

ANNALES

Anali za istrske in mediteranske študije
Annali di Studi istriani e mediterranei
Annals for Istrian and Mediterranean Studies
Series Historia et Sociologia, 27, 2017, 4





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Annals for Istrian and Mediterranean Studies**

Series Historia et Sociologia, 27, 2017, 4

ISSN 1408-5348

UDK 009

Letnik 27, leto 2017, številka 4

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Graphic design:**

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Tisk/Stampa/Print:

Grafis trade d.o.o.

Založnik/Editore/Published by:

Zgodovinsko društvo za južno Primorsko - Koper / *Società storica del Litorale - Capodistria*©

**Za založnika/Per Editore/
Publisher represented by:**

Salvator Žitko

**Sedež uredništva/Sede della redazione/
Address of Editorial Board:**

SI-6000 Koper/Capodistria, Garibaldijeva/Via Garibaldi 18
e-mail: annaleszdjp@gmail.com, **internet:** <http://www.zdjp.si/>

Redakcija te številke je bila zaključena 27. 12. 2017.

**Sofinancirajo/Supporto finanziario/
Financially supported by:**

Javna agencija za raziskovalno dejavnost Republike Slovenije (ARRS), Luka Koper, Mestna občina Koper

Annales - Series historia et sociologia izhaja štirikrat letno.

Maloprodajna cena tega zvezka je 11 EUR.

Naklada/Tiratura/Circulation: 300 izvodov/copie/copies

Revija *Annales, Series historia et sociologia* je vključena v naslednje podatkovne baze / *La rivista Annales, Series historia et sociologia è inserita nei seguenti data base / Articles appearing in this journal are abstracted and indexed in:* Thomson Reuters (USA): Arts and Humanities Citation Index (A&HCI) in/and Current Contents / Arts & Humanities; IBZ, Internationale Bibliographie der Zeitschriftenliteratur (GER); Sociological Abstracts (USA); Referativnyi Zhurnal Viniti (RUS); European Reference Index for the Humanities and Social Sciences (ERIH PLUS); Elsevier B. V.: SCOPUS (NL).

Vsi članki so v barvni verziji prosto dostopni na spletni strani: <http://www.zdjp.si>.
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SLOVENIA AND THE UN IN THE CORRESPONDENCE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL JAVIER PEREZ DE CUELLAR, 1991–1992

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ABSTRACT

The article highlights the relations among the Slovene and broader Yugoslav political leaderships with the Cabinet of the Secretary-General of the United Nations (the UN) through a correspondence kept in the fond of Javier Perez de Cuellar. The UN, which became involved in the developments in Yugoslavia relatively late, was promptly being informed and asked to intervene throughout the independence process by the diplomats of the newly independent republics. Contrary to the expectations, however, the UN, under the leadership of de Cuellar, took over a more visible role in the process of disintegration rather late.

Keywords: the United nations, Yugoslav disintegration, the European Community, Javier Perez de Cuellar, Cyrus Vance, Non-Alignment Movement

LA SLOVENIA E L'ONU NELLA CORRISPONDENZA DEL SEGRETARIO GENERALE JAVIER PEREZ DE CUELLAR, 1991–1992

SINTESI

Nell'articolo l'autrice analizza i rapporti tra la leadership politica slovena e in generale quella jugoslava con il gabinetto del segretario generale dell'Organizzazione delle Nazioni Unite (ONU) a quanto risulta dalla corrispondenza conservata presso il fondo di Javier Perez de Cuellar. L'ONU, coinvolta relativamente tardi negli sviluppi della situazione jugoslava, ne era tuttavia puntualmente informata. Per tutto il processo di indipendenza, inoltre, le furono rivolte richieste d'intervento da parte dei diplomatici delle varie neo-nate repubbliche. Sotto la guida del de Cuellar l'ONU però, contrariamente alle aspettative, assunse soltanto in un secondo momento un ruolo più visibile nel processo di dissoluzione della Jugoslavia.

Parole chiave: Organizzazione delle Nazioni Unite, dissoluzione jugoslava, Comunità europea, Javier Perez de Cuellar, Cyrus Vance, movimento dei non allineati

One of the key roles in the historical breakup of Yugoslavia was taken over by then Secretary-General of the United Nations (the UN) Javier Perez de Cuellar, who, by then, was already approaching the completion of his second mandate and was dealing with the issue of his succession.¹ In 1982, he was appointed Secretary-General as a compromise candidate, after the Eastern Bloc with China at the helm, did not support de Cuellar's predecessor Kurt Waldheim for his third term. As a compromise candidate, he steered between the wishes of the Western and Eastern Blocs, as well as the Non-Aligned Movement, which later crucially affected the delay of the recognition process of Slovenia and Croatia's independence.

The archive units reveal that the Cabinet of the Secretary-General intervened in the developments in Yugoslavia fairly late. In 1989, when the streets and squares in Ljubljana were full of protesters, who welcomed the May Declaration, and while the Rallies of Truth took place at various locations in Yugoslavia, the correspondence with the Secretary-General concerning Yugoslavia mainly revolved around the forthcoming session of the Non-Aligned Movement. The meeting was held in September 1989 in Belgrade; however, the Yugoslav situation was not a part of the official agenda. Even in the second half of the 1990, when Slovenes had already elected their first democratic government and were regularly implementing new constitutional amendments and legislation, the correspondence did not revolve around these events. After October 1990, Yugoslavia fades away from the correspondence completely.

Globally, this period was marked by the Persian Gulf crisis, in which the UN was actively involved. During the time of the plebiscite, the crisis focus of the Middle East was already peaking. Therefore, the UN headquarters in New York became the centre of attention for structuring the international coalition against Iraq, which essentially made the situation in Yugoslavia fade into the background. This way, in January 1991, the meetings between the representatives of Yugoslavia and the UN revolved around the Gulf War. Yugoslavia, as one of the leading countries of the Non-Aligned Movement, which included almost two-thirds of UN member states, had an important role in this matter – at least in principle.

CONTACTS OF THE UN WITH STATE ACTORS IN YUGOSLAVIA UNTIL THE DECLARATION OF SLOVENIA'S INDEPENDENCE

Nonetheless, Slovene leadership tried to inform the UN's leadership about the importance of the plebiscite-



Image 1: Javier Perez de Cuellar, UN Secretary-General in 1982 (Photo: Rob Bogaerts, www.gahetna.nl)

tary decision days and months after the plebiscite. The earliest letter addressing this issue was found in the personal archive of the former president Milan Kučan, and not in the UN's archive. It was sent by Kučan, then a representative of the presidency of the Socialist Republic of Slovenia (SRS), on 18 March 1991, to the Secretary-General. In the letter, he stressed that living in Yugoslavia as such, was no longer possible for the Slovene people. He called for the structuring of a new Yugoslav community, or else the only other alternative was to seek a way towards independence.² Thus, the president also added the *Resolution of the Proposal on*

1 The paper was written as part of the research project J6-6832 *Slovene Diplomats and Foreign Policy Aspects of the Independence Process of the Republic of Slovenia, 1980–1992* under the team leadership of Prof. Dr. Jože Pirjevec. Additionally, it was made possible by the Fulbright Visiting Scholar Program, which enabled me to study at the UN Archives and Records Management Section in New York City. For all the help I would like to extend my gratitude to Dr. Dušan Nečak and Dr. Božo Repe, as well as to Dr. Kota Yoshitome for all the talks, the staff at the UN archives, and the Cabinet of the former President, Milan Kučan, for enabling me to use one of the documents.

