wide competencies in order to be able to shape and enforce state policies.

The constitutional position of the collective head of state increased, and the Presidency of SFRY became politically influential institution, in the legal framework of Yugoslav federation which, comparing to its federal units, had much narrower competencies than before 1974. The Presidency of SFRY had quite particular constitutional and political position, as a coordinating political body participating in the process of shaping policies. It had the right to legislative initiative as well as the right to propose the content of policies to the Assembly and to the FEC. This had been another deviation from the assembly system since the head of state should not have the right to participate in shaping state policies in different areas. Some authors rightly observed that the position of the President of the Republic according to the 1963 Constitution was more in accordance with the assembly system (Đorđević, 1977, 554). The Presidency was not at all the organ of the

Assembly, since the Assembly did not elect it, and it was not responsible to the Assembly. All of this was contrary to the assembly system principles.

Although the Presidency's proposals had not been obligatory, they nevertheless influenced the process of decision-making. According to Article 319 of the Constitution, the Presidency could make a pressure on the Assembly in order to achieve the enactment of its proposals. If a chamber of the Assembly would not be ready to adopt a draft bill or other proposal of the Presidency, even after the Presidency submitted it for the second reading, a chamber would be dissolved, while the mandate of the Presidency would simultaneously cease. Through this solution, the Presidency got the formal possibility to influence the process of decision-making although this meant that the hierarchical relationship between the Assembly and the Presidency had been undermined.

The Presidency had the right to veto a legal act enacted by the FEC which had the general political importance, although this was suspense rather than absolute veto, since a competent chamber of the Assembly had to make final decision on the act. This competence also showed that the Presidency should have bigger political weight than the FEC since it had been composed of the representatives of the federal units (including the autonomous provinces) and the president of the leading (and the only) political party. Therefore, the Presidency had become the meeting point of often different positions and interests of the republics and autonomous provinces, and its constitutional competencies gave it the possibility to moderate between opposing interests in order to guarantee the balance between the constituent parts of the Federation.

The fact that the Presidency was not elected by the Assembly and responsible to it was one of the major deviations from the assembly system. As some authors rightly argued, it had been a political actor in itself (Potts, 1996, 301). The method of election of the Presidency (by the republican and provincial assemblies) was the result of the strengthening of federal units' position. However, it seems to us that the only appropriate solution would be for the federal state to have the right to elect its head of state, and, according to the assembly system principles, this right had to belong to the Assembly of Yugoslavia.

Only at first sight it seems that the method of election of the Presidency was not convergent with its competencies. One could conclude that indirectly elected Presidency had to have much narrower competencies. We have to agree since all abovementioned competencies strengthened the head of state to the degree that the system looked more like parliamentary or semi presidential than the assembly system. However, the very purpose of the Presidency and its election by federal units considerably diminished imperfection of the method of its election. Since it served both as an instrument of inter-republican negotiations and making compromises and as an instrument for shaping joint interests of federal units, its indirect election by federal units was quite natural although it more inclined to confederal than to federal model.

CONCLUSION

The official attitude of constitution-makers and political elite in second Yugoslavia was that the assembly system as the form of government was one of the cornerstones of the

constitutional and political system. Although the constitutions had changed, the assembly system remained the basic feature of the political system in each of them. The ideological and theoretical reasons for its preservation in all constitutional acts, despite serious differences between them, were clear and strong. The Yugoslav constitution-makers thought that the principle of unity of powers, which is the basis of the assembly system, was more democratic than the principle of separation of powers, and that the assembly, as the organ of self-management and the expression of sovereignty of working people, had to be supreme power in the structure of the state which had to wither away. Therefore, the assembly system was unavoidable choice of the socialist constitution-makers.

Despite this principal theoretical viewpoint, Yugoslav constitution-makers experienced two main problems trying to constitutionalize the assembly system. Firstly, despite the fact that there were some experiences with the assembly system in other countries, this system had been almost unknown in modern constitutions and political systems. The Swiss model could not be taken over since the Swiss social and constitutional systems were not acceptable for ideological reasons. Yugoslav supposedly socialist system could not be based on the Swiss bourgeois system. Socialist models which appeared in the past could be useful only to limited degree. The model of Paris Commune lasted only two months which was not enough for thorough explorations and conclusions although it could and did serve for ideological purposes as the first socialist model of organization of state power. Model established in the Soviet constitutions, commencing with the first constitution from 1918, could be more useful since it had been adopted in all Soviet constitutions.

The principles of the assembly system had been developed to different degrees and with different contents in four Yugoslav constitutional acts. These differences were so huge that the question if all of them really institutionalized this system was quite reasonable. Socio-political and historical context influenced differences of the constitutional solutions. The first post-war constitution (1946) even introduced a kind of mixed form of government with some elements of the separation of powers despite the definition of the Assembly as the supreme organ of power. The theoreticians as well as the politicians explained this as a result of the hard post-war economic situation which had to be overcome through effective and active role of the state. Despite some truth in this argument, total dependence of the Assembly could be explained only with the desire of the political elite to concentrate political power in its hands. If the Assembly could meet more often, and could have the possibility to question the Government's policies, it could participate in the creation of state policies in meaningful way, while the Government still could have active and influential role in order to overcome post-war difficulties.

The reasons for strengthening of the assembly system, which happened in 1953 and 1963 constitutional acts, had to be found both in the socio-political context and the ideological and practical-political reasons. The clash with Stalinism in 1948 and orientation of the political elite on self-management necessarily led to strengthening of the assembly system since the political-executive organs were rightly seen as a basis of bureaucracy. Reform-minded members of top political elite as well as important sections of the middle layers of political elite were in favour of strengthening the role of assembly since they

could fulfil their democratic ideals and/or reach more political power. Democratic reforms which were proclaimed in 1950s and 1960s, based on the idea of self-management, were incompatible with the concentration of power in a dozen or so of the most influential politicians who were members of the powerful Government.

However, constitutional strengthening of the assemblies was not straightforward and it had been done with some deviations. Although strengthening of the political role of the federal assembly had been visible in the second part of 1960s, it had less been the result of its systematic independence from the executive power and party elites than the fact that the assembly deputies had shown less dependence from the political elites while representing local or republican interests during the debates and voting in the assembly.

This was the case even more in the last Yugoslav constitution (1974). Despite the constitution-maker's claims that the principles of the assembly system were strengthened (Kardelj, 1977, 11), it was not the case. In fact, it was quite the opposite. The fact that Yugoslav federation lost some of its competencies and that the Presidency of SFRY had to become a kind of organ which had to make balance between federal units considerably influenced this outcome. The fact that the Assembly of SFRY could make decisions only with delays and complicated procedure of searching for compromises of republic and provinces, as well as the fact that there was need for operative and efficient political institutions, which the FEC and the Presidency turned out to be, decisively influenced weakening of the assembly system. It was visible that political elite tried to solve or at least to control political crisis not through strengthening of assembly as the supreme organ but through negotiations of republican and provincial political elites. Such political and constitutional orientation meant that the assembly had to become second-class political institution.

Although constitutional provisions were different in analyzed constitutional acts, it was noticeable that some institutions characteristic for the systems of separation of powers were accepted in all or in some of them (delegation of legislative powers, right to collective resignation, political irresponsibility of head of state, etc.). The fact that at least some of these institutions were explicitly prescribed in particular constitutional acts indicated that the constitution-maker intended to strengthen the executive to some degree, or at least to deprive the assembly of its superior position.

All in all, the assemblies never became the supreme organs of power in practice although in some periods their influence strengthened and they could with some justification be marked as important political institutions. It seems that the political elite abandoned the idea of assembly system in the last constitution even formally although it had never been officially proclaimed.

ODNOS MED ZAKONODAJNO IN IZVRŠNO OBLASTJO V
JUGOSLOVANSKIH SOCIALISTIČNIH USTAVAH

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POVZETEK

Namen prispevka je preučiti ustavne norme v socialistični Jugoslaviji z vidika razmerja med zakonodajno in izvršno oblastjo, da bi odgovorili na vprašanje, ali oziroma v kolikšni meri so bila načela skupščinskega sistema dejansko zagotovljena z ustavo. Avtor analizira določila štirih jugoslovanskih ustav (iz let 1946, 1953, 1963 in 1974), in sicer v njih opredeljene pristojnosti Zvezne skupščine, Zvezne vlade (od leta 1953 dalje Zveznega izvršnega sveta) in predsednika republike (oziroma Predsedstva SFRJ) ter odnose med temi telesi. Čeprav je bila skupščina v temeljnem zakonu države opredeljena kot najvišji organ oblasti in so tudi ustavne teorije jugoslovanski sistem razlagale kot skupščinski sistem oblasti, pa je vsaka od štirih preučevanih ustav določala tudi pristojnosti politično-izvršnih organov in jim s tem omogočala določen vpliv. Te pristojnosti so bile manjše v ustavnem zakonu iz leta 1953 in ustavi iz leta 1963, ki sta utrjevala vlogo skupščine, večje pa v ustavah iz let 1946 in 1974, ki sta močno okrepili vlogo izvršnih organov. Na podlagi tega avtor priznava jugoslovanskemu ustavnemu sistemu lastnosti skupščinskega sistema, vendar precizira, da je šlo pri njem za mešanico prvin skupščinskega sistema in delitve oblasti, vsaj glede na ustavi iz let 1946 in 1974.

Ključne besede: Jugoslavija, skupščinski sistem, ustava, Zvezna skupščina, Zvezni izvršni svet, predsednik republike, Predsedstvo SFRJ

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COLD WAR DIPLOMACY AND US–SOCIALIST YUGOSLAVIA
FRUITFUL RELATIONS: AN EXAMINATION OF THE ESTABLISHMENT
OF US–MONTENEGRO COOPERATION IN 1980

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ABSTRACT

During the 1970s, Yugoslavia formed a geostrategic partnership with the United States and engaged in multiple cooperative efforts. As one of the republics in Yugoslavia, Montenegro leveraged this partnership to establish numerous relations with the United States, with the primary goal of improving economic cooperation. Conversely, the United States paid greater attention to Montenegro during this period due to the Yugoslav constitution of 1974, which granted more power to the republics in creating international policy. The American government aimed to strengthen its influence in Montenegro and opened an Information Centre in the region in 1980. The close cooperation and mutual interests between the two nations resulted in the first official visit of the Montenegrin delegation to the United States in 1980. This paper relies mainly on unpublished sources from the State Archive of Montenegro.

Keywords: Montenegro, USA, Lawrence Eagleburger, Momčilo Cemović

LA DIPLOMAZIA DELLA GUERRA FREDDA E LE RELAZIONI PROFICUE
TRA GLI STATI UNITI E LA JUGOSLAVIA SOCIALISTA: UN'ANALISI
SULL'INSTAURAZIONE DELLA COOPERAZIONE TRA GLI
STATI UNITI E IL MONTENEGRO NEL 1980

SINTESI

Negli anni '70, la Repubblica Socialista Federale di Jugoslavia ha instaurato una partnership geostrategica con gli Stati Uniti e ha intrapreso numerosi sforzi di collaborazione. In quanto una delle repubbliche costituenti della Jugoslavia, il Montenegro ha sfruttato tale partenariato per stabilire una serie di relazioni con gli Stati Uniti, con l'obiettivo principale di potenziare la cooperazione economica. Al contempo, gli Stati Uniti hanno concentrato maggiore attenzione sul Montenegro durante quel periodo, in virtù dell'emanazione della Costituzione jugoslava del 1974, che ha conferito alle repubbliche maggior potere nella sfera della politica internazionale. Il governo americano si è adoperato per rafforzare

la propria influenza nel Montenegro e, nel 1980, ha aperto un Centro informazioni nella regione. Grazie a una cooperazione stretta e ad interessi reciproci, le due nazioni hanno poi sperimentato la prima visita ufficiale di una delegazione montenegrina negli Stati Uniti nel 1980. La presente analisi si basa principalmente su fonti inedite provenienti dall'Archivio di Stato del Montenegro e pone l'accento sul ruolo di figure chiave come Lawrence Eagleburger e Momčilo Cemović.

Parole chiave: Montenegro, Stati Uniti, Lawrence Eagleburger, Momčilo Cemović

INTRODUCTION

The conflict between Yugoslavia and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in 1948 marked a significant turning point in the communist bloc, as it broke its monolithic nature and caused major geostrategic changes (Leffler & Westad, 2010, I, 214). The West, particularly the United States of America (USA), supported Yugoslavia at that time because of its importance for the security of NATO's southern flank (Leffler & Westad, 2010, I, 215). From 1950 to 1955, the West, i.e., NATO, provided substantial military and economic aid to dissuade the USSR from invading Yugoslavia, with the USA playing a prominent role by sending over USD 525 million worth of aid and USD 55 million in loans by the end of 1952 (Aleksić, 2019, 125). The total value of economic and military support from the West during the 1949–1955 period amounted to approximately USD 1.5 billion (Leffler & Westad, 2010, I, 215). The USA supported Yugoslavia's "hybrid non-Soviet form of socialism" due to Belgrade's policies that served Western interests (CIA Documents, 2009, 231). The Democratic Party leader Adlai Stevenson's visit to Belgrade in June 1953 symbolized US diplomatic support for Yugoslavia (Petrović, 2014, 583), and Yugoslavia was included in the USA's Most Favoured Nation (MFN) program (Leffler & Westad, 2010, II, 52). The USA's comprehensive support reached its peak in 1953 to keep Tito in power, as stated by the US Ambassador to Belgrade George Allen (Lampe et al., 1990, 47). Allen believed that a Marxist Yugoslavia independent of Moscow benefited the "free world" more than joining the West, and thus it was crucial for the USA to make Tito capable of resisting Moscow and keeping him in power (Jakovina, 2002, 34; Bekić, 1988, 75). The USA's geostrategic goal was achieved when Tito rejected Moscow's attempt to bring Yugoslavia back into the communist base.

