

UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARDS YUGOSLAVIA AFTER THE
SECOND WORLD WAR*Zachary T. IRWIN*

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ABSTRACT

The paper examines the major areas of United States-Yugoslav relations between 1944 and 1948. The paper's purpose is to place bilateral relations in the context of the emerging Cold War prior to Yugoslavia's expulsion from the Cominform. The paper's method depends on existing scholarship (Trieste, Greek Civil War), as well as primary sources such as memoirs and the multivolume Foreign Relations of the United States.

America's postwar relations with socialist Yugoslavia are among the most significant episodes in the history of the Cold War. In one aspect, the confrontation between Yugoslavia's early belligerence and the fact of American hegemony galvanized Washington's perception of a resurgent communist bloc. The Truman Doctrine and NATO, initially, were directed against international communism rather than a certain state. Moreover, the "bloc" featured, at first, a cautious Stalinist metropole and an aggressive "Stalinist" eponym. Whether one considers Stalinism and Titoism incompatible owing to the former's conformist hierarchy or the latter's undisciplined militance, the result was the same. Yugoslavia was expelled from the Cominform in 1948, and the Cold War's Balkan focus shifted east.

Nevertheless, in the years 1945-47, Belgrade's challenge to America's postwar policy decisively shaped the foundation of the Cold War. Aggressive "communism," in the sense of a strategic offensive coordinated by Moscow, emerged from Tito's willingness to engage the United States at three levels. Shooting down an American reconnaissance plane evinced a superior confidence in the spectacular defiance of superior force. Diplomatically, Yugoslavia's claims against Italy expressed a refusal to redeem wartime assistance in postwar compliance, and no less, repudiated American designs for a noncommunist Italy. Finally, Belgrade's plan for a Balkan Federation, either enlightened statesmanship or petty imperialism, became intelligible to Washington in the context of support for Greek communist insurgency. The weakness of the United States' view that war against the axis was a wholly separate matter

from peace with former allies was first exposed in policy towards Yugoslavia. Conversely, Stalin's assumptions about communist party clients were scarcely more satisfactory in policy towards Yugoslavia, and expulsion from the Cominform reflected an emerging reality. Stalin's responsibility for the "camp of socialism" was meaningless if fraternal parties acted as willful coequals. Tito's survival after 1948 afforded the United States the sudden windfall of a strategic buffer. Yugoslavia's new significance for the Cold War was second only to Washington's shocked surprise that the 1945 American version of peace was not a self-evident proposition in Belgrade. Had Tito remained with the Cominform, the Cold War's fulcrum could have as likely been Trieste as Berlin.

The Wartime Legacy

Postwar American policy did not emerge *ex nihilo*. The defeat of the Axis in southeastern Europe revealed three converging problems for American policymakers, each of whose resolution posed stark challenges by mid-1945. First, the fate and composition of Yugoslavia's postwar government left little scope for American influence. Second, the question of Trieste and the Italian border was prolonged and involving, and finally, consequences of the Greek Civil War remained central to relations with Belgrade through 1948. In each case, policy choices were inherited from Britain's deeper wartime involvement in southeastern Europe.

After the 1943 Teheran Conference, the British decided to seek the ouster of the Chetnik leader Draža Mihailović, favoring instead a mediated agreement between the Partisans and the Government in Exile. Overruling Secretary of State Cordell Hull, who remained skeptical of British support for the Partisans, President Roosevelt advised King Peter to dismiss Mihailović as head of the government, and to accept negotiations with Tito. In May 1944, Peter appointed a new prime minister Ivan Šubašić, who opened negotiations with Tito. The resulting Tito-Šubašić agreement provided for a united government of Royalists and Partisans (FRUS Yalta, 1955, 250-255).¹ The agreement excluded from the government not only collaborators, but any hostile to Partisan rule. A postwar referendum would decide the monarchy's future role. It is unlikely that Churchill placed much confidence in the Partisans, and he resolved to settle the matter of compliance directly with Stalin. The so-called "percentages agreement" allocated various weights to British and Soviet interests,

¹ AVNOJ was to hold "legislative power until the Constituent Assembly will have completed its task." A "single government" would be formed consisting of "various political opinions supporting the fundamental aspirations of the national liberation struggle." Elections for the assembly would be held in conditions of complete freedom of elections, freedom of assembly, liberty of speech. ... The rights of "independent political parties, corporations, groups or individuals who have not collaborated with the enemy."

assuming the equivalence of communism and Soviet interest and British and noncommunist. Greece would be subject to ninety percent British influence and Yugoslavia equally divided. Again, the American Secretary Hull expressed his opposition, and Roosevelt agreed only on condition that any such agreement be limited to a three-month period (Resis, 1978, 372). The uneven distribution of portfolios in the Yugoslav cabinet indicated the limits of such an agreement.

American policy was in even less control, if less improvised. The United States approached the problem of postwar government as it did territorial arrangements, i.e., to consider a radical divide between wartime and the postwar era. The 1941 Atlantic Charter, was taken as a sufficient policy principle in the matter of Trieste and the Italian-Yugoslav boundary. The Charter had envisioned democratic elections and had forsworn "aggrandizement territorial or other" after the war. The "percentages" agreement was not simply incompatible with free elections, it pertained to a different international order. Thus, between February and March 1945, the Yalta Conference not only reaffirmed the Tito-Šubašić accord, but endorsed the sweeping "Declaration on Liberated Europe." The Declaration partners pledged to support interim "government authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population and pledged [support of] ... the freely elected governments responsible to the will of the people" (FRUS Yalta, 1955, 861). The betrayal of America's literal interpretation of the pledge became an evident example of Soviet duplicity. Yet for all their precision, the British approach was not much more satisfactory. In July 1945 at the Potsdam Conference, Churchill protested to Stalin that Tito's behavior in Yugoslavia had in fact become "ninety-nine to one against Britain." Stalin showed his interpretation of "interests" to be no less elastic than that of "free elections," i.e., that the Yugoslav proportions were 90 percent British, 10 percent Yugoslav, and 0 percent Russian. The Soviet Government "did not know what Tito was about to do" (Churchill, 1953, 636). As incidents between the Allies and the Partisans multiplied, Alexander Kirk, the political advisor to the Supreme Allied Command, advised the American Secretary of State "to carefully reexamine and clarify our position in respect to Yugoslavia." Kirk was concerned that Yugoslavia not be absorbed "into the Kremlin orbit" (FRUS, 1969-1972, 1945, v. 4, 1148). Charles Thayer, head of the American mission with Tito, had been highly critical of the agreement with Tito, since it left him "the only one with any real power in Yugoslavia."

