

CENTRE AND PERIPHERY IN NAPOLEONIC ITALY:  
THE NATURE OF IMPERIAL RULE  
IN THE *DÉPARTEMENTS RÉUNIS*, 1802-1814

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**ABSTRACT**

*This article attempts to examine the relationship between the structures of the Napoleonic state and the peoples of the Italian peninsula during the French occupation of Italy between 1802 and 1814. It concentrates on those parts of the peninsula which were directly under French rule, the départements réunis. In these places, unlike the two satellite kingdoms of Italy and Naples, the French could, if they thought it best, replace local elites and administrators, with French officials. They did this on an appreciable scale, when the either met local resistance to their rule, or if they felt the local elites could not adapt to their system of rule. Thus, this process represents an interesting example of a foreign empire attempting to rule without the help of a "third element", a set of circumstances crucial for the future development of the modern state in Italy, as well for the model of modern imperialism.*

*Key words: Centralization, Missions, Patron/Client networks, dirigisme, campanilismo, Apennine spine, Imperialism*

CENTRO E PERIFERIA NELL'ITALIA NAPOLEONICA:  
LA NATURA DEL RUOLO IMPERIALE NEI *DÉPARTEMENTS RÉUNIS*, 1802-1814

**SINTESI**

*L'articolo intende esaminare le relazioni tra le strutture dello stato napoleonico e le popolazioni della penisola italiana durante l'occupazione francese dell'Italia tra il 1802 e il 1814. Si concentra su quelle parti della penisola che erano direttamente sotto il dominio francese, i départements réunis. In questi luoghi, a differenza dei due regni satelliti d'Italia e di Napoli, i francesi avrebbero potuto, se avessero pensato che fosse stato meglio, sostituire le élite e gli amministratori locali con dei funzionari francesi. Lo fecero in modo notevole nell'incontrare resistenze locali al loro dominio, o nei casi in cui ritennero che le élite locali non potessero adattarsi al loro sistema di governo. Questo processo rappresenta un esempio interessante del tentativo di un impero straniero di governare*

*senza l'aiuto di un "terzo elemento", una condizione che si è rivelata cruciale per il futuro sviluppo dello stato moderno in Italia e di un modello di imperialismo moderno.*

*Parole chiave: centralizzazione, missioni, Patron/Client networks, dirigismo, campanilismo, Appennini, imperialismo*

The weakness of the state in the Italian peninsula, in the face of the defiant durability of localism and archaism, has long been embodied in the concept of *stato civile/stato reale*. The period of Napoleonic domination is generally seen as a crucial period in this process of estrangement between state and citizen, as well as in the process of state-building. The *epoca francese* was the moment when Italian society at every level was exposed to the model of the centralised nation-state shaped by the French Revolution, and the experience is generally regarded as the single most formative influence on the process of state-building in the region. This study seeks to explore the influence of Napoleonic rule from an aspect of the problem of *stato civile/stato reale*, that of the relationship between the centre of the state and its periphery, with a particular concentration on the problems of cultural mediation in the context of a state that was *dirigiste* new and often, alien.

The specific set of historical circumstances which brought the Italian states into the Napoleonic empire makes the relationship between the concept of *stato civile/stato reale*, that of centre-and-periphery, and the figure of the cultural mediator a useful combination of phenomena for the exploration of Napoleonic rule in Italy, and in the territories which became the *départements réunis*, in particular, for two main reasons. The first justification for the centrality of the concept of centre and periphery to the history of the state in Napoleonic Italy is the vastly different political cultures that had evolved in France and the Hesperian peninsula in the early modern period, an *évolution de longue durée* which the reforms of the Revolution re-enforced. In stark contrast, the French state, even at its weakest, dealt with its periphery on its own terms (for a regional example: Sahlins, 1989). Indeed, any Italian comparison heightens the sense of coherence, professionalism and continuity of the French state. At the extreme limits of its powers, whereas provinces and communities might indeed defy the Bourbon monarchy with varying degrees of success (Brunet, 1987), the Italian peripheries simply ignored their political centres or, in still greater contrast, drew them into local politics as a source of mediation or patronage (Raggio, 1990).