However, since the mid-1950s, Yugoslavia's closer ties with the Soviet bloc led to a decline in relations with the USA, resulting in the termination of military cooperation in 1957 (Jakovina, 2002, 120). At the same time, ideological disagreements caused a new cooling of relations with the USSR during 1957–1958 (Cvetković, 2014, 657–658). Yugoslavia then sought a "third way" and became one of the founders of

the Non-Aligned Movement, hosting the first conference in 1961. In the early 1960s, Yugoslavia once again aligned itself more closely with the USSR in international politics. The USA perceived this as Yugoslavia's preparation to return to the Soviet bloc, which led to Yugoslavia's exclusion from MFN status in June 1962 (Bogetić, 2009, 88). The increasing closeness between Yugoslavia and the USSR led to the deterioration of relations with the USA, so during Tito's first visit to the USA to meet with President Kennedy in 1963, the Americans insisted that it was an unofficial, working visit (Bogetić, 2007a, 70). Even though political relations were reaffirmed and an agreement on economic cooperation was reached, the visit was overshadowed by the incident against Tito in New York, caused by members of the Serbian and Croatian political emigration. Only a month after the meeting with Tito, President Kennedy was assassinated, and the benefits of this visit were temporary.

Yugoslavia maintained close relations and cooperation with the USSR from 1962 until the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 (Bogetić, 2009, 94). The possibility of a Soviet invasion of Yugoslavia was a genuine concern at the time. However, a new rapprochement between Yugoslavia and the United States followed. In October 1968, President Lyndon Johnson informed the Yugoslav ambassador in Washington of his interest in the independence, sovereignty, and economic development of Yugoslavia (Bajc, 2014, 720). Relations continued to improve with the start of President Richard Nixon's administration mandate. Two days before his inauguration in January 1969, Nixon sent a letter to Tito expressing his desire to visit Yugoslavia (Bogetić, 2007b, 166). Nixon's visit to Yugoslavia took place in late September and early October 1970, during which he supported Yugoslavia's independence from the USSR and challenged the Soviet leader Brezhnev's doctrine of limited sovereignty. Nixon complimented Tito, calling him a giant on the world stage. Nixon believed that Tito, as the leader of the Non-Aligned Movement, could significantly contribute to improving relations between the East and West, particularly in the crisis zones of Asia and Africa. This was especially true with regards to Tito's mediation efforts in improving relations between the US and Egypt (Richard Nixon Foundation, 2022). One of the achievements of this meeting was the reaffirmation of economic relations. On Nixon's initiative, the US granted Yugoslavia the privileged status of a developing country and promised financial support. The American Government also guaranteed security for American companies to invest in Yugoslavia (Bogetić, 2007b, 174).

Nixon's visit to Yugoslavia in 1970 marked the beginning of a decade of improving relations between the USA and Yugoslavia. The US supported Yugoslavia's independence and non-aligned policy, on the condition that it remained ideologically and militarily independent from the USSR and China (Milosevic, 2018, 191). The two countries shared common interests, and to solidify their renewed partnership, President Tito visited President Nixon in October 1971, resulting in the "Joint Statement" of the two presidents, also known as the "Washington Declaration," which established long-term Yugoslav-American relations (Bogetić, 2015a, 15). The relationship between non-aligned Yugoslavia and the US, a world

superpower, was based on mutual respect, cooperation, and equality (Milošević, 2018, 192–193). The US confirmed its interest in an independent and non-aligned Yugoslavia, emphasizing that Yugoslavia was an important factor in international relations (Bogetić, 2011, 169). During the meeting in Washington, Presidents Tito and Nixon exchanged compliments, with Tito calling Nixon an “esteemed friend,” and Nixon praising Tito’s “strong convictions” and his ability to talk “with anyone in the world” (Robertson, 1971). The two presidents agreed to regular consultations and to improve all forms of cooperation, including trade, joint ventures, industrial cooperation, and long-term programs of scientific, educational, and cultural cooperation, to maintain positive continuity in their relationship.

Non-aligned Yugoslavia played a crucial role in maintaining the political balance and security of European countries, as NATO had a “vital interest in preserving the integrity and independence of Yugoslavia” (CIA Document, 2009, 232). The USA and NATO were prepared to provide military support to Yugoslavia in the event of Soviet aggression, and in November 1974, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger supported Yugoslavia’s independence and non-alignment during a meeting with Tito in Belgrade (Bogetić, 2014, 177). As the leader of the Non-Aligned Movement, Yugoslavia played a significant role in US policy towards Third World countries and was instrumental in the policy of détente between the blocs, leading to improved relations between the USA and Yugoslavia in the second half of the 1970s. This is evidenced by the meeting between Yugoslav President Josip Broz Tito and American President Gerald Ford in 1975, as well as the meeting between President Tito and President Jimmy Carter in 1978. At that point, the positions on the relations between the two countries, as well as on significant international issues, were harmonized. In August 1975, Presidents Tito and Gerald Ford discussed several topics during their meeting in Belgrade, including the Conference on European Security and Cooperation in Helsinki and the Israeli-Palestinian crisis and its impact on the Middle East region (Gerald R. Ford, 2023). Yugoslav main goals were: to acquire modern military and civilian technology from the USA, continue credit arrangements with the American financial institutions and get help from administration in suppressing the activity of anti-Titoist emigre groups (Lazić, 2022, 129–130). The USA requested Yugoslavia, as the leader of the Non-Aligned Movement, to influence Arab states, particularly Egypt, to accept peace negotiations with Israel organized by the USA (Naughton, 1975). President Ford’s visit demonstrated Washington’s continued support for maintaining the independence of Yugoslavia, while on the other hand, Washington expected more understanding from Yugoslavia for USA interests in various international issues (Lazić, 2022, 129). Meanwhile, Yugoslav representatives demanded increased investment from the USA in industry, agriculture, and technology transfer (Bogetić, 2015b, 253). President Ford pledged to strengthen economic ties and agreed to procure arms from the USA to Yugoslavia, which supported Yugoslavia’s independence, integrity,

and non-aligned position (Bogetić, 2014, 179). Secretary of State Kissinger emphasized the significance of Tito and Yugoslavia for American interests, stating “Tito is not under the control of Moscow, and his influence is felt all over the world” during a meeting with his team in 1975 (Leffler & Westad, 2010, III, 52). This position was unique in the bipolar world at that time.

During a meeting in Washington in March 1978, Presidents Tito and Carter agreed on the positions of détente between the East and West and the mediating role in peace processes in the Middle East and the Horn of Africa. At the time, the Cold War was only cold in Europe, while it was hot on the periphery, namely Africa, Central America, and the Middle East (Leffler & Westad, 2010, III, 75). This was particularly significant in relation to the then serious crisis in the Horn of Africa, where Yugoslavia, through communist Ethiopia, had a great influence. United States Secretary Cyrus Vance expressed the goals of the United States as strong support for the independence and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia, respect for Tito and Yugoslavia as leaders of the Non-Aligned Movement, and the strengthening of bilateral relations in all areas.¹ Tito’s policy remained important for US interests, so Carter described Tito as “the symbol of East European aspiration for freedom and independence and a true friend of the United States” (Doder, 1978). The American president also emphasized that the independence and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia were essential for peace in the world.² According to US Ambassador in Yugoslavia, Lawrence Eagleburger, this period marked the best Yugoslav-American relations since World War II.³

The USA remained committed to supporting Yugoslavia’s internal and foreign policies even after Tito’s death in May 1980. American officials were concerned about the fragile nature of Yugoslavia as a multinational federation and feared that nationalist tensions between Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes would tear the country apart. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Carter’s national security adviser, shared this view (González Villa, 2017, 701). In June 1980, President Carter visited Yugoslavia and reassured its new leadership of America’s continued support for Yugoslavian independence (Dobbs, 1980). The US had a strategic interest in maintaining Yugoslavia’s independence to prevent Soviet access to the Adriatic and Mediterranean (CIA Documents, 2009, 269). However, it was a challenging task given the federation’s significant internal problems, such as political leadership issues, internal divisions, unemployment, inflation, and a growing trade deficit, even during Tito’s final years in power (Ramšak, 2017, 689).

1 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XX, Eastern Europe, 252. Memorandum from Secretary of State Vance to President Carter, Washington, Undated. <https://history.state.gov/> (last access: 2023-02-02).

2 Foreign Relations, Volume XX, Eastern Europe, 242. Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National security affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter, Washington, September 20, 1977. <https://history.state.gov/> (last access: 2023-02-05).

3 Foreign Relations, Volume XX, Eastern Europe, 249. Telegram from the Embassy in Yugoslavia to the Department of State, Belgrade, February 24, 1978. <https://history.state.gov/> (last access: 2023-03-23).

The strengthening of political cooperation between Yugoslavia and the USA led to intense diplomatic activity.⁴ From 1977 to 1980, several high-level Yugoslavian officials visited the USA, including Edvard Kardelj, a member of the Yugoslav Presidency; President Draža Marković, who headed a delegation of the Yugoslav Parliament; Tihomir Vlaškalić, who led a delegation of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia; and General Nikola Ljubičić, Federal Secretary for National Defense. Additionally, there were numerous visits by republic and provincial delegations, economic delegations, and other groups. In turn, Yugoslavia received visits from US Vice President Walter Mondale, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, several members of the presidential cabinet, almost 100 congressmen and senators, and numerous delegations from American federal states, governors, and other groups.

The bilateral relations between Yugoslavia and the USA were marked by a special focus on growing economic cooperation. In terms of its value, the USA was the fourth largest partner in Yugoslav foreign trade, after the USSR, FR Germany, and Italy. In 1979, the total trade in goods between the USA and SFRY amounted to 1,419,000,000 dollars. Yugoslav exports were around 370 million dollars, while the import from the USA was worth about 1,049 million dollars. However, SFRY had a high trade deficit with the USA amounting to about 679 million dollars. Yugoslav exports stagnated, while imports from the USA increased significantly in just one year, reaching 615.8 million dollars in 1978. The import from the USA accounted for 8.2% of total Yugoslav imports and 5.7% of total Yugoslav exports. To facilitate business meetings and agreements between American and Yugoslav businessmen, the Yugoslav-American Economic Council was established in 1974 (Lampe et al., 1990, 144). American investments played a significant role in economic relations. In 1967, Yugoslavia adopted the first law allowing foreign investments, based on which the International Finance Corporation of the World Bank formed the International Investment Corporation for Yugoslavia (IICY) in 1969 to promote foreign investments in Yugoslavia (Lampe et al., 1990, 127). The financial cooperation between Yugoslavia and the USA was well-developed (Lampe et al., 1990, 148). American state and private banks, along with the International Monetary Fund, were Yugoslavia's main creditors, having lent several billion dollars. Between 1949 and 1989, the official export-credit agency of the US Government, the "Export-Import" (EX-IM) bank, approved more than 2.5 billion dollars in loans to Yugoslavia (Lampe et al., 1990, 112).

US - MONTENEGRO COOPERATION IN 1970S

After World War II, Montenegro became a republic within socialist Yugoslavia, with the smallest territory of all the Yugoslav republics at 13,812 km² and a population of approximately 585,000 according to the 1981 census. In the 1970s,

4 SAMN 358, f. 6. Proposal of the platform for the visit of the delegation of the Executive Council of the Parliament of Socialist Republic (SR) Montenegro to the United States of America, Titograd, April, 1980.

Montenegro sought to enhance cooperation with the United States based on the framework of Yugoslav-American relations. It is worth noting that Montenegro and the United States had established diplomatic relations prior to 1918, during the period when Montenegro was an independent state. In 1905, the US representative John Jackson presented his credentials to the Montenegrin King Nikola I Petrović-Njegoš (Andrijašević & Rastoder, 2006, 184). However, the United States severed diplomatic relations with Montenegro in January 1921 when they recognized the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, which included Montenegro since 1918. As a result, there were no official relations between the two nations until the establishment of US-Montenegro cooperation in 1980.

The first significant contact between Montenegro and the United States during this period occurred in 1972 when, at the request of the Montenegrin government, the Committee for Coordination of Activities of the US Institutions in Cooperation with the University of Montenegro was established at Florida State University in Tallahassee.⁵ This initiative was made possible by the cooperation agreement between Presidents Tito and Nixon, as outlined in the Washington Declaration of 1971, which called for long-term cooperation in science, education, and culture (Bogetić, 2011, 169). The committee, chaired by Professor Robert M. Johnson of Florida State University, consisted of professors from several US universities and provided significant consulting assistance to Montenegro in the establishment of the University “Veljko Vlahović,”⁶ which was founded in 1974. Subsequently, the University “Veljko Vlahović” continued to collaborate intensively with Florida State University.⁷ In December 1975, the two universities signed an indefinite-term cooperation agreement that envisaged teacher exchanges, work on joint research projects, and the organization of seminars.⁸ During the signing of the agreement, Dr. Branislav Ivanović, Vice-Rector of the University “Veljko Vlahović,” visited Florida State University, and the university’s Rector, Stanley J. Marshall, made a

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- 5 SAMN 361, f. 17, 41; 5/1972, Commission for the Development of Higher Education in Montenegro, Information on the forthcoming discussions of the representatives from SR Montenegro and the USA, Titograd, 4th October 1972. The committee had 12 members: Robert M. Johnson (Dean of Postgraduate Studies and Director of Research Work of the State University of Florida), Dr. White Kerr (Professor at Michigan School of Medicine), A.R. Chamberlain (President of Colorado State University), William H. Clayton (Dean of the College of Oceanographic Sciences A. and M. University of Texas), Guy Corriden (Director of the Department of European Studies), Paul M. Dottie (Professor of Biochemistry at Harvard University), William R. Kist (Head of the Department of English Language at the University of Texas), Robert O. Lawton (Dean of the College of Art and Science, Florida State University), George Maćešić (Professor of Economics and Director of the Centre for Slavic and Eastern European Studies at the State University of Florida), Viktor G. Rosenblum (Professor of Political and Legal Studies of the North-western University School of Law), John E. Nelor (Assistant Vice President, Michigan State University) and Denzel D. Smith (North-western University Advisor and Senior Advisor, Batel Memorial Institute).
- 6 In the period 1974 - 1992, the University of Montenegro was called University “Veljko Vlahović” after a prominent Montenegrin intellectual and revolutionary.
- 7 SAMN 358, f. 10. Note on some issues of international activities of the University “Veljko Vlahović”.
- 8 SAMN – 358, f. 12. Information on the activities of the University “Veljko Vlahović” at the international level, without date.

return visit in March 1976. In October 1977, Bernard F. Sliger, the new rector of Florida State University, visited the University of Titograd.