Regardless of American perceptions, Secretary of State Stettinius advised that America's ambassador to the Government in Exile take up residence with the Allies in Belgrade. Undersecretary of State Joseph Grew met with the British ambassador in Washington to advise him that such "provisional recognition" would be granted (FRUS, 1969-1972, 1945, v. 4, 1183-1184). A more durable recognition would be awarded only if Tito recognized the "transitional" nature of existing political

arrangements, an unlikely outcome in view of the claims of AVNOJ (Peoples Council of National Liberation of Yugoslavia). The king allowed Šubašić to form another government for the sake of unity preceding elections. The same approach could not be carried out on the Italian-Yugoslav boundary.

The Italian-Yugoslav boundary dispute demanded immediate Allied action, for the Yugoslavs and Allied forces stood on the brink of violent confrontation as war ended. Unlike the problem of cooperation between Partisans and noncommunist political forces, the Allies could not expect Stalin's endorsement would resolve the dilemma. Nevertheless, the boundary dispute and the Tito-Šubašić Accord shared certain diplomatic features. In both cases, respectively, Britain and the United States lacked a common stand concerning territorial delineation or power distribution. Similarly, they lacked common expectations of the partisans during the war or after the peace. Generally Washington was prepared to defer the boundary to postwar conference diplomacy. The British interest in a wartime Balkan landing, as their emphasis on a division of territory, assumed that the geopolitics of war would be the basis of peace.

Yugoslavia's claims for a revised boundary including Trieste rested on Italian fascism's post-WWI annexations, its crude anti-Slavic policy of assimilation, and its membership in the defeated Axis. The Atlantic Charter deferred a territorial settlement to a postwar peace conference and upon adhering to the charter, the Foreign Minister of Yugoslavia's Government in Exile spoke of the "struggle for restitution of right and justice ... and [to] reestablish her frontiers and the freedom of the Balkan nations" (Inter-Allied Review, 15. 6. 1946, in: Howard, 1949, 342).

Postwar consideration of the boundary, however, was more complex. Policy outcomes reflected Allied wartime relations with the Partisans, Italy's surrender in 1943, and the secondary place of the Allied landing compared with Operation "Overlord" in France. In August 1944, Churchill and Tito discussed the question of an eventual Allied Military Government (AMG) in northern Italy. Churchill pressed for an AMG in order to "avoid prejudicing the final status of the disputed area" and to secure communications with central Europe (Minutes of the Anglo-Yugoslav meeting of August 12 and 13, 1944, in: Rabel, 1988, 30). Tito remained uncommitted to endorsing a broad authority for the AMG. The next month, the Second Quebec Conference occasioned an early American memorandum concerning the area. The AMG would be extended to Italy's pre-1939 boundaries, since "any other course such as letting the Tito forces occupy the Istrian Peninsula ... would undoubtedly prejudice the final disposition of the territories [and] cause deep resentment on the part of the Italian people" (Memorandum by Grew to Hopkins, in: Rabel, 1988, 31). The document did not suggest that "Tito forces" were part of a larger conspiracy, i.e., it remained a local question. Nevertheless, the goal of a smooth transition between the AMG and a decisive peace conference became less and less realistic throughout 1945.

In wartime, it was considered unreasonable to withhold supplies from the Partisans to compel agreement with the AMG, and Washington could not commit additional troops to the area while war continued in the Pacific. Tito had no intention to comply with the Allied commander, nor even with Stalin's wishes. At a meeting September 21, 1944, Tito's biographer, Vladimir Dedijer, reported a meeting in the Kremlin at which Tito resisted Stalin's pressure for any concessions to the Yugoslav monarchy. Upon a direct question, Tito stated his forces would offer "determined resistance" should the British land in Yugoslavia (Dedijer, 1953, 234). It is not clear if Tito knew of the "fifty-fifty" accord with Churchill, yet in their 1948 exchange, Tito expressed his resentment of an earlier plan to carve up Yugoslavia into "spheres of influence." Similarly, Tito's Committees of National Liberation and the AMG represented antithetical forms of organization. The AMG was temporary and nonpolitical, while the Committees were permanent and highly political, i.e., Partisan organization was not intended to be withdrawn for military reasons. AVNOJ had been discussed at Yalta and was to admit noncommunist representatives who had not collaborated. The discussion would have no obvious effect on Yugoslav behavior.

The pace and character of Italy's liberation all but invited the Partisans to a contest for Trieste. Yugoslav forces enjoyed the advantage of proximity and shorter supply lines. Field Marshall Sir Harold Alexander, Supreme Allied Commander in the Mediterranean Theater (SACMED), sought to reconcile the demands of the American military representative to attempt outright AMG occupation in Trieste and the Julian Region and Alexander's own preference for a negotiated line of demarcation. As long as the war continued, Alexander could rationalize his approach in military terms. Tito would allow use of the ports of Pula and rail connections with Trieste, but no territory in the Julian Region. The Partisans assumed command of Italian Communist resistance units, and by early May only the city of Trieste remained to be divided between the Partisans Fourth Army and advancing New Zealand Forces. Churchill had warned Truman on April 27 that Trieste must be spared from Yugoslav occupation, arguing that Roosevelt had attached "great importance" to the city as "an international port forming an outlet into the Adriatic from the regions of the Danube Basin" (FRUS, 1969-1972, 1945, v. 4, 1124). Immediately before the joint occupation of the city, Churchill branded the Partisans as "Russian Tools" contrasting their arrival in northern Italy as "conquerors" and the Allies as "liberators." Alexander Kirk, the American Ambassador in Italy, was no less emphatic. Yet Truman would not risk a direct clash between the Allies and the Yugoslavs because, he claimed, a conflict in the Balkans might jeopardize Soviet willingness to enter the war against Japan. Secretary of War Stimson was no more anxious for a challenge.

Churchill's distrust of the communists and their "National Front" arose from British experience in Greece. Insistence on "ninety percent" recognition of British

interest in Greece during Churchill's conversation with Stalin was understood by Stalin, if reluctantly by Tito (Dedijer, 1953). Neither the Soviet Union nor the Partisans were willing to aid Greek communists during wartime. But ultimately, the Greek Civil War resumed, and by late 1945 Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Albania provided aid and sanctuary to communist insurgency. Belgrade's decision to close its border with Greece in 1949 was a condition for receiving American aid after the Cominform rupture.