2 OAMK, The letter by Milan Kučan to Secretary General de Cuellar, March 18, 1991.

3 Resolucija o predlogu za sporazumno razdružitev SFRJ.

4 ARMS, AG-019, S-1024-0097-07, The letter by Davorin Rudolf to the Secretary-General, 9th May 1991.

Agreed Dissolution of SFRY,³ which was adopted by the Slovene Assembly on the 20 February 1991. With it, Slovenia called for separation of the Yugoslav republics into two or more sovereign and independent states, which the republics would perform gradually, consensually and in a reasonable period of time (ULRS 1). The letter did not end with inclinations for the UN to intervene and resolve the situation, but with a request to consider the attached document.

However, a much more urgent letter was sent to the Secretary-General two months later, on 9 May 1991, by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Socialist Republic of Croatia (SRC), Davorin Rudolf. The Minister wrote a three-page letter to the Secretary-General, notifying him on the situation in Yugoslavia, particularly in Croatia. This had happened just before the changing of the position for the President of the Federal Presidency of SFRY, which according to the priority order, was supposed to be occupied by the Croatian representative, Stjepan Mesić. Overshadowed by the presidency exchange, Rudolf reported to the Secretary-General about the increasing violence in Croatia. For the first time in the correspondence, the letter demanded that the UN took the position in which it condemned the use of force, violence and intimidation rather than viewing the outbreak of violence in Yugoslavia as an internal matter. Additionally, it asked the UN to take on the role of mediator between the conflicting parties.⁴

The reply to the above-mentioned letter was not found in the Secretary-General archive. Combats between the Croatian police force and pro-Serbian units continued to escalate, still, not much was done by the UN and other major players, apart from calls to calm the situation. The Gulf War was still at the forefront of the UN's focus, even though the date of Slovenia's implementation of the plebiscitary decision was rapidly approaching. The day after Slovenia and Croatia had declared independence on 25 June 1991, the European Community (EC) became actively involved in the situation in Slovenia – with the support of the United States of America (the USA), the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), and the UN. At the same time, the contacts between Slovene diplomats intensified.

CONTACTS DURING THE SLOVENIAN INDEPENDENCE WAR

Peter Millonig did not have a formal diplomatic title. He was a liaison officer of the Republic of Slovenia in the USA, appointed by the government of the DEMOS coalition and not by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Zupančič, 2016, 326). Yet, the first official letter addressing the war in Slovenia, kept in the Secretary-General's archive, was

his. Millonig sent the letter on the day of the outbreak of war, 27 June 1991, and according to him, he followed the instructions of the then Slovenian Prime Minister, Alojz Peterle. He informed de Cuellar about the movements of armoured vehicles of the Yugoslav People's Army (YPA) to the Slovene border crossings with Austria, Italy and Hungary, as well as towards the capital. Moreover, he notified the Secretary-General that the Slovene government was determined to fight against the invaders until they were driven out. Only then would the government decide on further negotiations.⁵ He concluded the letter with a request for intervention to end the violent conflicts, which was the first such appeal to come from the Slovene representative.⁶

The day after Slovenia's declaration of independence, 26 June the Slovene President of Presidency, Milan Kučan, sent the letter to the Secretary-General. However, the letter was not preserved in the revised correspondence, but instead in the daily newspaper *Delo* (26. 6. 1991). In the letter, Kučan informed the Secretary-General that the Slovenian Assembly had adopted a constitutional law on the secession from SFRY. With this decree, the Slovene forces were immediately claiming sovereignty on their territory. Concurrently, Kučan notified the Secretary-General that the Assembly had adopted a *Declaration on the foreign policy of the Republic of Slovenia*⁷ based on the principles of the UN Charter. In this respect, the president also formally applied for the right of entry of the Republic of Slovenia into the UN, along with establishing the observation mission for Slovenia at the UN in both New York and Geneva (*Delo*, 26. 6. 1991; Repe, 2014, 330), undoubtedly for better coordination of diplomatic activities and international recognition of Slovenia.

Two days later, however, on 28 June, Kučan informed de Cuellar about the war in Slovenia. He wrote that the YPA was carrying out air strikes on Slovene territory and that he was forced to order the territorial defence to implement self-defence. Kučan argued that Slovenia was entitled to take these measures on the basis of Article 51 of the UN Charter, which provides that every member state may resort to self-defence. Moreover, he added that the YPA and the Yugoslav government were in violation of Article 39 of the UN Charter, which provides that the Security Council determines whether a violation of peace has taken place and needs armed forces as a response. Nonetheless, the Security Council did not make any decisions regarding the war in Slovenia. He concluded the letter by asking de Cuellar to get the Chairman of the Security Council to convene an extraordinary session due to hostilities towards Slovenia.⁸ The Secretary-General's reply was not preserved in the correspondence. Nevertheless, Kučan's call for the extraordinary session is mentioned in the first paragraph

5 Later, de Cuellar also took the position on the necessity of securing the ceasefire first and then negotiating the Yugoslav disintegration.

6 ARMS, AG-019, S-1024-0097-07, The letter by Peter Millonig to the Secretary-General, 26th June 1991.

7 Izjava o zunanji politiki Republike Slovenije.

8 ARMS, AG-019, S-1024-0097-07, The letter by Milan Kučan to the Secretary-General, 28th June 1991.

of the chapter on the Yugoslav war in de Cuellar's autobiography. He wrote that the Security Council did not respond to Kučan's request, thus, it is possible to assume that de Cuellar did forward it to the Security Council (De Cuellar, 1997, 477).

However, it was not really expected for the above-mentioned request to have any effect at that time in any case, since the international community reacted negatively to the actions of Croatia and Slovenia. Only a few days prior to the declaration of their independence, on 19 June at the CSCE meeting, the foreign ministers adopted the *Statement on the Situation in Yugoslavia*, in which they gave support to united Yugoslavia (CSCE 1). On 21 June, the US Secretary of State, James Baker, said in Belgrade that "*the US or any other state will not recognize unilateral secession of Slovenia and Croatia.*" He added that "*borders can only be changed by consensus*" of every party involved (Baker, 1995, 482–483). Two days before the declaration of independence, the foreign ministers of the EC followed Baker's position. Having returned to the USA, Baker suggested to President George H. W. Bush that the USA, together with other European allies, keep the policy of non-recognition of any republic which would/had declared independence unilaterally (Fabry, 2002, 155).