The second point turns on the political geography of Napoleonic Italy: The tripartite division of Italy by Napoleon into the imperial departments and the two satellite kingdoms of Italy and Naples awarded the best governed part of the peninsula – the Habsburg province of Lombardy – and the area with the most deep rooted tradition of statist, enlightened reform – the mainland part of the Kingdom of Naples – to the satellite kingdoms. The Habsburgs and Neapolitan Bourbons possessed administrative elites intellectually prepared for Napoleonic rule. In contrast, those parts of the peninsula where

the grip of the centre on the periphery was weakest fell directly under Paris: Liguria, the Duchies of Parma and Piacenza, the Papal States, Tuscany, and Piedmont. Although there had been a determined effort at enlightened reform in Tuscany under Peter-Leopold in the 1780s, it had ended in disaster and in the following decades, was revealed to have put down only very shallow roots (on the reforms: Diaz, 1966; on their collapse: Turi, 1969; Fantappiè, 1986). Piedmont under the Savoyard state presented the most powerful and best administered of the Italian states, but below a certain level, its society shared the same condition of limited central control, beyond the most basic needs of traditional absolutism (Symcox, 1983). In different ways, the French pinned high hopes on the administrative elites of Tuscany and Piedmont; in the former for their supposed enlightened principles in civic life, the latter for their military and bureaucratic efficiency in a system formed in the image shadow of *le grand siècle*. They were largely, if not entirely, disappointed. Paolo Prodi had made a case recently for the existence of a deeply rooted tradition of a centralist, laicising drive within the Papal government which predated and actually predated that of enlightened reform, but he also readily admits its failure by the time of the French period (Prodi, 1987, 183–184). The dukes of Modena and, more spasmodically, those of neighbouring Parma, expended great energy on legal reforms and assaults of feudal privilege, but to little practical effect (Santini, 1987). No such claims have ever been made for the Republic of Genoa, whose presence in its hinterland was intermittent, and where the real influence the centre in the valleys came through private networks of patronage and commercial relations (Raggio, 1990, *passim*). Thus, the French assumed direct responsibility for exactly those parts of the peninsula where their rule, and the culture it rested upon, would seem most alien, and where indigenous intermediaries would be hardest to find. The *départements réunis* were unpromising soil, and therefore gave the French the inclination, as well as the justifiable opportunity, to dispense with any real policy of “accommodation” to indigenous mores.

As the Italian states were absorbed into the empire, the French inherited the internal, “micro” peripheries of the ancien régime states which formed the intrinsic theatre of the struggle between the political centre and its hinterland. However, the nature of Napoleonic expansion also meant the creation of a new, imperial periphery, based on the timing and point of entry of the French into Italy: The political, imperial periphery began in Piedmont, occupied definitively in 1800 after the battle of Marengo, then extended itself to Liguria and the Duchies of Parma and Piacenza in 1805, to Tuscany in 1808, and finally to the Papal States in 1810. It is unusual to look for any lowest common denominator to give a wider identity to these territories, still less a highest common factor. Nevertheless, the introduction of the concept of centre and periphery lends to elements which certainly qualify as the former and, arguably, could represent the latter. As has become clear, the political and institutional history of these various states during the ancien régime shares the common theme of the – usually vain – struggle of central governments to control their hinterlands; they are all characterised by the limited success of traditional absolutism and the failure of enlightened reform, where it was attempted.