While the British were mainly responsible for suppression of the Communist-dominated popular front (EAM), an American presence followed developments closely. As German forces withdrew from Greece in 1944, Greek politics polarized around the well-organized popular Front and the Monarchist EDES government (Close, 1995, 127-149). To the dismay of the communists, Moscow signaled its lack of interest by recognizing the EDES government. The British were in a position to engage EAM directly. Moreover, they enjoyed support owing to their distribution of desperately needed food, a reputation for defending Greece against possible Bulgarian claims, and an Anglophilism deeper than the monarchy itself. After mutual terror between EAM's armed forces (ELAS), EDES, and their British allies, the Greek communists (KKK) concluded that a political course was necessary, and further fighting useless. EAM accepted the demobilization of its armed forces, a partial amnesty and the right to organize for elections legally (Close, 1995, 144-145, 155). The far right elements among the police used the Varkiza Accords, named for a village near Athens, as an opportunity for terror against their opponents, but for the KKK they were a critical chance to reorganize. Their leader Nikos Zachariades returned with a British escort from foreign imprisonment. The civil war would resume with deep Yugoslav involvement. As with the Italian boundary, Tito had his own objective. During the 1944 fighting, Yugoslavia and Republican Macedonia had supported Slavophone "Macedonians" who shared little sympathy for the Monarchists. Indeed, the National Guard had forced some 25,000 across the border into Bulgaria and Yugoslavia (Close, 1995, 161). Exchange of fire in the area had led to casualties on both sides.

The Postwar Interlude: The Transition in U.S. Policy

Wartime had distinguished U.S.-Yugoslav relations by subordination of conflicts to the pressing need of defeating the Axis. The Potsdam Conference offered the last evidence of this constraint. After the defeat of Japan, there were no such constraints on Washington concerning Soviet attitudes, and it was possible to risk interpreting Tito's behavior as a local case of aggressive communist totalitarianism. The first evidence of the new attitude dates from the spring of 1945 at the San Francisco Conference where Stettinius met with Šubašić. In two conversations, the American Secre-

tary effectively made resolution of the Trieste problem a condition for Lend Lease Assistance (FRUS, 1969-1972, 1945, v. 5, 1229, 1233-1234). Šubašić pleaded for support at Potsdam for the agreement with Tito. In fact, Churchill proved to be the most willing to press for a settlement of the Yugoslav issue, i.e., he called for the Conference to issue a statement that the Tito-Šubašić Accord had not been honored. Stalin objected that since Yugoslavia was an ally, the Conference could not issue such a statement in Yugoslavia's absence. The best course of action would be to invite Tito and Šubašić together. Churchill agreed, but Truman did not. He had come to the conference with more important issues than holding "a police court hearing." Yugoslav matters could wait until the peace conference (FRUS Potsdam, 1960, 129).

The next month, after Japan's surrender, the State Department was prepared for a new approach. Tito's behavior provided ample cause. The question of Trieste and the Julian region provided the occasion for a new American policy and the critical transition in American policy. During the first week of May, General Alexander sought "a purely military settlement" with the Partisans that would not prejudice an ultimate territorial outcome. Tito responded that such an agreement was no longer possible, since the war had ended (FRUS, 1969-1972, 1945, v. 4, 1142-1144). Alexander then sent his chief of staff, General William Morgan, to Belgrade to continue negotiations. The State Department now responded with a direct representation to Truman. Cavendish Cannon of the State Department's Southern European Division criticized the War Department's reluctance to become more directly involved in the region as a consequence of a mistaken viewpoint that the result of opposing the Partisans was part of a "program for building up the Italians." Cannon argued that the problem could not be exclusively "Balkan" or "Italian." "[It is] essentially one of deciding whether we are going to permit the Soviet government which operates directly on territorial settlements in the case of Poland ... to set up whatever states or boundaries look best for the future power of the USSR" (Memorandum by Cannon, 6. 5. 1945, in: Rabel, 1988, 59). It was indispensable to secure Trieste, not only on behalf of a "democratic" Italy, but as a step towards "the future peace of Europe." Undersecretary of State Joseph Grew communicated portions of the memorandum to Truman, posing the stark alternative as one of "withdrawing completely from this area ... or of implementing our present policy by threat of force to secure complete and exclusive control of Trieste and Pola, the keys to the region" (FRUS, 1969-1972, 1945, v. 4, 1152-1153). In a personal briefing with the President, Grew opined that "Russia was undoubtedly behind Tito's move with a view to utilize Trieste as a Russian port in the future." Truman recognized that it could be necessary to respond with force, but only reluctantly. In a subsequent meeting with British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden, Truman acknowledged the importance of an Allied presence in Trieste and Pula, but that "unless Tito's forces

should attack, it is impossible for me to involve this country in another war" (Truman, 1955, 248). The situation would not come to that.

Truman sent his personal emissary Harry Hopkins to Moscow within a few days of the meeting with Eden. The accompanying message placed "restraint" of Tito along with the important of "free elections" in Eastern Europe, although the tone expressed consequences only for public opinion-not for American policy. The trip had the desired effect as far as Trieste was concerned. Truman proposed to Churchill that Alexander and Eisenhower organize "a show of strength" that might have more persuasive impact (Truman, 1955, 249). To the extent possible Partisan administration in Trieste had been directed much like its administration elsewhere in Yugoslavia. "Popular institutions" were created to deal with potential anticommunist organizations and individuals. Incidents between Allied and Yugoslav forces aggravated tensions. On May 21, the Yugoslav government announced its willingness to accept AMG control in Trieste along with a demarcation line proposed by General Morgan. Despite Alexander's reluctance to press the matter of Pula, it too was presented to Tito as a final draft agreement on June 2 (FRUS, 1969-1972, 1945, v. 4, 1181-1182). Ten days later "Zone A" divided by the Morgan Line from "Zone B" became the basis of the agreement. By including Istria on Zone B and the "Free Territory of Trieste" in Zone A, the agreement effectively limited further negotiations to the narrow strip about 11 miles long dividing the southern boundary of "Zone A" with the northern boundary of "Zone B." Initial American insistence that AMG be extended to the entire Julian area was simply abandoned, while in its place AMG government sought to insure rights of the Slovene minority and to distinguish AMG's rule from the remainder of Italy.

The Trieste question now shifted to the meetings of the Council of Foreign Ministers (CFM) in September 1945 and on several occasions in 1946. At the first meeting, Italy and Yugoslavia submitted rival territorial claims. Although all agreed that Trieste should remain a free port, Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union claimed the city for Yugoslav sovereignty, while Italy, the United States and Britain sought to retain it for Italy. Secretary of State James Byrnes suggested a four power commission of experts to recommend a new boundary based mainly on ethnic criteria as well as "local geographic and economic factors" (Byrnes, 1947, 124). The issue made no progress until the CFM resumed meetings in 1946. By that time, the character of Yugoslav-American relations had developed as a separate issue.