In the following days, a ten-day war was fought in Slovenia, while negotiations with the ministerial troika⁹ of the EC simultaneously took place. Namely, the UN with de Cuellar at the helm renounced the leading role in the negotiations to the EC and generally kept out of the situation in Yugoslavia. For the next couple of months, de Cuellar merely observed the situation from the sidelines and gathered information. In this respect, a rather interesting document was sent to de Cuellar by Janez Stanovnik on 8 July, just a day after the signing of the Brioni Agreement.¹⁰

DIPLOMACY AT THE TIME OF THE INDEPENDENCE MORATORIUM

Stanovnik was a member of several delegations of Yugoslavia at the UN; in addition, he was an economic advisor for the Yugoslav permanent mission in New York for many years. He held his main position as an Executive Secretary of the UN Economic Commission for Europe for 15 years (Udovič, 2016, 767). Becoming a member, and then President of the Presidency of the SRS, he was also an expert on the situation in Yugoslavia. Therefore, it was not unusual that the Secretary-General paid attention when he presented first-hand information on the developments in Yugoslavia. Stanovnik was perhaps the

only Slovene politician who could afford to write such a personal letter, owing to his reputation in the UN. In fact, he was supposed to present his viewpoint in person at the meeting in Geneva, however, he was unable to arrive in time from Slovenia due to restrictions in road passages and difficulties crossing the Slovene borders.

As stated by Stanovnik, he sent the letter as a friend and a former colleague, and not as a politician, much less as a diplomat. At the beginning of his five-page letter, he expressed his beliefs that the only way out of the Yugoslav crisis was a transition into complete democracy and a market economy. Likewise, he wanted the changes in Slovenia to positively influence the remaining parts of Yugoslavia and, thus, enable its further unity. However, according to him, this was impossible due to Serbian nationalism, firm viewpoints concerning Kosovo by Slobodan Milošević and the aggressions of the YPA. Stanovnik criticised the lack of mechanisms for resolving conflicts by the EC and the absence of the UN representative during negotiations in the Brioni Agreement, while simultaneously, he called for accelerated integration of Slovenia to the EC. Namely, he considered the Slovene market too small to maintain a successful economy. Finally, he expressed hope that the Secretary-General would help Slovenia achieve international recognition, which was, according to him, the only way to prevent further conflicts in Slovenia.¹¹ Four days later, de Cuellar replied to Stanovnik with best wishes and a promise to consider his perspectives, but the letter did little to change his perspective on Yugoslavia.¹²

De Cuellar and the UN still maintained the viewpoint that the war in Slovenia was an internal matter of Yugoslavia, since Slovenia and Croatia had not been recognised by any state at that moment. However, there were different points of view amongst individual European countries as well as in the EC. The latter wanted to stabilise the situation on its own, and for that reason it circumvented the French President, François Mitterrand, and the British Prime Minister, John Major, who proposed that the situation in Yugoslavia should be considered by the UN Security Council as well. The USA also opposed the involvement of the Security Council. They argued this would give Germany a larger forum to achieve the international recognition of Slovenia and Croatia (Pirjevec, 2003, 83).

One of the more prominent Slovene diplomats in the UN was Ignac Golob. At one point he was a UN press secretary and he served as Yugoslavia's ambassador to the UN from 1982 to 1986, however, during the process of international recognition of Slovenia, he was not accredited as such at the UN. When Slovenia declared

9 The ministerial troika of the EC consisted of the foreign minister of Luxembourg, Jacques Poos, the foreign minister of the Netherlands, Hans van den Broek, and the foreign minister of Italy, Gianni de Michelis.

10 Kučan also notified de Cuellar on the Brioni Agreement on 10 July: ARMS, AG-019, S-1024-0097-07, The letter by Milan Kučan to the Secretary-General, 10th July 1991.

11 ARMS, AG-019, S-1024-0097-07, The letter by Janez Stanovnik to the Secretary-General, 8th July 1991.

12 ARMS, AG-019, S-1024-0097-07, The letter by the Secretary-General to Janez Stanovnik, 15th July 1991.

its independence, he was a Yugoslav ambassador in Mexico. He concurrently represented Yugoslavia in the UN Conference of the Secretary-General Committee on Disarmament. He resigned from this position on 3 August, writing a letter to de Cuellar, in which he also expressed willingness to take some other function in the UN if the Secretary-General considered it necessary.¹³ With this in mind, he probably hoped for a new position and a chance to lobby in favour of the recognition of Slovenia. The Secretary-General, however, did not grant him any of such functions and therefore Slovenia was left with no representative in the biggest international organisation in the world, even though, Slovene politicians had been trying to establish temporary representative bodies since the declaration of independence. Nevertheless, Golob was not deterred by this, so he returned to the UN palace with the media accreditation granted by the Slovene newspaper *Dnevnik*. Thus, he became a correspondent from the UN palace (Lisjak, 2002) and gained access to the most important diplomats, through whom he secretly lobbied for Slovenia's recognition. In 1992 he stated that he went to New York with the intention to

*bring the problems of Slovenia to all the diplomats here. If a person is not present, no one thinks of them. Out of sight, out of mind. Hence: here we are in sight and closer to mind... Everyone wants to know what Slovenia is, what it wants and what its position in the Yugoslav territory is. On the other hand, the UN is an organization of countries, including Yugoslavia, and this organization does not thoughtlessly like to give recognition to the new states. However, in the case of Slovenia, like it or not, they will have to confer recognition. Very soon, they will have to confirm it.*¹⁴

Golob was clearly successful. This was observed by the pro-Serbian representatives as well, who tried to remove him from the UN by force (Lisjak, 2002). Serbia strived for the Security Council to stay out of the Yugoslav situation. By doing so, it had a greater manoeuvring space which allowed progress of the great Serbian goals, particularly in Croatia. This likewise suited de Cuellar, however, the international community increasingly started to pressure the Security Council. On 21 September 1991, de Cuellar received a letter from Anders Björck, the president of the Council of Europe. In the letter, Björck called for moving of the UN's "effective military units" to Yugoslavia to attain peace. This position was taken by the Council of Europe in its Resolution

969.¹⁵ However, the UN was not yet ready to take this step, partly due to the pressure coming from Serbia and the USA, which argued that the international intervention should be left to Europe.

THE UN FORMALLY ACTIVATES

Finally, Belgium, France, Great Britain, and Austria, in accordance with the EC declaration, adopted on 19 September 1991, submitted a proposal to convene a session of the UN Security Council regarding the events in Yugoslavia. The session took place on 25 September, until then however, intense diplomatic lobbying proceeded. On 24 September de Cuellar received a letter from Stjepan Mesić, then President of the Presidency of SFRY, who was in an unpleasant position as a Croat while performing his function. Mesić welcomed the decision to convene a session of the Security Council concerning Yugoslavia. During the war in Slovenia, Mesić had already strived via Germany for the Security Council to do so. Nevertheless, his first call to convene the session was prevented due to intervention of the Non-Aligned Movement group of states, which had de Cuellar's full support (Repe, 2002, 304). He also added in the letter that as President of the Presidency he had absolutely no control over the YPA anymore. He, therefore, advocated that the Security Council, in accordance with the Council of Europe resolution, sent peacekeeping forces to Yugoslavia. As reported by him, the EC was not able to provide such forces and that the only agent to do that was the UN. He suggested that the UN forces should go to the Croatian border territory along Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, and Montenegro. According to him, this would prevent the continuation of the war.¹⁶

The letter sent by Mesić was significant since he was prevented from attending the Security Council session, even though he was *de iure* the leading politician in Yugoslavia, *de facto*, however, he was anything but. Instead, the foreign minister of SFRY, Budimir Lončar, attended the session in New York. Together with the pro-Serbian orientated diplomatic corps, Lončar had already started lobbying in favour of united Yugoslavia via the Non-Aligned Movement.¹⁷ With the support of the Non-Aligned Movement member states, Lončar secured a meeting with de Cuellar the evening before the session. The record shows that Yugoslavia wanted the further negotiations for peace to be held under the patronage of the EC. Namely, at the meeting, Lončar emphasised for the first time that the conflict became an international problem, not as a result of different nationalist movements in Yugoslavia, but due to the interference

13 ARMS, AG-019, S-1024-0097-07, The resignation letter by Ignac Golob from the position of the member of the Conference of the Committee of the Secretary-General on Disarmament, 3rd August 1991.