There is also a geographic unity to the *départements réunis*, which is neglected in the existing historiography: They are linked together, literally, by the Apennine spine, which

gave each state absorbed into the *départements réunis* a broadly similar internal geography composed of relatively passive, easily controlled lowland regions – a narrow coastal plain in the case of Liguria, broad river valleys in those of all the rest – and mountainous hinterlands, usually dotted with fiefs legally independent of central authority and local communities traditionally defiant of it.<sup>1</sup> Although the political cultures of the states of ancien régime Italy were extremely diverse, this should not occlude the structural conditions – the correspondence of physical and human geography with their political evolution – that gave them, up to a point, a shared character and experience. Fernand Braudel established the centrality of mountain regions to Mediterranean history, and above all of their relationship to the plain which, translated into political terms, is the centre: “They compel the attention of the plain, but arose its fear as well.” (Braudel, 1975, 29). The essential truth of this relationship was no different for the Napoleonic empire than it had been for the Italian ancien régime. However, within this wider truth, there is also a case for distinguishing between the two great mountain regions of Italy for, Braudel also – rightly – insisted on the unique character of the Alps among the great ranges of the Mediterranean basin: “/.../ the Alps are after all, the Alps /.../ an exceptional range of mountains from the point of view of resources, collective disciplines, the quality of its human population and the number of good roads” (Braudel, 1975, 33), a judgement re-enforced by many local studies (of particular relevance in this context: Viazzo, 1989). The Apennines did not stand at any of the great crossroads of Europe, although they were vital for much local trade. Neither were they drawn into the wider pattern of European politics, as were many Alpine communities in the Napoleonic period: Whereas the great Tyrolean revolt of 1809 drew much of the Alto Adige – part of the Kingdom of Italy – into its orbit (Eyck, 1986) – the much larger risings in the central Apennines later that same year had no wider affiliations, even with the Alpine revolt nor, indeed, any readily identifiable epicentre or leadership (Grab, 1995). The nature and course of these two revolts are emblematic of the difference between the Alps and the Apennines, and their different political relationships to their respective “centres” and to the outside world in general. The Alps were a busy crossroads; the Apennines – the core of “French Italy” – are much closer to Braudel’s general dictum, “mountain freedom”:

The mountains are as a rule a world apart from civilisations, which are urban and lowland achievements. Their history is to have none, to remain almost always on the fringe of the great waves of civilisation, even the longest and most persistent, which may spread over great distances in the horizontal plane but are powerless to move vertically when faced with an obstacle of a few hundred metres. (Braudel, 1975, 34)

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1 This is not to suggest that this was peculiar to the *départements réunis*. There are parallel circumstances across the Apennines in several departments of the Kingdom of Italy which were the theatre of a massive revolt in 1809, as well as in the Alpine departments involved in the Tyrolean revolt of the same year: The Apennine spine stretched into the Kingdom of Naples, creating almost identical circumstances in the Abruzzesi and Calabria.

The combination of political history and topography the French inherited ensured that this reality was as true for the French in the early nineteenth century as it had always been. It proved as great a test for them as all the coalition wars of the period. To overcome the Apennine spine would, indeed, be to change the course of Italian history.

The governments of the ancien régime struggled with their hinterlands according to their own, individual political cultures, but their collective practical experience was to rely on the politics of mediation and sporadic incursion in local life best expressed as “government at one remove” (Raggio, 1990, *passim*; Wormald, 1981). Whatever the hopes of reformers at the centre, their rule was never characterised by real social control over their highland subjects. In so far as social control was exercised before the nineteenth century, it was through the Church of the Counter-Reformation, and even this was probably weakened by the anti-clerical reforms of the late eighteenth century. The Church had little common ground with the Napoleonic state, but from the sixteenth century onwards it identified the problems of social control and administrative weakness on the periphery of the Italian states as would later imperial officials. In the present context, it is enough to state the shared definition and location of the problem of the periphery, by the agents of the Counter-Reformation, the secular reformers of the late ancien régime and the agents of French imperialism. Catholic missionaries and French magistrates and administrators all started from the same geographic base, the cities of the lowlands which formed the central core of every ancien régime state, and worked out, with the instruments of control they possessed and felt appropriate, to the political micro-peripheries carved out of the Apennine spine, the ubiquitous periphery.