Through the Loan Agreement signed in 1974 between the Government of Yugoslavia and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), some of the funds were allocated to the development of the University of Montenegro.⁹ Additionally, the University signed a collaborative agreement with the Centre for Yugoslav-American Studies, Research and Exchange. Notably, the Biological Institute of Titograd¹⁰ and the Smithsonian Institute, as well as the Kotor Brain Research Laboratory and the University of California Brain Research Institute, participated in joint projects. Since 1972, the Medical Institute in Titograd and the US Department of Health have also cooperated. Educational collaboration was fostered through scholarships, such as Fulbright and Irex, which supported various forms of training, university partnerships, and guest lecturers.¹¹

The first significant economic contact between Montenegro and the United States occurred in the late 1950s when the US Development Loan Fund (DLF) approved USD 15 million for the construction of a new hydropower plant in Montenegro (Lampe et al., 1990, 60). On December 21, 1973, representatives of EX-IM Bank, Montenegrin Ironworks company, and Investment Bank of Titograd signed a Loan Agreement worth USD 34 million in Washington for the reconstruction and modernization of the Ironworks company, the largest loan that a Montenegrin company had received from abroad until then.¹² However, the development of trade exchange was slow. In the first ten months of 1979, Montenegrin imports from the United States amounted to about USD 105 million, with machinery and equipment, corn, soybeans, petroleum coke, and aluminum fluoride being the main items.¹³ Nevertheless, Montenegrin exports to the United States were 50 times smaller than imports, totaling only about USD 2.5 million. Over 50% of the value of Montenegro's exports to the United States referred to refrigerators produced by the company Obod from Cetinje, followed by significant exports of medicinal herbs.

Montenegro aimed to improve economic cooperation with the United States based on long-term agreements and contracts, in line with the economic liberalization policies and efficiency-oriented economic reforms introduced by Slovenia during the 1960s (Woodward, 1995, 345). The Yugoslav government's economic reform and agreement with international creditors sought to increase exports to western markets over an extended period (Woodward, 1995, 347). Montenegro intended to attract US investments to enhance economic development and address the growing unemployment rate. Official data indicated that unemployment in Montenegro rose

9 SAMN 361, f. 39, 57; 6/1975, Proposal for the Law on the Ratification of the Agreement.

10 The capital of Montenegro, Podgorica, was renamed into Titograd in 1946. The city was named after Yugoslav President Tito. The name Podgorica was returned in 1992.

11 SAMN 358, f. 6. Proposal of the platform for the visit of the delegation of the Executive Council of the Parliament of Socialist Republic (SR) Montenegro to the United States of America, Titograd, April, 1980.

12 Pobjeda, 23. 12. 1973, 1.

13 SAMN 358, f. 1. Initiatives for improving cooperation with the USA, Titograd, 18th December 1979.

from 6.5% in 1971 to 19.3% in 1979 (Woodward, 1995, 383–384). The priorities were to increase exports to the US market and attract US investments and technologies.¹⁴ At that time, Montenegro had only one joint investment agreement, signed in 1973 with the US companies Buttes Gas and Oil Co. and Chevron Overseas Petroleum Inc. from California, for oil exploration in the Montenegrin submarine (Lampe et al., 1990, 135). Montenegro particularly hoped for financial assistance from US commercial banks, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), and the International Finance Corporation, all members of the World Bank Group. Interbank and financial cooperation with the United States primarily occurred through the Investment Bank-Titograd and US commercial banks such as Bank of America, Manufactures Hanover Trust Co., City Bank, First Chicago International Banking Co., National City Bank, and Crocker National Bank. The most significant credit indebtedness from the late 1970s was a loan in the amount of USD 50 million approved by the Bank of America to complete the reconstruction of the Ironworks company.

In the late 1970s, Montenegrin expatriates living in the United States, numbering about 45,000, were of particular interest to the state. They formed immigrant clubs, with the Lovćen club from Detroit standing out as it mainly brought together ethnic Montenegrins. Additionally, there were 14,000 Albanian immigrants from Montenegro living in the USA, and their most famous club was called Besa, founded in Detroit in 1973. This club was recognizable for its patriotic attitude towards Montenegro and Yugoslavia. In 1974, Albanian immigrants from Montenegro founded a club named Montenegro in Los Angeles. Immigrants who lived in and around New York founded the American-Montenegrin-Albanian Association in New York in 1979. Immigrants from Montenegro who lived in Chicago founded the Boka association in 1979.

BEGINNING OF DIRECT COOPERATION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND MONTENEGRO

The Yugoslav republics began actively participating in international cooperation in the mid-60s. In March 1967, the Socialist Republic of Slovenia, the Italian autonomous region of Friuli-Venezia Giulia, and the Austrian federal state of Carinthia entered into an agreement for cultural cooperation. This was followed by the establishment of the Commission for Cooperation between Friuli, Carinthia, Slovenia, and Croatia in the area of spatial planning and tourism in Videm in 1969, which led to the creation of “Quadrigon” (Klabjan, 2013, 412).

The 1974 Yugoslav Constitution enabled greater participation of the republics and provinces in international relations. While foreign policy management remained under the responsibility of the Federal Government, Article 271 of the Constitution allowed the republics and autonomous provinces to cooperate internationally within

14 SAMN 358, f. 6. Proposal of the platform for the visit of the delegation of the Executive Council of the Parliament of Socialist Republic (SR) Montenegro to the United States of America, Titograd, April, 1980.

the framework of Yugoslavia's established foreign policy and its international treaties (Ramšak, 2014, 736). This led to the establishment of international economic cooperation by special bodies, including the Republic Secretariats for International Cooperation, which were renamed the Republic Committee for International Cooperation in Slovenia in 1980 (Ramšak, 2015, 767). The republics also formed institutes for international scientific, technical, and cultural-educational cooperation (ZAMTES), and the republican Chambers of Commerce also participated in cooperation. On November 20, 1978, the Yugoslav republics of Slovenia and Croatia, the Italian regions of Veneto and Friuli-Venezia Giulia, and the Austrian Federal States of Carinthia, Styria, and Upper Austria formed the "Working Community of States and Regions of the Eastern Alpine Regions," whose main goal was regional cooperation (Portmann & Ruzicic-Kessler, 2014, 306). This community was later renamed the "Alpine-Adriatic Working Community." During the 1970s, Slovenia strengthened its cooperation with the Federal Republic of Germany, particularly with the federal province of Bavaria, which saw several high-level visits (Udovič, 2022, 541).

In accordance with the 1974 Constitution, the Committee for Foreign Relations was established in 1975 within the Executive Council (Government) of the Parliament of Montenegro.¹⁵ The committee was responsible for following Yugoslavia's foreign policies and exploring potential cooperation with other countries of interest to Montenegro. In 1979, the Committee for Foreign Relations was reorganized into an independent collegial administrative body, officially named the Republic Committee for Foreign Relations, with the task of managing Montenegro's international relations in accordance with its constitutional rights and duties.¹⁶ One of its primary objectives was to establish direct cooperation between Montenegro and the USA, which was a significant and crucial undertaking.

The cooperation between Montenegro and the United States was deeply influenced by the devastating earthquake that struck Montenegro in 1979, causing material damage amounting to around USD 4.5 billion, or approximately four times the annual gross national income. The United States was among the first countries to send urgent aid to Montenegro, providing assistance in the form of food and equipment which arrived on nine special planes, as well as a team of top US experts in seismology and geology. In addition to the US government, aid was also provided by the US Red Cross and many US companies, including money, medicines, clothing, food, and water purifiers.¹⁷ The initial aid from the United States was valued at USD 1.3 million, and Mr. Lawrence S. Eagleburger, the US Ambassador to Belgrade, donated USD 25,000 and visited Montenegro in the first days after the earthquake. The US President, Jimmy Carter, authorized

15 SAMN 358, f. 10. Report on the Committee's work for the period May 1978- 31 December 1979, Titograd, mart 1980; Official Gazette SRMNE, 4/1975, 10. 2. 1975.

16 SAMN 358, f. 1. Records from 3rd Session of the Republic committee for foreign relations, 21.12.1979. and 11.01.1980.

17 SAMN 358, f. 9, Reminder for discussions with the US Ambassador to Yugoslavia, Titograd, November 1980.

Ambassador Eagleburger to coordinate the distribution of American aid.¹⁸ Following the Montenegrin government's suggestion, the US Congress approved USD 10 million in aid for the construction of schools and hospitals. However, Ambassador Eagleburger was not satisfied with this amount and asked the US government to send more aid, as the earthquake had destroyed much of the coastal infrastructure, and tens of thousands of people had lost their homes.¹⁹

During a Congressional debate, Senator Edward Moore Kennedy proposed an amendment to provide USD 20 million in aid to Montenegro, but the proposal was ultimately rejected, which Ambassador Eagleburger believed was a mistake. Despite his energetic appeals, the US Government cited a lack of funds and did not change its decision.²⁰ Ambassador Eagleburger warned the government that the absence of significant US aid would damage relations with Yugoslavia, strengthen forces seeking closer relations with the USSR and a return to a more repressive system, and strengthen nationalist forces wanting to destroy Yugoslavia. This had wider political consequences, as other Western countries were waiting to see the US response before providing aid. In September 1979, Ambassador Eagleburger and Yugoslav representatives signed a USD 10 million gift agreement between Yugoslavia and the US to aid in the aftermath of the earthquake in Montenegro.²¹ The US Government delivered this assistance through the USAID.

The US Embassy in Belgrade organized the provision of aid and contacted representatives from the USA regarding further assistance and cooperation programs for the reconstruction of Montenegro. Ambassador Eagleburger promised to encourage US partners and corporations to provide aid to Montenegro.²² Since finances were a priority, the first cooperation was agreed upon in this area. In October 1979, President of the Government of Montenegro, Mr. Momčilo Cemović, and President of the World Bank, Mr. Robert McNamara, met at the exclusive Montenegrin hotel St. Stefan (Pobjeda, 9. 10. 1979, 2). Mr. McNamara, who had served as Secretary of Defense from 1961 to 1968, agreed that the IBRD would approve an USD 85 million loan to Montenegro to

18 SAMN 358, f. 1. A note on the conversation between Deputy Federal Secretary, Milorad Pešić and Ambassador L. Eagleburger, Belgrade, 16th May 1979.

19 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XX, Eastern Europe, 264, Telegram from the Embassy in Yugoslavia to the Department of State, Belgrade, May 10, 1979. <https://history.state.gov/> (last access: 2023-02-12).

20 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XX, Eastern Europe, 265. Telegram From the Embassy in Yugoslavia to the Department of State, Belgrade, June 1, 1979. <https://history.state.gov/> (last access: 2023-02-12).

21 SAMN 358, f.1 Agreement on gifts between the SFRY and the USA for assistance in eliminating the consequences of the earthquake, Belgrade, 29 September 1979.

22 SAMN 358, f. 1. A note on the conversation between Deputy Federal Secretary, Milorad Pešić and Ambassador L. Eagleburger, Belgrade, 16th May 1979.

help it eliminate the consequences of the earthquake.²³ Representatives of the Montenegrin Government signed this loan agreement in Washington, D.C. at the IBRD in October 1979. Later, the American EX-IM Bank approved a USD 90 million loan for the import of US equipment to Montenegro for repairing the consequences of the earthquake. The loan could be used by all Montenegrin companies that were importing American equipment.

PREPARATIONS FOR MONTENEGRIN DELEGATION'S VISIT TO THE USA

Scientific, trade, financial, and humanitarian cooperation were emphasized as crucial for improving relations between the United States and Montenegro. In a meeting with Ambassador Eagleburger, Milorad Pešić, the Deputy Federal Secretary of Foreign Affairs, expressed Montenegro's desire for their delegation to visit the United States to obtain more aid.²⁴ The US government accepted this proposal, and Ambassador Eagleburger extended an official invitation to the Montenegrin government delegation. In June 1979, the Yugoslav government approved the visit of the delegation, and in September of the same year, the Montenegrin government decided to send the delegation to the United States to discuss various forms of cooperation with US representatives.²⁵ Montenegro coordinated its cooperation plans with the United States with the official Global Projection for the Development of Yugoslavia's Cooperation with the United States for the period 1979–1985.²⁶ The Montenegrin government undertook extensive preparations for the delegation's visit, which was the first official visit since World War II, with a focus on long-term economic cooperation.²⁷

The United States were also keen to strengthen institutional relations with Montenegro. In light of this, the US government made the decision to establish a US Information Center in Titograd at the end of 1979. The first director of the center was Mr. Robert McCarthy, who visited Titograd and met with the Republic Committee for Information in late November 1979.²⁸ The center was scheduled to begin operations at the beginning of 1980, with the aim of promoting US literature and culture and collaborating with Montenegrin educational, cultural, and information institutions.

23 SAMN 358, f. 1. Federal Secretariat for Foreign Affairs, Directorate for North America, Australia and New Zealand - Executive Councils of SR Montenegro, SR Macedonia and Socialist Autonomous Province (SAP) Kosovo, Belgrade, 2nd November 1979.

24 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XX, Eastern Europe, 265. Telegram From the Embassy in Yugoslavia to the Department of State, Belgrade, June 1, 1979. <https://history.state.gov/> (last access: 2023-02-15).

25 SAMN 358, f. 2. Conclusions from the First Session of the Republic Committee for Foreign Relations, 7th September 1979.

26 SAMN 358, f. 1. Republic Committee for Foreign Relations – Chamber of Commerce SR Montenegro, Titograd, 14th September 1979.

27 SAMN 358, f. 1. Initiatives for improving cooperation with the USA, Titograd, 18th December 1979.

28 SAMN 358, f. 1. A note on the visit of Robert McCarthy, the newly appointed director of the future US Information Centre in Titograd, to the Republic Information Committee, 29th October 1979.