14 Delo, 23. 5. 1992: Dolga pot do 'srca' sveta.

15 ARMS, AG-019, S-1024-0097-07, The letter by Anders Björck to the Secretary-General, 21st September 1991.

16 ARMS, AG-019, S-1024-0097-07, The letter by Stjepan Mesić to the Secretary-General, 24th September 1991.

17 ARMS, AG-019, S-1024-0097-07, The note by J. P. Kavanagh to Viendra Dayal, 24th September 1991.

of international mediators.¹⁸ While only a month prior, the permanent representative of Yugoslavia in the UN, Darko Silović, argued there was no need for the Security Council to intervene in the Yugoslav conflicts at this moment,¹⁹ however, there was the need for the additional internationalisation and diplomatic mediation. According to Lončar, this was the viewpoint taken by the Serbian government in particular. This being said, one of the obstacles in the UN involvement in the Yugoslav crisis was dropped. However, de Cuellar remained hesitant, stating that he did not want to replicate the efforts of the EC's special envoy Lord Carrington.²⁰ Namely, de Cuellar considered himself an accomplished diplomat who might wear down Carrington's authority by intervening, compromising the peace negotiations, which according to him, "should not fail". With this viewpoint, de Cuellar argued in favour of united Yugoslavia, based on a new constitution and increasing rights to the minorities in different entities.²¹

The record between Lončar and de Cuellar also reveals that Lončar had access to a draft of the Resolution 713, adopted at the end of the Security Council session the following day. The Resolution was rather conservative since the Security Council surpassed the EC recommendation as well as the requests of Mesić on international military mediation. The Resolution provided that the situation in Yugoslavia compromises international peace and security. The only meaningful decision made by the Security Council was implementing the "general and complete embargo on all deliveries on weapons and military equipment to Yugoslavia" (Trifunovska, 1994, 350; Bethlehem, 1997, 2).²² De Cuellar and Lončar did not specifically talk about the embargo, even though the article concerning the embargo had already been written in the draft of the Resolution, also seen by Lončar.²³ Obviously, Yugoslavia did not oppose the article on the embargo regarding weapons. Meanwhile, Slovene politics was critical towards the resolution, since it assessed that through this provision Serbia had been given

advantage in the military armament (Pirjevec, 2003, 83). The provision also pushed the Croatian government to publicly strip Lončar of the right to represent Croatia in the international arena, while Silović was stripped of these rights in the UN.²⁴ De Cuellar later wrote in his autobiography that the embargo was adopted as a warning [to the European countries] against premature recognition of Slovenia and Croatia (De Cuellar, 1997, 477). De Cuellar's reasoning, however, was most likely pretend ignorance. Just a few hours before the Security Council session, there had formally been great changes at the top of Yugoslav politics. The representatives of Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo, and Vojvodina convened a meeting in the Federal Presidency without its President Mesić, who could not make it to Belgrade due to barricaded roads. The Serbian-oriented members of the Presidency arbitrarily stripped Mesić of his right to represent Yugoslavia at the UN (Pirjevec, 2003, 85) which had actually already been taken away from him. Unlike de Cuellar, who made little effort to lobby for last minute changes to the Resolution 713, the US Secretary of State Baker was very clear in his statements during the session. For the first time he identified Serbia as the aggressor in the conflict (Bethlehem, 1997, 72). The Vice-President of the Serbian government, Budimir Košutić, reacted to Baker's statement the same night as he made a call to the Chef de Cabinet to the Secretary-General Virendra Dayal. Košutić defended Serbia's decisions to constitute the new Federal Presidency as an effort for democratic reconstruction of Yugoslavia while Slovenia and Croatia were using force to assert their move towards independence. Moreover, Košutić marked Baker's words as a distortion of *the real situation* in Yugoslavia.²⁵

However, the *real situation* in Yugoslavia was intensifying. The moratorium on the secession of Slovenia and Croatia was now coming to an end, which the YPA was aware of. In an effort to pressure Croatia, it performed strategic attacks on targets in Croatia and on 1 October, it issued an ultimatum to the Croatian govern-

18 ARMS, AG-019, S-1024-0097-08, Minutes of the meeting between the Secretary-General and Budimir Lončar, 24th September 1991.

19 ARMS, AG-019, S-1024-0097-08, The letter by Darko Silović to Jose Ayala Lasso, 9th August 1991.

20 Peter Carrington, the 6th Baron Carrington, is a distinguished British politician, who held the office of the British Minister of Defence, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the NATO Secretary-General position, during which he gained recognition by mediating the conflicts between Turkey and Greece in 1987. Due to his experience, the EC appointed him as the special envoy to lead the negotiations for ceasefire. On 7 September 1991, he convened the first peacekeeping session in the Hague. The highlight of his activities was the so-called Carrington-Cutileiro plan – respectively named after its second author, Jose Cutileiro, the coordinator of the Conference on Yugoslavia – in February 1992. The plan proposed recognition of the new republics, whilst respecting the rights of the minorities in each republic. Due to Serbia rejecting the plan – during this time, Serbia controlled a third of the Croatian territory – Carrington resigned (Meier, 1999).

21 ARMS, AG-019, S-1024-0097-08, Minutes of the meeting between the Secretary-General and Budimir Lončar, 24th September 1991.

22 ARMS, AG-019, S-1024-0097-09, The Resolution 713 (1991) adopted by the Security Council at its 3009th meeting, 25th September 1991.

23 The archive keeps three preserved copies of the resolution's draft, written by Great Britain, Belgium, France, and Austria. Two drafts carry the official UN header, while the third one does not. In the third draft, the article on embargo is stated as a new article. All three drafts are dated 24 September. The reports do not clearly show whether Lončar had another, earlier draft which excluded this article, or perhaps, he simply did not have any comments regarding this article. All the drafts are in the file ARMS, AG-019, S-1024-0097-07.

24 ARMS, AG-019, S-1024-0097-07, The Statement of the Croatian Government regarding the UN Security Council Resolution No. 713 on Yugoslavia, 27th September 1991.