Above all, they all perceived the common enemy in the latent – or rampant – cultural and social barbarism which lurked in the fastness of the Apennine spine, even if they sought to tame it in vastly different ways, and to very different ends. In the context of the struggle to assert the authority and cultural dominance of the micro-centre over the micro-periphery, the French imperialists stood in a long tradition of intruders. Although they were truly alien intruders, in a way the traditional elites were not, the discourse common to Catholic missionaries, enlightened intellectuals and French occupiers is, perhaps, the most striking evidence of this unlikely historical continuity.

The deeper differences between the French and their predecessors, secular and clerical, emerges in their respective attitudes to their geographic bases, the lowlands and, in particular, the cities. While the Counter-Reformation had created an ideological, as well as a physical base for itself in the urban areas (Prosperi, 1996; Châteleur, 1997), the French – unlike the enlightened reformers before them (Fantappiè, 1986) – regarded the cities and plains as, at least, “safe bases”, but only in the sense that they could police them effectively. Although never a threat to the French after 1800, the new rulers believed the communities of micro-centres had been emasculated and corrupted by the success of the Counter-Reformation. Their very passivity was regarded as a problem, if less pressing in kind than the volatility of the hinterland. In a grudging acknowledgement of the social revolution wrought by the Counter-Reformation, the French Prefect of Ombronne – the Tuscan department virtually synonymous with the old state of Siena – admitted that thanks, at least in part, to the influence of the post-Tridentine clergy, “The city of Siens

is, perhaps, less crime-ridden place of all.” The “general moral depravation” was not the fault of the clergy in either the city or the countryside, nor did he believe that they were worse now than in the past.<sup>2</sup> The problem had much deeper roots:

To find the cause of Tuscan moral depravation, it is necessary to go very far back in time, for Boccaccio in his tales, and the historians who have written after him, have all given us a picture which is anything but good (of the Tuscan character).<sup>3</sup>

Clearly, the impact of Leopoldine enlightened absolutism had left no appreciable mark on the Tuscans, in his eyes.

However disagreeable they appeared to the French, urban and lowland centres provided the only starting point available for the integration of the peripheries of the Apennine spine into the dominant – if hardly deeply rooted – official culture espoused by the elites of the centre. In such circumstances, neither the indigenous reforming regimes of the late ancien régime, still less the French – and perhaps not even the Tridentine Church – could hope to draw on the centre-petal forces of acculturation found on the peripheries of the French and Spanish states in the same period (Sahlins, 1989, *passim*). The hinterlands had displayed a high degree of loyalty to the ancien régime in its unreformed, dynastic, corporate and patrimonial forms, during the French invasions of the late 1790s; the Piacentino, the Artetino in Tuscany, the valley of the Fontanabuona in Liguria, and the whole of the southern uplands of Piedmont shared the dubious common characteristic of intense defiance of the centre throughout the ancien régime and at the outset of Napoleonic rule in each area, with that of ferocious loyalty to that same ancien régime, in the face of the French invasion. However, what counted in times of peace, both before and after the imperial conquest, for indigenous and foreign regimes alike, was the equal capacity of the periphery to defy the centre over its attempts to exert meaningful social control beyond the cities and the plains.

The crushing failure of reform in the late eighteenth century, followed by the reassertion of the local independence of the periphery during the wars of the late 1790s, left the French with almost an administrative no-man’s-land to colonize, rather than entrenched systems of government to reconstruct or supplant. Unlike the hinterlands of the Kingdom of Naples, the Apennine spine of the *départements réunis* possessed no “over mighty subjects” in place of the central state, but this did not automatically mean the French could make their strength tell. Certainly they soon found that overt opposition, if organised in even the most rudimentary form, could be brushed aside, as happened in the Piacentino in 1805-1806 (Paltrinieri, 1927) and the Tuscan Aretino, in 1808, but when larger scale resistance had been quelled, the French found no socially or economically dominant elites they could appease in these areas. Great landlords were either absentee, as in Tuscany and most of the Papal States, or simply non-existent, as in the Piacentino or the Ligurian valleys. It was all but impossible to attempt the much vaunted Napoleonic policy of *ralliement* if only a handful of local