The Tito-Šubašić agreement had broken down by October 1945 in large part to Communist manipulation of nominations for the November scheduled parliamentary elections. Ambassador Richard Patterson and Counselor Harold Shantz took the occasion of Šubašić's resignation to advise that Washington insist on postponement of the elections. Shantz considered Yugoslavia had become a "ruthless totalitarian police regime" whose consolidation would "abandon all prospects for democracy in

this country" (FRUS, 1969-1972, 1945, v. 5, 1257). The United States, therefore, should threaten to withdraw recognition unless elections were properly conducted. Byrnes agreed with American representatives that Šubašić's resignation amounted to a revision of the Yalta Conference's understanding. Byrnes requested that Ambassador W. Averell Harriman seek from Stalin a joint statement asking the elections be postponed until a common government were reestablished. Stalin replied that he considered no such postponement necessary (FRUS, 1969-1972, 1945, v. 5, 1270-1275).

Instead, the American Secretary sought support from the British, although British practice concerning recognition, the change of government, and Britain's deepening involvement in Greece made unlikely a strong representation. The joint note of November 9 said little. The single list of candidates had caused Šubašić to resign and both powers found that such a situation was "inimical to the exercise of democratic processes and prejudicial to the validity of the elections now contemplated." Without the guarantees of the Tito-Šubašić agreement, Yugoslavia would not enjoy the "prestige" of a democratic government (FRUS, 1969-1972, 1945, v. 5, 1281). Popular Front candidates received 90% of the vote, allowing Tito to claim the prewar parties had simply been rejected. The following month Tito proclaimed the People's Federated Republic of Yugoslavia, and a subsequent constitution based on that of the Soviet Union. The State Department's Chief of Southern European Affairs, Samuel Reber, advised the Secretary that although the elections were not democratic, there would be no purpose in withholding recognition, along with a note expressing condemnation of the regime's policies (FRUS, 1969-1972, 1945, v. 5, 1289). Patterson presented the note with his credentials late in December 1945. Secretary Byrnes refused to permit the note to be published at the time despite Patterson's condemnation of this "satellite" of the USSR and his foreboding about recognition. Tito was not indifferent to Anglo-American attitudes towards Yugoslavia, and in early January he requested an invitation to visit the United States in order to discuss "conditions for a loan" and to present his "point of view on political and economic questions" (FRUS, 1969-1972, 1946, v. 6, 867-868). The request was firmly rejected.

The Cold War Emerges

If we consider the "Cold War" to be distinguished by a significant domestic involvement in diplomatic conflict, it is possible to date that transition from early 1946. The episode did not involve diplomatic conflict, but the trial of General Draža Mihailović. The Chetnik leader had been captured in mid-March 1946. The United States appealed for justice on his behalf, an act of "interference" Belgrade rejected stoutly (Yugoslavia, 1946, 634, 669). Djilas' recollection of the event is worth an extensive quotation, for it demonstrates a dynamic quality quite unlike earlier diplo-

matic exchanges. Preparations for a trial started promptly. "We had no control over its significance or the direction it would take, still less so because most of the Western press lined up in his defense. ... Now the West glorified him even more for fighting the communists. ... Obviously the situation called for public trial."... (Djilas, 1985, 35). The popular magazine, *The Saturday Evening Post*, published an article, "The Cost of Our Yugoslav Blunder," based on a journalist's tour, warning about Tito the "extremist" and his plans for a pro-Soviet Balkan Union" (Smith, 1945, in: Lees, 1976, 60). Congressional and Senate Resolutions condemned the Mihailović trial. American Serbian groups, such as the Serb National Federation, now commanded national attention. The Mihailović trial was not a unique example. Although not the subject of a diplomatic note, the trial of Archbishop Alojz Stepinec outraged Croatian and Catholic opinion.

But the most serious incident occurred early in August, when a United States Air Transport Service plane was forced down over Yugoslavia on its way between Rome and Vienna. On August 19 a second plane was shot down and the bodies of its five flyers found just over the boundary with Austria. Byrnes later acknowledged that Belgrade had charge the United States with no less than 176 violations of Yugoslav airspace, although he failed to mention that the violations had taken place between July 16 and August 8 (Byrnes, 1947, 144; FRUS, 1969-1972, 1946, v. 6, 915). Thus, there was ample cause for Djilas to remark that American military aircraft "simply took no account of our sovereignty" (Djilas, 1985, 41). In fact, the very public incidents involving the downed aircraft concealed a second "aircraft" problem. On May 27th, the Embassy received a "peremptory" note withdrawing the use of the Zemun base for American Embassy aircraft personnel (FRUS, 1969-1972, 1946, v. 6, 894). The impact was especially inconvenient due to the absence of civilian aircraft and dependence on the Zemun facility of American and Allied diplomatic personnel accredited in Hungary and the Balkans. Communication with Washington from Belgrade fell to Chargé Harold Shantz in the absence of Ambassador Patterson. Shantz pointed out that "harassment of our Embassy through official malice, stupidity or both continues daily" (FRUS, 1969-1972, 1946, v. 6, 895). For American aircraft to use Zemun, it was now necessary to request 48 hour advanced permission for each flight and provide a detailed manifest of the plane's personnel and contents. After July 18, aircraft flying between Vienna and Belgrade were compelled to enter Yugoslavia through Subotica in Vojvodina, and necessarily from Hungary. Soviet permission was required for such flights. U.S. aircraft that did land were "immediately surrounded by armed guards [while] passengers and crew are escorted by armed guards ... [and] the crew not allowed to approach the aircraft until cleared for departure" (FRUS, 1969-1972, 1946, v. 6, 914). The details of daily relations began to make evident Yugoslavia's geostrategic importance through its seven neighboring states. A break in relations would have regional impact.

Shantz did not believe Soviet influence decisive in the matter of aircraft restriction. His analysis was that Tito "makes decisions which show that he has the final authority." He denied that Soviet "observers" were present in the Foreign Ministry, while affirming that the NKVD maintained an office in Belgrade (FRUS, 1969-1972, 1946, v. 6, 916). He was aware that the aircraft incident involved an unpleasant reciprocity. Shantz reported that his Yugoslav contacts insisted that the United States could resolve the aircraft problem at Zemun by addressing three issues of "vital importance" for Yugoslavia, i.e., the ceasing of "constant" overflights, the release of 166 Yugoslav merchant vessels held in Austria, and opening rail connections with Austria (FRUS, 1969-1972, 1946, v. 6, 910). The conflict remained unresolved.