25 ARMS, AG-019, S-1024-0097-07, Note of a telephone conversation between the Chef de Cabinet and the vice-president of the Serbian government, 1st October 1991.

ment to lift the blockade of the YPA barracks on its territory. On 2 October, the escalation of violence forced de Cuellar to issue an appeal to everyone involved to reduce violence and call for continuing the cooperation with Lord Carrington in peace negotiations.²⁶ However, only a day later, the ambassador of Yugoslavia, Silović, informed the Chef de Cabinet Dayal that the “working part of the Presidency”, also referred to as the “rump presidency” which excluded Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, and Slovenia, declared it was taking over the full functions, including the supreme command of the armed forces.²⁷ Meanwhile, Croatia refused to lift the blockade of the YPA barracks and on 5 October, the UN received its first documented letter from the then President of Croatia, Franjo Tudman, who asked de Cuellar to intervene more firmly in the escalation of tensions.²⁸

On 7 October, the YPA bombed Banski dvori in an obvious assassination attempt on the President of Croatia and the whole Croatian government. That same night, de Cuellar and the British foreign minister, Douglas Hurd, had a telephone conversation regarding the incident. The latter stated that he “fears that the European efforts are exhausted”. Namely, all the efforts made by the EC did not give the desired result, although, the British obviously pressured de Cuellar in this way to force greater involvement of the UN in the conflict. Hurd said he also spoke to Lord Carrington, who agreed that de Cuellar had to report to the Security Council about the attacks on Banski dvori as well as on other Croatian towns, including Vukovar, which had already been under siege, and Dubrovnik. In addition, Hurd expressed his belief that this report was the opportune time for the Secretary-General to appoint a special envoy of the UN to Yugoslavia who should be an American. In other words, Hurd searched for a UN alternative to the EC’s Lord Carrington. De Cuellar replied that he was willing to report to the Security Council, yet, he needed to speak to Carrington in person first in order to make sure that Carrington truly agreed on appointing another special envoy, who would be a direct competition to him.²⁹

This way, under the pressure of European diplomacy, de Cuellar was forced to get involved in the situation more firmly. He did that unwillingly, while still having Lord Carrington and some sort of “spheres of interests” between the EC and the UN as an excuse. Clearly, de Cuellar was a big supporter of united Yugoslavia, which was evident in his actions and statements.



Image 2: Cyrus Vance, Special Envoy of the UN Secretary-General of the United Nations for Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina (www.wikipedia.org)

CHOOSING THE SPECIAL ENVOY

After discussion with Hurd, a short-term coordination on choosing the envoy took place. At the request of de Cuellar, a day later, on 8 October, this position was given to Cyrus Vance (Bethlehem, 1997, 456). However, before the Secretary-General made his decision public, he had consulted the US Secretary of State, Baker. De Cuellar portrayed Vance as a highly respected person in Yugoslavia and, as a former US Secretary of State himself, Vance knew practically every agent in the crisis. Baker upheld the candidate with no comments. At the same time, he urged de Cuellar to convene another session of the Security Council to extend sanctions against Yugoslavia, which was supposedly also supported by van den Broek, the President of the EC Council of Ministers. De Cuellar wished to avoid the convening of the session by explaining that the reports showed improvements of the situation in Yugoslavia “in the past 18 hours”, thus according to de Cuellar the call for the extraordinary session would not be necessary.³⁰ Therefore, de Cuellar

26 ARMS, AG-019, S-1024-0097-09, The Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Paragraph 3 of Security Council Resolution 713 (1991), 25th October 1991.

27 ARMS, AG-019, S-1024-0097-07, Demarche by the permanent representative of Yugoslavia to Chef de Office of the Secretary-General, 3rd October 1991.

28 ARMS, AG-019, S-1024-0097-07, The letter by Franjo Tudman to the Secretary-General, 5th October 1991.

29 ARMS, AG-019, S-1024-0097-07, Minutes of the telephone conversation between the Secretary-General and the British foreign minister, 7th October 1991.

30 ARMS, AG-019, S-1024-0097-07, Minutes of the telephone conversation between the Secretary-General and the US Secretary of State Baker, 8th October 1991.

found another excuse which disabled the Yugoslav crisis discussion at the global level.

On the same day, the Secretary-General met the permanent Yugoslav representative Silović and informed him about Vance.³¹ Silović welcomed their choice and suggested that Vance meet both the now deposed President Mesić and his deputy, the Vice-President of Presidency, Branko Kostić, who took on full responsibility after establishment of “rump presidency”. Despite great prospects, the preserved archive sources display disappointing results of Vance’s position. The first mission in Yugoslavia was held on the line Belgrade, Brussels, Bonn, Sarajevo, Ljubljana, and Zagreb. The only evident conclusion of this mission was the adoption of a position on lifting the blockade on the barracks of the YPA in Croatia.³²

On 18 October, the Hague Conference session led by Lord Carrington took place, in which the mediators tried to impose a truce plan on all the parties involved, transforming Yugoslavia into a loose economic union with a single internal market and a joint external trade, which also respected the rights of minorities and different nations. At the same time, a special autonomous status would be given to the parts of Croatia where there was predominantly Serbian population³³ (Trifunovska, 1994, 356–365).

Slovenia was largely criticised at the session. Namely, Vance considered the Slovene representatives being too passive at the session.³⁴ This was perhaps a result of conversation with Lord Carrington and de Cuellar on 10 October. During the talk, Carrington stated that the Slovene nation did not want to have anything to do with other parts of Yugoslavia. The other five nations might find some common ground regarding a joint market, Slovenia, however, as noted by Carrington, did not wish for that either. He assessed that the Slovene position probably stemmed from the fact that with “*the exception of the Italian minority*” (sic!), there were no other minorities in Slovenia, especially Serbian or Croatian. Carrington, therefore, marked Slovenia as a somewhat lost republic that would never agree on the unity of Yugoslavia. In this respect, he was determined that the EC had to focus on keeping Croatia in Yugoslavia and to commit itself to protecting the right of the Serbian minority.³⁵ With such arguments, Vance might have thought of Slovenia as the main culprit for the bloody civil war in Yugoslavia.

Even the conversation with Kučan did not encourage Vance to change his views on Slovenia when he visited Ljubljana on 16 October. Kučan received Vance by saying: “*I am very glad to see you, but I am afraid that you may not have realized the difficulties of the task you have undertaken*”.³⁶ Kučan called for a joint solution, provided it took effect immediately. This could have been the adoption of some loose “*institutionalized mechanisms*”, with which Yugoslavia could overcome the existing political crisis³⁷ since Slovenia “*does not seek recognition in order to harm others*”. Although, he continued that “*Slovenia could not be the ‘hostage’ to the fact that no general solution is found*”, adding that Slovenia would not stay in Yugoslavia if the solution was not presented in a short time.³⁸

Vance, on the other hand, was determined that international recognition of both Slovenia and Croatia was harmful to the peaceful outcome of the Yugoslav crisis and that recognition was possible only after the signing of the peace treaty.³⁹ In accordance with Kučan’s views upon the arrival of Vance, Slovenia agreed with Carrington’s plan, particularly because it advocated recognition and independent international integration of those states which declared independence. Slovenia, however, did not agree upon the introduction of customs union and common Yugoslav institutions. In contrast, the Serbs completely rejected Carrington’s proposal and continued to persist on the unity of the Yugoslav Federation, which included all the republics and nations (Repe, 2002, 377; Trifunovska, 1994, 363–365).