In early October 1979, the President of the Republic Committee for Foreign Relations, Mr. Branko Lukovac, and Ambassador Eagleburger met to discuss the development of cooperation and friendship between Montenegro and the United States, and to facilitate the Montenegrin delegation's visit to the US.²⁹ They agreed to continue meeting to ensure the delegation's visit was successful. To this end, William Whitman, an economic advisor at the US Embassy in Belgrade, visited Montenegro from November 12th to 14th, 1979.³⁰ During his visit, he toured the Aluminum Plant Titograd, a significant player in the non-ferrous metallurgy sector producing roughly 110,000 tons of primary aluminum annually. Whitman stated that there were real opportunities for cooperation and joint investments between the US-based General Motors and Aluminum Plant Titograd. Additionally, the Ironworks company, Montenegro's largest company in the ferrous metallurgy sector, sought diplomatic assistance in securing an additional USD 3 million loan from EX-IM Bank to complete its reconstruction project, in addition to a USD 50 million loan already taken from US banks for equipment purchases. The Ironworks company also required support from the US Embassy in obtaining US licenses for projects based on special steels and sought US investors for their realization. Much of the Ironworks company's equipment was of US origin, making it necessary to facilitate the quick import of required spare parts from the United States.

In Montenegro's most significant financial institution, the Investment Bank, Whitman was informed that Montenegro's development depends on processing steel, aluminum, and wood, as well as on developing coastal and mountain tourism. The bank requested joint investments and cooperation with appropriate US companies for these projects. Investment Bank representatives requested that the US Embassy direct US business people to Montenegro and help find business partners. Mr. Whitman agreed with this proposal. The representatives of Montenegro's largest agricultural company, Agrocombine "13th July," expressed interest in exporting red wine to the US market. Mr. Whitman also mentioned the possibility of exporting white wine to the US since the United States had low customs rates on imports of wine from Yugoslavia. Additionally, representatives of the largest company in the electronic industry sector, Obod, informed the US advisor that they signed a contract for exporting 50,000 refrigerators to the USA in 1980. Obod was interested in purchasing technology, obtaining US licenses, and joint investments in the electronic industry. The largest tourist operator, Montenegro-tourist, presented the possibilities of joint investments in constructing luxury hotels to attract US tourists. Whitman also discussed with the representatives of the Port of Bar the possibilities of agreeing on joint investments in the free customs zone and making the port a transit point for exporting American goods to Southeast European countries.

29 SAMN 358, f. 2, Chairman of the Committee Branko Lukovac – Mr. Lawrence S. Eagleburger, US Ambassador to Yugoslavia, Titograd, 11th October 1979.

30 SAMN 358, f. 1. A note on the visit of the US Economic Adviser William Whitman to Montenegro.

After consulting with Montenegrin businessmen, Mr. Whitman highlighted the real possibilities of economic cooperation. First and foremost, the US market was interested in importing quality wines from Montenegro. The refrigerators produced by Obod company were in demand in this market, and Mr. Whitman recommended expanding cooperation in this area. Additionally, cooperation with Ironworks company and the Aluminum Plant should have been raised to a higher level. He advised Montenegro-tourist to increase interest in the Montenegrin coast among American tourists through advertising and the development of a reservation system. Moreover, he suggested that joint investments were possible in the reconstruction and construction of areas affected by the earthquake, especially in the construction of modern catering facilities. Finally, Mr. Whitman recommended that representatives of Montenegrin companies should consider opening a joint representative office in the USA, which would conduct research on the US market.

In the early 1980s, it was decided that a Montenegrin delegation would visit the United States in the latter half of April.³¹ In mid-February 1980, the Montenegrin Government made an official decision to send the delegation to the United States.³² At the end of February 1980, President of the Republic Committee for Foreign Relations, Branko Lukovac, and Ambassador Eagleburger discussed the goals, approximate date of the visit, and preparations for the delegation's departure.³³ Mr. Lukovac presented the preparations for the visit in detail and the Montenegrin side's views on the possibilities of cooperation in certain areas. Ambassador Eagleburger praised Montenegro's decision to offer a broader list of programs and projects, so that the US side could hold consultations and determine its interests in the projects. However, upon the request of Ambassador Eagleburger, the visit was postponed until May. Subsequently, the State Department informed the Yugoslav Government that it would cooperate fully to facilitate the Montenegrin delegation in achieving the goal of the visit.³⁴

Following that, preparations were accelerated. The Republican Committee for Foreign Relations established a Platform for the visit of the Executive Council delegation to the US in April.³⁵ In the meantime, Ambassador Eagleburger returned to Montenegro, accompanied by a group of associates, including John E. Reinhardt, the director of the United States Information Agency.³⁶ The purpose of their visit was to officially open the US Information Centre in Titograd, the

31 SAMN 358, f. 6. Federal Secretariat for Foreign Relations – Administration for the North America, Belgrade, 30th January 1980.

32 SAMN - Republic Committee on Foreign Relations (358), f. 12, Report on the visit of the delegation of the Executive Council of the Parliament of SR Montenegro to the USA, Titograd, June 1980.

33 SAMN 358, f. 7. A note on the conversation with the US Ambassador, Titograd, 22 February 1980.

34 SAMN 358, f. 6. To the comrade Budimir Lončar, ambassador of the SFRY in Washington, 3rd March 1980

35 SAMN 358, f. 6. Proposal of the platform for the visit of the delegation of the Executive Council of the Parliament of Socialist Republic (SR) Montenegro to the United States of America, Titograd, April, 1980.

36 SAMN 358, f. 11, Information on the discussions with Mr. Rainhard and L. Eagleburger, Titograd, 17th April 1980.

first official institution of a foreign country in Montenegro since World War II.³⁷ During the opening of the Centre, an exhibition entitled “Contemporary American Graphics” was showcased, which was a significant step toward better cooperation between the United States and Montenegro in the fields of information, science, technology, and culture. President Cemović informed the US representatives about the preparations for the Montenegrin delegation’s visit to the United States. The US Embassy provided concrete proposals to the Montenegrin delegation on whom to contact in the United States, and President Cemović requested that representatives of certain US companies be involved in the visit preparations. Ambassador Eagleburger accepted the request and assigned William Whitman, an economic advisor at the Embassy, to facilitate this task. In mid-April 1980, Montenegrin representatives met with representatives of several US companies, including General Electric Company and General Motors, in Belgrade.³⁸ It was agreed that the representatives of the US companies would visit appropriate partners in Montenegro and continue negotiations on possible cooperation in the United States during the visit of the Montenegrin delegation.

VISIT OF MONTENEGRIN DELEGATION TO THE USA

The Platform for the visit of the Montenegrin delegation was officially approved by the Yugoslav Government at the end of April 1980.³⁹ Subsequently, the Government and the Presidency of Montenegro agreed that the delegation should visit the United States between the 21st and 30th of May, with Prime Minister Momčilo Cemović leading the delegation.⁴⁰ The delegation’s members of the economic section were headed by Omer Kurpejović, the President of the Chamber of Commerce of Montenegro. The majority of the delegation members were representatives of Montenegrin companies, which was consistent with the business-oriented essence of the Visiting Platform. The political objectives of the Platform included meetings with high-ranking officials in the State Department and Congress.

The Montenegrin delegation arrived in the United States on May 21, 1980, just two weeks after Tito’s funeral.⁴¹ In Washington, the delegation met with US Secretary of Commerce, Philip M. Klacnik, and his team. The Prime Minister of Montenegro, Cemović, emphasized that it was in Montenegro’s interest to

37 SAMN 358, f. 13, Proposals regarding the obligations related to the opening of the US Information Center in Titograd, 3rd April 1980.

38 SAMN 358, f. 6, Information on discussions.

39 SAMN 358, f. 12, Report on the visit of the delegation of the Executive Council of the Parliament of SR Montenegro to the USA, Titograd, June 1980.

40 SAMN 358, f. 6, Republic Committee on Foreign Relations – to the Presidency of Montenegro, Titograd, 13th May 1980.

41 SAMN 358, f. 12, Report on the visit of the delegation of the Executive Council of the Parliament of SR Montenegro to the USA, Titograd, June 1980.

enhance economic relations, increase cooperation, and boost trade in goods, and he expected the US to take more initiative. The delegation presented a list of Montenegrin products available for export to the US, along with a special publication on Montenegro's economy and an agreement for joint investments and long-term production cooperation. However, Yugoslav restrictive regulations and the insistence on tied counter-deliveries were significant obstacles for US investors, which deterred them from investing more in Yugoslavia. Secretary Klacnik promised to encourage US companies to work with partners from Montenegro and expressed that he had the mandate of President Carter to improve economic cooperation with Yugoslavia.

During their visit, the Montenegrin delegation also met with George West, the Assistant Secretary of State at the US State Department. Prime Minister Cemović presented the goals and interests of the delegation, stressing the importance of maintaining stable and consistent relations between Montenegro and the United States. Mr. West, in turn, acknowledged the significance of Yugoslavia's non-aligned policy and the US government's commitment to strengthening relations with the country. He expressed support for cooperation programs between Montenegro and the United States and offered assistance to generate interest among US business communities for further cooperation with Montenegro.

The President of the Foreign Policy Committee of the House of Representatives in Congress, Clement J. Zablocki, along with about 10 congressmen, met with the Montenegrin delegation. Mr. Zablocki was well-versed in Yugoslav politics, having been a member of the first congressional delegation to visit Yugoslavia in 1952 (Aleksić, 2019, 120). The congressmen emphasized their support for President Tito's policies and for an independent and non-aligned Yugoslavia. Prime Minister Cemović explained Montenegro's position within Yugoslavia and its plans for development, which relied on strengthening economic cooperation with the United States.⁴² The congressmen also discussed Yugoslavia's relations with the United States and other Western countries, as well as its role in the Non-Aligned Movement. They expressed interest in cross-national relations and the internal cohesion of Yugoslavia, and supported joint investments in the Yugoslav and Montenegrin economies as a means of improving other forms of cooperation.

The Montenegrin delegation received support during their discussions with representatives of the US Government's financial institutions. They met with Harold Allen, Vice-President of the EX-IM bank, and signed an agreement to use the previously approved loan of USD 90 million (Pobjeda, 23. 05. 1980, 1). Vice President Allen emphasized that this was a unique loan, not only because of its particularly favorable conditions but also because of its purpose. The EX-IM Bank representatives expressed their readiness to review all programs and projects for the reconstruction and development of Montenegro after the earthquake.

42 SAMN 358, f. 12, Report on the visit of the delegation of the Executive Council of the Parliament of SR Montenegro to the USA, Titograd, June 1980.

The meeting with Paul Gilbert, the President of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), was significant. OPIC had published a report on joint investments between Yugoslavia and the USA, which was of interest to the Montenegrin delegation. They had hoped that OPIC would encourage US companies to invest in Montenegro and participate in the loan approved by EX-IM Bank. The OPIC representatives acknowledged that Montenegro had viable projects for US companies to get involved in and offered loans up to USD 4 million and insurance up to USD 50 million for projects in Yugoslavia. The meeting with Mr. Bradshaw, the USAID director of the Department for Europe and the Middle East, focused on the realization of the USD 10 million aid approved by Congress for repairing earthquake damage in Montenegro.

Representatives of the US Government, Congress, and state financial institutions expressed support for cooperation with Montenegro during the visit of the Montenegrin delegation. They informed the US business community about the visit, which opened doors to many important US companies in Detroit, Chicago, and New York for the Montenegrin delegation. Several US companies, including Jim Miller, Whirlpool, JTI, Panda Corporation, Intertronic, and General Electric, showed interest in cooperating with Montenegro in the electrical industry, particularly with the Montenegrin company, Obod. General Electric was already procuring aluminum from Montenegro at the time. The Montenegrin delegation also visited the headquarters of Ford in Detroit, which expressed interest in importing steel components from Montenegro and cooperating in the production of off-road vehicles. Furthermore, the company International Harvester offered cooperation in the production of construction and agricultural machines.

Prominent US tourist companies from Chicago and New York expressed interest in investing in Montenegrin tourism. Representatives from Hyatt, one of the world's leading tourist companies, proposed building two hotels in Montenegro: one in the capital and another on the coast. They agreed to send representatives to Montenegro for further consultations. Additionally, Inter Continental considered building a hotel in Titograd. The US travel agency Harvey Olson and American Express Agency, one of the world's largest, were interested in cooperating in tourism and working with Hyatt. The company Bangor Punta proposed a joint investment in the construction of sailboats and yachts in Boka Kotorska, one of the most beautiful bays in the eastern Adriatic, and their rental in Yugoslavia and Europe. The largest US manufacturer of machines for recording and controlling business in tourism and catering, National Cash Register (NCR), offered modern machines for Montenegro's tourism industry.

Discussions about cooperation, joint investments, trade, and technology transfer in agriculture were held with companies such as FMC, Borde, and Pepsi-Co, who expressed interest in cooperating with Agrocombine "13th July." Additionally, several US shipping and port companies considered an offer for the Port of Bar, with the intention to receive general cargo and containers from the USA for the Yugoslav and neighboring markets and to transport goods from the same area to the USA. A

significant advantage of the Port of Bar was its free customs zone with grain silos that could store high quantities of grain exported by the USA to this part of Europe. The US exported approximately 500,000 tons of wheat per year only to Yugoslavia. The largest freight forwarding company in Montenegro, Zeta-trans, requested a partnership in these matters.

During the visit, the company Talos negotiated long-term cooperation and discussed the construction of a factory for the production of contact lenses in Titograd. The company Industrial Noise Control offered a complete project for the production of isolation material, while Amarkord showed interest in cooperating in the field of production of telecommunication devices. The company Forbacks offered the sale and installation of lighting fixtures, and representatives from the Fuller company expressed interest in making a project for dry cement production in the cement factory located in Pljevlja.

In addition, the Montenegrin delegation held meetings with representatives of the international banking sector and leading US banks to secure their financial support for Montenegro's reconstruction and development projects and programs. At the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the Montenegrin delegation was received by the bank's President, Robert McNamara, and his team. President McNamara affirmed the bank's commitment to support Montenegro's development program as part of its collaboration with Yugoslavia. The International Finance Corporation (IFC) approved funding for two programs in Montenegro. Furthermore, the delegation met with representatives from Chemical Bank (New York), Marine Midland Bank (New York), Continental Bank (Chicago), American National Bank and Trust Company (Chicago), First Chicago Bank, Morgan Guaranty Trust Company (New York), Manufacturers Hanover Trust Company (New York), and The Chase Manhattan Bank (New York).