Finally, the first incident involving American military aircraft touched the issue of American aid to Yugoslavia through UNRRA (United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Agency) in wounding an UNRRA official. Byrnes actively, and unsuccessfully, sought to have aid discontinued after the second incident. He told Undersecretary of State for Economic Affairs, William Clayton, "I want you to do everything we properly can do to stop further shipments of supplies of any sort... (FRUS, 1969-1972, 1946, v. 6, 930). Clayton was unwilling to allow the program to become politicized owing to American commitments to the United Nations and to his refusal to grant any propaganda advantage to the Soviet Union. The debate over UNRRA assistance to Yugoslavia came to involve the Congress. Byrnes' Undersecretary, Dean Acheson, revealed to Senator William F. Knowland that by the end of July 1946 Yugoslavia had received \$327,578,000 in commodities and was scheduled to receive \$102,000 more, i.e., more than ten times the amount granted as Lend Lease during the war (FRUS, 1969-1972, 1946, v. 6, 931). Seventy-three percent of UNRRA aid was American, and much of it food and heavy equipment that could be diverted for military use. Acheson opposed the "drastic action" of curtailing aid, and the decision remained in effect through the creation of the European Recovery Program in 1947 (FRUS, 1969-1972, 1946, v. 6, 933).

Tito's regrets about the loss of American lives and his promise that no such incident would be repeated averted irresistible pressure for economic sanctions. Nevertheless, compared with the prolonged tension over the Italian boundary, Yugoslavia's management of UNRRA and the aircraft issues appears episodic and reciprocal. The American diplomat John C. Campbell explained the depth of Yugoslav resentment imposed by the 1945 settlement, e.g., an act of "brute force [and] the betrayal of an ally. ..." "It was difficult for the British and Americans to grasp the depth of the anger felt, not just by the communist led regime ... but also by the people, regardless of political persuasion. The Yugoslavs sensed a finality in this "provisional" decision, just as they had anticipated the finality of their own "'liberation' of the city" (Campbell, 1976, 7). Trieste became a symbol of unredeemed sacrifice comparable to Serbian rights in establishing Yugoslavia's internal order after the First World

War. For the United States and Britain, the entire boundary question was altogether different, a local, if critical, example of Allied responsibility for insuring the peace, and rehabilitating Italy from fascism. The "gravest problem" according to Truman's report from Stettinius was to "forestall Yugoslav occupation ... prejudicing by unilateral action a final equitable settlement ... and precipitating serious trouble with Italy" (Truman, 1995, 16). In August 1945, AMG officials in Trieste and Zone A published General Order No. 11 establishing its own monopoly for "administrative, legislative, executive or other powers of government" (AMG Gazette [1], 15. 9. 1945, in: Rabel, 1988, 81). Partisan organizations and institutions were disestablished. Tito might have recalled Stalin's remark reported by Djilas, "Whoever occupies a territory also imposes on it his own social system. Everyone imposes his system as far as his army can reach. It cannot be otherwise" (Djilas, 1962, 49). Soviet diplomacy would support Yugoslav claims-to a point-and Yugoslavia's struggle to realize, in Truman's phrase, "a final equitable settlement."

At the initial meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers (CFM) in September, Italy and Yugoslavia submitted incompatible boundary claims.² The Western powers and the USSR recognized only a vague commitment to ethnic considerations of the peoples and internationalization of the city. At the 1945 meeting, the Council adopted Byrnes' proposal for a four-power "expert" commission to recommend a boundary, but the "experts" simply produced four different solutions.³ A Soviet line assigning all of Trieste and Istria to Yugoslavia ran from Monfalcone northeast to Udine and Tolmezzo, while the Allied lines ran parallel from northern Istria east to Gorizia. Allied differences centered on Istria with the United States and British lines assigning Pula to Italy and differing over Albona in southeast Istria, which the United States included within Italy. What became known as the "French Line" assigned to Yugoslavia most of Istria, except its northwestern corner. When the CFM resumed discussion in June 1946, Molotov proposed a "compromise." A new boundary between the French and earlier Soviet "expert" line was advanced, leaving Trieste as an "autonomous district" administered by a governor jointly chosen by Italy and Yugoslavia, or by the CFM itself in the event of their disagreement (FRUS, 1969-1972, 1946, v. 2, 714-715). Byrnes rejected out of hand Molotov's proposal that Trieste be placed under Yugoslav sovereignty. Byrnes was prepared to accept an international regime for the city, but one under the authority of the United Nations and not the CFM.

² Kardelj proposed the "proper line of demarcation," with certain changes, to be the 1914 boundary between the Austro-Hungarian Empire and Italy, proposed the so-called "Wilson Line" proposed after WWI, i.e., consideration of the "550,000" Italians in Venezia Giulia. The "Wilson Line" is included on a map facing p. 252 in *FRUS* 1945, v. 2. Statements of Kardelj and De Gaspari are in *FRUS*, 1969-1972, 1946, v. 2, 141-143.

³ The "Experts" boundaries are reproduced on a map facing p. 152 (*FRUS*, 1969-1972, 1945, v. 2).

Much of the open discussion of the CFM centered on the question of the city's rule, after bilateral discussion and acceptance of the French Line as the boundary. Secondary issues remained such as adoption of the phrase "Free Territory of Trieste" (FTT), the practical problems of governing a city whose hinterland was limited to the "immediately adjacent area," and the issue of which decisions the CFM would leave to the peace conference itself. Byrnes' acceptance of the French Line would have deferred settlement of the FTT's territorial extent and its regime to the Peace Conference. Molotov insisted that at the larger forum, discussion of the boundary would become an occasion "to inflame passions" instead of affording a regime statute greater legitimacy as Byrnes maintained (FRUS, 1969-1972, 1946, v. 2, 723). Byrnes was especially adamant about installing a strong governor for the FTT; later he would write about the danger of repeating the "unhappy experience" of the League of Nations with the city of Danzig. "Because the High Commissioner appointed by the League had been powerless to protect the integrity of that city after a well organized Nazi minority had captured control of the local legislature, we were determined that the Governor of Trieste should be invested with strong powers" (Byrnes, 1947, 147-148). The comparison of a Nazi "coup" and "infiltration" of Danzig were drawn explicitly.

Given an opportunity to express their viewpoints, Alcide De Gaspari (Italy) and Edvard Kardelj (Yugoslavia) opposed internationalization of Trieste, the former "absolutely" and the latter because such a decision would be made by the CFM. Kardelj rejected the French Line because it would deny Slovenia a coastline and because of the number of Slovenes remaining under Italian rule (Byrnes, 1947, 725-28). The CFM finally agreed to include the French Line in its recommendations to the Peace Conference, although for the United States the larger boundary was acceptable only with the negotiation of satisfactory arrangements for the FTT. The CFM also agreed that the territory itself would be "bounded by a line drawn from Duino to the French Line." FTT "integrity and independence" would be "assured" by the Security Council, while its provisional government and permanent statute agreed by the Peace Conference. Finally, the CFM agreed to create another Commission representing itself to meet with Italian and Yugoslav representatives to examine "the whole subject" of the statute and to present its recommendations to the Peace Conference.