The next session of the Hague Conference was held on 25 October, however, it did not lead to a successful outcome. Slovenia informed Carrington and van den Broek that it was ready to conclude treaties of non-aggression, demilitarisation, a free-trade zone, trade co-operation, energy as well as anything else beneficial for all the parties involved (Repe, 2002, 377; Trifunovska, 1994, 368–369). This way, Slovenia essentially did not give up its plan for complete secession from Yugoslavia, even though it attended the conference which tried to find the solution to reconstruct the Federation. Serbia also did not depart from its idea of a unified Yugoslavia. Thus, Carrington gave Serbia time to consider until 5 November, when an additional session of the Hague Conference was held. Nonetheless, Serbia rejected the adoption of the agreement again, which consequently

31 ARMS, AG-019, S-1024-0097-07, Minutes of a conversation between the Secretary-General and the permanent representative of Yugoslavia to the UN, 8th October 1991.

32 ARMS, AG-019, S-1024-0097-09, The Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Paragraph 3 of Security Council Resolution 713 (1991), 25th October 1991, 25.

33 Ibid, 29–35.

34 Ibid.

35 ARMS, AG-019, S-1024-0098-12, Minutes of a meeting between the Secretary-General and Lord Carrington, the presiding at the peace conference on Yugoslavia, 10th October 1991, 5.

36 ARMS, AG-019, S-1024-0098-12, Note on the meeting of the honorable Cyrus R. Vance with the president of the Republic of Slovenia, Milan Kučan, 16th October 1991, 1.

37 Ibid, 5.

38 Ibid, 4.

39 ARMS, AG-019, S-1024-0098-01, The letter by Dimitrij Rupel to the Secretary-General, 6th November 1991, 4.

allowed Slovenia to actually act out less visible diplomacy and to work from the background only.

Vance's opinion on the passive Slovene diplomacy was also reflected in his reports to the Secretary-General, in which he did not pay too much attention to Slovenia. However, Ernest Petrič, at the time an official Slovenian representative to the USA,⁴⁰ reported to the Slovene government that Vance got his information from the American ambassador in Belgrade. That was Warren Zimmermann, who claimed that Slovenia was in violation of the arms embargo – which proved to be true – and there had to be economic sanctions imposed against Slovenia as well as Serbia for violating the Resolution of the Security Council (Repe, 202, 379). On November 6th, the Slovene foreign minister Dimitrij Rupel responded to the Zimmermann's accusations in a letter sent to de Cuellar. Initially, he supported the calls for introducing another embargo, this time on oil, against Serbia, but at the same time, he rejected the idea of implementing this same embargo against Slovenia. He considered it to be unreasonable to impose sanctions against those agents that were not directly involved in the conflicts between the Serbs and the Croats. Doing so, he referred to the Slovene cooperation in the observation mission of the EC and also to cooperation of Slovenia at the Hague Conference despite the expiry of the three-month long moratorium on independence. Concurrently, he stressed that the Serbian embargo and confiscation of Slovene products in the Yugoslav market had already inflicted harm on the Slovene economy.⁴¹

The EC, however, with the Rome Declaration, adopted on 8 November, finally took the position in favour of introducing the oil embargo. The foreign ministers of the EC – with complaints coming from France, Great Britain, Italy, Spain, and Greece – came to a conclusion to cease economic cooperation with Yugoslavia and Slovenia, together with suggesting the oil embargo to the Security Council (Trifunovska, 1994, 378–380; Pirjevec, 2003, 95). Vance, however, performed some key discussions in the region in the following days.

VIEWS ON THE RECOGNITION OF NEW REPUBLICS

The first official talk between Vance and Milošević was held on 6 November and it still revolved around

federative Yugoslavia, although, without Slovenia and Croatia. He claimed that many Muslims also wanted a unified Yugoslavia alluding to Bosnia and Herzegovina being a part of smaller federative Yugoslavia.⁴² A day later, Vance met the Prime Minister of Hungary, József Antall, who supported the recognition of new republics if a truce could not be achieved.⁴³ On the same day, Vance additionally met the Austrian Chancellor Franz Vranitzky, who supported the new sanctions against Yugoslavia. He stated that Austria was, otherwise, willing to recognise both republics directly after declaring independence, but was unable to do so due to the moratorium. Now, however, he expressed disappointment that the Carrington plan was not adopted and therefore, supported further sanctions. He was not clear, though, on whether Austria had been ready to recognise Slovenia and Croatia together with other European countries or individually.⁴⁴ Vance arrived at the Vatican on 8 November, where he spoke to Cardinal Angelo Sodano. The latter lobbied for the UN peacekeeping mission and simultaneously supported individual recognition of the independent republics.⁴⁵

After the talks, Vance returned to New York and reported to de Cuellar. During this time, he became acquainted with a letter, sent by the Vice-President of the "rump presidency" Kostić, in which he requested that the UN immediately send peacekeeping forces to Croatia.⁴⁶ Clearly, the letter fairly surprised him as it did de Cuellar and the President of the Security Council. Regarding the matter, Vance agreed with the Secretary-General to present the letter to the public as a letter sent to the President of the Security Council, with neither date nor signature, even though it contained both pieces of information. At the same time, Vance told the press that the "rump presidency", which he described as the most likely author of the letter, could not speak on behalf of all eight members of the Presidency.⁴⁷ Vance told de Cuellar that "some sort of monitoring" would have to be performed, although de Cuellar responded with dissatisfaction, saying this would be subjected to high risk.⁴⁸ Oddly enough, de Cuellar still argued that Vance acted solely as a support to Carrington, but did add that Slovenia and Croatia would ultimately become internationally recognised.⁴⁹ At the same time, he expressed concerns

40 After international recognition of Slovenia, Petrič also became the first Slovenian Ambassador to the USA.

41 ARMS, AG-019, S-1024-0098-01, The letter by Dimitrij Rupel to the Secretary-General, 6th November 1991.

42 ARMS, AG-019, S-1024-0098-01, Notes on a meeting of the special envoy of the Secretary-General and the president of the SR of Serbia, 6th November 1991.

43 ARMS, AG-019, S-1024-0098-01, Notes on a meeting between the special envoy of the Secretary-General and the prime minister of Hungary, 7th November 1991.

44 ARMS, AG-019, S-1024-0098-01, Notes on a conversation between Cyrus Vance and the Chancellor of Austria, 7th November 1991.

45 ARMS, AG-019, S-1024-0098-01, Notes on a conversation between Cyrus Vance and cardinal Angelo Sodano and Archbishop Jean-Louis Taurano, 8th November 1991

46 ARMS, AG-019, S-1024-0098-01, The letter by Banko Kostić to the Secretary-General, 9th November 1991

47 ARMS, AG-019, S-1024-0098-01, Notes on a meeting between the Secretary-General and the special envoy, 11th November 1991, 5.