Apart from discussing direct financial and credit cooperation, these banks expressed interest in supporting investments by US companies in Montenegro. The banks requested that all business arrangements between Montenegro and the United States be reported to them in a timely manner so they could be involved. During these negotiations, President Cemović was hosted by David Rockefeller, President of Chase Manhattan Bank. Additionally, Investment Bank-Titograd decided to open a branch in New York to improve Montenegro's cooperation with US banks and companies. The US banks expressed readiness to assist with the work of the office and to provide staff training.

The Montenegrin delegation had a series of meetings with emigrants from Montenegro and their associations in Detroit, Chicago, and New York. This was the first time an official delegation from Montenegro visited these associations, recognizing the important role that emigrants play in bridging cooperation between Montenegro and the United States. While in New York, the delegation also visited the UN, which had financed four projects in Montenegro after the earthquake. The delegation met with UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim, who promised further UN engagement in repairing earthquake damage, especially in the restoration and protection of cultural and historical monuments.

THE OUTCOME OF THE VISIT

The Montenegrin delegation successfully achieved the primary objectives of their visit, which was to spark economic cooperation between the US and Montenegro.⁴³ They secured the interest of various US companies and banks, and the next crucial step was to implement the agreements and conduct further negotiations with the interested parties. To achieve this, the Montenegrin government created a program related to tasks execution in mid-June 1980, and interested Montenegrin companies developed action plans for cooperation with US partners.⁴⁴ Specific negotiations started between several US companies and Montenegrin partners. The President of Panda Corporation visited Montenegro and discussed establishing cooperation in the food and electronic industry. International Harvester from Chicago also visited and talked about cooperation in the production of construction and off-road vehicles. General Manager of General Electric, Arthur Puccini, informed the Prime Minister of Montenegro about the possibilities of long-term production and technical cooperation, and General Electric was interested in purchasing various products from Obod and Ironworks companies. American Express made a significant number of reservations for US citizens and Montenegrin emigrants. The touristic agency Harvy Olson made a proposal for cooperation with Montenegro-tourist. NCR contracted the sale of its products, and Hyatt Hotel Corporation drafted a contract for construction of two hotels in Montenegro. Bangor Punta corporation prepared an agreement on the production, sale and rental of sailboats in the Bay of Kotor. Talos was ready to conclude a long-term arrangement with the Aluminum Plant, worth USD 70 million per year for the purchase of certain aluminum products.

More specific moves were made by Montenegro as well. Montenegro-export (Montex) was appointed as the representative of the US chemical giant Union Carbide for the Soviet Market, while the Montenegrin company Industria-import established a concrete cooperation agreement with the company Intertronic from Chicago. Additionally, the Investment Bank from Titograd opened a representative office in New York, which became operational on January 1st, 1981.

The specific moves that were taken by Montenegro yielded significant results. In 1980, the value of Montenegrin exports to the United States had increased about 3.5 times compared to 1979, reaching around USD 9 million.⁴⁶ However, the value of imports from the United States to Montenegro remained roughly the same as in 1979. The coverage of imports by exports from Montenegro to the USA was still low, at only 12.2%. The largest contributor to Montenegrin exports was the company Obod, which signed a long-term agreement with US partners in New York

43 SAMN 358, f. 6, Reports, Titograd, 19th June 1980.

44 SAMN 358, f. 8. A record from from the 7th Session of the Republic Committee for Foreign Relations, held on 16th June 1980.

45 SAMN 358, f. 8. Draft action program for the implementation of tasks arising from the visit of the delegation of the Executive Council of the Parliament of SR Montenegro to the United States.

46 SAMN 358, f. 9, Reminder for discussions with the US Ambassador to Yugoslavia, Titograd, November 1980.

on December 4th, 1981, to export 35,000 refrigerators, valued at around USD 4 million (Pobjeda, 5. 12. 1981, 1). The US Information Centre in Titograd was a symbol of successful cooperation between the two countries. The Centre functioned as part of the US Communications Agency and had a library of about 2,500 books and regularly received around 90 US magazines (Pobjeda, 2. 12. 1981, 7). It organized monthly screenings of American movies and facilitated the exchange of scientists and lectures. Through the Fulbright program, the Centre also enabled the exchange of professors and students.

CONCLUSION

The Montenegrin delegation, led by President of the Executive Council Momčilo Cemović, visited the United States in late May 1980. The delegation established political ties and received support for their program to strengthen relations with the United States, meeting with representatives from the Congress and State Department. The delegation also held meetings with representatives from significant US state-owned and private financial institutions and banks.

The cooperation between the United States and Montenegro was in line with the diplomatic and economic relations between Yugoslavia and the US. Like other Yugoslav republics, this collaboration was conducted under the supervision of the Yugoslav government but had local specificities. Following the devastating earthquake in 1979, Montenegro required humanitarian aid as well as direct financial and economic cooperation with the US. Direct cooperation with the US was also necessary for Montenegro to establish stronger connections with its significant diaspora in America. On the other hand, the US recognized that the survival of Yugoslavia after Tito's death depended primarily on political consensus among the republics. This necessitated the US to have better insights into the developments within the individual republics. Consequently, the US established its Information Center in Montenegro in April 1980, becoming the first institution of a foreign state to open in Montenegro after World War II. During this period, the US Ambassador Lawrence Eagleburger established close contacts with the highest representatives of the Montenegrin government. Additionally, the US aimed to strengthen its political influence in Montenegro by enhancing financial and economic cooperation with the country.

DIPLOMACIJA HLADNE VOJNE IN PLODNI ODNOSI MED ZDA IN SOCIALISTIČNO JUGOSLAVIJO: PREUČITEV VZPOSTAVITVE SODELOVANJA MED ZDA IN ČRNO GORO LETA 1980

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POVZETEK

Črnogorska delegacija, ki jo je vodil predsednik izvršnega sveta Momčilo Cemović, je konec maja 1980 obiskala Združene države Amerike. Delegacija je navezala politične stike in dobila podporo za svoj program krepitve odnosov z Združenimi državami, pri čemer se je srečala s predstavniki kongresa in zunanjega ministrstva. Delegacija se je sestala tudi s predstavniki pomembnih ameriških državnih in zasebnih finančnih institucij in bank. Sodelovanje med ZDA in Črno goro je bilo v skladu z diplomatskimi in gospodarskimi odnosi med Jugoslavijo in ZDA. Tako kot v drugih jugoslovanskih republikah je to sodelovanje potekalo pod nadzorom jugoslovanske vlade, vendar je imelo lokalne posebnosti. Po uničujočem potresu leta 1979 je Črna gora potrebovala humanitarno pomoč ter neposredno finančno in gospodarsko sodelovanje z ZDA. Neposredno sodelovanje z ZDA je bilo potrebno tudi zato, da bi Črna gora vzpostavila močnejše povezave s svojo številčno diasporo v Ameriki. Po drugi strani pa so ZDA priznavale, da je bilo preživetje Jugoslavije po Titovi smrti odvisno predvsem od političnega soglasja med republikami. Zaradi tega so ZDA morale imeti boljši vpogled v dogajanje v posameznih republikah. Zato so ZDA aprila 1980 v Črni gori ustanovile svoj informacijski center in tako postale prva institucija tuje države, ki se je po drugi svetovni vojni odprla v Črni gori. V tem obdobju je ameriški veleposlanik Lawrence Eagleburger vzpostavil tesne stike z najvišjimi predstavniki črnogorske vlade. Poleg tega so si ZDA prizadevale okrepiti svoj politični vpliv v Črni gori s krepitvijo finančnega in gospodarskega sodelovanja z državo.

Ključne besede: Črna gora, ZDA, Lawrence Eagleburger, Momčilo Cemović

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BORIS PAHOR – TESTIMONE DELLA DISTRUZIONE DEL CORPO NEI LAGER NAZISTI

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SINTESI

Nell'opus letterario testimoniale di Boris Pahor, il tema del campo è uno dei più importanti. A differenza di altri eminenti testimoni che sono tornati vivi dai campi nazisti, egli non ha scelto di fornire un resoconto completo e cronologicamente lineare della sua esperienza nel campo. La tematica del corpo, presente fin dall'inizio della scrittura autobiografica di Pahor, emerge con forza in tutte le sue opere successive. A differenza di altri eminenti testimoni che, come lui, hanno vissuto l'esperienza estrema del campo di concentramento, Pahor non distoglie lo sguardo dai corpi emaciati e dai cadaveri. La sua rappresentazione del nudamento è così drammaticamente concreta da suscitare orrore nel lettore.

Parole chiave: Boris Pahor, corpo, campi nazisti, deportazione, Necropoli

BORIS PAHOR – WITNESS OF THE DESTRUCTION OF THE BODY IN THE NAZI CAMPS

ABSTRACT

In Boris Pahor's literary testimonial oeuvre, the camp theme is one of the most important. Unlike other eminent witnesses who returned alive from the Nazi camps, he has not chosen to give a comprehensive and chronologically linear account of his camp experience. The motif of the body, which is present at the beginning of Pahor's autobiographical writing, stands out strongly in all his later works. Unlike other eminent witnesses who, like him, endured the extreme experience of a concentration camp, Pahor does not avert his gaze from the emaciated bodies and corpses. His depiction of camp stripping is so dramatically concrete that it evokes horror in the reader.

Keywords: Boris Pahor, body, Nazi camps, deportation, Pilgrim Among the Shadows

INTRODUZIONE

Nei racconti di Boris Pahor il tema del corpo risulta essere tra quelli di maggior rilievo.¹ Esso si evidenzia dapprima sullo sfondo dei suoi ricordi dell'infanzia trascorsa a Trieste, tra il Borgo Teresiano e la riviera di Barcola, collegandosi poi sia alla sua scelta di abbandonare il seminario per rifugiarsi successivamente nell'ambiente naturale montano², sia alla sua esperienza africana, dove trascorre come soldato italiano un breve periodo sul fronte libico. Anche nel momento in cui egli descrive l'universo dei campi di concentramento, questo tema prorompe in tutta la sua complessità rimanendo prevalente, anche quando racconta il suo ritorno alla vita, nei giorni in cui nel sanatorio francese entra in contatto con la natura e con la ragazza francese di nome Arlette (che gli renderà omaggio del suo amore) incominciando così a rigenerare i suoi succhi corporei. Il tema è determinante anche nei lavori che descrivono le esperienze postbelliche dello scrittore, nei momenti in cui riferisce dell'incontro con una ragazza che era stata stuprata negli anni della sua infanzia o quando descrive con grande tenerezza (sottile sentimento) il congedo finale dalla propria moglie malata. Anche sul letto di morte il corpo della sua compagna di vita gli appare in tutta la sua bellezza e quindi degno di tenerezza. Nel mosaico di testimonianze, che l'autore triestino compone e rifinisce per lunghi sette anni, possiamo osservare come il suo corpo – che all'inizio appartiene ad un ragazzaccio spensierato dalla pelle arsa dal sole, poi ad un giovane confuso pronto ad abbandonare il seminario e quel mondo spirituale che non gli apparteneva – si tramuti in un corpo oltraggiato e umiliato. Solo dopo la conclusione dell'esperienza del lager verrà rigenerato dall'amore e dalla natura. Dato che l'esaltazione del corpo non è mai un fatto episodico negli scritti di Pahor, conviene approfondire questo aspetto della sua scrittura.

LA TESTIMONIANZA DI UN CORPO ESAUSTO E OLTRAGGIATO

La tematica del corpo è presente già dall'inizio negli scritti autobiografici di Pahor, ovvero nella sua prima raccolta autonoma di racconti brevi *Moj tržaški naslov (Il mio indirizzo triestino)* del 1948 scritti subito dopo la liberazione e il suo

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- 1 Nel suo *Knjiga o Radi (Libro su Rada)* lo scrittore afferma che, durante le sue comparse in pubblico, gli capitava spesso di affrontare il tema del corpo (Pahor, 2012, 100). Dopo l'incontro alla Facoltà per lo Sport dell'Università di Lubiana, il 6 giugno 2009, scrive nel suo diario: «*Ho l'impressione di essere riuscito a formulare la tesi sul rispetto del corpo dopo la catastrofe del ventesimo secolo, che ha portato all'annientamento milioni di corpi, grazie alla sollevazione contro il fascismo, che è stata iniziata proprio dai giovani anche attraverso l'affermazione del significato sociale della diffusione dello sport per consolidare la nostra identità. Il signor Marij Šušteršič è venuto a prendermi con Aleksander Rudolf, mentre dopo la presentazione mi ha portato in ospedale a far visita a Rada e in seguito a casa. Ho potuto riscontrare una certa intesa tra la buona accoglienza riservatami dai giovani e la loro benevolenza nei confronti del mio impegno più intimo*» (Pahor, 2012, 104–105).
 - 2 Lo scrittore crede di essere stato convinto della giustezza della sua decisione dal rapporto intimo con la natura (cfr. Pahor, 2003, 39–40).

rientro a Trieste dal sanatorio francese. Nel primo racconto dal titolo *Naslov na žaganici (L'indirizzo sulla tavola)*³, la descrizione della morte del prigioniero Tomaž si accompagna alle immagini dei corpi scheletrici, dei crani senza capelli, dei corpi debilitati e seviziati di coloro che si affollavano davanti alle entrate delle baracche difendendosi con le loro braccia ossute dai colpi di frusta:

L'ampio spazio dell'Appellplatz a Dachau è un campo zigano distrutto dai bombardamenti. La bandierina esposta in fondo alla vallata è scomparsa, noi ci spogliamo sulla grande piazza, restiamo in piedi nudi, a terra, sui pagliericci, giacciamo i morti. Sempre a terra si trovano altri pagliericci coperti dagli escrementi e dalle urine di corpi portati via ed inoltre: cucchiari di legno, zoccoli e, sulla piazza grande, mucchi di stracci a righe dove le persone attendono nude in piedi sugli stessi stracci, sui petti i segni delle costole che sporgono sotto la pelle squamosa (Pahor, 1948, 25).



Fig. 1: Boris Pahor per il suo novantatreesimo compleanno (Foto N. M., 26 agosto 2006).