2 On the longevity of Tuscan violence – and the distorting effect its image could have on wider perceptions, Dean, 1997.

3 ANP, F<sup>7</sup> 8867, Prefect of Ombronne to Min. 3e arrond, Police-Générale, 15 July, 1810.

notables existed to work through. Ruthless French policing and, above all, the removal of dissident or dangerous local elements through mass conscription did, indeed, prove popular with the great magnates of Tuscany who had been among the targets of the *Viva Maria* revolts of the late 1780s, but they were absentees, and their goodwill was marginal to the process of binding the centre to the periphery. Elsewhere, there was not even this much to work through. Undoubtedly, it proved easier for the French to establish the administrative skeleton of their rule where there was no great baronage to impede them, yet the absence of aristocratic authority posed deeper problems of its own. It meant, in effect, that these communities knew neither the sort of centralised, formal authority expounded by absolutists and enlightened reformers alike, but also what Jonathan Powis – with reference to the work of K.B. McFarlane – calls the natural leadership of the local community by its nobles in the interests of staving off civil disorder, not promoting it (Powis, 1984, 104; McFarlane, 1973). Throughout most of the Apennine spine, north of the Abruzzi at least, there was no one with the financial resources, political inclination or training living in the hinterland to provide such leadership for such ends. There were scattered, strategically important fiefs in parts of the Apennines, but the concept of feudal justice had not really penetrated them (Braudel, 1975, 38–39; on the mediaeval Apennines: Wickham, 1988). Thus, the French found a virgin wilderness, at least in terms of organised political culture and public life as they understood them, but a wilderness is as dangerous as the seigneurial quagmires Joseph Bonaparte and Murat found further south, if not more so.

The French understood the magnitude and nature of this task, perhaps rather better than they did the characters of the communities they now governed, but it is revealing that they tended to regard the problem of the peripheries as being a lack of government, whereas that of the micro-centres was that of bad government. Indeed, the Director-General of Police in Rome saw the former as much preferable to the latter, at least in the case of the upland communities of Umbria, part of the hinterland of the former Papal States. Their climate and their distance from Rome had allowed them “to preserve more purely, their original natures and the memories of their modern history”. Whereas other areas had suffered from poor government, or no government at all, the ephemeral presence of Papal authority had saved the Umbrians of the periphery from a worse state than isolation:

/.../ being further from the metropole, they were less under the yoke of the priests, and better able to resist the influence of that (Papal) government which constantly sought ways to destroy any sense of national spirit in its territories.<sup>4</sup>

The very existence of a government such as that of the Papacy was, therefore, harmful to a people. Where the climate was invigorating, it was better to be ungoverned. Despite the many problems involved, virgin soil was preferable to the presence of the ancien régime. Those responsible for policing the Ligurian and Parmensi departments despised the weakness of the deposed Dukes of Parma-Piacenza and the Genoese patricians, less for their rule than for the social, cultural and economic degeneration its absence had pro-

4 ANP, F<sup>7</sup> 6531, D. Gen. Police, Rome to Min. 3e arrond, Police-Générale, 10 Oct. 1812.

duced. At the height of the revolt in central Italy, in 1809, the Commissaire General of Police in Genoa told Paris how important it was to impress on ‘these unruly and turbulent valley communities that “we no longer live in the times when a handful of peasant rebels from the valleys could terrorise the city and dictate the law to the government”’.<sup>5</sup> The legacy of the weak, intermittent rule of the old Republic was, at least to the Prefect of Genoa, “a region where heads are naturally hot, and guns do not wait long to be fired”.<sup>6</sup> What the French hated was the legacy of discord they believed this weakness engendered. Left rudderless, a culture of vendetta and feuding was only to be expected. This was certainly Nardon’s opinion of what he found in the Piacentino, the hinterland of the duchies and the theatre of the revolt of winter, 1805-1806.