48 Ibid, 2.

49 Ibid, 4.

about Carrington's statement on the above-mentioned recognitions (ARMS 31, 1).⁵⁰ However, both de Cuellar and Vance were committed to introducing the oil embargo, which was likewise supported by the US Deputy Secretary of State, Lawrence Eagleburger. As reported by Vance, only the Italian Prime Minister, Giulio Andreotti, expressed hesitation on the embargo. De Cuellar, however, reassured Vance that he was soon meeting Andreotti for a working lunch, during which they would end up on "the same page".⁵¹

In the following talks, Vance progressively focused on Serbia accepting the peacekeeping forces, which, as already mentioned, had international support. The permanent representative of Yugoslavia at the UN, Silović, confirmed that the "rump presidency" had indeed strived for the arrival of the UN peacekeeping forces and that was why de Cuellar also expressed willingness to start the talks in the Security Council for initiating the process of moving the forces. Nevertheless, Silović and de Cuellar collided regarding the matter of the location to which the forces would be directed. Silović advocated the viewpoint of the "rump presidency" that the forces should be located in Croatia to "protect the Serbian population", whereas the Croatian side wanted the forces on the border crossings between Croatia and Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Montenegro. De Cuellar responded that the location of the forces would be determined by the Security Council.⁵²

In the meantime, Vance performed a few similar meetings throughout Europe and, together with the Secretary-General, engaged in a few informal talks with the Security Council member states. After that, during the Security Council session on 27 November 1991, they adopted the Resolution 721 (UN 1; Trifunovska, 1994, 414–415; Bethlehem, 1997, 2). With this, the Security Council authorised Vance to prepare "the ground" for the arrival of the peacekeeping forces in the territory of Croatia. Contrary to de Cuellar's wishes, the Resolution did not impose new sanctions against Yugoslavia. However, prior to the beginning of the session, Vance had already brought up the issue of the oil embargo at the informal negotiations, although interestingly enough, he did it according to the Slovene principle, which was to make the embargo selective.⁵³ Vance, therefore, opposed the perspectives of de Cuellar and the US diplomacy, which determined that sanctions should be imposed against all the Yugoslav republics.⁵⁴

THE MAASTRICHT MEETING AND THE RECOGNITION OF SLOVENIA

After the adoption of the Resolution, Yugoslavia was slightly pushed into the background from the European spotlight. During the period between the 9 and the 11 December,⁵⁵ a meeting of the European Council was held in Maastricht. During the session they discussed the future of the EC and a detailed integration of Europe into a union. During the meeting, it became completely evident that, by Christmas time, Germany intended to formally recognise Slovenia and Croatia. Apprehensive that Germany might try to influence the other eleven states at the conference, de Cuellar tried to influence these talks. Therefore, the more the EC started to incline towards the immediate recognition of Slovenia and Croatia, the harder the Serbian side pressured the UN. This was a critical period, since de Cuellar, a very effective advocate of the unified Yugoslavia, was soon to retire from the Secretary-General position. On the first day of the Maastricht session, de Cuellar wrote a letter to van den Broek, who also held the presidential position in the Council of the Foreign Ministers in the EC. In the letter, he stated that Vance had reservation towards the premature recognition of "some Yugoslav republics". He specifically emphasised that he did not want to question the nations' right to self-determination; however, he feared that the selective recognition of independence would negatively impact the situations in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia. For this reason, he suggested to van den Broek to avoid the unilateral actions of the twelve EC states.⁵⁶

The letter immediately received a critical response by the German Foreign Minister, Hans Dietrich Genscher, who was also the President of the CSCE at that time. He argued that such public statements and discordant fronts would lead to the escalation of violence in Yugoslavia.⁵⁷ The two letters gave rise to a verbal war between de Cuellar and Genscher, which did not lead to consensus. On 15 December, the Security Council once again discussed the placement of the peacekeeping forces in the Croatian territory, which was finally adopted with the Resolution 724 (UN 2; Trifunovska, 1994, 429–431; Bethlehem, 1997, 2–3). With this Resolution, however, the Security Council still did not declare the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia, although, it did not explicitly forbid it either, even though some member states of the

50 Ibid, 1.

51 Ibid, 5.

52 ARMS, AG-019, S-1024-0098-02, Notes on a meeting between the Secretary-General and the permanent representative of Yugoslavia, 14th November 1991.

53 ARMS, AG-019, S-1024-0098-02, Notes of an informal meeting of the Security Council in Conference room 7, 13th November 1991.

54 ARMS, AG-019, S-1024-0098-01, Notes on a meeting between the Secretary-General and the special envoy, 11th November 1991, 4.

55 The official documents specify the date of the meeting between 9 and 10 December, however, the leaders and the foreign ministers held the session until the early morning hours on 11 December.

56 ARMS, AG-019, S-1024-0098-03, The letter by Secretary-General to van den Broek, 10th December 1991.

57 ARMS, AG-019, S-1024-0098-03, The letter by Hand Dietrich Genscher to the Secretary-General, undated.



Image 3: The flag raising ceremony at the UN building in New York City on 22nd May 1992. Secretary-General Butros Butros Ghali speaks at the podium. On his right are president of Republic of Slovenia, Milan Kučan, and behind him Dimitrij Rupel, Foreign minister of Slovenia. On his left are General Assembly President Samir S. Shihabi and President of Croatia, Franjo Tudjman (www.unmultimedia.org)

Security Council tried to force this article. Furthermore, the Security Council was particularly pressured by the group of states belonging to the Non-Aligned Movement, which demanded that the Security Council maintain the territorial and political unity of Yugoslavia.⁵⁸ De Cuellar expressed his belief that the reaffirmation of the arms embargo by the Security Council in the Resolution was the most imperative matter at that moment. This, however, once again compromised the self-defence of Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Slovenia. In this way, the Security Council reiterated the call for reasonable diplomacy and against the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia (De Cuellar, 1997, 491, 494).

Only one day after that, on 16 December, the EC adopted the decision, i.e. the Brussels Agreement, on the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia. With this declaration, the EC states agreed to give recognition to both republics on 15 January 1992 (Trifunovska, 1994, 431–432). Van den Broek informed de Cuellar about the declaration with a report, in which he stated that they carefully contemplated de Cuellar's warnings about the consequences of "premature, selective and uncoordinated"⁵⁹ recognition.

This was, however, completely rejected by the twelve states, claiming that they would grant recognition only after a one-month period, only to those states seeking recognition, and in the form of a joint recognition.⁶⁰ A following report to the Secretary-General on the situation in Yugoslavia, after the adoption of the Brussels Agreement, stated that the above-mentioned events brought immediate escalation of violence in Bosnia and Herzegovina, just like de Cuellar and Vance warned.⁶¹

In accordance with the declaration's provisions, Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Macedonia applied for a formal recognition by the EC on 19 December. On the same day, Serbia requested that the Security Council held an extraordinary session, in which it would discuss the EC decision that determined the ultimate disintegration of Yugoslavia.⁶² This, however, was not granted.

On 24 December, the initial talk between the departing Secretary-General de Cuellar, the special envoy for Yugoslavia, Vance, and the newly-elected Secretary-General of the UN, Butros Butros-Ghali took place. The talk revolved around the unilateral actions of the EC

58 ARMS, AG-019, S-1024-0098-03, Statement by the Non-Aligned Movement on Yugoslavia sent by Sarko Silović to the Secretary-General, 14th December 1991.

59 ARMS, AG-019, S-1024-0098-03, The letter by Secretary-General to van den Broek, 10th December 1991.

60 ARMS, AG-019, S-1024-0098-03, The letter by van den Broek to the Secretary-General, 17th December 1991.

61 ARMS, AG-019, S-1024-0098-03, Note to the Secretary-General, 17th December 1991, 1.

62 ARMS, AG-019, S-1024-0098-03, The letter by the vice-president of the Presidency of SFRY Branko Kostić to the President of the Security Council, 19th December 1991.

regarding the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia, along with the preparations to direct the UN peacekeeping forces to Croatia. Ghali's viewpoint was predominantly against the independence of the new republics. He believed Yugoslavia had a regional problem, which should entirely be a matter for the EC, including the direction of the peacekeeping forces.⁶³ Ghali, therefore, took the pro-Serbian perspective, in which he considered the war in Yugoslavia a civil war. On the whole, this resembled de Cuellar's positions before September 1991.