Il lager nazista descritto da Pahor è un luogo abitato dai morti, alcuni in posizione verticale altri in posizione orizzontale. Un luogo dove il corpo umano si trasforma in una lunga conduttura, dove

un medico con gli occhiali e i guanti di gomma incide i corpi, mentre l'acqua scorre sul tavolo di pietra lavando via le interiora. Poi con un ago cuce la pelle grinzosa dall'inguine al sottomento. Sui corpi un cordone bianco dalla gola all'inguine. Giacciono tutti supini, ossuti, dalle labbra socchiuse spuntano i denti. Solo uno è gonfio e completamente bianco (Pahor, 1948, 25–26).

Coloro che abbandonano questo luogo da morti, si ritrovano in un carro bestia-puzzolente, dove l'ultimo rimasto ancora in vita e che riesce a muoversi rischia di calpestarli con i piedi «*in testa, sul collo*» (Pahor, 1948, 26).

3 Questo racconto breve è stato pure pubblicato nella raccolta *Dihanje morja* (Pahor, 2001, 47).



Fig. 2: Boris Pahor fu durante la Seconda guerra mondiale rinchiuso in diversi lager nazisti, a Natzweiler-Struthof, Markirch, Dachau, Mittelbau-Dora, Harzungen e Bergen-Belsen. Nella foto due sopravvissuti che giacciono tra i cadaveri sul pavimento coperto di paglia delle baracche chiamate «Boelke Kaserne» a Nordhausen, uno dei numerosi sottocampi di Mittelbau-Dora (Autore della foto Harold M. Roberts, 11 aprile 1945. United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, courtesy of National Archives and Records Administration, College Park. Public Domain, <https://collections.ushmm.org/search/catalog/pa12850>).

Nel secondo racconto breve dal titolo *Sto šestdeset trupel (Centosessanta cadaveri)* l'autore racconta di «ossa negli indumenti a righe», delle teste rasate «sulle quali aderiva una pelle grinzosa», dei corpi consumati dai quali è evaporata la vita, abbandonati in terra invece che introdotti nei forni:

Non sentiamo più la fame, accanto a me uno geme, non lui, geme il suo corpo. A qualcuno esce un gorgoglio dai polmoni: quando sputerà nella coperta grigia, questa si colorerà di rosso, mentre lui stringerà nei pugni quel brandello. Ancora, quando lo porteranno via dal vagone avvolto nella coperta, le sue dita ossute stringeranno quella pezza. Sì, perché adesso li portiamo via nelle coperte. Questi sono i nostri funerali. Riesco io a pensare

a quei centosessanta sottoterra e al vagone accanto alla locomotiva che si sta riempiendo di nuovo? No, tutto è evidente, in noi irrevocabile, tutto senza tempo. Il tempo se n'è andato con il pane, con il cibo caldo. Sì, il tempo è imputridito, così come la lunga ferita di quell'uomo accanto alla porta sotto la coperta. Si è liquefatto nel fango sanguinolento degli uomini. Sotto di me, sotto il carro ferroviario stanno accovacciati. Appoggiati alle ruote perché il loro corpo non riesce più a piegarsi per consentire loro di raggiungere i pantaloni scivolati dalle gambe nodose. Un uomo a fianco della ruota sotto il treno. Ruota di metallo! Perché l'uomo non è d'acciaio come la ruota? Perché è così misero che la sua carne si decompone e le sue ghiandole marciscono e si rapprendono? (Pahor, 1948, 32–33).

Nel centro della testimonianza di Pahor sui lager non si situa solo il trauma psicologico, rimane innanzitutto il trauma del corpo, l'esperienza dell'annientamento della dignità umana. Che nei campi nazisti l'offesa della persona e della sua dignità fosse soprattutto di carattere corporale lo testimoniano molti sopravvissuti.⁴ A differenza di altri eminenti testimoni, che come lui sono riusciti a sopportare le condizioni estreme dei campi di concentramento, Pahor non allontana lo sguardo dai corpi stremati e dai cadaveri. Al contrario, li ricorda con insistenza ed anche in circostanze orribili, appena accettabili per chi legge. Poiché nei campi nazisti di concentramento e sterminio, ovvero nei luoghi in cui venivano sperimentati violazioni estreme sui corpi e la loro distruzione, il corpo del singolo deportato o della deportata non si imbatteva solamente nell'umiliazione e nel supplizio di sé, esso doveva pure misurarsi con l'annientamento di altri corpi, con la puzza dei cadaveri bruciati e in decomposizione, con le cloache e l'assoluta sporcizia. Nel suo saggio *Exterminations. Le corps et les camps* (Stermini. I corpi e i campi) Annette Becker osserva:

Nel campo tutto appartiene al collettivo, è impossibile restare soli, non per dormire, non per lavorare e nemmeno per i bisogni del corpo; sempre assieme, sempre in vista di altri, nella promiscuità tra gli attacchi di vergogna, tra il fetore e le urla, sotto gli spari (Becker, 2006, 340).

In *Nekropola* (1967) (*Necropoli*) lo scrittore triestino si inoltra senza indugio nel mondo dei sepolti e dannati, tra i morti e i bruciati. Dalla soglia del campo di concentramento abbandonato ci conduce tra gli scheletri in mezzo all'intreccio dei corpi straziati. Otto anni più tardi, nel romanzo *Zatemnitev* (1975) (*Oscuramento*), riesce a narrare con maggiore precisione le sue prime esperienze corporali vissute da deportato, quando rievoca i momenti in cui i deportati sistemati nelle casse di ferro dovevano affrontare il freddo pungente della Baviera, e come al loro arrivo nel lager i passi dei loro corpi risuonavano

4 Sui deportati come persone senza diritti cfr. Agamben, 2005, 172.

nel vuoto sul tavolato di legno, e soprattutto come venivano denudati. Sul «rituale d'ingresso», con il quale le autorità del campo sottraevano al malcapitato tutti gli averi, nonché il nome e il cognome⁵, Pahor scrive già nel *Onkraj pekla so ljudje* (1958) (*Oltre l'inferno stanno gli uomini*) così come nei lavori che seguirono, nei quali ricorda la sua vita nei campi adoperandosi affinché

il lettore possa rivivere ciò che gli viene trasmesso dalla pagina stampata. Ad esempio, posso descrivere quell'olandese, alto un metro e settanta, che pesa trenta chili e cammina, cammina ancora, così completamente disidratato attraversando la baracca per fare i bisogni – ma nonostante questo rimango da qualche parte distaccato dalla realtà, visto che non riesco a restituire tutta l'angoscia contenuta in quel luogo. Oppure ad esempio quel rito quando devi scrivere sulla coscia del detenuto il numero identificativo e trovi una pelle ruvida come la corteccia di un albero, per cui la bagni e la ribagni per poter ottemperare alle formalità, cosicché a questo corpo annientato potrà essere dato un nome e un cognome prima di finire nel forno crematorio. Chi descrive tutto questo è costantemente dominato da un senso di impotenza, dato che non riuscirà mai a riprodurre l'odore delle ossa bruciate, del sebo, la prigionia che è il soffio del nulla, essendo essa stessa un nulla (Pahor, 1998, 98).

Dunque, l'attenzione posta da Pahor al corpo ricorda quella che viene riservata al medesimo anche da Primo Levi e Imre Kertész, dai quali Pahor si differenzia perché riesce a palesare la sensazione che nasce dalla forzata nudità del corpo da lui provata nel momento in cui come detenuto si era trovato nudo e il suo corpo era diventato «*un nucleo indifeso senza guscio*» (Pahor, 1978, 83).

Il rito attraverso il quale venivano denudati i detenuti viene descritto dal nostro autore nei minimi particolari. Egli si adopera affinché, chi legge, possa rivivere per lo meno in parte quello shock che egli stesso aveva provato e comprendere il senso di impotenza che lo aveva assalito quando «*il rasoio veleggiava attorno al suo inguine*» (Pahor, 1978, 80), oppure quando osservava come i barbieri infierivano sui corpi delle persone anziane. Questo rito viene da Levi descritto sinteticamente con la frase «*in un momento ci troviamo rasi e tosati*» (Levi, 1958, 32). Kertész si sofferma soprattutto sulle conseguenze morali (Kertész, 2014), mentre Rousset vi farà riferimento con due sole parole *corp nus* (Rousset, 2008, 31) (*corpi nudi*), mentre Pahor seziona questo tema con grande precisione, maggiore di quella che si concede Semprun. La rappresentazione della procedura di denudamento applicata nei campi è riproposta nella sua opera in modo così drammaticamente concreta da suscitare terrore e ribrezzo. Difatti Pahor nel descrivere le scene dell'umiliazione e debilitazione

5 Quanto sia stato importante il momento della prima accoglienza nei campi e come in questo momento veniva interrotta l'esistenza dei malcapitati come cittadini liberi cfr. Jezernik, 1993, 44.



Fig. 3: Al momento della liberazione del campo di concentramento di Bergen-Belsen, aprile 1945. I corpi dei morti giacciono in una fossa comune nel campo in attesa di sepoltura (Autore della foto No 5 Army Film & Photographic Unit, Morris (Sgt). Imperial War Museum, War Office Second World War Official Collection, IWM BU 3777. Wikimedia Commons).

fisica nel campo di concentramento non concede nulla all'immaginazione⁶. È spietato quando narra di come venivano trasportati i corpi scheletrici e zuppi d'acqua, caricati e trascinati i cadaveri, appoggiati su portantine di fil di ferro, mentre cadevano e venivano alzati, poi come ci si sedeva sui cadaveri ed infine la promiscuità tra i morti e i vivi a metà.

È altrettanto sgradevole quando si sofferma sulle condizioni che regnavano nell'infermeria del campo «*come i suoi malati presenti nella cameretta di Hartzungen, quasi tutti cadaveri ossificati con la bocca nera di carbone, spiravano coprendosi con la mano il membro mummificato*» (Pahor, 1958, 21).

Nella sua approfondita analisi di *Necropoli* Ivanka Hergold evidenzia come in questo lavoro il corpo, fotografato dall'autore senza alcun sentimentalismo, venga considerato come un qualcosa di «*grande e sacro*», e come nella sua prosa si confondano i confini tra cadavere e corpo:

Qui il confine tra corpo e cadavere viene percepito appena. Per indicare un cadavere lo scrittore usa anche la parola 'corpo', dato che questo confine verso il nulla viene oltrepassato frequentemente⁷. Ma anche il corpo-cadavere svanisce in tutta la sua modesta moltitudine attraverso il fumo ed altre forme di trapasso che appaiono così tipiche per questo romanzo. Sui terrazzi abbandonati, dove difatti non c'è più nulla, restano i vuoti. Il corpo viene cancellato anche come cadavere, per questo motivo l'invasione del nulla diventa quasi percepibile (Hergold, 1997, 222–223).

Dato che ricopriva il ruolo di infermiere egli si trovava nel campo in contatto giornaliero con i corpi malati, esausti e agonizzanti, nei quali alitava l'ultimo soffio di vita (Pahor, 1958, 41). Poteva vedere da vicino gli effetti dell'inedia, dello sfinimento e delle malattie infettive. Viveva in stretto contatto con la morte, per cui si sentiva protetto dalla stessa. Credeva di esserle troppo vicino per poter esserne aggredito. Se confrontiamo con altri autori i modi in cui egli ha vissuto entrambe le situazioni – sia l'esperienza dei campi di sterminio, che attraverso il suo corpo per iscriversi nel suo animo, e sia l'essenza fisica degli orrori di quei luoghi – l'autore più vicino a Pahor potrebbe essere Shlomo Venezia, che in qualità di membro del *Sonderkommando* ad Auschwitz testimonia di quando i cadaveri transitavano dalle camere a gas ai forni crematori (Venezia, 2007).

Il campo di concentramento è per Pahor il regno del «*nulla privo di pensieri*», dove persiste solo il corpo del deportato. Un corpo che lotta contro la fame e si oppone con tutte le sue cellule vitali alle umiliazioni. Un corpo che

6 In uno dei suoi appunti registra che leggendo le poesie di Edith Bruck gli vennero in mente i passi scritti nel 1950 da Jean Cayrol nel suo *Lazar parmi nous (Lazzaro tra di noi)* e racconta: «*abbiamo bisogno di scrittori che non si vergognino di camminare tra i cadaveri e la sporcizia, che non temano di sporcarsi le mani*» (Pahor 1991, 21).

7 Sui «musulmani» che, come cadaveri ambulanti hanno cancellato il limite tra l'uomo e l'essere inumano, tra la vita e la morte (cfr. Agamben, 1998, 37–80).

è stremato fino all'inverosimile, votato alla morte e che anche dopo la morte rimane immeritevole di rispetto. Nella moltitudine affamata che riempiva le baracche del campo di Dora-Mittelbau, il pensiero defluiva assieme al fluido che colava dai corpi:

Quando la pelle è pergamena, le cosce sottili come le caviglie, il pensiero diventa un lieve sussulto che a volte nasce dall'ossessione permanente delle cellule affamate [...] (Pahor, 1978, 306).

Quindi il lager è il luogo dove il corpo umano diventa quello di un animale, il luogo dove lo *Stück*⁸ (il pezzo) diventa un pacco nascosto tra gli operai schiavi. In ambedue i lavori autobiografici di Primo Levi, *Se questo è un uomo* (1958) e *La tregua* (1963), nei quali l'autore sintetizza la sua esperienza di Auschwitz – Buna, descrivendo pure il ritorno a casa, egli si sofferma, solo in modo episodico, sulle trasformazioni subite nel corso della detenzione dal suo corpo e da quello degli altri. Come egli stesso ammette era venuto a conoscenza del mondo dei «vivi a metà» solo quando si era trovato tra gli ammalati a causa della scarlattina.⁹

Il suo racconto si sofferma sull'aspetto impeccabile dell'ingegnere-notabile e all'immagine del corpo vigoroso e compatto del giovane Elias, che era stato impiegato nel gruppo dei chimici. Apparizioni di gambe traballanti, scheletri vaganti, gomitolini di membra e cadaveri ossuti, che giacciono accatastati a causa del terreno troppo ghiacciato per consentire la loro sepoltura, si susseguono nelle ultime pagine della sua opera autobiografica, quando descrive la vita nei campi dopo la fuga degli aguzzini nazisti. Anche in *La tregua* – appena lo scrittore e chimico torinese rievoca la sua ultima fase di vita nei lager, come stavano sdraiati i suoi compagni di sventura nel lazzaretto di Buna-Monowitz e la loro agonia per malattia e fame – egli volge la propria attenzione dai moribondi e sofferenti ai sopravvissuti (Levi, 1963).