A comprehensive examination of all issues pertaining to Yugoslavia and the United States at the Peace Conference is beyond the scope of this paper. Some questions, the Austrian boundary and Italian reparations, were important for Yugoslavia, but only the issue of the FTT can be said to have demonstrated persistent political objectives of lasting importance for bilateral relations. Yugoslav attitudes towards the boundary were the most emphatically advanced. In his first address to the Conference, Kardelj in plenary session rejected the French Line for "exchanging [the principle of] an ethnic frontier for a so-called ethnic balance"; for its "negation of

what is most fundamental ... in the universal struggle with Fascism..." and for the "further injustice of taking Trieste from Yugoslavia" (Byrnes, 1947, 752-53). In Committee, the Yugoslav representative Aleš Bebler devoted 14 pages of a "19 page exposition to proving that Trieste should become an integral part of Yugoslavia, but ended by offering to make "a last effort to avoid a failure of the peace conference" (FRUS, 1969-1972, 1946, v. 3, 74) in proposing a plan of internationalizing Trieste. In the American view, the proposal attempted to create a government of the FTT "from liberation committees and certain other political groups ... [that included] all the Yugoslav and pro-Yugoslav groups in Zone A" (FRUS 1946, v. 3, 3). Soviet thinking about the statute was correspondingly designed to keep the "power of Governor to a minimum and to place maximum power in a local assembly." But in discussion, the Soviets acknowledged the need to revise the draft granting the Governor wider powers to fulfill his "responsibilities" to the Security Council (FRUS, 1969-1972, 1946, v. 3, 20). Compared with questions at the conference whose discussion occasioned greater Soviet tenacity, the Trieste issue revealed greater Soviet flexibility. Thus, despite their acceptance of the "international" status, Yugoslavia's proposed draft referred to the "Free City of Trieste" (a less permanent designation?) "closely associated with Yugoslavia" (FRUS, 1969-1972, 1946, v. 4, 758). Trieste and Yugoslavia would then constitute a "true union," whose foreign relations would be represented through Belgrade.

A French delegation's proposal for the FTT was adopted by the Conference on October 10, leaving final approval of the statute for the CFM (FRUS, 1969-1972, 1946, v. 4, 790). American acceptance of the French proposal required little compromise. Soviet efforts at the CFM meeting sought to weaken the FTT executive, however, were abandoned. The treaty was signed on February 10, 1947, despite vigorous Italian and Yugoslav protest. American policy was guided by several strong and unchanging factors. Samuel Reber, an advisor to the American delegation, wrote a lengthy analysis of the boundary issue that appears to have been instrumental in shaping Byrnes' thinking. In it Reber provided a rationale for American policy that compared the Trieste statute with that of Danzig; a comparison Byrnes would cite in his memoirs. Reber cited the "very efficient Yugoslav political organization already established in the area," and Yugoslavia's "obvious intent to seize control of the territory through any means..." (FRUS, 1969-1972, 1946, v. 4, 8842). Finally, he sent along a memorandum from the British delegation concerning Trieste, whose intent was to alert Byrnes and to stiffen his resolve. The document described the "Russians and Yugoslavs" as "co-conspirators to prevent the creation of a truly neutralised territory." The "terrifying fragile" FTT was subject to a "high pitch" of "racial animosities" [sic] and a "precarious" economic outlook. Both the British and American analyses stressed the vulnerability of the FTT to destabilization after the replacement of the AMG by a provisional government.

The overwhelming consensus of diplomatic reports from Italy and Venezia Giulia placed the preservation of Allied order in the region as basic to maintaining Western order in Italy. Many Italians believed that since the Allies were responsible for disarming Italy, they were also responsible for defending it against an aggressive Yugoslavia. For most of 1946 and 1947, local conditions in Zone A were precarious if not "terrifyingly fragile." American diplomats and military officers reported a litany of dangers from early 1946 - "concentrations" of Yugoslav troops in Zone B, the "deplorable effect" on opinion of American demobilization, the depressing level of "civilian morale," "hysteria" among some Italians about the region's future, and "obstruction" of AMG work by pro-Yugoslav groups (FRUS, 1969-1972, 1946, v. 6, 874, 876, 878, 882). It was hardly surprising that no governor could be appointed as the FTT statute envisioned in view of the progressively deteriorating relations between Washington and Moscow. Instead, Britain and the United States communicated to Belgrade and Moscow their "firm intention" to maintain Zone A and to resist encroachment by force. The Allies were concerned that even if Trieste were held and Zone A lost, the result would be a break in communications between Trieste and Austria along with a "considerable loss of [Allied] prestige" (FRUS, 1969-1972, 1946, v. 6, 876). Instead of creating the FTT in September 1947 as planned in the Peace Treaty, British and American officials came to see the FTT as a dangerous outpost in the Cold War subject to Yugoslav subversion.

Bilateral Relations at a Nadir: The Greek Crisis

Increasingly the Administration's perception of Yugoslavia as a Soviet "satellite" found support in virtually every area of Belgrade's diplomatic and military activity. Although Yugoslav authorities paid compensation for the downing of the American military transport, the episode seemed consistent with other points of contact. Bilateral conflict arising from the Greek Civil War presented a distinctive and somewhat ironic situation. The Greek crisis by late 1946 included elements similar to those present in subsequent Cold War conflicts such as Vietnam and Afghanistan. Like these and other episodes, the Greek government was subject to increasing subversion through, in part, its use of repression over political means of conflict resolution; its economic situation was dismal and demanded extensive assistance; and its boundaries and ethnicity created a difficult defensive situation for Western military assistance.

Initially, American postwar attitudes indicated little interest. In an early general assessment of postwar military assistance, a coordinating committee from the Departments of State, War, and Navy found it "desirable" to cooperate with the British in Greece "to maintain security especially along the north and northwestern frontier" (FRUS, 1969-1972, 1946, v. 1, 1158). The level of effort would "depend on the

extent of armament in neighboring countries." The report noted "disagreement" about the Greek situation, although the comment was as appropriate to British and American attitudes as those between the Allies and the Soviet Union. Britain was deeply committed to the Greek monarchist government, but the United States was critical of Greek behavior at the Peace Conference, as well as with the government's disorganization, and the country's increasing polarization around "totalitarian rightist and leftists" (FRUS, 1969-1972, 1946, v. 4, 883; 1947, v. 5, 10). In response to British interest that the United States assist Greece, Undersecretary Acheson reminded Britain's ambassador that as of July 1946 "despite frequent reminders," Athens had failed to use a \$25 m. credit granted in 1945 and showed little "ability" to make use of such funds (FRUS, 1969-1972, 1946, v. 7, 182). Finally, American reluctance to become involved reflected the sheer scope of the challenge. The American chargé expressed the difficulty. "A modern army of 50,000 men is well beyond Greek financial resources and several times that number, all well equipped, would be required even to make a pretense of defending the northern frontier as a whole" (FRUS, 1969-1972, 1946, v. 7, 140). Greek claims against Bulgaria, even were they fulfilled, would not improve the situation; claims against "Northern Epirus" (Albania) evoked some sympathy, but little real support; of course, there were no claims involving Vardar (Yugoslavia) Macedonia, since the country was a former ally.