CONCLUSION

When the European countries gave recognition to Slovenia and Croatia, the Slovene diplomacy instantly set its focus outside of Europe, particularly towards the USA since its recognition played the key role in the integration of Slovenia in the UN. The USA, however, decided to wait, mainly because it wanted to see if the UN missions would be successful in the coming months.⁶⁴

Nonetheless, the UN forces operated rather passively and did not alleviate the violence in Bosnia and Herzegovina, let alone prevent it. In the following interviews, Ghali tried to shift responsibility for lobbying against the recognition and introduction of the new republics to the UN, by saying that the Security Council and its permanent member states, respectively, determined these matters, not the Secretary-General (Janežič Ambrožič, 2012).

De Cuellar also relativized his pro-Serbian viewpoints after a while. He spoke about a delicate relationship between the EC and the UN. The former supposedly hindered the UN involvement by occupying the conflict resolution process of the Yugoslav crisis. Eventually, however, the European politics finally concluded that the UN reaction was needed since the EC did not have the Yugoslav trust (De Cuellar, 1997, 478). Having said that, de Cuellar probably meant Serbia, after all, Slovenia and Croatia had put more trust in the decisions taken by the neighbouring states and the USA. He argued that the peace project in Yugoslavia was, according to him, the key ingredient in succeeding with the further integration of Europe, which he supported, and for that reason, he strived only for the supporting role to Lord Carrington in the Resolution 713. He continued to condemn Germany's efforts to recognise Slovenia and Croatia since their declaration of independence. In his opinion, Genscher forced the twelve states to recognise the new republics regardless of their readiness to take this step. He described the adoption of the Brussels Agreement as

a sudden and unexplained change of perspectives of the twelve states. Even after the war, he advocated that the premature recognition of the republics was one of the reasons for war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. He believed that this step only prevented the sanctions against the Serbian violence in Croatia, which in turn only gave courage to the Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina. According to him, the UN peacekeeping forces were not supposed to be involved before the EC managed to negotiate truce, which would only be achievable without the recognition (De Cuellar, 1997, 478–495).

However, regardless of the reluctance of both de Cuellar and Ghali, the Slovene integration in the UN as a full member was also delayed by several other reasons. In the opinion of Ignac Golob, the biggest reason was the outbreak of war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The fact that Slovenia was no longer involved in the armed conflicts and was rather stable in the first half of 1992, despite the political aggravations in the collapse of the DEMOS Coalition; it also became slightly neglected by the international community. Still, Belgrade successfully lobbied with the member states of the Non-Aligned Movement.⁶⁵ In March 1992, Milan Kučan sent a letter to the Secretary-General, in which he justified the Slovene request for UN membership. Golob delivered it to the Secretary-General Cabinet no earlier than on 5 May⁶⁶ (Trifunovska, 1994, 566) almost a month after the USA had given recognition and a week after China (27 April 1992), which did it as the last permanent member state of the Security Council. In the application, Kučan wrote that Slovenia had full control over its territory and was executing peaceful politics. Therefore, he asked for the request to be put on the agenda of the Security Council and the General Assembly sessions, so in the future Slovenia could fulfil its international responsibilities and actively cooperate in achieving the goals of the international organisation⁶⁷ (Trifunovska, 1994, 566).

On 18 May, the Security Council adopted the Resolution 754 (Bethlehem, 1997, 8), in which it proposed to the General Assembly to accept Slovenia to the UN. The General Assembly did that on 22 May 1992⁶⁸ (Trifunovska, 1994, 579). Following Slovenia, UN membership was also given to Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Croatia. The three newly-accepted member states instantly demanded removal of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia from the organisation. Taking this step, Slovenia became an equal counterpart in the international community.

63 ARMS, AG-019, S-1024-0098-03, Note on the conversation on Yugoslavia held at the Secretary-General's residence, 24th December 1991, 4.

64 According to the Resolution 727, adopted on 8 January 1992, the Security Council first sent 50 observers to Yugoslavia (UN 3; Trifunovska, 1994, 470–471; Bethlehem, 1997, 4), and afterwards, according to the Resolution 749, adopted on 7 April 1992, they also sent the UNPROFOR peacekeeping forces (UN 4; Trifunovska, 1994, 522–523; Bethlehem, 1997, 6).

65 Delo, 20. 3. 1992: Dolga pot Slovenije v OZN.

66 Delo, 23. 5. 1992: Dolga pot do 'srca' sveta.

67 Delo, 7. 5. 1992: Prošnja Slovenije za članstvo v OZN.

68 Delo, 23. 5. 1992: Dolga pot do 'srca' sveta.

SLOVENIJA IN ORGANIZACIJA ZDRUŽENIH NARODOV V KORESPONDENCI
GENERALNEGA SEKRETARJA JAVIERJA PEREZA DE CUELLARJA, 1991–1992

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POVZETEK

Članek obravnava slovenska prizadevanja za mednarodno priznanje in enakopravno članstvo v OZN. Skozi prizmo arhivskih virov v fondu generalnega sekretarja Javierja Pereza de Cuellarja odstira stališča generalnega sekretarja, ki so bila zadržana in pogosto skladna s stališči držav Gibanja neuvrščenih ter pro-srbskega jugoslovanskega vrha. Slovenski diplomati, podobno kot hrvaški, v tem času niso uradno sodelovali v razpravah Varnostnega sveta OZN. Njihova vloga je bila posledično skrčena na pisemsko komunikacijo ter lobiranje preko držav, ki so podpirala mednarodno priznanje novo-osamosvojenih republik. Pri tem je zlasti pomembna vloga sosednjih držav, pa tudi Nemčije, Velike Britanije in Francije. Slednji sta namreč že zelo zgodaj želeli, da bi se Varnostni svet vpletel v jugoslovanski konflikt. To je Varnostni svet nazadnje storil konec septembra 1991, ko je uvedel embargo na prodajo orožja Jugoslaviji. Medtem je bil generalni sekretar ves čas pod vplivom jugoslovanskih politikov, ki so si prizadevali za ohranitev enotnosti. Ti so se vsaj ob eni priložnosti srečali z generalnim sekretarjem na predvečer zasedanja Varnostnega sveta, kjer so družno koordinirali zelen potek zasedanja. Prav tako so na Varnostni svet pritiskale države Gibanja neuvrščenih, ki so tudi želele ohraniti enotno Jugoslavijo. Na zapleteno razmerje moči kažejo tudi poročila in pogovori posebnega odposlanca OZN za Jugoslavijo Cyrusa Vancea, ki si je neuspešno prizadeval za mediacijo v konfliktu. Pri tem pa je negativno ocenjeval vlogo slovenskega političnega vrha, kljub več srečanjem in dejstvu, da je Slovenija pristajala na pogajanja za mirno razrešitev spora.

Ključne besede: Organizacija združenih narodov, razpad Jugoslavije, Evropska skupnost, Javier Perez de Cuellar, Cyrus Vance, Gibanje neuvrščenih

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