Just as important as the occurrence of the revolt and its immediate causes, was the social climate and culture of anarchy that had given birth to it:

/.../ this country needs to be governed /.../ in March, every day brings a tableau of hideous crimes to light which, although not a threat to the state, nevertheless, threaten the social order...morals, customs, passions are the bad consequences of an ancient impunity (from the law).<sup>7</sup>

The Apennine spine of Italy was treacherous country for any kind of authority, and its populations were judged, at best, laws unto themselves, at worst, prone to slip into an atavistic barbarism if not “policed”. But who was to do it, in the circumstances of foreign occupation and the alienation of so many components of the indigenous elites?

If the geographical starting point for the assertion of French rule was based in the traditional micro-centres of the cities and lowlands, their intellectual base line was that, simply, they had nothing to learn from previous regimes or the communities of the periphery, nor did they expect to. Rather, the newest wave of intruders brought their own methods of administration and social control with them, to enforce the whole panoply of their rule. Following the imposition of their rule, by conventional military force where necessary, the French next introduced Gendarmerie brigades composed wholly of Frenchmen and Piedmontese into the countryside, together with their network of courts, whose criminal sections and highest officials were also usually French or Piedmontese; in this way, the centre introduced itself directly and permanently into the periphery. These outposts were supported and directed from a reduced number of traditional micro-centres, for although the departments themselves corresponded to the major provinces of the ancien régime states, above the prefects resided the real power of the three regional directors-general of police for the *départements réunis* – all French – in Turin for Piedmont, Liguria and Parma-Piacenza; in Florence for the three Tuscan departments; and in Rome for Rome,

5 ANP, F<sup>7</sup> 8818, Comm.-Gen. Police, Genoa, to Min. 3e arrond, Police-Générale, 24 June, 1809.

6 ANP, F<sup>7</sup> 8818, Prefect of Genoa to Min. 3e arrond, Police-Générale, 14 April, 1808. The work of Raggio (1990) on the valley of the Fontanabuona in the early modern period lends a fair degree of accuracy to the opinion of the Prefect.

7 ANP F<sup>1c</sup> 85, Rapport au Gouverneur-Générale de la situation des Etats, 17 June, 1806.



itself, and Umbria. Moreover, these superior officials – both departmental and supra-regional – were not sedentary: The prefects toured their departments at every conscription levy, usually four times a year, and the directors-general of police also did extensive, if less regular tours of the periphery. Thus, the French advanced the implementation and methodology of policing the periphery well beyond anything conceivable under the ancien régime within a few months of annexing a particular state.<sup>8</sup>

Yet, this was done largely without the co-operation of local elites. The cultural intermediary, “the third element”, was almost wholly lacking in “French Italy”. France possessed a remarkable pool of educated talent at the point of the Napoleonic conquest, and it was mobilised to the full, in an attempt to fill the gaps left by a combination of alienation from, and intolerance by, the Napoleonic state. The Church was first, emasculated by the abolition of the missions and the regular orders who staffed them, thereby reducing its effectiveness as both a cultural influence and as a pure information gatherer, on the periphery, to say nothing of its own active resentment of Napoleonic rule, in general. Contemporaneously, the secular elites found it difficult to adapt to the “political culture shock” of the professionalised, centralised and highly rigid Napoleonic state. Quite apart from those elements within the Italian elites who opposed the new regime either for reasons of residual dynastic loyalties – as was the case in Piedmont, particularly – or from ideological conviction, which could embrace figures as diverse as Alfieri and Pius VII – many willing collaborators were rejected by the French, themselves. The Napoleonic state rejected their residual attachment to patrimonial and corporate mores, and simply found them educationally and intellectually unprepared to enter their service. Local magistrates were unfamiliar with the Napoleonic law codes and, even more, with the day-to-day procedural methods of the French courts, the introduction of which brusquely shifted them from the world of in camera inquisitorial hearings to that of the public trial in open court, under a wholly new set of laws. Magistrates were no long arbiters between plaintiffs, but interpreters of a code handed down by the state. As a net result, many magistrates, virtually all public prosecutors and the gendarmes who enforced their judgements, were no longer Italians. Prefects were, by definition, outsiders in the Napoleonic system, but the wider circumstances of empire ensured that so were almost all their key collaborators in local government and justice. As the rift with the Papacy reached its climax in 1809, with the imprisonment of Pius VII and the occupation of Rome, the Concordat was dissolved, and after this moment, the regime even resorted to placing Frenchmen in the vacant sees of Parma, Piacenza, Asti and Florence, with disastrous consequences for cultural mediation (Broers, 2002, 86–98).