Questo orientamento in senso testimoniale di Levi, che nasce anche dalla profonda convinzione che il corpo nei lager era un corpo violato e schiavizzato (cfr. Marino, 2012), non è rimasto senza traccia nel racconto *I sommersi e i salvati* (1986), ovvero in quel saggio da tutti considerato come una delle analisi più rilevanti e approfondite sul sistema di sterminio nazista e sulle sue vittime (Verginella, 2003). Egli scrive inequivocabilmente che ad Auschwitz il suo corpo non era più suo (Levi, 1986, 96). Nei singoli capitoli dove riflette, problematizzandola, sulla sua esperienza estrema e sugli oltraggi subiti, elabora il concetto di area grigia con avvalendosi della quale descrive

8 Nel campo di concentramento il corpo del deportato viene contrassegnato, classificato, archiviato. Al suo arrivo il deportato è un volto, un corpo, non un individuo (cfr. Becker, 2006, 345; Levi, 1958, 22).

9 Qualcosa di simile accadde a Kertész. Quando si ammalò l'alter ego di Kertész e il suo corpo si riempie di ferite, in lui si manifesta dapprima un senso di sconforto, in seguito il rifiuto assieme al ritiro dello sguardo dal proprio corpo (Kertész, 2014, 140).

la gerarchia che si era creata tra i detenuti privilegiati e quelli non privilegiati. Allo stesso modo rimuove la coltre di fumo che copre il complesso rapporto tra carnefici e vittime e la logica perversa di sopravvivenza nel luogo della morte, in cui la pratica della violenza dissennata aveva devastato anche la parlata dei prigionieri.

Egli si immerge senza tentennamenti nei caratteri morali della sofferenza nei lager e nei sensi di colpa e vergogna provati dai deportati appena diventavano preda degli aguzzini nazisti e dei loro sodali (Levi, 1986, 83). Levi considera la nudità imposta sia ai singoli che ai gruppi come una cosa facente parte della violenza esercitata nei campi e come elemento costitutivo delle pratiche di umiliazione e deprivazione del senso di integrità delle popolazioni rinchiusi (Levi, 1986, 90). Ammette di averla vissuta come un trauma, come un segnale di una malignità deliberata e gratuita (Levi, 1986, 90).

Ne *I sommersi e salvati* la parte del racconto dove Levi narra dei calci e delle percosse, delle teste rasate e dei corpi stremati, assume il ruolo di introduzione all'esame profondo della lacerazione morale provata dai deportati dopo il «rituale d'ingresso» (Levi, 1986, 25). Lo scrittore torinese, confermando che erano le riserve fisiologiche di ciascun deportato a decidere della sua sopravvivenza (Levi, 1986, 26), usa l'analisi dei corpi maltrattati e umiliati per puntare alle conseguenze psicologiche sugli abitanti dei campi. Trattenendosi sul tema del corpo, egli si sofferma lungamente sul segno indelebile lasciategli dai numeri identificativi tatuati sul braccio che si era portato dietro da Auschwitz in quanto sopravvissuto:

L'operazione era poco dolorosa e non durava più di un minuto, ma era traumatica. Il suo significato simbolico era chiaro a tutti: questo è un segno indelebile, di qui non uscite più, questo è il marchio che si imprime agli schiavi e al bestiame destinato al macello, e tali voi siete diventati. Non avete più nome: questo è il vostro nuovo nome. La violenza del tatuaggio era gratuita, fine a sé stessa, pura offesa: non bastavano i tre numeri di tela cuciti ai pantaloni, alla giacca e al mantello invernale? No, non bastavano: occorreva un di più, un messaggio non verbale, affinché l'innocente sentisse scritta sulla carne la sua condanna. Era anche un ritorno barbarico, tanto più conturbante per gli ebrei ortodossi: infatti, proprio a distinguere gli ebrei dai 'barbari', il tatuaggio è vietato dalla legge mosaica (Levitico 19.28).

A distanza di quarant'anni, il mio tatuaggio è diventato parte del mio corpo. Non me ne glorio né me ne vergogno, non lo esibisco e non lo nascondo. Lo mostro malvolentieri a chi me ne fa richiesta per pura curiosità; prontamente e con ira a chi si dichiara incredulo. Spesso i giovani mi chiedono perché non me lo faccio cancellare, e questo mi stupisce: perché dovrei? Non siamo molti nel mondo che portiamo questa testimonianza (Levi, 1986, 95–96).

Se proviamo ora a tornare all'esame della letteratura testimoniale di Pahor, possiamo constatare che il contrappunto al suo racconto di corpi denudati e oltraggiati, già in disidratazione se non in decomposizione, diventa il narrare della loro rianimazione



Fig. 4: Giovani e anziani sopravvissuti a Dachau al momento dell'arrivo delle truppe statunitensi, 29 aprile 1945. (Autore della foto sconosciuto. United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, Photograph No. 45075. Wikimedia Commons).

e del risveglio dopo il ritorno dal paese dei morti, non appena riesce a percepire i corpi di coloro che erano scappati alla morte avvolti nelle lenzuola pulite e fragranti. Nella città di Lilla il reduce Igor Suban comprende che il suo corpo è in salvo,

poiché il tessuto immacolato gli offre un'accoglienza intima, delicata e invitante. E nei suoi sensi si manifesta l'impressione di un'accoglienza dapprima tiepida, che diventa poi sempre più calda tanto da assomigliare alla vicinanza di un corpo inesperto di una ragazza dal quale si sprigionano scintille di calore assieme a gesti di tenerezza amorosa [...]. Devi giacere tranquillo, mi sono detto, tranquillissimo, per consentire che la forza balsamica rilasciata da questo gradevole tessuto si possa trasferire nelle cellule del tuo corpo coricato (Pahor, 2001, 61–62, 74).

Dopo la partenza dai campi di concentramento di Hartzungen e Bergen Belsen, quando il suo alter ego si infila sotto la doccia bollente e si ritrova tra gli altri corpi allampanati dei deportati mentre ascolta nella stanza accanto i

prigionieri di guerra scherzare con modi da caserma e far mostra della propria mascolinità avverte in modo drammatico la differenza tra i corpi sani e i corpi malati. In presenza di queste voci maschili traboccanti di un'assonanza quasi animale, si sente deprivato del proprio orgoglio, come un maschio che ha perso la mascolinità (Pahor, 1958, 19–20). Si sente umiliato anche quando si deve presentare nudo di fronte ad una donna medico: *«ha l'impressione di un'umiliazione inattesa e che tutta la sua esperienza vissuta nei campi si sintetizzi in questo povero corpo, e ciò addirittura di fronte ad una creatura femminile»* (Pahor, 1958, 21).

Radko Suban, l'alter ego dello scrittore convalescente nel sanatorio francese, sente che deve innanzitutto sistemare il suo rapporto con la natura. Gli spetta innanzitutto rinnovare i suoi succhi vitali, assaporare le forze benefiche della natura. Solo allora sarà in grado di accogliere la donna che gli farà dono di un amore inatteso, aiutandolo a far sì che il suo corpo vilipeso e mortificato ridiventi sensibile al benessere. L'amore di una donna è ciò che stimola nel rimpatriato uno sviluppo nuovo e la volontà di vivere. Nella sua *Zibelka sveta* (*La culla del mondo*), analogamente allo scrittore Igor Sevken, ricordando i tempi del dopoguerra scrive:

Al ritorno dal mondo della distruzione sentivo ciò che provo ora. Accanto a Magda di cui ti ho parlato. È difficile da spiegare visto che ha a che fare proprio con la consapevolezza di essermi salvato, nonostante che un'infinita teoria di corpi si sia trasformata dapprima in pelle e ossa, ed in seguito in cenere. Allora ho avuto la sensazione che ogni mio abbraccio amoroso possa vendicare ogni corpo andato perduto (Pahor, 1999, 91).

INNO AL CORPO

Se ci riferiamo solamente a quanto scritto da Pahor sui campi di concentramento, potremmo affermare che l'attenzione da lui posta al corpo deriva dalla sua esperienza di addetto all'infermeria, che gli aveva consentito di sopravvivere ai lager in stretto contatto con i corpi e i cadaveri (Cresto-Dina, 2012). Se poniamo la sua opera intera sotto la lente di ingrandimento, possiamo osservare quanto nella sua prosa il valore testimoniale del corpo sia intimamente legato alla sua visione del mondo e alla sua esperienza di vita in genere. Quando nell'opera *Knjiga o Radi* descrive le visite nel sanatorio, dove cambia a sua moglie le bende sulle caviglie e sulle ambe gonfie e umide, dichiara che non lo fa in quanto infermiere *«visto che mi considerava un pessimo infermiere, ma con un rispetto speciale, quasi reverente»* (Pahor, 2012, 220–221). Il corpo di lei, anche se aggredito da una grave malattia, rimane ai suoi occhi di forme aggraziate e il viso privo di rughe, degno di un bacio. Si tratta di atteggiamenti e attenzioni che hanno molto a che fare con la scelta operata da Pahor negli anni giovanili, quando abbandona i dogmi e la morale cristiana con la decisione intima e irrevocabile a favore dell'amore e del corpo.

Come seminarista fallito cerca riparo nella natura. Si riconosce nel pensiero di Epicuro, Lucrezio, Democrito e Spinoza (Pahor, 2012, 346). Volendo essere ancora più precisi, in tanti segmenti della sua prosa autobiografica riconosciamo la decima Proposizione del terzo *Libro dell’Etica* nel quale il pensiero di Baruch Spinoza affronta il tema «*delle origini e della natura degli affetti*»:

PROPOS. X. – Un’idea che escluda l’esistenza del nostro corpo non può esistere nella mente nostra, anzi le è contraria. 3 DIMOSTR. – Qualunque cosa possa distruggere il corpo nostro non vi può esistere (prop. 5 di q. p.), e pertanto non può neppure esistere l’idea in Dio, in quanto Dio ha l’idea del nostro corpo (cor. prop. 9 p. II) 1; cioè (prop. 11 2 o 13 p. II), non può darsene l’idea nella mente nostra; ma al contrario, poiché (per le med. prop.) la prima cosa che costituisce l’essenza della niente nostra è l’idea del corpo attualmente esistente, il primo e principal conato della nostra mente (prop. 7 di q. p.) è affermare l’esistenza del nostro corpo: o pertanto l’idea che nega l’esistenza del corpo nostro è contraria alla nostra mente. C.D.D. [Come Doveva si Dimostrare] (Spinoza, 1960, 71–72).

Dato che secondo Spinoza l’uomo è parte integrante della natura ne deriva che anche la bramosia faccia parte della natura umana, per questo motivo anche lo spirito si deve rappresentare «*ciò che aumenta o rafforza la possibilità del corpo di agire*» (Spinoza, 1960, 201).

Il rapporto vitalistico di Pahor con il corpo è intriso di consuetudini e valori assorbiti nell’ambiente borghese triestino, anche nei contatti con i giovani sloveni della città che erano stati formati nello spirito dell’associazione sportiva slovena *Sokol*¹⁰, contatti mantenuti anche fino alla sua ragguardevole età¹¹. La consuetudine dello scrittore nel praticare l’esercizio fisico, che gli consentiva di possedere un buon controllo del corpo, gli permise di affrontare meglio le varie patologie ed inoltre accrebbe le sue capacità di osservazione degli stati corporali più estremi. A questo proposito non si può trascurare il fatto che dopo l’esame di maturità avrebbe voluto iscriversi alla facoltà di medicina (Pahor, 2012, 428), cosa che gli era stata impedita in parte dalle condizioni economiche della famiglia ed in parte dalle turbolenze portate dalla guerra. Possiamo chiederci se il suo interesse per la medicina fosse collegato con le sensazioni e le esperienze vissute negli anni della prima guerra mondiale, quando sentì sulla propria pelle le conseguenze dell’epidemia di spagnola che lo colpì assieme ad altri membri della sua famiglia.

10 Sul tema del rapporto tra sessualità e nazionalismo nel Diciannovesimo e Ventesimo secolo cfr. Mosse, 1996. Sulla cultura della formazione e autocontrollo del proprio corpo cfr. Vigarello, 2006, 199.

11 «*Dopo pranzo sulla Strada Napoleonica mi sono inchinato al mistero divino del creato dal quale dipende la mia energia vitale*» (Pahor, 2012, 390). Sui temi dell’allenamento fisico e della disciplina del corpo cfr. Foucault, 1978, 91–117.

Qui ci muoviamo tra indizi e probabilità, ma anche tra certezze non trascurabili. Lo scrittore triestino racconta anche degli anni della prima guerra mondiale quando nel suo ambiente familiare poté percepire tutto il dramma dei corpi febbricitanti dei famigliari malati che facevano loro agognare il ristoro di una qualche bevanda.

Supplicavamo per avere dell'acqua per sprofondare poi nell'incoscienza. In risposta sentivamo il fragore degli scoppi lontani che rimbombava dagli angoli dello spazio isolato. A quel punto mia madre si alzava come una sonnambula per lenire la sete a Mimica che si stava spegnendo. In realtà crollava sui parchetti rimanendo distesa davanti all'armadietto del letto. Io mi ero accorto che il corpo di mia madre non si trovava più accanto a me, mi ero svegliato a metà dal delirio febbrile provando a cercarla come un cieco con le mani tese nell'oscurità finché non sfioravo i suoi capelli. Allora mi trascinavo fino a lei per cercare di sollevarla. Ma ero troppo piccolo, rimasi accovacciato accanto a lei e alla sua camicia da notte umida e fresca (Pahor, 2001, 85–86).

Sua madre, la sorella Evelina e lui stesso erano sopravvissuti all'influenza letale, mentre la sorellina di quattro anni Mimica perse la vita¹². Nel breve racconto *Odločujoči neznanki (Alla sconosciuta risoluta)*, nel quale narra della sua infanzia, si sofferma in primo luogo sulle esperienze vissute durante la prima guerra mondiale e sulle prime paure che lo assalirono¹³, quando i suoi cari si ammalarono di influenza spagnola: «Cosi il respiro della morte si insinuò nelle mie cellule con un brontolio caldo che strisciava lungo le pareti come il rimbombo di un terremoto che non si placa mai» (Pahor, 2003, 86).