Yet, Yugoslavia was deeply involved. As early as March 1946, the communist leader Zachariades met with Tito and received promises of extensive assistance for which he offered the promise of Aegean Macedonia's autonomy under a communist regime (Close, 1995, 182). Tito recommended a guerrilla challenge to the monarchist unlike Stalin, who urged the Party (KKK) to take part in the elections scheduled for March 31. Instead, Zachariades announced that the KKK would abstain, assuring the monarchists a parliamentary majority. Meanwhile, the Greek regime began a wholesale repression of the left, a policy that necessarily singled out Slavophone Macedonians. The policy had the effect of providing the KKK with an ample source of guerrilla recruits for the Democratic Army of Greece (DSE) under communist control (Close, 1995, 195-196). In October, Tito placed the Yugoslav inspired Macedonian Popular Liberation Front (SNOF) under Greek communist command. There is evidence that Byrnes was aware of the situation on the Greek border. The Greek scholar Stephen Xydis reports a meeting "in late summer 1946" from Greek sources between Byrnes and Premier Tsaldaris in which Byrnes claimed that General Lucius Clay in Germany reported a plan for Albania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria to work with the KKK "to overthrow the Greek Government and take over Macedonia, Thrace and Epirus" (Xydis, 1963, 639). Although Tsaldaris found Byrnes sympathetic and prepared to offer economic aid, there is no indication that any further steps followed the meeting.

Instead, in December, the Greek government lodged a complaint with the Security Council claiming that Albania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria threatened Greece's territorial integrity. In response, the three communist states charged Greece with border provocations. The Ukrainian delegate's involvement in the debate, in lieu of the Soviet, was an unusual feature of the debate. The American representative Hershel Johnson supported the Greek claim but avoided a direct challenge to Yugoslavia. He ridiculed the suggestion that Greece could threaten the northern boundaries whose states disposed of armies "at least five times larger than Greece's." As for Yugoslavia, Johnson considered that Belgrade's true aim was not to protect Slavophone Macedonians, but to create an "autonomous state [which] would undoubtedly be the elder and favorite daughter of Yugoslavia if such were accomplished" (Xydis, 1963, 352). Instead, the United States, acknowledging the border tensions, proposed creation of a commission under the Security Council that would examine the situation directly.

By early 1947, the tone of American diplomatic reporting expressed greater alarm. On February 7, Ambassador Lincoln MacVeagh reported Greek military intelligence concerning "especially lively guerrilla activity on all areas of Greece's northern regions. ..." Moreover, their goal was to extend activity "southward through central Greece" (FRUS, 1969-1972, 1947, v. 5, 10). On February 21, Acheson reported to Secretary George Marshall what became the basis of the Truman Doctrine regarding Greece, i.e., that the country "probably will be unable to maintain her independent ... [since] Soviet dominated governments ... are making every effort to prevent any improvement in Greek internal affairs ... [and] these efforts are designed to make untenable the position of any Greek government not subservient to Soviet aims" (FRUS, 1969-1972, 1947, v. 5, 29). Three days later the British ambassador informed Marshall that Britain's decision to withdraw from Greece on March 31 remained firm. Truman's speech on March 21 to Congress proposed \$300 M of aid to Greece and \$100 M to Turkey. Greece would resist communist "terrorism" and its "accomplices north of the border." Truman later wrote that there was "no doubt that the rebels were masterminded from the satellite countries" (Truman, 1955, 131-132). Later in the spring when the United Nations Commission found Greece's neighbors guilty of supporting the rebels, the United States began a campaign to answer the three communist states who threatened the peace "under the direction of the USSR" (FRUS, 1969-1972, 1947, v. 5, 867).

During 1947 through the spring of 1948, bilateral relations appear only to have multiplied points of contention. In the words of the new Ambassador Cavandish Cannon, Trieste and its adjacent zones became a "proving ground both for American and Soviet intentions" (FRUS, 1969-1972, 1947, v. 5, 123). Allied soldiers, he noted, were occasionally detained by Yugoslav authorities and subject to "serious maltreatment" before their return. Efforts to introduce troops into Zone A, in accord

with Belgrade's interpretation of the Peace Treaty, were blocked by the Allies as a "carefully planned coup" (FRUS, 1969-1972, 1947, v. 5, 91). Americans still sought compensation for the downed aircraft. In addition to the problems common to Western diplomatic relations with socialist states, an embittering series of arrests and trials of Yugoslav employees of the U.S. began on December 31, 1946. The American Embassy in Belgrade employed 38 Yugoslavs and the Zagreb Consulate 8. The arrests of eight employees, their conviction for espionage and execution or lengthy imprisonment was perceived as a "premeditated plan to impede and interfere with the Embassy's work and intimidate its personnel" (FRUS, 1969-1972, 1947, v. 5, 751). Again in January, an employee, an American citizen long resident in Yugoslavia, was arrested and sentenced to death for espionage; although the sentence was commuted to 20 years after vigorous protest, the arrest and interrogation of embassy employees continued.

Belgrade complained as well. Yugoslav Foreign Minister Vladimir Velebit cited blocked accounts, frozen gold reserves, unpaid reparations "(FRUS, 1969-1972, 1947, v. 5, 765-769, 771-775). American authorities refused to extradite war criminals unless they were identified by the United Nations War Crimes Tribunal. The United States acknowledged that the financial issues were a convenient "bargaining lever," especially in view of the overall state of relations and the unresolved status of American property nationalized by the authorities. Patterson left as American Ambassador in the spring of 1947. Briefly, John Cabot assumed the post, although his abrasive style appears to have accomplished little except to maintain communication. In December Cannon replaced Cabot. Tito promptly requested an audience with Cabot's successor. Curiously for Ambassador Cannon, Tito's most pressing interests were economic, i.e., the removal of the ban on tourism and release of Yugoslav gold" (FRUS, 1969-1972, 1948, v. 4, 1062).