In almost every sense, Napoleonic rule in the *départements réunis* marked a powerful moment in the evolution of the phenomenon of the gulf between the “official” and the “real” state in many parts of the Italian peninsula. The introduction of a new regime, of the very blue print that would become the unified kingdom half a century later, was carried out by alien hands, without the significant presence of indigenous cultural mediators. One the level of efficacy, the remarkable human resources of Napoleonic France rendered

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8 Indeed, even before Gendarmerie units arrived in the Tuscan departments, the French had deployed regular Tuscan cavalry and their own troops to do this service on an interim basis.

this a nuisance, rather than an impediment to the restoration of public order, the effective collection of taxes or the workings of conscription. All this thoroughly impressed the rulers of many of the successor, restored states after 1814. Conversely, it worked against the acceptance of the new regime by the Italian masses, at any appreciable level.

## CENTER IN PERIFERIJA V NAPOLEONOVNI ITALIJI: NARAVA IMPERIALNE VLOGE DÉPARTEMENTS RÉUNIS, 1802-1814

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### POVZETEK

*Napoleonovemu zavzetju Italije je sledil proces neposredne priključitve ene tretjine polotoka k Franciji. Območja pod neposredno francosko oblastjo niso doživela procesa izgradnje državnosti, kot se je to zgodilo v Franciji pred in med revolucijo. Italijanske države so se namreč močno zanašale na neformalne metode nadzora, zlasti na perifernih goratih predelih vzdolž Apeninskega polotoka. Njihov ancien Régime je bil odvisen od mikro elit kot tudi od mreže, ki so jo oblikovale vplivne plemiške družine, da bi povezale mesto in podeželje; še najbolj so se zanašale na vlogo misij in drugih dejavnosti Posttridentinske Cerkve, da so tu, v odsotnosti močnega državnega aparata, širile informacije in svoj vpliv. Prihod centralizirane in zelo profesionalizirane Napoleonove države je tako predstavljal popolno spremembo za velik del Italije in uvedbo povsem tujega stanja za prebivalstvo. V takih okoliščinah so morali Francozi izbirati med dvema opcijama: ali naj se zanesejo na »tretji element« – v okviru kompleksnih mrež mediacij, ki so izvirele iz italijanskega ancien Régimea – ali pa naj uvedejo neposredni sistem. Večinoma so se odločili za slednjega, kar je imelo pomembne posledice za prihodnost Italije.*

*Zaradi vzdržljivosti lokalizmov in arhaičnosti je bila šibkost države na italijanskem polotoku že dolgo vgrajena v konceptu stato civile/stato reale. Obdobje Napoleonove prevlade na splošno velja za ključno v procesu odtujenosti med državo in državljani, kakor tudi v procesu oblikovanja države. Epoca francese je bil moment, ko je bila italijanska družba na vseh ravneh izpostavljena obliki centralizirane nacionalne države po vzoru francoske revolucije, izkušnja pa na splošno velja za eno izmed najpomembnejših v procesu izgradnje države. Razprava želi prikazati vpliv Napoleonove vladavine, in sicer glede problema stato civile/stato reale ter razmerja med središčem države in njenim obrobjem, s posebnim poudarkom na problematiki kulturnega posredovanja države, ki pa je bila pogosto nezaželena.*

*Ključne besede: centralizem, misije, Patron/Client networks, dirigisme, kampanilizem, Apeninski polotok, imperializem*

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