Ci chiediamo se dobbiamo forse cercare in questa esperienza precoce di una malattia devastante e della scomparsa della sorella Mimica la fonte della sua determinazione, che gli ha consentito, in mezzo a innumerevoli supplizi, di imporre a sé stesso

la volontà di astrarsi dallo spazio, di calmarsi, come se fosse lui l'infermiere di sé stesso, cercando di allontanare le immagini ostili così come fa un'infermiera che con mano gentile sorregge il malato...che ritorni quella spossatezza così generosa...che venga come l'etere per il paziente che sta per affrontare un intervento chirurgico (Pahor, 1987, 252). Forse.

12 Le sue parole di conforto a sua madre «perché Mimica, che giace sull'altro lato del letto matrimoniale, non respira più.» (Pahor, 2003, 16).

13 Egli stesso crede che buona parte delle paure che lo avevano invaso potevano essere connesse all'incendio del *Narodni dom*, quando gli parve che «la città e la gente si allontanavano da me e sentivo che il mio corpo era sempre più solo in quello spazio senza tempo. [...] Con la scoperta del corpo nazionale, della comunità nazionale e della sua tradizione ho compreso da dove mi viene quel turbamento in cui si uniscono sia la paura che lo scherno, ambedue profondamente radicati nei nuclei delle mie cellule». (Pahor, 2003, 88, 91).

Nel suo rapporto con il corpo si percepisce quella parte di «triestinità» che è del tutto estranea agli alter ego narrativi in stile mitteleuropeo di Svevo. Per questo motivo egli è così vicino al sentire mediterraneo di Albert Camus, che Pahor considera così affine, quando in uno dei suoi libri legge: «*esiste solo un amore a questo mondo. L'abbraccio di un corpo femminile significa mantenere accanto a sé quell'insolita gioia che vediamo calarsi dalla volta celeste sul mare.*» (Pahor, 2012, 478–479).

Si tratta di una gioia che è per lo più evitata dalle sue interlocutrici slovene non avvezze all'abbraccio amicale. Una gioia espressa dal corpo che rimpiange così intensamente per gli anni passati nel rapporto con i genitori (Pahor, 2003, 65). Nella prosa autobiografica dell'autore i ricordi di un tempo – quando, ragazzo scapestrato, frequentava il bagno comunale *Pedocin* o prendeva il sole sulla riviera di Barcola – si intrecciano con la descrizione del monolocale al pian terreno in cui la famiglia di cinque membri aveva separato con un filo di ferro «*la zona notte dal fornello e dal lavandino*». Questa esperienza di vita in promiscuità era situata ai margini dei valori e della rispettabilità borghesi, che la famiglia Pahor, a causa delle proprie ristrettezze economiche, non era in grado né di rispettare e tanto meno di affermare (Pahor, 2003, 65)¹⁴. Se consideriamo l'ambiente sia familiare che sociale nel quale è cresciuto Pahor, troviamo una risposta a chi si chiede da dove nascano in lui quei tratti specifici di una testimonianza che si distingue dalla migliore letteratura sui campi di concentramento lasciataci in eredità da altri autori cresciuti in un ambiente borghese quali Levi, Semprun e Kertézs. Non a caso, quando Primo Levi riflette e ricorda la sua esperienza nei campi, afferma di esser stato troppo vulnerabile perché troppo «*incivilito*» (Levi, 1958, 91).

Durante la sua infanzia e adolescenza Pahor non ha mai provato su di sé una qualche forma paradigmatica di repressione o inibizione borghese, per quanto avesse optato, in relazione al proprio corpo, per valori e pratiche propri della borghesia¹⁵. Non ha rinunciato al piacere, non ha screditato la sensualità, al contrario si è adoperato per rinvigorire il proprio corpo prendendosi cura della sua salute. Nei suoi scritti non ricorre a metafore o allusioni che potrebbero far pensare ad un qualche rancore nei confronti del proprio corpo. Quando si tratta del corpo si permette di non essere troppo premuroso nei confronti dei suoi lettori, anche se è sempre rispettoso nei loro confronti. Non è quindi strano che in *Knjiga o Radi (Libro su Rada)*, quando cerca di esprimere il rapporto con il proprio corpo si riferisca alla descrizione di Camus dell'estate algerina.

14 In una simile condizione della scala sociale era precipitata pure la famiglia di Henrik Tuma, uno dei pochi autori sloveni che si era occupato del corpo nei suoi scritti autobiografici (Tuma, 1994).

15 Foucault collega la valorizzazione del corpo con il processo di urbanizzazione. Egli sostiene che l'incremento del valore del corpo non dipenda dalle dinamiche di mercato, e quindi dal valore aggiunto acquisito della forza lavoro, bensì per ciò che la «cultura» del corpo rappresenta sotto il profilo politico, economico e anche storico per il presente e il futuro della società borghese (Foucault, 1978, 128–130).

Si tratta soprattutto della paura che mi attrasse dato che in sostanza Camus non concorda con Gide. Da parte di Camus al corpo, che viene esaltato con entusiasmo, viene anche attribuita una storia e addirittura una psicologia quando afferma che il corpo svestito è apparso sulle spiagge del Mediterraneo dopo due millenni come ai tempi della gioventù greca. Questa valorizzazione del corpo da parte dello scrittore appartiene al periodo prima della guerra visto che è stata pubblicata nel 1938 ad Algeri. Si tratta di un messaggio importante quasi un avvertimento ante mortem se consideriamo cosa poi fecero le varie dittature del ventesimo secolo con i corpi umani. Il mio interesse per la valorizzazione dei corpi è invece post mortem, dopo l'annientamento degli stessi, sia in modo rapido attraverso le camere a gas e sia lentamente per mezzo della sadica degradazione riducendo alla fame coloro che erano costretti ai lavori forzati. Da qui la mia insistenza nel descrivere l'intimità. Certamente dobbiamo prendere in considerazione ambedue i corpi, quello di lui e quello di lei, anche se il corpo della donna amata ha precedenza sull'altro, visto che è come un raggio di sole dal cielo, come scrive Camus, ed è anche garanzia dell'esistenza futura del genere umano (Pahor, 2012, 47).

L'attrazione per il corpo spinge Pahor verso la sua venerazione, dato che la sua principale esigenza è la ricerca del sentimento e della seduzione corporale. In *Zibelka sveta* racconta di una relazione amorosa tra il cinquantaseienne Igor Sevk e la molto più giovane Lucie. L'amore unisce l'ex deportato con una donna che nella sua infanzia era stata costretta a subire le violenze sessuali del padre. Il reduce dai campi tedeschi, che era stato salvato dall'amore, cerca di aiutarla amorevolmente perché si liberi dalla devastazione interiore procuratale dal padre aguzzino. La tenerezza amorevole di un uomo più anziano, che in virtù della sua esperienza nei lager sa apprezzare il corpo e la vita, la salva dall'intorpidimento fisico causato dal disastro procuratole dal padre (Pahor, 1999, 70).

Quando Igor Sevk visita il *Louvre*, santuario museale della celebrazione artistica del corpo, si sofferma con il pensiero da una parte sul ventesimo secolo «che aveva costruito il proprio futuro sui morti, posto le fondamenta della nuova civiltà sugli scheletri preparati con strumenti tecnologici e sulle loro ceneri, come sul più efficace dei concimi naturali» (Pahor, 1999, 156), e dall'altra sull'esaltazione artistica del corpo, e ciò non poté impedire che le due guerre mondiali accatastassero

milioni di cumuli di corpi annientati. Lo scalpello dello scultore non ha dato alcun contributo al salvataggio dell'unica cosa preziosa posseduta dall'uomo. Lo sviluppo tecnologico non ha fatto altro che aggiungere nuove possibilità, affinché il corpo del seviziato potesse con il proprio dolore cooperare in modo più efficace all'effeatezza del suo aguzzino, come scrive qualcuno, invece di aiutarlo a resistere meglio alla violenza (Pahor, 1999, 160).

In tutti i conflitti – siano stati questi di carattere religioso, ideologico o politico – sostiene Pahor, è stato punito soprattutto il corpo, anche se nella maggior parte dei casi era innocente (Pahor, 1999, 160). Per questo motivo egli spera nell'avvento di un'epoca «*nella quale prevarrà il sentimento di apprezzamento del corpo umano. Non quei corpi delle riviste illustrate, nemmeno quelli dei concorsi di bellezza o dei campi naturalisti. Una giusta e consapevole valorizzazione. Ancor prima di sentirsi ecologi-salvatori della natura, essere ecologi del corpo, ovvero dell'assoluto fondamentale*» (Pahor, 1999, 157). Quando nel *Libro su Rada* egli ritorna al rapporto amoroso del quale aveva già scritto nella *Zibelka sveta*, pensa di aver descritto in questo suo lavoro l'amore intimo e di aver così «*valorizzato il corpo nell'amore*» (Pahor, 2012, 454). Nell'amore egli vede l'unica possibilità affinché l'uomo si avvii verso un futuro diverso (Pahor, 2012, 419), nel quale il rispetto della dignità umana coincida con il rispetto del corpo. In questa sua convinzione il nostro autore appare in completa sintonia con il premio Nobel Wole Soyinka il quale afferma che il corpo definisce l'ambito dei diritti¹⁶, così come con Umberto Eco che richiama l'attenzione sul problema del rispetto degli altri corpi:

«dobbiamo anzitutto rispettare i diritti della corporalità altrui, tra i quali anche il diritto di parlare e pensare. Se i nostri simili avessero rispettato questi diritti del corpo non avremmo avuto la strage degli innocenti, i cristiani nel circo, la notte di San Bartolomeo, il rogo per gli eretici, i campi di sterminio, la censura, i bambini in miniera, gli stupri della Bosnia (Martini & Eco, 1996, 23, citato da Pahor, 1999, 5).

Con questa sua ultima riflessione Boris Pahor si erge di fronte a qualsiasi potere che si arroghi il diritto di vita e di morte, quindi un potere che si presenti in un ruolo omicida. Egli si appassiona alla vita in quanto quintessenza dell'uomo.

16 Il corpo è la casa dell'intelletto e la struttura fondamentale all'interno della quale si articola la nostra individualità e si svolge la nostra esistenza. La materialità del corpo definisce l'ambito dei diritti (Soyinka, 2012).

BORIS PAHOR – PRIČEVALEC UNIČENJA TELESA V NACISTIČNIH TABORIŠČIH

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POVZETEK

V pričevanjskem opusu Borisa Pahorja je taboriščna tematika ena najpomembnejših. Tržaški pisatelj je po povratku iz taborišča prevzel moralno odgovornost preživelega. Za razliko od drugih eminentnih pričevalcev in pričevalk, ki so se iz nacističnih taborišč vrnili živi, se ni odločil za celovit in kronološko linearen opis svoje taboriščne izkušnje. Že v prvih črticah, ki jih je objavil leta 1948, je svojo pripoved pospremil s podobami koščenih teles, golih črepinj bres las, sestradanih in mučenih teles, ki se gnetejo pred vhodi v bloke in se branijo s koščenimi rokami pred udarci bikovk. Motivika telesa, ki je prisotna že v samih začetkih Pahorjevega avtobiografskega pisanja, močno izstopa vseh njegovih poznejših delih, ki obujajo spomin na taboriščne izkušnje. Za razliko od drugih eminentnih pričevalcev, ki so podobno kot on prestali ekstremno izkušnjo koncentracijskega taborišča, ni odvrnil pogleda od izmučenih teles in trupel. V Nekropoli (1967) se je brez oklevanja spustil v svet pogreznjenih in pogubljenih, med umrle in sežgane. O najzgodnejših telesnih izkušnjah, ki jih je imel kot deportiranec, je podrobneje spregovoril v Zatamniti (1975). O vstopnem obredu, s katerim so taboriščne oblasti odvzele vsakemu deportirancu poleg osebnega imetja, tudi ime in priimek, je Pahor sicer pisal že v Onkraj pekla so ljudje (1958), pa tudi v poznejših delih, v katerih je obudil svojo taboriščno izkušnjo. Pozornost, ki jo je Pahor posvetil telesu, je sorodna tisti, ki ju telesu naklanjata Primo Levi in Imre Kertész, razlikuje pa se v razgrinjanju občutja, ki sledi ogolitvi telesa, v razlagi stanja, v katerem se je kot taboriščnik znašel gol, ko je njegovo telo postalo »nezavarovano jedro brez olupka«. Prikaz taboriščne ogolitve je pri njem tako dramatično konkreten, da sproži v bralcu grozo. Pahor je kot pričevalec neprizanesljiv še posebej, ko opisuje prevažanje suhih in poškropljenih teles, prekladanje trupel, promiskviteto med mrtvimi in pol živimi. V načinu podoživljanja bodisi taboriščne izkušnje skozi telo in spremembe, ki jih je ta vpisala v telo, bodisi razgalitve taboriščnih grozot v njihovi fizični esenci, je Pahorju še najbližji Shlomo Venezia, ki kot bivši pripadnik Sonderkomanda v Auschwitzu priča o prekladanju trupel iz plinskih celic v krematorijske peči. Kontrapunkt Pahorjeve naracije o ogolitvi in uničenju telesa je pripoved o telesnem oživljanju in prebujanju po povratku iz dežele smrti. Ženska ljubezen je tista, ki izzove v povratniku novo rast in voljo do življenja. Če bi se sklicevali samo na Pahorjevo taboriščno prozo, bi lahko trdili, da je pozornost, ki jo namenja telesu, povezana z njegovo izkušnjo bolničarja, ki je preživel lager v neposredni bližini bolnih teles in trupel. Toda če pod lupo postavimo celoten njegov opus, potem uvidimo, da je pričujočnost telesa v njegovi prozi močno prepojena z njegovim svetovnim nazorom in njegovim vitalističnim odnosom do sveta, ki korenini v njegovi tržaškosti.

Ključne besede: Boris Pahor, telo, nacistična taborišča, deportacija, Nekropola

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