Tito's Expulsion from the Cominform: A Partial Conclusion

There is little evidence to suggest that Tito anticipated the Cominform expulsion, for the organization's founding meeting had been in Belgrade. Thus, there was no need to change relations with the United States. Despite Velebit's and Tito's insistence that they desired improved American relations, both remained unflinching in their refusal to concede to American interests in any change concerning Greece or the FTT. Cannon concluded that Yugoslavia "stands out as [the] Soviets most faithful and conscientious collaborator" (FRUS, 1969-1972, 1948, v. 4, 1061). Marshall, however, rejected any withdrawal of representation in retaliation as an "essentially negative course [that would] deny us certain information ... and prevent our endeavoring to protect American interests in the Balkans..." (FRUS, 1969-1972, 1948, v. 4, 313). Moreover, Cannon reflected Marshall's thinking in considering

Yugoslavia the "most important satellite in the Russian orbit." Moreover, American observers were alert to the first indications of a split with Stalin when that importance would increase. Although trials of the "Cominformists" Sreten Zujović And Andrije Hebrang were taken as a result of party conflict and the dismal economic situation, the American chargé Borden Reams correctly perceived Belgrade's insistence on hosting a conference on the Danube regime against Soviet wishes as "the first direct and irrevocable challenge" to Stalin (FRUS, 1969-1972, 1948, v. 4, 1073).

Yugoslavia was expelled from the Cominform on June 28, 1948. By the next month, George Kennan's National Security Report no. 18 set a broad and novel direction in U.S. policy. The United States would be prepared to assist Tito in exchange for demonstrating a "loyal and cooperative attitude"⁴ American policy followed the advice of Walter Bedel Smith, the United States Ambassador in Moscow, i.e., not to appear "overeager to draw Tito in our direction" in view of the "harm" that could follow among Tito's own supporters (FRUS, 1969-1972, 1948, v. 4, 1097).

The results of the new situation in areas of greatest Yugoslav-American conflict, Greece and the FTT, were not as immediate as some State Department analysts believed. Yugoslavia's expulsion from the Cominform took place a few months after the so-called "Tripartite Declaration" on Trieste of March 20. The United States, Britain and France announced their intention to support the return of the FTT to Italian sovereignty. The announcement was made for the benefit of noncommunist parties in Italy's approaching elections, but without Soviet and Yugoslav cooperation, there was no possibility of abolishing the FTT. The Allies received the desired electoral vote in Italy, and on June 13 in the FTT itself. Failing a return to Italy of the FTT, they simply returned to support the status quo. Late in 1949, the Yugoslavs would approach the United States to consider supporting a negotiated outcome with Italy for the entire question.

The Greek situation differed. The war in Greece was at its most intense in mid-1948. Given American support for the government, it is probable that the rebels would not have prevailed over time. Nevertheless, Belgrade's decision to close the border, effectively denying sanctuary to the rebels, amounted to a severe blow. Yugoslavia received American credits of \$20 M. after the decision, and far more subsequently. The quid pro quo nature of the action should not be understood as a cynical choice. The Cominform blockade made assistance to the rebels an impossible luxury. It was Stalin, not Tito, who effectively ended the rebels' cause.

In the introduction, several questions were raised that recommend a tentative answer. The progress of Tito from ally to enemy was based on a misperception of both roles. The United States envisioned a world in which the "United Nations" would

⁴ For the background on NSC 18, see Lees (1996, 53-55).

govern in a reprise of the "war to end all wars." The shock and disappointment in response to communist policy was directed at Tito especially because of yet another misperception. Yugoslavia was seen as a willing and anxious satellite who earned the status of a near equal to Stalin. Yugoslavia's intransigence was less the response of a proxy than a zealous disciple, whose commitment was rewarded with the privilege of initiative. Second, America's response to the former ally was gradual but eventually provoked conflict. The decision to violate Yugoslav airspace was emblematic as was the refusal to extend UNNRA supplies. Economic retaliation suggested a world view where American dominance could be obtained "on the cheap" without violence. There is no evidence that the United States sought to threaten Belgrade directly.

Finally, the problem of multilateral (Anglo-American) decision making contributed considerably to Yugoslav-American conflict. At first, Washington deferred to the British at Yalta and earlier concerning expectations of the Partisans. When Britain effectively abandoned independent involvement in the Balkans outside of Greece, the United States confronted a resurgent communist power not entirely of its own making. Had United States involvement compelled a different policy towards Mihailović, it would have felt greater responsibility for Yugoslav developments. The lack of that sense worsened relations for both sides.

POLITIKA ZDRUŽENIH DRŽAV AMERIKE DO JUGOSLAVIJE PO DRUGI SVETOVNI VOJNI

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POVZETEK

Povojni jugoslovansko-ameriški spor je postal osrednja tema zgodnje faze hladne vojne. Konflikt med tema dvema državama je bil posledica kombinacije ozemeljskih in političnih vprašanj, ki jih je bilo čedalje bolj čutiti tudi v notranji politiki obeh držav. Prvo bistveno vprašanje, katerega začetek je se segal v povojno diplomacijo, je bila določitev jugoslovanske-italijanske meje. Američani so si prizadevali, da bi bil sporazum sklenjen v skladu z načeli, kot so bila zapisana v Atlantsski listini, in da to območje do izida multilateralnih pogajanj nadzira zavezniška vojaška uprava. Jugoslavija pa se je zavzemala za takšen sporazum, ki bi bil v korist interesov tega medvojnega lojalnega zaveznika in bi zagotavljal neposredno udeležbo lokalnih "narodnoosvobodilnih komitejev". Začasni kompromis, po katerem so nastali "Cona A in B" in "Svobodno tržaško ozemlje", je sicer preprečil nasilje, zato pa bolj malo pripomogel k izboljšanju odnosov med državama.

Z bilateralnimi problemi so se spori samo še povečevali. Eden najresnejših izmed njih je bil posledica sporazuma, ki sta ga podpisala Tito in Šubašić, namernega kršenja jugoslovanskega zračnega prostora in sestrelitve ameriškega letala, reakcije Washingtona na sojenje Mihailoviću in Stepincu, in dodelovanja pomoči UNRRE po vojni. Ti incidenti, ki jih je bilo čutiti tudi v notranji politiki obeh držav, so odsevali klasični amalgam politike hladne vojne. Nekakšen nadomestni konflikt je potem postal jugoslovanska in ameriška podpora nasprotujočima se stranema v grški državljanski vojni: navdihnil je ameriško "Trumanovo doktrino" in mobiliziral slovensko govoreče Makedonce na obeh straneh meje. Odnosi med državama so se začeli zlagoma izboljševati šele po sporu Jugoslavije s kominformom in blokadi, ki je sledila in hkrati preprečila nadaljnjo podporo grškim upornikom.

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